# Security K---GDS 2022

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#### The affirmatives recalibration of NATO reflects a logic of securitization that inflates threats in order to justify a bloody war machine that paves the way for attacks around the globe in the name of security

Campbell, 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. (Horace B. Campbell, “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis,” *Counter Punch*, 4-9-2019, Available Online: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/)//ILake-MO>

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted.

There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima.

The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO.

**Security is an unsustainable social fantasy that justifies policy with apocalyptic worst-case thinking---the impact is an endless, self-fulling cycle of enemy creation and biopolitical governance.**

**Tulumello 20** - PhD in Urban and Regional Planning (2012, University of Palermo), assistant research professor in human geography at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS-Lisboa), Fulbright Research Scholar at the University of Memphis (2016); Benjamin Hooks Institute for Social Change Policy Fellow (Fall 2016 to Spring 2017); Visiting Scholar at the Polytechnic of Turin (2019) and the University of Naples Federico II (2021); Senior Expert Evaluator for Regiostars Awards 2019 (DG-REGIO, European Commission; 2019); coordinator of the thematic section 'Political economy of territory' of the Portuguese Association of Political Economy (2020-2022)

Simone Tulumello, “Agonistic security: Transcending (de/re)constructive divides in critical security studies”, Security Dialogue 00(0), 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620945081

Security is about the prevention of events **yet to happen**; hence, the future is – or, rather, possible futures are – the object of security practice. Preventing means acting here and now on a threat, which is then ‘the future cause of a change in the present’ (Massumi, 2005: 35). Securing is about **anticipating** (see Amoore, 2013; Anderson, 2010a, 2010b; Aradau and Van Munster, 2012) ‘a virtual cause, or quasicause’ (Massumi, 2005: 35).7

According to Ulrich Beck ([1986] 1992), among the characteristic elements of modern society is the emergence of ‘risk’ and its management as a central governmental practice.8 Risk is about the quantification of the future, and particularly future dangers, in terms of probability (see Aradau and Van Munster, 2012: 99–100). The ‘balance’ between prevention/anticipation and other dimensions becomes central to security thinking at this juncture. A self-perceived risk society shifts the focus from the ‘event’ – and reactions to it – to the management of potential threats, which need to be continuously assessed and anticipated. Practices based on risk management are about calculating the trade-off between probability and the impact of a certain event. In this framework, securitization is a cost–benefit curve: The more we invest, the more we increase security, at the same time curtailing other dimensions. When the added cost of increasing securitization becomes bigger than the marginal gain (in terms of increased security), the balance is found. Economic thinking of this kind has permeated more and more fields of governance, from the ‘securitization of life’ (LoboGuerrero, 2014) to conceptualizations of crime control (Foucault, [2004] 2007: 4–5; see also Becker, 1974).

In line with the hegemonic standing of the individual in Western Enlightenment ideas (Mignolo, 2009; Mouffe, 2008; Panikkar, 1982), individual rights are placed right at the center of the conceptualization of the balance. This is particularly evident in the way in which the United Nations (the quintessentially universalist institution) envisages security, more recently in the paradigm of human security (for an overview, see Smith, 2005: 51–55):

We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security. (United Nations, 2005: §143)

The human security paradigm constructs a liberal individual as its subject (see Robinson, 2016; Shepherd, 2008) and, in stressing the interrelatedness of the ‘human elements of security, rights and development’ (United Nations Human Security Unit, 2009: 6), it is concerned about ‘strik[ing] a balance among humanitarian, political, military, human rights and development strategies’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 28; see also Panikkar, 1982: 83). Another example of the balancing of rights, and its paradoxes, is the deployment of CCTV systems as preventative means, a field where most regulations are concerned with striking a balance of ‘proportionality’ between the (alleged) increase of personal safety9 and the loss of privacy.10

In short, mainstream logics of security, centered on Western conceptions of individual human rights, seek the correct balance between security and other rights. I stress the centrality of Enlightenment conceptions because these make the nature of contemporary security logics evident. Lacanian planning theory (e.g. Allmendinger and Gunder, 2005; Gunder, 2003) has discussed how modernist planning – which is rooted in Enlightenment ideas and health and social order concerns – is permeated by a desire for security and certainty. It follows that the fantasy of security is central to modern Western thinking – as is a permanent state of unfulfillment:

Much of what we perceive of as **social reality is** actually a **culturally constructed** set of **fantasies** that seek to provide a sense of **completeness**, or **ontological wholeness**, that we all desire, but is **never** actually **achieved**. (Gunder, 2003: 293)

Anderson (2010b: 229) has referred to the coexistence of the fantasy of **security** with the **impossibility** of securing as the ‘**radical ambiguity of security’**. Because ‘living bodies can **never be completely protected’** (Lorey, [2012] 2015: 20), securing is a never completed task. Since there **is always another potential threat, another virtual cause of disruption**, more **security calls** for **more security**, in an **unstoppable circuit**. In psychosocial terms, these logics are typical of relations of **control**, based on the assumption that the **other** is always **inclined** to **transgression** and should thus **relentlessly** prove their **innocence** (Carli and Paniccia, 2003: 212–225). The idea of ‘balancing’ between an insatiable right, security, and other rights seems quite problematic: a ‘myth’ (Neocleous, 2007) crucial to the construction of the liberal order. Security may never be achieved, but it is always worth trying harder, as long as endangered individuals exist, as summarized by two powerful statesmen:

We will chase terrorists everywhere. If in an airport, then in the airport. So if we find them in the toilet, excuse me, we’ll rub them out in the outhouse. And that’s it, case closed. (Vladimir Putin, cited in Oliphant, 2015, emphasis added)

I want to put all the nation’s resources into protecting our citizens. . . . We will eradicate terrorism because we are attached to freedom. (François Hollande, cited in Horobin et al., 2015, emphasis added)

For Putin and Hollande, security **only makes sense** as a good that institutions must pursue in its **purest form**: **absolute security**. These formulations may be **hyperbolic**, but their underlying logic is **not** structurally **different** from that at the core of mainstream **Western**/liberal **understandings** of security – for instance, the UN’s notion of human security (see also Christian Borch’s [2015: 95–119] discussion of the **totalitarian biopolitical character** of crime prevention). And though all these understandings of security involve different ideas about what might be the correct balance between security and rights, they are **all concerned** with **striking it**. Inevitably, **freedom** and **security** end up **converging** – with the **latter trumping the former** – as evident in this excerpt from an interview with Italian former center–left minister of the interior Marco Minniti:

Security is freedom: It is evident that there cannot be an idea of security without guaranteeing individual freedom; and at the same time, there is no true freedom if everyday safety is not guaranteed. (cited in Giannini, 2017, emphasis added)11

These contradictions are taking on an even more pronounced scale amid recent transformations of the ways in which futures are conceptualized in security practice. More and more, so-called **low-probability, high-impact events**, along with a focus on **possibility in spite of probability**, have become **central** to **security logics** (Amoore, 2013; Anderson, 2010a, 2010b). Terrorism provides possibly the most evident example of this trend: In the West, being the victim of a **terror** attack is an event with an extremely **low probability**,12 and yet compare this with the amount of **political discourse** and governmental resources concerned with **terrorism** – is the late ‘**risk society’** concerned with actually **measurable risks after all**?13 While attention to low-probability, high-impact events increases, the **focus shifts** toward the **management** of **all behaviors** and bodies that are considered to be **out of place** (Aradau and Van Munster, 2012; Borch, 2015). Critical thinkers have therefore argued that the **logics** of **terrorism** **preparedness** have become the **central** discursive engine in global **trends** toward the normalization of **states** of ‘**emergency’** and ‘**exception’** (Adey et al., 2015; Agamben, 2003, 2015). Needless to say, there are powerful interests behind the securitization in the name of terrorism and other threats – critical urban studies, for instance, has shown how terrorism is the central discursive engine in the attack late capitalism has launched against democracy (see, for example, Rossi and Vanolo, [2010] 2012).

And yet, if large majorities – especially in the Western world, but increasingly so in the global South – support the allocation of so many resources to, along with the constraining of their own rights in the name of, the fight against **phenomena** with such **low** **actual ‘impact’**, this could also be due to the fact that the **fantasy** of **security** seems **more real than it has ever been**. After all, never in the history of mankind have there been societies safer than those of the contemporary West (Bauman, 2005). Of course, this is not valid for everyone. Security is distributed very unevenly internally within societies, along geographic, class, ethnic/racial, gender, and other divides, but most attention is devoted to fighting (allegedly, see Melossi, 2003) external threats.

#### Vote negative in favor of a ruthless critique of securitization – capital has colluded with industry to produce a field of expertism designed to maintain global militarism – if their scholarship is suspect you should refuse to evaluate the consequences of the plan

**Neocleous, 18** – Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University. (Mark Neocleous, “The bleak rituals of progress; or, if somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no,” *Socially Responsible Innovation in Security*, Routledge, 2018, pg. 129-139)//ILake-MO

Yet to organize and mobilize in the name of socially responsible innovation in security is nonetheless to organize and **mobilize** in the name of **security**. Moreover, as I have been trying to suggest in the first half of this chapter, it is likewise to **mobilize** in the name of **capital**. What ‘socially **responsible** innovation in **security’** gives us, then, is little more than yet another way of **participating** in the logic of **security**. Adopting a term straight out of the discourse of capital (‘innovation’), and adding to it one of the key terms of corporate neoliberal power (namely ‘corporate social responsibility’), socially responsible innovations in security appear to be little more than new ways of rendering the social over to the powers of state and capital.

One might extend this observation by pointing out that although it is generally assumed that the whole point of innovation is that it surprises – ‘the greater the surprise, the more innovative the idea’ (Nowotny, 2008, p. 103) – rarely is anything actually genuinely surprising offered in socially responsible innovations in security. Quite the opposite, in fact: accepting entirely the logic of **security**, all such **innovations** do is try and **moderate** this logic by somehow recognizing ‘privacy’ or ‘liberty’, or by not being too **discriminatory** or exclusionary, or by being less under the corporate powers within the security industry. Ultimately, the least surprising thing of all happens: **security** still **wins**. Worse, security wins by having the whole of the social offered up to it, and offered up to it by the new ‘socially progressive’ advisors to Princes, those whose political vision commits us to what we are told must be our fate: one security experience after another, one security scare after another, one recovery from each security scare after another, one security innovation after another.

The more dominant a concept becomes, the more **unimaginable** the means by which those living under its spell might break that **domination**. In the case of security, the only way to imagine breaking its domination is to begin with its **ruthless critique**. To advocate socially responsible innovation in **security** is to advocate **conformity** rather than critique. If somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no.

## Framework

### 2NC---Reps Shape Reality

#### Securitized representations shape reality.

Cohen 19 – Deputy Editor In Chief at Balkanist, President of Northfield Initiative, former Research Intern at Global Policy Group, former Intern with the Office of Senator Amy Klobuchar for the United States Senate

Nick Cohen, “Beyond Emergency Measures: Normative Politics after a Successful Securitization,” Undergraduate Journal of Humanistic Studies, 5-23-2018, <https://d31kydh6n6r5j5.cloudfront.net/uploads/sites/111/2019/07/cohen_beyondemergency.pdf>

Securitizations not only have powerful effects on immediate policy responses to threats, but also have lasting political and social implications. Extending from present securitization theory, this paper has demonstrated that a successful securitization fundamentally alters the baseline of normative politics. By discursively constructing an ‘Other’ that is existentially threatening to the Self, securitizations elevate certain core values (those seen as existentially threatened) while simultaneously subducting others. In so doing, securitizations create discursive frameworks through which the distortion, perversion or abrogation of non-core values becomes acceptable, since these transgressions are taken in the name of protecting the core, constitutive values of the political body. Furthermore, this ‘new normal’ is quite resilient, informing the calculus of policy makers long after the securitizing speech act first took place, although the new framework is never ossified to the point of being irreversible.

This extended framework holds useful insights for policy-makers and practitioners. It suggests that policy-makers can use existing securitizations to legitimize certain actions, or, alternatively, that they can engage in a securitizing speech act to create long-term acceptance for a broad goal. Conversely, acknowledging the lasting political and social impacts of a successful securitization allows practitioners to first identify and then counteract a securitizing discourse. In effect, noting the role of securitization on the normative framework of politics allows politicians and security practitioners to engage in strategic desecuritizations, ultimately removing issues from the realm of security altogether.

#### Recent examples prove.

Unver and Kurnaz 22 – Assistant Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University, Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from the University of Essex; Research Assistant at Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University

Hamid Akin Unver and Ahmet Kurnaz, “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” SSRN, 4-5-2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4040148

Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position(Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit, and delegitimize rival countries(Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.

The foreign policy use of such terms predates the 2016 US elections and proliferated after the Russian military involvement in Crimea and Donbas (Khaldarova, Pantti, 2016). The primary reason for this contextual proliferation was the Russian decision to deny the initial stages of its involvement in Ukraine and its broader strategy of distracting and dividing Western attention over Russian military operations (Mejias, Vokuev, 2017). There is still a debate over whether it was really Russian information operations that had derailed NATO response in Ukraine, or if disinformation discourses are employed in order to shift the blame over to Russia at a time when NATO was already divided over its commitment to Ukraine (Lysenko, Brooks, 2018). While there is robust evidence of Russian information operations in Ukraine and its role in spreading disinformation in NATO countries, sustained NATO apathy towards rising Russian military influence in the Black Sea after 2014 and Syria after 2015 support the latter claim.

Critics of Western disinformation discourses for example, argue that such discourses have turned into ‘floating (or empty) signifiers’, that have no specific or agreed-upon meaning (Farkas, Schou, 2018). In that vein, blaming others for engaging in disinformation often distracts attention away from a mistake or failed policy enacted by the blamer (Monsees, 2020). In this case, critics argue that Western discourses on disinformation are intended to distract attention away from NATO or EU divisions, or more domesticlevel polarization dynamics, by creating a unique empty signifier (disinformation) that is employed as a rallying rhetoric that bolsters the significance of external threats (Mas-Manchón et al., 2021). This way, disinformation and its associated terms like misinformation, fake news and information war get securitized, receiving disproportionate levels of attention in the policy domain. In this context, disinformation and its associated terms are used to exaggerate an existing threat and create a rallying discourse that would channel the attention of the divided Western nations away from their internal disagreements, and towards an inflated external threat. Some scholars go even further, arguing that disinformation is being securitized in the West (especially in NATO) to the extent the ‘war on terror’ was securitized through the 2000s (Lanoszka, 2019). In this line, disinformation is alleged to have become a new strategic glue that would help Western nations pool in their increasingly diverging interests and resources into a common cause (Baumann, 2020).

Securitization of disinformation in domestic politics is relatively well-studied (Freelon, Wells, 2020; Neo, 2021). Although these terms have entered into mainstream debate after the 2016 US elections, former President Donald Trump too, had securitized fake news to delegitimize his opponents by constructing rival disinformation as a national security problem, indirectly attributable to China (Polletta, Callahan, 2019). Following the tornado of accusations in the US, political actors in Britain, France, Italy, South Africa, Kenya and others have begun blaming each other for engaging in organized disinformation (Maweu, 2019; Saurwein, Spencer-Smith, 2020). Even in Sweden, there is empirical evidence that suggests accusing journalists of spreading fake news results in self-censorship of such outlets (Bennett, Livingston, 2018). There are further cases of evidence supporting the claim that elite-level discourses on disinformation have a direct effect on how the wider society perceives information and facts in general, creating a measurable effect on public trust towards such facts and information (Van Duyn, Collier, 2019). In Singapore for example, delegitimizing rival parties and news outlets through disinformation discourse is considered ‘acceptable’, as part of the state’s duty to discipline the opposition and its political actors (Tan, 2020). Similar trends emerging in democracies and authoritarian countries alike, such as in Austria, Australia, Poland, Russia, and South Africa, demonstrate the universality of instrumentalizing disinformation discourse as a political delegitimization tactic (Kurowska, Reshetnikov, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018).

#### Language mobilizes proportionate policy action.

Shipoli 18 – Founding Partner of Shipoli Ventures, Visiting Research Scholar for Georgetown University, Programs Director for the Federation of Balkan American Associations, Security, IR, Turkey, US, and Balkans expert for Duco

Erdoan Shipoli, “Islam, Securitization, and US Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Macmillan, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-71111-9

One of the most important building blocks in securitization is the speech act, which is theorized by Jane Austin (1962) in her book How to Do Things with Words. Austin argues that the speech act is neither true nor false; it is a performed action, like when you say, “I bet” you actually “act”, or when you say, “I do” in a marriage, you actually “perform” something and your status changes, and even when you “declare war” you perform an act and you are in the state of war. In such cases there is no further action needed to finish these acts, they are final. Security is also a communicative act (Waever 1995), which affects the audience and drives them to act accordingly. Speech act is equated to action, not only communication (Austin 1962; Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Booth 2007), and this is why, by labeling an issue as a “security” issue, one preforms an act, such as naming a baby, naming a ship, getting married, or declaring a war. This case only updates the “speech act” into the “security speech act”, where a political significance and an existential importance are given to the issue that is labeled as “security” (Waever 1995). When labeling an issue as a security issue, usually the word “security” is uttered. But that is not always a must, as words such as “defense, offense, or attack” have a similar effect as the word “security” (Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). In politics, a security labeled issue is equated to existence; this is why it becomes a priority policy for the government and the people. When an issue is profiled as a security issue then the action has already happened. There is no true or false, it immediately becomes a security issue, which is later discussed by the audience to issue the legitimacy to use the extraordinary means, that would not be used in normal circumstances, just to ensure the wellbeing of the securitized issue.

Language is always very important in politics, but especially in constituting a threat and a security atmosphere, language becomes even more important. Bourdieu (1999: 170) argues that there is a magical symbolic power of words, as they make people see and believe a particular vision of the world and make them act and mobilize in that world, as almost an equivalent of force. German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas (1984: 289), explains the relation between language and action as follows: “to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something”.

### ---Turns NATO

#### Securitized discourse directly affects NATO policymaking.

Unver and Kurnaz 22 – Assistant Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University, Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from the University of Essex; Research Assistant at Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University

Hamid Akin Unver and Ahmet Kurnaz, “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” SSRN, 4-5-2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4040148

Following the Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, disinformation and fake news became popular terms to help generate domestic awareness against foreign information operations globally. Today, a large number of politicians, diplomats and civil society leaders identify disinformation and fake news as a primary problem in both domestic and foreign policy contexts. But how do security institutions define disinformation and fake news in foreign and security policy, and how do their securitization strategies change over years? This article explores 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, and more than 2,000 NATO texts, news, statements, and publications using computational methods since January 2014 and presents an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to explore the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. The study finds that NATO’s threat discourse and securitization strategies are heavily influenced by US political lexicon and discovers that word choices change based on their likelihood of mobilizing alliance resources and cohesion. In addition, the study finds that NATO’s recent disinformation agenda is in fact a continuity of NATO’s long-standing Russia-focused securitization discourse and an attempt to mobilize alliance attention on Baltic states and Poland to counter Russia.

### 2NC---Research First

#### What and how we research is a political activity that shapes subjectivity – even if debate is a game, as an educator you have an ethical obligation to reject logics of securitization

Stavrianakis 6 – Senior Lecturer in International Relations @ University of Sussex, Director of Teaching and Learning in the School of Global Studies, PhD @ Bristol [Anna, “Call to Arms: The University as a Site of Militarised Capitalism and a Site of Struggle,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol 35, No 1, 12/1/2006, DKP]

If universities are sites of both domination and contestation, what does this mean for research? Primarily, it means that it is a political activity. That is, what academics choose to research (and what they put on their teaching syllabi) is intimately related to their worldviews and value systems. As Max Weber argued, “all knowledge of cultural reality … is always knowledge from particular points of view.”41 Issues that require and/or receive academic investigation do not exist objectively but within a frame of reference that constitutes them as a problem: “without the investigator’s evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality.”42 At present, it is only those arguments that challenge mainstream values and ideas that are recognised as political: the inherent political situatedness of mainstream arguments goes unnoticed precisely because it is unremarkable.43 This applies as much to scientists and engineers as it does to IR scholars. As documented above, the problems for which scientists and engineers seek solutions exist within a framework that is significantly influenced by the needs of the arms industry. The problems that IR scholars seek to analyse are influenced by the frameworks governing the discipline, such as the ESRC’s emphasis on priority areas and demands for policy engagement. This emphasis, in addition to the principle of having to apply competitively for funding to carry out research, a core academic duty, serves to orient the discipline in particular directions, towards the instrumentalisation and commercialisation of academic research. Even those who seek to “play the game” further entrench the principle of external funding and reproduce the discourse of policy relevance in order to win resources to conduct their own, critical research.

Conducting policy-relevant research is not necessarily antithetical to challenging oppression: targeted interventions in the policy process can be effective, but run the significant risk of co-option. Being accepted as policy relevant requires that one use the same vocabulary and conceptual language as those making or implementing policy, and this generally requires acceptance of the parameters within which a policy is framed. Even those who seek to use this vocabulary for strategic gain have to negotiate the hurdles of co-option and neutralisation. Policy relevance is often reduced to improving the processes through which a policy is implemented; yet such an approach sidelines debate about the values and goals that inform policy. It is difficult for those who seek to challenge oppression through policy engagement to have an impact on value choices, however. They are unlikely to have access to or credibility with elite actors because their critical stance disadvantages them in the networking that is intrinsic to academia (as in any other profession).

If we accept that research is a political activity, how are we to proceed? Two potential strategies spring to mind. One is based on Max Weber’s dictum that “the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic platform.”44 Academics have a socially privileged role that should not be abused by advancing political positions that carry extra weight because of the authority invested in the speaker. For Weber, objectivity is not the same as moral indifference, but the social position of academic is not one for advancing political views because we cannot choose rationally between values: that choice is “a matter of faith” rather than empirical fact.45 The Weberian concept of value neutrality refers to academics’ responsibility to keep the scientific discussion of facts separate from the evaluation of them, having accepted that the choice of what to study is value-driven. The task of an academic, in this view, is to engage in technical criticism and value clarification.46 This serves to identify the repercussions of particular courses of action and the value schema that motivate them, but refrains from commenting on the validity of those values.

A second option is to engage explicitly as an activist academic, making clear what one’s political commitments are and actively choosing sides.47 In this scenario, academics explicitly choose to research instances or structures of social injustice, often conduct research with rather than on particular subjects, and use their research to inform campaigning and protest. This is neither necessarily biased research nor the production of propaganda (although of course, like any research, it can be). The activist academic is explicit about the values motivating her/his research – and as argued earlier, value choice is intrinsic to all research, whether it is acknowledged or not – and seeks to connect academic practice to activism, learning from and contributing to activist struggles. Engaging with campaigners and social movements has the dual effect of putting more pressure on government to change its policies and contributing to the wider democratisation of social life through the sharing of skills and knowledge among activists and academics. Both Weberian and activist strategies share an acceptance of the political nature of all research, and that there is no view from nowhere, but the latter strategy actively tries to use research to challenge oppression. Those following a Weberian strategy may well undertake research that is critical of the status quo, but they do not explicitly ally themselves with what they believe to be progressive social forces.

My own understanding of activist academic research retains a belief that scholarship is a different social activity from campaigning. While both are politically situated and motivated, the primary aim of campaigning is to generate change, while the primary aim of scholarship is to generate truth (which can only ever be situated and partial), a process in which scholars have a duty to deal explicitly with ’inconvenient’ facts.48 However, scholarship and campaigning can be mutually reinforcing, through a process of translation “that allows for mutual intelligibility among the experiences of the world” that aims to “identify and reinforce what is common in the diversity of counter-hegemonic drive.”49 One of the challenges for activist academics is traversing the boundaries between academia and activism.50 For academics of this persuasion, the task is to ensure that there is “neither too much reflection on too little experience, which is armchair theorizing, nor too little reflection on too much experience, which is mere activism.”51 Of course, there are risks associated with activist research, including the loss of access to the very institutions and actors that need to be examined, because of one’s reputation as an activist or lack of contacts within elite circles. This poses difficult questions for activist researchers and can be a disciplining process, requiring them to weigh up the benefits to be gained from contributing to social struggle against their role as a scholar in exploring the social world. Given that activist academics’ contribution to social struggle is based on their scholarship, this is a significant risk.

As a brief illustration of how academic strategies play out in practice, my own research explores non-governmental organisation (NGO) activity in relation to UK involvement in the arms trade through the lens of debates about global civil society.52 It assesses the government’s stated policy against its export practice, introducing “inconvenient facts” regarding the relationship between arms capital and the UK state and role of coercion in the development of capitalism. The leap to an explicitly activist agenda comes through engagement with the issue of change in UK arms export policy and my involvement with anti-arms trade campaigners. I am indebted to campaigners and NGO workers, many of whom have conducted painstaking research into the arms trade and its effects. On the basis of the research I have done – using scholarly methods such as documentary analysis and interviews53 – I am in a position to contribute to activist debates and strategy, which I have done predominantly through involvement with CAAT at the local and national level. A second aspect of my research explores the widespread image of NGOs and campaign groups as progressive agents of global civil society. I am interested interrogating the dominant liberal narratives of a globalising emancipatory and non-violent sphere separate from the state and market, and NGO activity on the UK arms trade is a rich case study for this. This research has implications for campaigning but may not be directly relevant for it. I do not conduct my research for arms campaigners but I contribute where I can; my research agenda is not defined by what is campaignable. This is in line with my understanding of scholarship and campaigning as distinct social activities.

A key issue for critical scholars is strategy: do they use the main claim to legitimacy that scholars have, that of disinterested inquiry, and introduce “inconvenient facts” into their research; or do they get involved with the individuals and groups struggling against the oppression they document and analyse? Significant numbers of academics are involved in advising political actors: the disagreement comes over whose politics should be supported. Academia prides itself on its independence and the impartiality of research, a position promoted by key funding bodies.54 If one accepts that “good research is not just books and academic papers, but is also the creative action of people to address matters that are important to them,”55 is one at risk of a conflict of interest? In an activist conception of scholarship it is acceptable to be involved with groups and/or individuals one is researching. This rests on an acknowledgement that there are forces of domination in society: some social forces are much better resourced and more widely ideologically acceptable, so being involved with them does not look like a conflict of interest. Activist academic research challenges this and self-consciously allies itself with groups and individuals struggling against oppression in an attempt to bolster forces of resistance.

### 2NC---!---Psychic Violence

#### Securitization within educational spaces causes psychic violence — that outweighs.

Stern 18 – Professor of Education in the School of Psychological and Social Sciences at York St. John University

Julien Stern, “The Politics of Schooling,” A Philosophy of Schooling, 2-20-2018, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1\_9

Those who are in constant fear of death, therefore, necessarily fear life. The idea of fearing life is well captured by the poet Larkin, who said ‘[l]ife is first boredom, then fear’ (Larkin 1988, p 153). The psychologist Erikson presents the other side of this: ‘healthy children will not fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death’ (Erikson from Childhood and Society, quoted in Arthur 1990, p 150). Gandhi says it even more poetically: ‘[t]hose who defy death are free from all fear’ (Gandhi 1951, p 248). Passing on fear across the generations—or avoiding passing on fear—this is a choice made within schools. So Hobbes feared death and used reason to avoid it as long as he could. Macmurray overcame his fear of death, and therefore—he believed—overcame his fear of life. Macmurray’s account of overcoming fear by facing it is an important dimension of his philosophy, and it is in the application to school communities of Macmurray’s approaches to fear that is, I believe, of considerable value. Macmurray said that fear haunts all forms of community—family, friends, religious communities, and schools:

Fear freezes the spontaneity of life. The more fear there is in us, the less alive we are. Fear accomplishes this destruction of life by turning us in upon ourselves and so isolating us from the world outside us. That sense of individual isolation which is so common in the modern world, which is often called ‘individualism’, is one of the inevitable expressions of fear. (Macmurray 1992, p 32)

This form of ‘individualism’, expressed as ‘egocentricity’ and ‘selfishness’ leads to a ‘life which is fear-determined’, he says, and ‘fundamentally on the defensive’ (Macmurray 1992, p 33). Such a life ‘is permeated by the feeling of being alone in a hostile world’ (Macmurray 1992, p 33): this might be a description of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’, and it has a great deal in common with Macpherson’s account of Hobbes’ philosophy, centred on its ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson 1962). Macmurray and Hobbes, therefore, agree that fear leads to individualism which in turn leads to defensiveness and misery. Where they differ is in the possibility of ‘escape’ from fear. Hobbes understands the only way out of a nasty, brutish, short life is by the creation of a greater fear—that of government by the Leviathan. Life may remain somewhat nasty, but it will be longer, as people will no longer attempt to kill each other, as they will all fear punishment by the government. For Hobbes, this is not a mere theory: he described himself as living in fear, being born with fear as his inseparable twin. Macmurray, in contrast, found escape from the fear of death precisely in recognising that death was inevitable. The purpose of government was not to create enough fear to stop people from killing each other. It was to enable friendship in community to flourish.

Political systems at any scale can be founded, as Hobbes describes it, primarily on a (rational) fear or they can be founded, as Macmurray describes it, primarily on friendship—which does not ‘depend upon pure reason’ (Macmurray 1946c, p 8). Sitting alongside Hobbes are many other social contract theorists. Such theories are often driven by fear. Even Rawls (1972) bases his justice-oriented political theory on a social contract to be agreed by people sitting behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, assuming that the veil ensures they would fear the consequences of a system in which some are unfairly treated. It is not enough that the system should be fair: what is needed is ignorance of whether you are to benefit from or be harmed by the unfair system, to motivate you to agree to a fair system. Sitting alongside Macmurray are those who base politics on positive relationships. As described in Chap. 2, Macmurray and Aristotle, for example, both put friendship at the heart of their politics. Aristotle goes as far as to say that ‘in a tyranny there is little or no friendship’ (Aristotle 1976, p 278, quoted in Chap. 6).

Schools can be based on fear—fear of punishment, fear of failure, fear of bullying—just as much as nations can be based on fear. Few explicitly recommend fear as a motivator in school, but occasionally a fear-driven educational philosophy is revealed. The UK secretary of state for education, John Patten, complained of lessening expectation of eternal damnation amongst young people. He said that ‘the loss of that fear has meant a critical motive has been lost to young people when they decide whether to try to be good citizens or criminals’ (Macleod 1992). Although coverage of his comments clearly related them to his (Catholic) religious beliefs, Ball says that the principles of Patten and other ‘new right’ thinkers in the educational politics of the 1980s and 1990s ‘could trace its philosophy back to Hobbes’ (Ball 1994, p 29). Other education writers describe—in negative terms—the use of fear in schools, and the need to reduce its use. Harber (2002, 2004) writes of ‘schooling as violence’, including both physical and psychological violence, and describes how ‘authoritarianism in schools and classrooms’ creates an ‘association of pain and fear with learning’ (Harber 2002, p 11), whilst Chater writes of ‘education as violence to the spirit’ (in Ota and Chater 2007, Chap. 7). Failure in school is seen by Holt as generated by fear: fear of embarrassment, fear of failure, fear, perhaps, even of success (Holt 1964), and Barth describes the ‘biggest problem besetting schools’ as the ‘primitive quality of human relationships’, which leads to ‘children and adults … frequently behave[ing] like infants, complying with authority from fear or dependence’ (Barth 1990, p 36). More positively, Ayers describes a ‘good school’ as ‘fearless’ (Ayers 2004, p 39), and Noddings, noting how ‘schools have often induced fear, boredom, subjugation and feelings of inadequacy’, describes how ‘good education’ will take place in caring institutions (Noddings, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 1). And Fielding describes the headteacher Alex Bloom, working in London in the 1940s and 1950s, who believed that ‘at the root of much bad education, in both its broad and narrow senses, is the utilisation of fear, either as a motivating device for good behaviour or as a deterrence for its opposite’, noting that ‘fear enslaves and inhibits … [and] destroys the personality’, in contrast to Bloom’s view of education—including his work as a headteacher—which ‘implies growth … of the whole personality’ (Fielding, quoting Bloom, in Burke and Jones 2014, p 89).

The role of fear in politics—incorporating the politics of schooling—is complex. It is the dominance of fear that is objected to by Noddings, Ayers, Bloom, or Harber, but there must be room for some risk or stress that might induce some fear. Gill (2007) writes of an increasingly ‘risk-averse’ society that attempts to make children wholly safe: as dangerous, he says, to try to avoid fear at all costs as it is to be dominated by fear. In fact, Gill suggests that adult fears—fears of litigation, of being sued—are the source of a risk-averse culture that tries to abolish all fear. Even friendship or love, the positive relationship that is central to the politics of both Macmurray and Aristotle, has an element of risk and fear. Facer writes of ‘the self as democratic agent’ in schools as implying ‘the simultaneous fear and confidence engendered in the recognition of dependence upon others’, with friendship described as ‘that unique relation of fear and trust’ (Facer, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 74). It is the misuse of fear as the basis for all politics that is dangerous. Fear and love, according to Costello’s biography of Macmurray, are ‘the two founding motives in human beings’, and fear can have ‘value’ but is ‘misuse[d] and abuse[d] … in totalitarianism’ (Costello 2002b, p 290). Macmurray’s work has echoes in the social psychology of Mitscherlich. Living through Germany in the 1930s, and attending some of the Nuremburg trials in his professional capacity as a psychologist (Mitscherlich and Mielke 1949), he used his understanding of totalitarianism to analyse post-war Germany. Authority had been so misused before and during the war that survivors were unable to mourn (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975) and became a ‘fatherless society’ (Mitscherlich 1993). It is not that Germans had ‘got over’ the experience of the years of totalitarianism. They had rejected mourning and rejected authority altogether as both were too uncomfortable. Fearing their own history, Germans were unable to rebel against authority, leading to what is described as a ‘fraternal society’ (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975, p 305, described by Bly as the ‘sibling society’, in Mitscherlich 1993, p xvii). Education was tightly controlled in totalitarian Germany, but this meant education failed. ‘[E]ducation can never be complete’ as ‘[a]n educated man … [is] one who has retained his youthful receptiveness to the new and the unknown’, he says, so ‘[d]ogmatic certainty is the end of education’: ‘[t]he educated philistine is as uneducated as the ignoramus’ (Mitscherlich 1993, p 13–14). The politics of schooling reflects—and contributes to—wider politics. Fear-driven politics, like fear-driven schooling, typically divides people encouraging individualism and competitiveness and works against both friendship and self-realisation. ‘The world cannot be saved by the exercise of power’, Macmurray says, as ‘[t]o use power … is to appeal to fear: it is to make another afraid to refuse obedience to your command’ (Macmurray 1995, p 77). He continues, saying that ‘[t]he State acts through fear to maintain the common life of a society’ (Macmurray 1995, p 78) whereas it is left to communities—family, religion, schools—to ‘act through love to maintain and to create a community’ (Macmurray 1995, p 78). That is why Macmurray’s approach to fear—his way of tackling Hobbes’ twin—is so radical and so significant. It is also the basis of his qualified optimism.

### 2NC---!---Education

#### Understanding subjectivity is a prerequisite to true education.

Zambernardi 16 – Assistant Professor of Political and Social Science at University of Bologna

Lorenzo Zambernardi, (“Politics is too important to be left to political scientists: A critique of the theory-policy nexus in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, 4-27-2016, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066115580137

What, then, is the role of theory for practitioners? Rather than prescribe policies, IR scholarship should have a pedagogical role; it should help decision-makers to familiarize themselves with the complex matter of politics. It should be an instrument of self-education meant to widen policymakers’ mental horizons. IR should play the role that Clausewitz assigned to theory in the education of the military commander:

Theory should be study, not doctrine.... It is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience ... it leads to thorough familiarity with it. The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to a subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent.... Theory is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield. (Clausewitz, 1976: 141)

Theoretical knowledge is an instrument for intellectual development, not a substitute for political judgement. Thus, policymakers, while practitioners, should also be students of politics, and, paraphrasing William Butler, no broad line of demarcation should be drawn between the practitioner and the thinking man.14 IR theorists, on their part, should there- fore be reminded about the beginnings of US political science, which was born not primarily as a technique for direct application, but as a critical and formative discipline meant to educate political leaders and citizens (Crick, 1959: 19–36).15

More may be better: The political importance of theoretical pluralism

The second function of IR refers to its influence on those general ideas that shape the discussion on foreign policy decisions. In particular, even if scholarship is not supposed to guide the conduct of foreign affairs directly, it can still perform the role that Collingridge and Reeve (1986), in their analysis of the role of experts in policymaking, labelled as ‘ironic.’ Rather than provide solutions to problems, IR helps policymakers to look at problems from different angles, to question causal assumptions and to challenge simplistic doctrines employed by practitioners in their foreign policy conduct. IR scholarship can contribute to policy and public discussion on how to consider a specific issue, even when there are no precise answers to offer (Wilson, 2000: 122).

### 2NC---!---Serial Policy Failure

#### Worst-case scenario planning causes serial policy failure.

Schneier 10 – American Cryptographer, Computer Science Specialist

Bruce Schneier, “Worst Case Thinking,” Schneier Blog, 3-13-10, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case\_thin.html

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes**.** Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. **Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking**. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." **Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination,** it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential **to cause** dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities**. Risk assessment is devalued**. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. **It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness.** Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

#### Imperial information distorts their picture of the world and the policy outcomes.

Shor 10 – Professor of History at Wayne State University

Francis Shor, “Dying Empire: US Imperialism and Global Resistance,” https://books.google.com/books/about/Dying\_Empire.html?id=8JOiLnziVL0C

In order to excavate and explode the mental landscapes created by imperial enclosures, we will need to confront and transcend the blinkered intelligence, impeded wills, and hectored hearts that are integral to the imperial and civic enclosures that surround us in the United States. These enclosures are enerated by ideological mechanisms, media constructions, and daily social practices that are deeply embedded in the political culture of an imperial U.S. From uncritical patriotism, induced by ruling elites and ritualized by the corporate media, to cultural provincialism, U.S. citizens are ensconced in an imperial matrix that distorts reality and nurtures "aggressive militarism" and 'escalating authoritarianism." "As the militarization of American society proceeds," contends Carl Boggs, "the confluence of the domestic war economy and global Empire generates popular attitudes inconsistent with a vibrant, democratic public sphere: fear hatred, jingoism, racism, and aggression. We have arrived at a bizarre mixture of imperial arrogance and collective paranoia, violent impulses and a retreat from the norms of civic engagement and obligation that patriotic energies furnish only falsely and ephemerally."

Recognizing how falsely and ephemerally patriotism attempts to assuage the assaults of militarism and imperialism, a number of feminist dissenters have promoted "matriotism" as a key component of critical opposition. Among the more prominent proponents of matriotism was Cindy Sheehan, the anti-war advocate who became a lightning rod for opponents of the Iraq War after her son, Casey, was killed in Iraq. Writing in January 2006, Sheehan argued that a "true Matriot would never drop an atomic bomb or bombs filled with white phosphorous, carpet bomb cities, and villages, or control drones from thousands of miles away to kill innocent men, women and children." Beyond this critique of war-making, Sheehan urged those among her readers who would join other matriots "to stand up and say: "No, I’m not giving my child to the fake patriotism of the war machine which chews up my flesh and blood to spit out obscene profits."

While flag-wavering patriotism may provide ideological cover for the mendacity of ruling elites and compensatory status for the powerless, it also reinforces the self-enclosure of imperialism. The desperate need to display the flag, from the phalanxes of those that now accompany the public appearances of U.S. presidents to the periodic fluttering outside the homes of average citizens, provides a symbolic ritual for imperial legitimacy. In effect, the

more uncritical the kind of patriotism that rules popular imagination and public discourse, the more alone, insulated, special and different the American ethos makes people feel. The more it holds up a distorting mirror to itself and the rest of the world, the more incomprehensible the rest of the world becomes, full of inarticulate, hostile elements.

That distorting mirror is not only part of the imperial narrative that represents the United States as the repository of good in the world, but is also a function of the role of corporate media's presentation of the world. Through the use of framing and filtering devices, U.S. corporate media, especially television, manage to narrow and exclude critical perspectives, leading to significant misperceptions. In fact, according to a University of Massachusetts study of television viewers during Operation Desert Storm in 1991: "the more TV people watched, the less they knew....Despite months of coverage, most people do not know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East, or about the recent history of U.S. policy towards Iraq" Added to media distortions, misrepresentations, and complicity, the Bush Administration's deliberate policy of disinformation in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003 further eroded the public's critical understanding of the situation in the Middle East and Iraq. Erroneously insisting on ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Bush Administration and complicit corporate media helped to frame the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Such misperceptions persisted into 2006 when a Harris Poll found that 64 percent still believed that Hussein had strong links to al Qaeda and 50 percent were convinced that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the U.S. invaded.

The kind of disinformation spread by politicians and pundits and reinforced by the media follows from our national and imperial myths which, in turn, bother literally and figuratively separate us from the rest of the world. While not a new phenomenon, such imperial self-enclosure does seem even more striking in the globalized and interconnected world we now inhabit. "As the American media has acquired a global reach," argue cultural critics Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, "it has simultaneously, and paradoxically, become even more parochial and banal." According to Sardar and Davies, the media reinforce what they call "knowledgeable ignorance" by acting as "the gatekeeper of what is relevant and necessary to know about Third World civilizations." Often, most evident in those mediage images are ones of random violence or poverty and disease unrelated to U.S. policies. However, it is not just those countries caught up in conflict, whether initiated by the United States or endemic to a particular region, that suffer from media frames that diminish or denigrate the reality of others' lives. "As a function of American narcissism," notes another critic, "American media tend to problematize all countries except the United States....The absence of self-reflexivity or a sense of humor and irony in viewing America's place in the world seems to be part of the collective habitus."

Even when U.S. citizens are aware of some vague relationship between their government and conditions elsewhere, there remains a kind of phenomenological disconnection, inherent in life in an imperial culture, which impedes understanding of the causal connections. Commenting on the violations perpetrated against peasants in central America by U.S. sponsored militaries and para-militaries and the resultant gross violations of human rights, Christian Smith observes: "

Most Americans probably were, in fact, concerned about these problems. But for most U.S. citizens, these injustices and atrocities remained essentially abstract and remote, detached from the immediate affairs that shaped their lives. It is not that most Americans were necessarily callous. They simply lacked the cultural and social positioning that would have infused these violations with a sense of personal immediacy and urgency.

The lack of a cultural and social positioning is evident in the way some U.S. citizens continue to see the world through the same blinkered filters that inform the dynamics of knowledgeable ignorance. A good example of the misperception of the U.S. role in the world is how the vast majority of U.S. citizens continue to overestimate the largesse of their government's foreign aid. Although most citizens believe the U.S. gives close to 10 percent of its GDP for foreign aid, the U.S. actually gives closer to 0.1 percent. Moreover, much of that aid is military material sent to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. A fictional example, albeit representative, of such knowledgeable ignorance or imperial arrogance while abroad is the evangelical Baptist father in Barbara Kingsolver's 1998 novel, The Poisonwood Bible. Nathan Price stubbornly insists that every last bit of U.S. culture and horticulture can be easily transplanted in the Congo in the midst of the Cold War. With such imperial blinders and blinkered intelligence he manages to endanger his whole family, resulting in the death of one child and his own demise.

## Impact

### 2NC---!---War

#### Securitization is unsustainable. Only the alternative can avoid global conflict escalation, genocidal violence, catastrophic warming, and endless wars.

Ahmed 11 – International Security Scholar for Foreign Policy and New Internationalist, former Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, former Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex, DPhil in International relations and M.A. in War & Peace Studies from Sussex University

Nafeez Ahmed, “The International Relations of Crisis and the Crisis of International Relations: From the Securitisation of Scarcity to the Militarisation of Society,” Global Change, 10-xx-2011, https://www.academia.edu/1608098/The\_International\_Relations\_of\_Crisis\_and\_the\_Crisis\_of\_International\_Relations\_From\_the\_Securitisation\_of\_Scarcity\_to\_the\_Militarisation\_of\_Society

It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity.

The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transnational corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem.75 This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimensions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of rendering their interconnections intelligible.

As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77

It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capitalist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80

Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behaviour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the transformation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined conditions of ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Pacific Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81

In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India’s wheat surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India’s newly-constructed modern railway system shipped grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘outcaste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’. Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political structures’. 82

As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’. 83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-specific sociopolitical systems – and whether or not they lead to conflict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power.

3. From securitisation to militarisation

3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism).

Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84

Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87

By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’ them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity.

‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89

The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms.

Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93

Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism.

3.2 From theory to policy

Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’. 95

In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96

A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’ 97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’ 98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations.

A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’ 99

3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation?

Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100

But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of ‘othering’ in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102

In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104

### 2NC---!---Militarism

#### Security threats are political constructions by experts to justify constant militarism.

Rana 12– Assistant Professor of Law at Cornell University Law School

Aziz Rana, “Who Decides on Security,” Cornell Law Review, 7-xx-2012, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1070/

Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310 [\*1486] Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs. Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well. Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [\*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [\*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [\*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

### 2NC---!---Immiseration

#### Securitization causes endless immiseration.

Cohn 19 – Lecturer in Women’s Studies and Founding Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights at the University of Massachusetts Boston, holds a Ph.D. from The Union Graduate School

Carol Cohn, “The jig is up: The logics of imperialist, patriarchal global capitalism and the death of security,” Security Dialogue, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010619862912

What is changing? This: the contradictions and predations of patriarchal imperialist capitalism, and of the deeply racist and gendered material and symbolic order it produces, have enabled an accelerating, unrelenting, unfettered extractive stance toward the planet, its ecosystems and natural resources, and the plant and animal species and human beings that inhabit it. That stance has not only resulted in increasingly outrageous inequalities and concentrations of wealth; it has gotten us to the brink of climate catastrophe, ecosystem collapse, and a vast, literally unimaginable intensification and expansion of human immiseration and suffering. So what is changing in security (if not in security studies, critical or otherwise) is everything – from the entire context of stable planetary ecosystems that gave rise to the way our world is politically, economically and socially structured, to our understandings of those structures, and to our models and theories of what constitutes security within them, be it state security or human security.

We can no longer claim to be thinking about security unless we address the model that conceives the purpose of economic activity as ever-increasing ‘efficiencies’ of extraction, exploitation and consumption of nature’s resources, and of human labour, both paid and unpaid, for the purpose of profit – rather than, for example, conceiving the purpose of economic activity as meeting human needs for a decent and dignified life, and ensuring the sustainability of the resources and ecosystems on which life depends.

Consider just these few snapshots of what that model has produced: How is it possible to talk about ‘security’ while ignoring them/without centring them? [end page 9]

• In 2018, the world’s 26 richest people owned as much total wealth as the poorest half of humanity – that’s 3.8 billion people (Oxfam, 2019: 12).

• As global warming accelerates, ocean temperatures, acidity and pollution are all rising, damaging marine biodiversity, fisheries and ecosystems.

• Fish accounts for over 50% of protein in many least-developed countries, while 80% of the world’s fish stocks are already fully exploited or overexploited (United Nations, 2017).

• About 97% of the world’s fisherfolk live in developing countries, and fishing is their major source for food and income (United Nations, 2017).

• Increasing ocean temperatures cause increases in vector-borne tropical diseases, including to areas where there are no immunities.

• Sea levels are rising and storms intensifying, while nearly 2.4 billion people (about 40% of the world’s population) live within 60 miles of the coast (NASA Science, n.d.).

• Transnational forces, from global climate disruption to the globalization of markets, corporations and finance, make a mockery of national ‘sovereignty’ and democratic control.

If patriarchal, imperialist, extractivist capitalist paradigms and institutions continue to dominate humans’ relation to the planet, security – of the planet, of states, of people and of other life-forms – will be not just unattainable, but massively degraded in ways that are literally unimaginable to us.

And if we – as a journal, as researchers and theorists – continue as though this were not the case, we condemn ourselves to irrelevancy. That will not make us unique: institutional, disciplinary, professional momentum and inertia make it extremely difficult for any institution to change from business as usual. And most institutions won’t. But certainly if we don’t, we won’t make much of a contribution to the urgent life-work of interrupting this careening toward catastrophe.

### 2NC---!---Root Cause

#### Securitization is the root cause of the affirmative’s impacts.

Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales

Anthony Burke, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory & Event, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218079

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly 89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

**Generic**

### 2NC---AT: Perm

#### The Perm Fails — only complete rejection solves.

Neocleous 8 – Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University London, Editor of the journal Radical Philosophy, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Middlesex University London

Mark Neocleous, “Critique of Security,” Edinburgh University Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1r270k

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.

This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.

Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.

For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 2NC---AT: Realism Correct

#### Realism is Empirically Inaccurate — laundry list proves — our K has better explanatory power.

Rythoven 16 – Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Carleton University, PhD in Political Science from Carleton University, M.A. in Political Science from Carleton University

Eric Van Rythoven, (“The perils of realist advocacy and the promise of securitization theory: Revisiting the tragedy of the Iraq War debate,” European Journal of International Relations, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066115598635

Kenneth Waltz may have been correct in that states are security maximizers, but today, this may be occurring in a profoundly different way than he originally envisioned. His famous dictum argues that states look to maximize security though a balance of power that discourages both predation and counterbalancing (Waltz, 1979: 126). However, since the end of the Cold War, we have seen a distinctively different sense of security maximization: an ever-expanding domain of security issues. Despite appeals to the contrary (e.g. Walt, 1991), the broadening of security has risen to the status of international institutions, globalization and great power rivalry in terms of being a central, if ambiguous, feature of contemporary world politics.

Evidence of this broadening is pervasive. The executive summary of the Pentagon’s recent ‘Quadrennial defense review’ begins with the clichéd claim that the US ‘faces a rapidly changing security environment’, defined not only by interstate war, but also by ‘sectarian conflict’ and cyber-threats (DoD, 2014: iii). While intended to limit great power conflict, the United Nations (UN) Security Council now increasingly deliberates over the dangers of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 2011), Polio (UN News Centre, 2013) and, more recently, Ebola (UNSC, 2014). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe offers an even starker example. Its ‘comprehensive and co-operative’ approach to security holds arms control, the rule of law and minority rights as all equally viable ‘security’ concerns (OSCE, 2009: ii). This broadening includes the wholesale addition of new sectoral concerns (e.g. cyber-security), as well as an intensifying of traditional dangers. Once materially insignificant and geographically distant ‘rogue’ states, terrorists groups and local militias are now understood by policymakers and publics alike as ‘genuine’ threats to international security. Debates over what is and is not a security issue are now akin to a rowdy dinner table where several — often uninvited — guests rub elbows with more traditional military concerns.

In the midst of this broadening, there is a serious political and practical concern for realist scholars of security. If a state is encumbered by an ever-expanding security agenda that consumes more and more resources and promotes reckless adventurism abroad, what then will be left when the genuine problem of great power conflict emerges again? As a corrective, realists have repeatedly, and often admirably, engaged in sustained advocacy campaigns to convince publics and policymakers alike of the need to constrain the national security agenda. Lost in the extensive literature on the realist tradition is a rich history of political practice embodied by E.H. Carr’s interwar polemic against liberal idealism (Cox, 2001), Hans Morgenthau’s and Kenneth Waltz’s resistance to the Vietnam war (Oren, 2009), and even contemporary neorealism’s criticism of the US’s role in Iraq (Payne, 2007; Schmidt and Williams, 2008). While realist advocacy is diverse, speaking out against expansive conceptions of national security, or ‘threat inflation’ as it is more commonly known, is a recurrent theme.1

While previous works by Payne (2007) and Oren (2009) highlight the key tensions between neorealist theory and practice, this article joins Schmidt and Williams (2008) in questioning why such advocacy fails. Like Schmidt and Williams, I see the 2003 Iraq War as a crucial example of realism’s failure to influence public debate and to curb an expansive vision of national security.2 Also, in line with Schmidt and Williams, I am broadly sympathetic to explanations rooted in how a variety of ‘symbolic and political resources’ (Schmidt and Williams, 2008: 194) were employed rhetorically by neoconservatives against realists. My concern, however, is that this explanation elides how realists sceptical of the Iraqi threat were committed to a very specific model of advocacy anchored in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas. In this ironically liberal model of public discourse, the market valuation of the Iraqi threat was grossly inflated, something to be corrected through the provision of superior information and reasoning. Even if realists had been sensitive to the value of the rhetorical resources outlined by Schmidt and Williams — and I believe at some level that they were — the marketplace of ideas model is predicated on objective rational actors debating over facts and logic, not values.

It is against this backdrop of a tacitly liberal model of discourse that I argue for the value of securitization theory in explaining the failure of realist political advocacy. Contra the marketplace of ideas, securitization theory envisions debates over security as explicitly power-laden, where ‘some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Focusing specifically on the 2003 Iraq War debate, I examine how rhetorical resources in the form of identity and emotion were employed by neoconservatives against realists.

#### Realism is wrong and takes out the perm.

Rythoven 16 – Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Carleton University, PhD in Political Science from Carleton University, M.A. in Political Science from Carleton University

Eric Van Rythoven, (“The perils of realist advocacy and the promise of securitization theory: Revisiting the tragedy of the Iraq War debate,” European Journal of International Relations, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066115598635

Ironically, however, adhering to such metatheoretical fiats proved to entail serious political costs. It isolated realism from all but the most conventional forms of post-positivist theorizing so that Wendtian constructivism became ‘the most radical widening perspective to be addressed’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 163), if at all. It arrested any richer conceptualization of security, save for the comparatively insular debates between defensive and offensive realism. At the end of the Cold War, realists were left with a deeply problematic and under-scrutinized concept of threat inflation as the only way to account for the broadening of security agendas. When the time came for explicit political advocacy against policies like the 2003 Iraq War, realists were confined by a framework where the perceived danger of Saddam Hussein’s regime rested solely on ‘distorted history and faulty logic’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003a: 52). True to their microeconomic foundations, realists naively believed that such a market inflation could be corrected through superior information and reasoning, which they looked to provide. The results were tragic.

The inability of realists to grapple with, engage in, benefit from and respond to the widening and deepening debates underscores the first-order political risks of the incommensurability thesis. The effect is to silence alternatives even though they have a direct bearing on one’s own political practice. The thesis ‘be[came] a legitimisation of apartheid for paradigms, a dialogue of the deaf which precludes any exploration of the possibility of synthesis’ (Wight, 1996: 292). Yet, theories of security ‘are not hermetically sealed bodies of thought … there are often significant areas of overlap’ (Wight, 1996: 312). Jackson and Nexon (2009) would agree and go even further by arguing that most substantive bodies of research in IR are, in fact, commensurable at some level. Discarding the language of paradigms and programmes, they suggest an ideal-typical mapping of the discipline along different dimensions of commensurability, such as the plasticity of anarchy (Jackson and Nexon, 2009: 918). Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010: 414–415) recent call for analytical eclecticism similarly challenges the idea that incommensurability poses a hopeless barrier to communication among theories. Notably, this argument is made in the hopes of creating a more practical, policy-oriented study of social science (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 412), which closely resembles the kind of knowledge that realists look to use in their own advocacy.

### 2NC---AT: Experts Good

#### Experts fail.

Quirk 11 – Professor of Politics and Representation at the University of British Columbia, Research Associate at the Brookings Institution, PhD in Political Science from Harvard University

Paul Quirk, (“The Trouble With Experts,” A Journal of Politics and Society, 2-26-2011, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699

In his remarkable book Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock (2005) presents findings that might seem to account for some of the dire events of the succeeding years. Putting hundreds of experts through rigorous tests of their ability to predict economic and political trends, he found their predictions, on the whole, wanting. Experts performed only marginally better than they would have done by randomly guessing among the alternative predictions that the tests permitted. Experts actually performed worse, on average, than a standardized statistical model that Tetlock designed to extrapolate from long-term patterns and current trends in any context. In addition to their lack of accuracy, Tetlock shows that the experts consistently overestimated their ability to make these predictions accurately, and that they failed to learn from their mistakes\*refusing to admit that their methods or assumptions might need revising. Although no category of experts performed substantially better than others, the ones that Tetlock calls ‘‘hedgehogs’’\*those who claimed to rely on a central idea or explanatory notion\*did somewhat worse than his ‘‘foxes’’\*those who used a complex and flexible intellectual approach.

In fact, apparently underlining Tetlock’s concerns, disastrous failures of expert advice, real or alleged, have been a theme of the past decade. In the run-up to the Iraq War, intelligence officials drastically exaggerated the clarity of the evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (Commission on Intelligence Capabilities 2005; Jervis 2010). On many accounts, the financial crisis and economic recession of 2008-2010 were partly the result of economic advice in the 1990s that promoted sweeping deregulation of financial services and endorsed a wide range of high-risk investment innovations contrived by financial managers.1 In the aftermath of the economic calamity, economists trumpeting a sharp reversal in approach helped design some of the most expansive measures for governmental direction of economic activity in American history\*with results that remain to be seen.2 One might conclude that the so-called experts have no real insight, and yet that policymakers act on their advice, with the public suffering the consequences. The problem with experts, in this view, is, as Tetlock suggests, a severe shortage of discipline, accountability, and ultimately competence.

### 2NC---AT: Scenario Planning

#### Their forwarding of scenario planning is corporate management and military warfighting *par excellence* -- this computational presencing of the world is the lexicon of a global genocide. Refuse the 2AC’s pleas of ‘self-reflexivity’ because scenario planning is “a knowledge project that has been calibrated to reproduce existing relations”

Keeling 19. Kara Keeling is an Associate Professor at the University of Southern California in the Critical Studies of Cinematic Arts and in the Department of American Studies and Ethnicity [“Queer Times, Black Futures,” 2019, *New York University Press*]//vikas

The mothership can’t save you so your ass is gonna get left.

—Erykah Badu, “On and On”

The future is “terra incognita”: although we may be able to guess the outcome of events that lie close to us, as we project beyond this we enter an unmapped zone full of uncertainty. Paradoxically, the range of options this reveals can seem paralysing. No one can definitively map the future, but we can explore the possibilities in ways that are specifically intended to support decision-making. **At Shell we use scenario building to help us wrestle with the developments and behaviours that shape what the future may hold and prepare ourselves more effectively.** We also believe it can inspire individuals and organisations to play a more active role in shaping a better future—for themselves, or even on a global scale. In this book, we use a metaphor of exploration and map-making to describe how we think about building scenarios. Like a set of maps describing different aspects of a landscape, scenarios provide us with a range of perspectives on what might happen, helping us to navigate more successfully. Exploration—of a territory or the future—involves both analytical thinking rooted in whatever facts are clear, and also informed intuition.

—**Shell International BV, “Shell Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide”**

Imagine that a man hails a taxi and instructs the driver to take him to a sustainable energy future. The taxi driver punches “sustainable energy” into the car’s GPS and steps on the gas pedal. Glancing at his passenger in the rearview mirror, the driver asks, “Do you believe in aliens?” For the rest of the ride, the taxi driver tells a tale of outer-space creatures who have been watching human development on earth. They notice that human actions have rendered the earth’s ecosystem increasingly tenuous and unsustainable and have depleted its energy supply. Speculating about the earth’s future and the potential of earthlings to participate in an intergalactic community, the space aliens in the driver’s tale determine that humans are “a bit too haphazard” to be “invited up to the intergalactic party.” The driver asserts, “We need to get better at seeing the bigger picture. We need to face the energy challenge.” He continues by explaining that, from his present vantage point, one of two likely futures will become manifest. The first is characterized by a disorganized and unsustainable “scramble” for resources, with governments prioritizing the day-to-day and delaying the big decisions necessary for long-term energy sustainability in an unceasing game of catch-up focused on producing more and more energy. The other entails the innovation of a cooperative “blueprint,” created by people all over the world taking action, agitating for their governments to change laws, imagining new paths for sustainable living, and working in harmony with the planet while “we all continue to profit and grow.” Clearly, the cooperative “blueprint” is the better plan for the future that the “we” invoked here desire; and, according to the taxi driver, it would earn humans an invitation to the aforementioned intergalactic party. This narrative is offered in an animated YouTube video produced by the future scenarios team at Royal Dutch Shell plc (aka Shell).1 “Join the Taxi Ride to a Sustainable Future” illustrates the multinational gas and oil company’s recent efforts to “look into the future” with their “Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050” project. A pioneer in the development of corporate “future scenarios,” Shell’s **investment in “the future” involves** forecasting into and speculating about **that future** in order **to maximize** their **profits**. It is an investment in maintaining its present status as a profitable multinational corporation. Attending to how and why they produce knowledge about that future offers insights into the temporality that sustains present relations. Royal Dutch Shell’s website not only showcases a set of future scenarios reports; it also includes documents that explain the process of producing scenarios and the benefits to corporations of doing so. **According to** the introduction to **“People and Connections: Global Scenarios to 2020,” scenarios are “a tool for helping managers plan for . . . different possible futures.” They are “***alternative stories of how the world may develop***,” which “help us understand the limitations of our ‘mental maps’ of the world—and to think the unthinkable, anticipate the unknowable, and utilise both to make better strategic decisions.”**2 The future scenarios offered in the 2050 project—“Scramble” and “Blueprints”—**draw from the available quantitative and qualitative data that Royal Dutch Shell** deems relevant to its present decision-making**. Based on the literature accompanying the scenarios, including the ninety-eight-page publication “Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide,” these speculative fictions inform decision-making aimed to maximize the** corporation’s profits and ensure its survival**. Contestations over “the future” and “futurity” have been central to formulations of time throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first: from the scientific inquiries into the relations of space and time carried out by physicists** such as Neils Bohr, Albert Einstein, and others; **to the theorizations of time offered by philosophers and artists such as Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, and Aimé Césaire** (which often contradict those advanced by physicists); **to the theories of modernity offered by political theorists; to the rise of financial derivatives as part of a shift away from the gold standard; and to the ways that film and other technologies have transformed lived experiences of temporality**. Thus, the strategies and assumptions that inform Royal Dutch Shell’s futures scenarios are antagonistic to those that animate Queer Times, Black Futures, which centers some of the cultural logics of Afrofuturism. In 1994, Mark Dery tentatively defined Afrofuturism as “speculative fiction that treats African-American themes and addresses African-American concerns in the context of twentieth-century technoculture—and more generally, African American signification that appropriates images of technology and a prosthetically enhanced future.”3 Over the past ten years, an explosion of interest in Afrofuturism has transformed the category itself, pushing its cultural logics and political investments into the twenty-first century. Currently, Afrofuturism is a rich and growing area of critical inquiry and cultural production, which includes film and other visual cultural forms, literature, critical scholarship, and audio culture. Its early definition, which influential scholar Alondra Nelson, among others, credited to Dery, has been revised and debated. Recently, Ytasha L. Womack offered the following definition in her book Afrofuturism: The World of Black Sci-Fi and Fantasy Culture: “Afrofuturism is an intersection of imagination, technology, the future, and liberation.”4 One of the aims of Queer Times, Black Futures is to interrogate these four constitutive elements of Afrofuturism—imagination, technology, the future, and liberation—within the context of finance capital’s stances toward (and investments in) the future. Queer Times, Black Futures considers the implications of scholarly, artistic, and popular investments in the promises and pitfalls of imagination, technology, futurity, and liberation that have persisted in Euro-American culture since the beginning of the twentieth century. The Afrofuturisms of interest to Queer Times, Black Futures consist of cultural forms and logics through which creative engagements with Black existence, technology, space, and time might be accessed and analyzed. Their conceptualizations of futures differ from those through which Royal Dutch Shell and other transnational corporations like it aim to ensure their existence. The corporate use of scenarios to support profitable decision-making affirms Kodwo Eshun’s claim in his essay “Further Considerations on Afrofuturism” that “science fiction is now a research and development department within a futures industry that dreams of the prediction and control of tomorrow.”5 Eshun continues:

**Corporate business seeks to manage the unknown through decisions based on scenarios, while civil society responds to future shock through habits formatted by science fiction. Science fiction operates through the power of falsification, the drive to rewrite reality, and the will to deny plausibility, while the scenario operates through the control and prediction of plausible alternative tomorrows**.6

**For Eshun, the difference between the future scenarios produced through science fiction and speculative fiction genres and those produced by the interdisciplinary teams assembled by multinational corporations resides in the stance each takes toward the present**. Science and speculative fiction writers often produce future scenarios that the range of data available today would deem impossible, or that fly in the face of reality and plausibility. **Multinational corporations**, conversely, **produce “**credible, relevant, and challenging alternative stories**” that help managers make long-term decisions rooted in present realities.7 By combining “different fields of knowledge and ways of knowing,” corporate scenarios seek to** ward off what **John Maynard** Keynes referred to as “uncertainty,” **and thereby** mitigate the vulnerability and risks of unanticipated events **caused by blind spots, at least some of which, as I discuss below, the Shell scenarios team attribute to the epistemological limitations of disciplinary knowledge**.8 Royal Dutch Shell’s existence is predicated on a system of racial capitalism that thrives on the dispossession and exploitation of Black people, Indigenous peoples (some of whom describe themselves as “Black”), and people of color. **A future** in **which** Royal Dutch Shell **would continue to exist as such forecloses upon a future in which those groups of living beings we currently can identify as “Black people” and/or Indigenous peoples, have the resources to enjoy a sustainable and joyful existence on this planet.** In order to grasp the significance of Shell’s speculative fictions about the future, it is helpful to have a sense of its history, including the environmental and human costs of its “strategic decisions.” Royal Dutch Shell was formed in 1907 after a merger between the British Shell and the Royal Dutch companies. Shell began as a venture between Marcus Samuel and his brother Samuel Samuel to control the oil trade in East Asia; it was formally launched in 1897 as the Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited.9 Royal Dutch was founded in 1890 by a Dutchman named Aeilko Jans Zijlker, who, as a manager of the East Sumatra Tobacco Company in the Dutch East Indies, found oil in northeast Sumatra in 1880 and convinced the Dutch authorities to support his efforts to extract it and bring it to market.10 While Zijlker founded Royal Dutch, it was Henri Deterding, another Dutchman, who later made it a profitable enterprise. Shell began operating in the United States in 1912 and claimed worldwide operation one year later with its expansion to Venezuela. Venezuelan oil became an especially significant aspect of Shell’s holdings, and it “was with mostly Venezuelan oils that the Allies fought the Second World War” on the European continent.11 The arrangement depended upon the oil company’s good relationship with Venezuela’s president at the time, a fascist dictator named Juan Vicente Gómez.12 Although the Royal Dutch/Shell Group (as it was then known) helped the Allies during World War II, even offering their dual headquarters in England and the Netherlands (which remained neutral during the war) to bolster the Allies’ war efforts, Deterding made no secret of his admiration for fascist dictators. He idolized Italy’s Mussolini and backed Spain’s Franco and Germany’s Hitler. Deterding reportedly offered to cooperate with Hitler, a decision that ultimately led to his ousting from his long-time leadership position.13 The history of Royal Dutch/Shell underscores the distance between the company’s stated purpose with its futures scenarios and the reality of how their profit-driven activities have impacted the peoples and ecologies they use in the name of ensuring the future of Shell Oil. The history of Shell’s flirtation and collaboration with fascist dictators is sediment within the present relations that sustain the oil giant’s profitability. These dealings contributed to Shell becoming one of the most profitable oil companies in the world after World War II. By the 1950s and 1960s, when post–World War II “economic growth throughout the industrial world was powered by cheap oil,” Europe was “the most competitive market in the world,” and “Shell was the leading European marketer.”14 During that time, Shell’s explorers found oil in Nigeria after a roughly fifteenyear search and set up an operation to extract it. The infamous events that followed reveal the extent to which Shell’s existence is predicated upon its ability to exploit land, lives, and labor. The future scenarios initiative at Shell began in 1970, when Shell was causing overwhelming ecological destruction in the Niger Delta and perpetuating violence against the Ogoni people who live there. Key staff on Shell’s scenarios team explain in a short video available on Shell’s website that in the 1970s, they predicted “volatility in the world would rise” as a possible result of the decision by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela to form OPEC (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1960.15 Their **speculation about a possible future that came to pass enabled them to prepare for the volatility ahead of time and thereby minimize its negative effects on their operations. But** the **future scenarios did not prevent them from extracting resources from the Niger Delta. Royal Dutch Shell’s operations in Nigeria demonstrate one example of how the company’s industrial practices have harmed the planet’s ecosystem across the world,** *especially on Black and other Indigenous people’s lands.* Some of Shell’s “strategic decisions” over time have threatened the survival of both the land from which Shell extracts its oil and those who live on it. By 1995, the Ogoni people had organized themselves to use nonviolent means to achieve justice. One of the most visible and outspoken Ogoni leaders was writer, journalist, and leader of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ken Saro-Wiwa. About MOSOP’s beliefs and motivations, Saro- Wiwa explained:

MOSOP was intent on breaking new ground in the struggle for democracy and political, economic, social and environmental rights in Africa. We believe that mass-based, disciplined organizations can successfully revitalize moribund societies, and that relying upon their ancient values, mores, and cultures, such societies can successfully reestablish themselves as self-reliant communities and at the same time successfully and peacefully challenge tyrannical governments.16

MOSOP’s effective nonviolent campaign drew international attention in the early 1990s. In 1990, Saro-Wiwa wrote the first draft of the Ogoni bill of rights. As Bronwen Manby describes: “In October 1990, MOSOP sent the Ogoni Bill of Rights to then–military head of state General Ibrahim Babangida, but received no response. In December 1992, MOSOP sent its demands to Shell, Chevron, and NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation], together with an ultimatum that they pay back royalties and compensation within 30 days or quit Ogoniland.”17 By 1993, citing intimidation and attacks on its staff, Shell’s operations in Ogoniland were suspended, and state-sponsored and extra-legal violence had been unleashed to stop MOSOP’s nonviolent protests of Shell Oil’s activities in the Ogoni area, which resulted in the deaths of “hundreds of unarmed Ogoni men, women, and children.”18 After several previous detentions, Saro-Wiwa and other members of MOSOP were forced into a detention center in Port Harcourt in 1993. Writing from there, Saro-Wiwa claimed that Shell was sponsoring the violent attacks against MOSOP. To this day, Shell denies any involvement. On November 10, 1995, after a trial that has been widely criticized as unfair, Saro-Wiwa and his eight codefendants were hanged in Port Harcourt Prison. Shell Oil condemned the executions. In 2009, “before the start of a trial in New York that was expected to reveal extensive details of Shell’s activities in the Niger Delta,” Shell settled with Saro-Wiwa’s son, Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr., for $15.5 million dollars, claiming that it was a humanitarian gesture.19 As of August 2018, Shell Oil is worth US$306.5 billion,20 and the company has been widely regarded as a leader in “corporate responsibility.”21 Yet, in 2004, Shell rocked the global financial market when it admitted that it had been overestimating its oil reserves by “2.1 billion barrels in Nigeria and Oman, 1.2 billion in Australia and Kazakhstan and 0.6 billion in other fields around the world.”22 Some commentators and observers placed partial blame for the deception on the company’s massive bureaucratic structure.23 The decision to overstate the reserves by 41 percent was attributed to the leadership at the time, and led to the replacement of three senior executives.24 Under international pressure from activists and humanitarians after the execution of “the Ogoni nine,” Shell conducted an internal review and updated its business principals to include “specific references to human rights.”25 In their first social responsibility report, published in 1998, the company stated: “We engage in discussion on human rights issues when making business decisions. We have established a regular dialogue with groups which defend human rights.”26 Yet, Royal Dutch Shell’s **present existence has clearly depended upon their ability to wreak havoc on**, **if not destroy**, **the living conditions of those who inhabit the lands from which Shell extracts its profitable oil**. “Corporate responsibility” is another calculation to increase profit **since Shell by no means plans to redistribute its wealth to account for the history that made it the one of the richest companies in the world**. **Under these circumstances, any likely future for Shell justifies the violences it has inflicted. The scenarios it predicts for the future, therefore, embed these violences and obfuscate present possibilities for redressing and preventing them.** Moreover, Shell’s futures assume that Shell will continue to extract whatever resources it needs. Presently, Shell’s interest in futures and future scenarios evidences its investment in its survival as a corporate entity. While the taxi driver’s tale blames government policies, Shell Oil’s own survival also jeopardizes the survival of the planet and all living things insofar as its profits continue to depend upon the exploitation and appropriation of land and living labor. Since Shell Oil’s future scenarios are of course designed to speculate on futures wherein the company will continue to generate profits, they do not include situations in which Shell Oil itself no longer exists, is rendered obsolete, or has redistributed its wealth. As such, Royal Dutch Shell’s continued existence (since its inception in the late 1800s) can be understood as part of the longue durée of a modernity that, as I will discuss later in this introduction, was *inaugurated by* the *colonization* of the so-called New World, the attendant **enclosure** of land, *and the* **transatlantic** *slave trade*. Their *future scenarios are part of a knowledge project that has been calibrated to reproduce existing relations.*

#### Their pluralism AND “not our scenario planning” args are bad faith that ignore the violent, inter-disciplinary nature of scenario analysis

Keeling 19. Kara Keeling is an Associate Professor at the University of Southern California in the Critical Studies of Cinematic Arts and in the Department of American Studies and Ethnicity [“Queer Times, Black Futures,” 2019, *New York University Press*]//vikas

**The mode of knowledge production that animates** Shell’s future scenarios hinges upon its understanding of the value of interdisciplinarity. Shell presents interdisciplinarity as a significant method for fulfilling the role played by speculative scenarios in its decision-making process, as explained in its publication, “Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide”: Scenarios address blind spots by challenging assumptions, expanding vision and combining information from many different disciplines. Our experience, training, current fashions and familiar ideas can strongly influence what we notice and how we interpret the world. The positive view of these influences is that they help us focus, but they can also create blind spots—whole areas we know nothing about—leaving us exposed to unanticipated developments. Expertise itself can, paradoxically, help to create these blind spots. Information acquired from discipline-based research can create fragmented learning.27 **The value** for Royal Dutch Shell **of assembling “interdisciplinary” scenarios teams consisting of experts from a** variety of fields**, combined with their interest in using the story form to include** relevant qualitative, nonquantifiable information in their scenarios, **calls attention to the convergence of the knowledge-production apparatus of a controversial transnational corporation with current academic discourses and practices.** **Those include interdisciplinarity and collaboration**, the tropes and creative operations of speculative and science fictions, **and the range of interests currently animated by imaginative speculations on the future**. Here, **“interdisciplinarity” marks a mode of knowledge production that can** meet the challenges and demands of contemporary capitalism. Heralded in some academic quarters as a way to resist the governance of traditional disciplines, “**interdisciplinarity**,” according to Shell Oil’s future scenarios team, **is** also **an emergent logic that serves the current needs of Capital by** calling attention to existing “blind spots” **created by disciplinary assumptions and** their attendant methods of **knowledge production.** As a way to engage with the world that might direct attention to what Capital has not (yet) taken into account, interdisciplinary and collaborative scholarship emerges in accordance with the needs of finance capital. Yet the difference between assembling a team of cross-disciplinary experts and producing interdisciplinary fields and areas of study is worth considering here. Talking specifically about the discipline of economics, Lawrence Grossberg has argued that Cultural Studies ought to take seriously the ways that interdisciplinary scholarship works to transform disciplines.28 Grossberg asserts that scholars in Cultural Studies have become “lazy” as a result of “the increasing tendency to tame interdisciplinarity by incorporating it into and delimiting it within the disciplines. Rather than taking on other disciplines,” Grossberg writes, “we grab onto a body of literatures and paradigms that have become transdisciplinary, so that they appear to liberate people from disciplinary canons to some extent.”29 It is debatable whether or not this tendency can be diagnosed as a symptom of laziness, rather than, say, the myopic modes through which scholarship is rewarded, at least in the United States, if not elsewhere, through publishing protocols and merit reviews that privilege the reproduction of existing scholarly methods, paradigms, and assumptions. Such a debate would not detract, however, from what is to be gained by pointing out, following Grossberg, that the interdisciplinarity of Cultural Studies historically has been predicated on a different model than the interdisciplinarity that informs the assembly of Shell Oil’s scenarios team.30 The interdisciplinary drive of Cultural Studies, at its most impactful, has been consistent with how Stuart Hall retrospectively described the interdisciplinary activities of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), founded at the University of Birmingham, England in 1964 by Richard Hoggart. The CCCS, which closed in 2002, was the institutional home of “the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies,” which notably included Stuart Hall. In an essay entitled “The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities,” also quoted in Grossberg, Hall writes: Serious interdisciplinary work involves the intellectual risk of saying to professional sociologists that what they say sociology is, is not what it is. We had to teach what we thought a kind of sociology that would be of service to people studying culture would be, something we could not get from self-designated sociologists. It was never a question of which disciplines would contribute to the development of this field, but of how one could decenter or destabilize a series of interdisciplinary fields. We had to respect and engage with the paradigms and traditions of knowledge and of empirical and concrete work in each of these disciplinary areas in order to construct what we called cultural studies.31 The interdisciplinary work described by Hall involves a sustained engagement with existing literatures in order to construct another field. It could be characterized as a mode of scholarly production that imaginatively, yet seriously, engages with disciplinary and interdisciplinary areas’ “existing paradigms and traditions of knowledge” and “empirical and concrete work” to construct a new scholarly terrain. Such an endeavor is calibrated to “be of service to people studying” a particular object or set of objects, or to those interested in specific questions; it creates ways to do that work. It is animated by a scholarly imagination. As Hall explains, after the critical, negative work that those who formed the CCCS did to distance themselves and their work from some of the ongoing traditions in the humanities, “the positive work one then went on to do in the Centre had still to be invented.”32 **The pulls toward interdisciplinarity can be situated within a broader transformation**, described by Gilles Deleuze, away from disciplinary societies **and** toward “societies of control.” In a short essay published in 1992 and entitled “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze argues, “**We are at the beginning of** something.” He describes it as **a widespread “substitution” of “mechanisms of control” for the “disciplinary sites of enclosure” that characterized** the **prior formations of power** described by Michel Foucault as those of “disciplinary societies.” **The struggle over** the transformation or destruction of **the traditional academic disciplines** in order **to develop interdisciplinary sites of knowledge production can be understood as part of the broader struggle against disciplinary societies**, **which are animated by** the same logics of enclosure.33 The **logics of interdisciplinary knowledge production**, however, also **are** consistent with aspects of the mechanisms of control discussed by Deleuze in 1992. According to him, in place of the enclosed spaces of disciplinary societies, which “reached their height at the outset of the twentieth” century, mechanisms of control have been accelerating since the end of World War II to become the dominant logic of power. Deleuze writes, “**Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continually change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point**.”34 **As** the logics of **disciplinary societies are increasingly eclipsed** by those of control societies, **institutions are being transformed**, **and** the **protocols and methods** through which a variety of disciplines, **including disciplinary knowledge production**, have been maintained over time **are** subjected to modulation and fluidity. Under present conditions, interdisciplinary modes of knowledge production can work as a mechanism of control.35 As such, they encapsulate a confrontation between liberating and enslaving forces. Based on our examples of Shell Oil’s scenarios team and considering the importance of interdisciplinarity to neoliberal university management logics, it could be argued that control societies are substituting interdisciplinarity (practiced as what Grossberg characterizes as transdisciplinarity, or assembling experts in different disciplines in order to produce knowledge across those disciplines) for disciplinarity.36 The logics and methods of interdisciplinarity do not guarantee, nor do they inherently express, liberatory or radically transformative knowledges. Yet, as Deleuze asserts, “There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.”37 Because “the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations,” it must not be assumed, however, that the weapons available to be found may not also be used to build the societies of control themselves.38 In other words, interdisciplinary knowledge—that is, knowledge that transforms the disciplines while creating other forms of knowledge—might still be fashioned into a weapon directed against the investment in interdisciplinarity as a strategy of control.

### 2NC---AT: Predictions Good

#### Predictions are intrinsically securitized.

Hagmann and Cavelty 12 – Researcher at the Center for Security Studies; Researcher at the Center for Security Studies

Jonas Hagmann and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “National risk registers: Security scientism and the propagation of permanent insecurity,” Security Dialogue, 2-15-2012, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010611430436

With the demise of communism as an overarching organizing principle and crystallization point, Western security doctrines have seen the inclusion of a growing range of different security issues from political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. By the same token, Western security politics has also been prominently infused with risk narratives and logics since the 1990s (Petersen, 2011; Hameiri and Kühn, 2011). Particular to risk-centric conceptualizations of public danger is the understanding that national and international security should take into account a varied set of natural or man-made disaster potentials, as well as other probable disruptions with potentially grave consequences for society. Also, specific to these dangers is the profound uncertainty regarding their exact form and likely impact, and the substantial room for conflicting interpretations surrounding them.

However, precise and ‘actionable’ knowledge of looming danger is quintessential to security politics, the shift to new security narratives notwithstanding. Without conceptions of existing or upcoming collective dangers, security schemes are neither intelligible nor implementable. Whether the matter at hand concerns the installation of hi-tech body scanners at airports, the construction of avalanche barriers in the Alps or diplomatic initiatives for a global anti-terror alliance, any security agenda is rhetorically and politically grounded in a representation of national or international danger. In recent years, the epistemological foundations of security politics have been addressed by reflexive and critical approaches, a literature that enquires into the formation, contestation and appropriation of (in)security discourses.

Situating itself in this broader literature, this article focuses on national risk registers as a particular means for authoritative knowledge definition in the field of national security. National risk registers are fairly recent, comprehensive inventories of public dangers ranging from natural hazards to industrial risks and political perils. Often produced by civil protection agencies, they seek to provide secure foundations for public policymaking, security-related resource allocation and policy planning. Evaluating and ranking all kinds of potential insecurities, from toxic accidents and political unrest to plant diseases, thunderstorms, energy shortages, terrorist strikes, wars and the instability of global financial markets, risk registers stand at the intersection of the broadening of security politics and the adoption of risk logics.

This positioning notwithstanding, the topic of risk registers as systematic ministerial attempts at authoritative definition of public danger has received little to no attention in the security studies literature – or any literature, for that matter – so far. Reflexive security studies has focused on the creation of new danger narratives for single cases such as migration or HIV/AIDS (Huysmans, 2000; Elbe, 2008), or on the rationalization of uncertainty through risk logics in the distinct case of terrorism (Rasmussen, 2002; Buzan, 2006; Amoore and De Goede, 2008). In other cases, it has also looked at the role of sovereign decisions in the production of knowledge (Williams, 2003; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007), the knowledge inputs of distinct security professionals such as the police (Bigo, 1996), the limits of knowing in particular (Daase and Kessler, 2007), or the role of science and scientific data in the production of public danger notions more generally (e.g. Büger and Villumsen, 2007; Villumsen, 2008). A recent inquiry into catastrophic futures, too, has some interfaces to the world of risk registers, though it deals more particularly with one specific type of anticipatory governance characterized by ‘radical unknowability’ (Aradau and Van Munster, 2011: 5).

In contrast to those contributions, risk registers are not about individual dangers, extreme risks or tipping points, but about mapping the territory of national insecurity as broadly and comprehensibly as possible. They are governmental technologies for making sense of a world that is seen to be so crowded with potential security issues that choosing the ‘right’ issues on the basis of ‘objective’ and scientific criteria has become the prime goal of security professionals, thus pushing to the background discussions about how to actually deal with those issues. National risk registers, then, are also tools for dealing with unknowability, or the limits of knowledge more generally, but they are not about making particular unexpected events – or catastrophes – actionable and governable. Instead, they are about the management of insecurity in the broadest sense, as they provide seemingly incontestable and neutral mechanisms by which danger potentials can be prioritized in a cost-effective way. In that sense, national risk registers are an integral constituent of a larger politics of insecurity. Though connected to the politics of catastrophe, they advance a different regime of knowledge and distinct modes of governing.

Indeed, risk registers advance an analytical agenda that shapes the way in which the larger organization of public danger is to be understood in the first place, and they also define which authorities are entitled to define danger on behalf of a political collective. Risk registers are hence situated in proximity to other domestic risk technologies and strategies that seek to make the future calculable (Hacking, 1990). However, such registers also differ in several ways from the technologies employed by the ‘managers of unease’ (Bigo, 2005). Most importantly, while the latter are mainly focused on identifying potentially disruptive individuals or groups, risk registers are interested in ‘themes’ of a diverse nature, advancing a depersonalized and even dehumanized image of security. Also, the type of knowledge that is empowered by risk registers is typically not actuarial or statistical in nature, but a type of expert-generated knowledge that is actively used to mask non-knowledge, and that is complicit in ‘feigning control over the uncontrollable’ (Beck, 2002: 41).

The aim of this article is to introduce national risk registers and to problematize the distinct ways of understanding and thinking about security introduced by them into current Western – or arguably European – security affairs. In doing so, we identify and put into question three elements of the larger security analytics with which these risk registers are associated. The first element relates to the specific type of knowledge that is valued, as well as the kinds of authorities that are prioritized by risk registers. While risk registers pretend to recognize scientific inquiry as the supreme authority for security knowledge construction, they in fact employ a glorified form of guesstimates that is turned into objective security ‘truth’ in the process. Through this ‘knowledge-laundering process’, risk registers foreclose the possibility of contestation and discount alternative views.

The second element is the registers’ reliance on the ‘conventional’ risk-analysis formula, which assigns a numerical value to a risk theme by multiplying the probability of occurrence by a figure for the potential impact. Such a rationalization of the future based on engineering risk-assessment methodology effectively silences value questions, while at the same time advancing an analytical perspective that competes with views emphasizing the malleability of future trajectories. By making potential monetary loss – in the form of consequences or impact in the risk formula – a central element of policy prioritization, it empowers a security agenda based on crude cost–benefit rationality. Marginalizing alternative kinds of rationalities, it effectively ‘depoliticizes’ policymaking in the security domain, circumventing debates about other possible values, aims and measures.

The third element pertains to the larger organization of insecurity. Risk registers posit risk ‘themes’ rather than referent objects as their analytical point of departure. In practice, this decision empowers a homeland-centric security agenda in which public ministries define what (and by implication, who) is to be protected – an analytical view that competes with both human subject-centric and more international security perspectives. Not only are classic distinctions between international and domestic issues reformulated; risk registers also strengthen a particular image of security based on a sense of all-encompassing vulnerability. With this, a sense of pervasive insecurity emerges. The security agenda becomes marked by constant mobilization for emergency response and object hardening, and security comes to be seen as requiring our persistent, unwavering dedication, even if a state of security can never be achieved.

## NATO Links

### 2NC---Links---NATO Generic

#### NATO colludes with the military industrial complex to inflate threats to maximize profits in the name of security – you should be skeptical of their authors claims as part of an apparatus of militarism

Campbell, 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. (Horace B. Campbell, “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis,” *Counter Punch*, 4-9-2019, Available Online: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/)//ILake-MO>

War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America

At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn,

“The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7]

In the spring of 1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is now known, from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states that within 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Truman administration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%.

NATO was born on April 4, 1949 out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The task of organizing the deception of the citizens of the West was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9]

### 2NC—Link---USSR Threat Con

#### Threat construction of the USSR through historical rewriting was the basis for NATO’s creation. That same belief was the justification for addition of “questionable” states to the alliance.

By Alexandra Gheciu, March 19, 2019 (“NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community”, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis (accessed via SAGE publications), Alexandra Gheciu is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies, accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645>) /lrap

… The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War  
One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate “dependable expectations” of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, “security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily “the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.”5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6  
Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.”8  
At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “spectre of Communism” provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law.  
Contrary to what conventional (realist) wisdom suggests, NATO was not simply set up as the hegemonic instrument of the US. On the contrary, political actors from other states—most notably Canada—played key roles in driving the process of establishing NATO and defining its key foundational principles.10 In fact, one of the key articles in the Washington Treaty is informally known as the “Canadian” article, precisely in recognition of the influential role played by Canadian policymakers in its formulation.11 Article 2 clearly shows that NATO was expected to play a role that went far beyond that of a conventional military alliance. That article succinctly summarizes the precepts of the Kantian-inspired democratic peace theory, as it stipulates: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”  
To decision-makers locked in a competition with forces regarded as representing communist otherness, it was imperative that countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US cultivate a sense of shared liberal-democratic identity—set in opposition to communism—among their peoples. In that context, they sought to articulate a narrative of Western unity, and disseminate it as widely as possible in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. As Erik Ringmar has argued, identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed via the telling of “constitutive” narratives.12 Narratives provide a set of meanings within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located and the actions deemed appropriate are brought together.13 The process of telling constitutive narratives is especially important during periods of fundamental transformation, when new identities are being formed and old ones are being pressured to evolve.14  
In the eyes of Western leaders, the narrative of unity among NATO members had to not only cultivate a sense of shared identity, but also to delegitimize—by casting them as inconsistent with Western identity—communist forces that were becoming increasingly powerful in many allied states. Once again, some of the most influential voices in favour of disseminating a narrative of Western unity and using that to legitimize community-building practices within NATO were its middle powers—particularly Canada. For instance, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, repeatedly argued in the early 1950s that NATO’s long-term goal had to be the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area. More broadly, Canadian officials, together with NATO supporters from Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, were acutely aware of the fact that, in order for the alliance to be able to help build “a community of free nations” united around liberal values, it had to find a way to help publics from allied states transcend recent memories of war among Western states. What was required, in other words, was a collective reinterpretation—and a selective forgetting—of the recent past.15 After all, the newly identified enemy, communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many in the West.  
The view of the “West as one” became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history following the establishment of the alliance.16 Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision-makers regarding the way in which the history of member states should be interpreted in order to foster a sense of Western community. In addition, NATO mobilized its substantial material and symbolic power to widely disseminate the discourse on Western unity in all the allied states and, simultaneously, to delegitimize alternative readings of history—especially those that focused on ideas of solidarity—and memories of friendship—with the Soviet Union.17 In particular, as Patrick Jackson has demonstrated, the discourse of Western civilization played a key role in orchestrating the collective (re)reading of Germany as a member of the Western community, and on this basis legitimating its incorporation into NATO. This is not to suggest that the West was an essential entity that objectively determined a field of outcomes. Rather, “Western civilization” needs to be understood as “rhetorical commonplace,” used by allied policymakers as a discursive resource for de-legitimating policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into American-led institutions.18 In the official NATO discourse, Germany was interpreted as a member of the Western family that, under the Nazi regime, had temporarily deviated from its core values. Following the end of that regime, however, (West) Germany—acting under the close supervision of allied states—could and should be reintegrated into the Euro-Atlantic community.  
Against the background of the constitutive discourse on Western unity, disagreements and tensions that continued to occur among member states could be represented as “family” feuds, and managed within the framework of shared norms and a persisting sense of community. A full analysis of inter-allied disagreements during the Cold War is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine what could be seen as one of the most significant set of disagreements within NATO: arguments concerning the accession to the alliance of states that did not comply with the liberal-democratic norms and values around which the Western community defined itself. Particularly interesting were arguments over the inclusion of Portugal in 1949, as well as the accession of Greece and especially Turkey (completed in 1952). In that context, middle powers like Canada and Norway emerged as strong proponents of the view that countries which did not respect basic liberal-democratic values did not belong—and should not be included—in the alliance which represented the Western community.19 In the end, however, all the allies were persuaded to support the inclusion of those “problem” countries. Several factors were crucial to the emergence of that consensus: a shared recognition among the allies of the geostrategic importance of those countries in the context of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a sense that, in that particular context, the inclusion of strategically vital but normatively deviant states was an acceptable compromise in the name of protecting the community of liberal values. The prevailing view came to be that the integration of states like Portugal and Turkey could be managed in a way that would not necessarily endanger the core values of the West. Furthermore, inclusion into the Western community was seen by some allied policymakers as a course of action that could help those countries evolve into stable liberal democracies. It is revealing, in fact, that a normative compromise that was eventually seen as reasonable in the cases of Portugal and Turkey was regarded as inappropriate in the case of a country whose political regime was perceived as an active threat to liberal-democratic values: Franco’s Spain.20 As Mark Smith put it, “Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward Western European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.”21…

### 2NC ---Link---Historical Facts

#### NATO has endured solely because of its threat construction – after the fall of the USSR, it used the gap to re-legitimize and re-determine its purpose

By Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, June 1, 2001 (“Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (accessed via Sage Journals), Mikkel Rasmussen is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Copenhagen and a professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/03058298010300020901>) /lrap

… The West imagines European security in terms of NATO. The West is a generic term, as is NATO, for what John Searle describes as collective intentionality in the actions of a number of governments.58 Whereas the West is a collective identity that shapes the actions of certain governments on a wide range of issues, NATO has become the pivot of Western security. It institutionalises a collective identity at the same time as it provides the military and political infrastructure for its member governments to act in concert. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO reaffirmed its identity as a collective intentionality that furnished the ends as well as means for Western security.59 NATO thus provides an opportunity for studying the Western praxeology of security. The next section will sketch how NATO embodied the rules of the modern security praxeology, and how it became the pivot of rule-altering politics after the Cold War.  
Strategy and Security  
In the late eighteenth century the concept of strategy came to define ‘questions of force’ in terms of means-ends rationality. Strategy was to define ‘war’s conduct as a “science” whose principles could be discovered, laid down in a “system”, and taught in the military academies that were just beginning to open their doors’.60 No one has defined the modern conception of strategy better than Carl von Clausewitz. Raymond Aron points out that Clausewitz’s theory is a praxeology.61 ‘War’, Clausewitz famously asserted, ‘is simply a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means’.62 By arguing that war was a means to achieve political ends, Clausewitz sought to define the rationality of war rather than its ‘grammar’.63 War has a meaning shared by no other form of violence (for example a bar brawl) because it is defined as a means to ends beyond the acts of violence themselves. The purpose of war is to use military means for political ends.64  
Politics is ‘nothing in itself’, Clausewitz argued, ‘it is simply the trustee for all these interests [of the state] against other states’.65 As war, politics was a means to an end. In the twentieth century the political ends served by strategy were defined by the concept of ‘security’. Security conceptually integrated a number of ‘interests’ into a coherent strategy for how a state should act. This process gained momentum in the wake of the Second World War. It was the concept of ‘national security’ that came to define Western strategy during the Cold War.66 It is important to note that compared to previous conceptions, ‘national security’ was a very ‘broad’ concept. As the US National Security Council pointed out in its NSC68 report, in ‘times of apparent peace’ security was not merely a matter of military capabilities. According to NSC-68, the military stalemate made it necessary to ‘make ourselves strong’ in socio-economic and ideological terms. Victory was to be an achievement not only of American society but also of the power of American ideals.67  
The New Strategic Environment  
The Cold War created a strategic environment with little space for transformation. By limiting states’ possibilities of action it entrenched the means-ends rationality of ‘national security’. One indication of this is that academic interest in the concept of security faded during the Cold War, but forcefully returned in the 1990s.68 At that time, the West believed that the world of NSC-68 had disappeared. ‘The monolithic, massive and potential immediate threat’ of a Soviet attack had vanished, NATO asserted in its Strategic Concept of 1991.69 This was, in the words of President Clinton, a ‘moment of panoramic change, of vast opportunities and troubling threats’.70 The end of the Cold War removed almost every one of the threats mentioned in NSC-68, the threats which warranted the concept of ‘national security’. However, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of security policy.  
Nowhere was the concept of ‘national security’ more constitutive than in NATO. Therefore many, if not most, security experts expected NATO to disappear with the end of the Cold War and ‘national security’ (and some still do).71 If the Alliance was to carry on, it was argued, it would be through bureaucratic inertia or to insure the safe passage to a new security order.72 The opposite has happened: NATO has become the pivotal institution in constructing a new European security architecture. Most importantly, perhaps, the construction of the new security architecture has to a considerable extent been achieved by constructing a new reflexive conception of security. NATO has not only reinvented itself; it has provided a Western forum for reinventing security.  
NATO has come to understand itself as a rule-altering institution. ‘The new strategic environment’, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson argued in the Mounbatten Lecture at the University of Edinburgh, ‘offers us a unique luxury; the opportunity to set the security agenda ourselves. And setting the agenda is what NATO of the 21st century is all about’.73 Thus the organisation is actively reconstructing the terms of its own existence. One of Beck’s central ideas is that constructivism is not only a philosophy of science but a characteristic of our times: NATO is clearly in a time of construction. In that sense, it lives up to the characteristics of reflexive modernity. An important part of reflexivity is the selfawareness brought about by reflection on one’s ability to construct one’s own terms of existence. NATO defines itself by the constructive character by which it has set a new security agenda.  
It is as an agent of constructivist politics that the Alliance finds its legitimacy, and therefore it opposes other constructions of what NATO is about. ‘NATO remains frequently misunderstood—its character as well as its policies’, Lord Robertson complains; ‘too many observers still tend to judge NATO by the outdated yardsticks of the Cold War’.74 Struggles of definition (or discourse), and the symbolic politics they entail, are central to NATO’s own understanding of its purpose. Though its image is a matter for its spin-doctors to construct, the ways in which NATO imagines security and security agency in the post-Cold War world is immensely important for security studies.  
NATO has been used as the forum for establishing a Western consensus on the security issues of the post-Cold War world. Most important to this process have been the two ‘strategic concepts’ of 1991 and 1999, which served to establish a common ground between Western governments on how to conceive not only NATO’s new role but also the security environment in which the Alliance should operate. In the following, I will therefore take my point of departure primarily from NATO’s strategic concepts in order to briefly outline the post-Cold War construction of security. Analysis of these concepts shows that not only does NATO’s self-conscious constructivism illustrate the heuristic value of Beck’s concept of reflexivity, but that the concept of security NATO is constructing is based on a notion of risk that fits Beck’s theoretical framework in a very successful manner.75 …

#### NATO’s definition of security was purposefully written to allow it to constantly change what qualifies as a “threat” because its existence is predicated on security

By Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, June 1, 2001 (“Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (accessed via Sage Journals), Mikkel Rasmussen is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Copenhagen and a professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/03058298010300020901>) /lrap

… Security Challenges and Risks  
Since 1991, NATO has defined the object of security—what is to be spotted, stopped, resisted and used—as ‘security challenges and risks’.76 This redefinition is a self-conscious break with the past and forms the basis for the construction of a new praxeology of security. In Beck’s terms, it exemplifies ‘rule-altering politics’.77 This is a type of politics one might refer to as constructivist, as it seeks to redirect policy by changing the entire conception of the environment of action. According to NATO, the new security environment is completely different from the past. The Cold War focused NATO in one direction and made the Alliance focus exclusively on the resources need to defeat the Red Army. ‘In contrast with the predominant threat of the past’, NATO argued in 1991, ‘the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess’.78 The new security policies NATO has constructed to deal with this new environment can be described through the concepts of ‘management’, the ‘presence of the future’ and the ‘boomerang effect’.  
‘Management’: A Work in Progress  
‘Security in the Cold War was essentially about things we didn’t want to happen’, Lord Robertson argues.79 NATO fought the Cold War by constructing a defensive security structure. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO has turned institution-building into an offensive strategy of ‘rule-altering’ politics. By making itself the institutional centre of European security, NATO has sought to manage the transformation of the Cold War system. It has used the enlargement of its own institutional sphere to define the rules of the new European security system in ways the Alliance believes will guarantee peace.  
By inviting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the Alliance in 2000, NATO committed to a radical enlargement of its membership. Furthermore, NATO has placed itself at the centre of a number of institutions and cooperation arrangements (Partnership for Peace, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, etc.) that include most European states. Furthermore, it goes to great lengths to stress the historical continuity of these two strategies of institution building. ‘The Alliance’, as the ‘Strategic Concept of 1999’ explains, ‘has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe’.80 What has changed, according to NATO, is the environment in which its vision of peace is to be realised.  
Central to NATO’s conception of the conditions for security agency in the post Cold War world is the notion that there exists ‘an environment of continuing change’.81 To NATO, this transformation is the result of the Alliance’s victory in the Cold War.82 The Alliance has a reflexive approach to its victory, however. By constructing our era in reflexive terms, NATO does not advocate that the post-Cold War world offers the possibility of pursuing clearly defined ends, achieved by means of the organisation itself. NATO has not set a new end for itself; it has established a number of guidelines by which it can manage the transformation of the present. In other words, NATO policy follows Beck’s recipe for political agency in reflexive modernity. The enlargement process shows this clearly.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the real debate about NATO enlargement did not take place at the Madrid Summit in 1997 when the decision on who should join the Alliance in the first round of the enlargement process was taken. The discussions in Madrid were portrayed as an objective evaluation of the applicants’ ability to join, and the decision reached was thus presented as the closure of the subject. The fact, however, that so much emphasis was placed on the need for a new round of enlargement suggested that the Madrid meeting itself was an act of symbolic politics, which was merely a signpost in a much larger process.  
The decision on enlargement was a true act of constructivist politics. With the Study on NATO Enlargement, and the discussions within the Alliance that surrounded it, NATO defined the conditions under which a country could join: any future member state should be well on its way to becoming a democratic society and should be in a condition to contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole.83 In spite of their vagueness (or perhaps because of it), these rules defined the enlargement process. They enabled NATO to reject a number of applicants in the first round of enlargement, but they also enabled applicants to keep the process open. In order to manage this process, NATO has increasingly sought to provide ‘objective’ rules for when a state can be admitted into the Alliance. Thus, in 1999 NATO launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which has created a process of consultation and evaluation through which states that seek membership may improve their military capabilities, while NATO can gain insights into their ability to meet Alliance standards.84 Beck discusses these kinds of technocratic strategies in relation to environmental regulation, where the limits of pollution are defined by scientific arguments that claim secure knowledge in situations where there can only be reflection.85 The same is true of NATO enlargement. MAP only disguises the fact that the question of who should become a member is a political decision. NATO readily acknowledges this; perhaps because of MAP’s attempt to ‘objectify’ enlargement has provided at least some applicants with a discourse through which they can convincingly argue in favour of their membership when their military reforms are going well.  
Enlargement is a reflexive process because its rules make NATO reflect not only on the nature of the Alliance but also on the characteristics of Western society. The criteria for joining NATO are, for all their vagueness, essentially requirements for ‘Western-ness’. For that reason, enlargement has been inevitable. In the early 1990s, the Eastern Europeans successfully portrayed their societies as ‘Western’. As NATO defined itself and its ‘enduring’ mission in terms of defending a ‘common heritage and civilisation’,86 Václav Havel could convincingly argue that ‘[i]f the West does not find a key to us, who were once violently separated from the West...it will ultimately lose the key to itself’.87 The key of Western identity is to lock the door to the past. ‘Protecting peace in a new Europe’ in effect meant managing the new Europe. The Alliance’s repeated emphasis on ‘stability’ must be seen in that light. Because the present is defined by transformation, doing nothing means losing control. In terms of the ship metaphor of governmentality, enlargement was regarded as the only way to steer Europe away from the rocks of the Cold War. Without it, the West feared that a wave of instability might push Europe backwards. In the words of Secretary General Javier Solana, ‘[m]anaging Europe’s benign evolution...is after all NATO’s key role today’.88  
NATO had to alter the rules of security policy in order to play that role. Thus NATO has broadened its conception of security. In the ‘Strategic Concepts’ that the organisation publishes regularly, NATO commits itself to ‘a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension’.89 Such a broad concept of security has enabled NATO to realise its ambition of stabilizing the peace achieved with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
This policy demonstrates how constructivist politics can change the content of concepts by placing them within a different understanding. Adopting a broader concept of security, NATO appropriated ideas designed in the 1980s as alternatives to NATO’s approach to security.90 From NATO’s own perspective on the way the times had changed, however, this was quite natural. Faced with the ‘monolithic’ threat of the Red Army, NATO had focused on military security. Now, ‘managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security’.91  
While this broad concept of security was originally designed to make NATO obsolete as the foremost provider of Western security, it is now used to export NATO’s services, making the Alliance the centre of European security. Institutions like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—which were explicitly intended to build security through the deliberative and inclusive strategies associated with the broad concept of security in the 1980s—have been marginalised because they are regarded as being unable to provide the enforcement capabilities needed by the West. In NATO, the broad concept of security provides a praxeology for the active enforcement of Western security rather than deliberation over different security considerations. Furthermore, widening the concept of security has permitted NATO enlargement to be constructed as a security necessity. The new European order holds many diverse threats in need of ‘management’. The broad concept of security has become the key whereby the West has opened the door of a new security order with NATO at the centre. As the very purpose of this order is to manage transformation, it holds an inherent impetus for continued expansion of the NATO framework. In the words of Lord Robertson, ‘[s]ecurity in Europe remains a work in progress’.92 Reflexivity offers no end. NATO’s example shows that one reason for this is that the policies needed to manage the problems at hand produce awareness of yet other problems. The broad concept of security continually presents new security issues to manage. As we shall see in the section on the ‘boomerang effect’, this has forced the West to face some hard choices. …

#### NATO uses proliferation logic to justify threat creation and intervention in order to maintain its hegemony and existence.

By Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, June 1, 2001 (“Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (accessed via Sage Journals), Mikkel Rasmussen is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Copenhagen and a professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/03058298010300020901>) /lrap

… The ‘Presence of the Future’: Proliferating Threats  
In the West, the end of the Cold War was constructed as the beginning of a new era, where a peace would reign. In this construction, however, peace did not entail the end of security. As described above, NATO has expanded its concept of security and engaged in much more active security policies. These policies led to its first major military engagement, against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo Crisis in 1999. How did a time of ‘peace’ become the scene of such an active security policy? The answer lies partly in the argument above: the broad concept of security has made NATO regard the post-Cold War world as a time of security challenges. Equally, however, NATO’s construction of the present as a time of transformation has focused its attention on the threats of the future rather than on the peace of the present.  
Proliferation is the catchword of insecurity in the age of risk society. Proliferation describes the accumulation of a threat across time. The construction of a risk depends on a scenario that constitutes a ‘real virtuality’ in Beck’s terms. Proliferation describes the logic in that scenario whereby minor problems of the present are constructed as major threats of the future.  
David Mutimer points out that in the course of the 1990s the issues signified by ‘proliferation’ have expanded dramatically. From signifying the stable control of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five original nuclear powers, proliferation has come to refer not only to the spread of other weapons of mass destruction but of any threat that spreads. Mutimer shows how the concept of proliferation control is even applied to the ‘war on drugs’.93 Again, it is the future that makes these issues security concerns. It is not the establishment of a nuclear facility in North Korea that poses a threat, but the prospect of North Korea having a nuclear capability. It is not the production of coca, and perhaps not even drug abuse in the US that poses a problem, but drugs’ long-term destabilising effect on Latin American countries and their effect on crime and social stability in the US.  
NATO applies the proliferation discourse to European security, and from a proliferation perspective the time of peace is more precarious than if it had been constructed in the terms of NSC-68. NATO operates against three types of ‘proliferation’. Firstly, NATO focuses on the ‘spilling over’ of ‘serious economic, social and political difficulties’ in ‘countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area’.94   
Secondly, the conception that not only Europe but the entire planet is in a process of transformation towards a more globalised world has convinced the Alliance that it has to ‘take account of the global context’. In a globalised world, conflicts from faraway countries can proliferate into the West by means of terrorism or organised crime. Furthermore, the disruption of the flow of vital resources need not only refer to oil but to a vast quantity of other goods and services from around the world that globalised economies need to function.95 Finally, NATO identifies ‘the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery’ as ‘a matter of serious concern’.96 These constructions of proliferation erode the distinction between ‘the North Atlantic area’ and the area beyond. NATO needs to go farther afield in order to maintain its security in a changing, globalised world. Proliferation temporalises the broad concept of security. The broad concept of security identifies, for example, economic or social crises as security issues. Proliferation outlines how these security problems might become the West’s security problems in time.  
Furthermore, proliferation may be regarded as the negative manifestation of the constructivist politics of risk society. From this perspective, ‘management’ can be regarded as benign, guided mechanism of proliferation. The enlargement process is a means of proliferating the institutions that NATO believes to have brought peace and security for fifty years across the European continent. It is guided by a scenario envisaging how all of Europe can develop into a security community like the West. However, not all European countries need to join NATO at once. The process of enlargement itself will proliferate security throughout the European system, or so the West hopes.97 Thus, the West is painfully aware that security is not the only possible outcome of enlargement. An alienated, hostile Russia is another eventuality that greatly concerns NATO. It is this ‘boomerang effect’ that is the subject of the next section….

#### NATO’s existence is predicated on the response to threats – its redefinition of security allowed it to further expand after the Cold War and is the only reason it can continue to exist

By Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, June 1, 2001 (“Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (accessed via Sage Journals), Mikkel Rasmussen is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Copenhagen and a professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/03058298010300020901>) /lrap

…Conclusions  
By defining the post-Cold War security environment in terms of ‘security challenges and risks’, NATO has engaged in constructivist politics. It has, thus, provided a forum in which the rules directing Western security policy have been redefined in terms of ‘management’, the ‘presence of the future’, and the ‘boomerang effect’. NATO has imagined itself as the agent of change in the post Cold War era. Its means of facilitating change has been through the broadening of the concept of security. This has placed it at the centre of a cobweb of security issues, interests and institutions. NATO’s function has become the weaving of this web into a stable security structure for the twenty-first century. It is the ‘presence of the future’ that has made this very active security policy necessary in the eyes of the West. The West has regarded, in turn, this time of peace from the perspective of a broadened conception of security because it believes that peace can only be maintained if every contingency in the proliferation of threats is managed. NATO’s constructivist policies have presented the West with several ‘boomerang effects’. Nonetheless, enlargement was carried through in spite of fears of alienating Russia. Just as NATO seemed to have managed that risk, it felt compelled to intervene in the Kosovo Crisis, risking its precarious relationship with Russia. In that sense, NATO’s ‘management’ of the Kosovo Crisis clearly shows the ‘risk trap’ the West faces. Western policy in the 1990s has created so many ‘boomerang effects’ that NATO’s window of opportunity has become very narrow indeed on a number of issues central to the West.  
Security, therefore, is no longer what it was during the Cold War. A decade after the end of the Cold War this might seem a trivial point. Still, most studies of international security analyse the changes in quantitative terms. There are fewer threats to ‘spot’, the argument goes, and therefore agencies like NATO must concentrate on less important threats in order to justify their existence. This line of argument overlooks the fact that the rules by which security issues are ‘spotted’ and the measures taken to stop threats have been transformed. The construction of these new rules has been pivotal to structuring European security; including the central role NATO has come to play in this structure. Security studies needs an understanding of agency that does not overlook these developments. This article’s central purpose has been to suggest that Beck’s notions of risk society and reflexive modernity offer a way of appreciating these new rules of security policy.  
If security studies is entering a ‘sociological era’, as Bill McSweeney suggests, it is because the practice of security policy is transforming. Only by appreciating the present societal context is one able to account for contemporary security policies. Risk society and international risk society ought to be understood as two sides of the same coin: a new, reflexive praxeology. It is important to note that this era of late-modernity defines a process of transformation rather than an entirely new departure. Therefore, elements of past and present practices exist side by side in a reflexive relationship. This is evident, for example, in the way NATO defines its policies both as a continuation of its ‘enduring purpose’, and as a new practice of security that views the Russian approach to security ‘outdated’.  
This article has focused on NATO in order to illustrate the heuristic value of Beck’s concepts of reflexivity. Thus, the article has pointed to the creation of an international risk society, but it has not argued for its existence. Such an argument would, on the one hand, have to focus on the processes Beck himself describes; processes which are eroding the nation-state, most notably, globalisation.113 At a time when the rules of world politics are being altered by governments, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which new possibilities open for what Beck refers to as ‘sub-politics’, that is, politics outside the traditional political arena conducted by new types of political agents (for example social movements, groups championing environmental causes, and NGOs).114 …

## Russia Links

### Link---Russia---Generic

**L – Russia**

**You’re either with us or against us—Russia’s invasion gave birth to NATO’s paradigm shift and whitewashing of atrocities—the aff’s tooling of Russian rhetoric leads to justifies of escalation in the name of pre-emption**

**Fotta 22** [Fotta, Martin. “Towards Anti-War Anthropology: On EASA, CEE and NATO.” Www.focaalblog.com, 14 Apr. 2022, www.focaalblog.com/2022/04/14/martin-fotta-towards-anti-war-anthropology-on-easa-cee-and-nato/. Accessed 24 June 2022. Martin Fotta is a researcher at the Institute of Ethnology, Czech Academy of Sciences. His current research focuses on the Romani diaspora across the Lusophone South Atlantic region.\ kaylan]

One of the casualties of Putin’s war on Ukraine will be European critical social science. While the war has instigated important discussions about [‘US-plaining’](https://commons.com.ua/en/us-plaining-not-enough-on-your-and-our-mistakes/), ‘[Westplaining](https://freedomnews.org.uk/2022/03/04/fuck-leftist-westplaining/)’ and about Russian imperialism, we also see—so far in a clash of keyboards—a growing weaponization of scholarship. There are signs of growing censorship of those ideas that would not align neatly into friend-enemy dyads. In the fight against ‘misinformation’, diverging opinions are framed, often preventively, as problematic and even pejoratively as “pro-Kremlin.” It is with this in mind that I revisit herein the campaign to amend the “EASA Statement on the Russian war against Ukraine”, published initially on 26 February 2022 and amended on 15 March 2022. The case reveals how not only mainstream media and big tech are changing what is permissible, but how militarism, securitisation, and warmongering is creeping into anthropologists’ language and analyses, at times insidiously as they usurp anti-hegemonic and decolonial positions to enhance their credibility. Where it will take us is hard to predict, but it might be worth looking into the amendments of the EASA statement to cast light on possible futures in social anthropology’s debates and in order to make a case for anthropology as an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, cosmopolitan and anti-war discipline. EASA’s statement on the Russian war and the protest campaign to rewrite it On the 26th of February 2022, two days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EASA executive committee (EASA EC) published a statement ‘EASA Statement on the Russian war against Ukraine’. While in the context of atrocities its value is symbolic rather than practical, the EASA EC must be commended on the swiftness of their response and the clarity of their stance against the war and imperialism. The first two paragraphs of the statement are particularly strong: The Executive Committee of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) condemns the Russian government’s illegal and unprovokedmilitary invasion of Ukraine: an imperialist war that is leading to immeasurable suffering and losses for the Ukrainian people, whose dignity, well-being, and independence we wholeheartedly support. As scholars we reject [President Vladimir Putin’s distorted interpretations of Russian and Ukrainian history](https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/03/18/marc-edelman-encirclement-historical-roots-of-putins-paranoia/) and the assault against and brutal denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty that they seek to justify. We see him as the main aggressor in the current situation that – as many anthropologists working in the post-socialist world have shown through their work – has its [roots in both the Russian imperial ambitions and the NATO expansion into the Eastern European territory](https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/03/01/don-kalb-fuck-off-versus-humiliation-the-perverse-logic-towards-war-in-europes-east/). **The last sentence has since been removed**. The [preamble to the new statement](https://easaonline.org/publications/support/ukraine0222) explains: As the Ukraine war has worsened in all sorts of shocking ways, the Executive feels that our statement needs to be unequivocal in order to avoid ambiguity of any kind. A group of EASA members contacted us to say that there were some ambiguities in our initial statement and therefore we have amended it. How did this change come about? On Friday, 11 March, almost two weeks after the statement had been published, a group of anthropologists from East Central Europe wrote an email to EASA EC demanding that what they saw as ‘controversial ideas’ in the statement be revoked. In the meantime, they also uploaded [a petition to GoogleDocs](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UHjtoczfboEF55eqQRkVpaCJSyBq3cz3F5MeufV3u2s/edit) and started gathering signatures. They explained in earlier versions of the petition that if EASA did not retract the wording by noon on Monday, 14th March, they would feel ‘morally obliged’ to go public with the petition. As EASA EC changed the wording, the petition was never widely circulated. The style of the protest itself is quite stunning as it features moralistic-conservative language (‘controversial ideas’), forces the executive committee to decide over a weekend, and in many ways resembles wartime Realpolitik (the initiators speak of ‘kind appeals’ but set conditionalities and prepare to escalate further, justifying such their steps with reference to morality). But it is the content of the protest that interests me here. As the authors of the petition explain: While we fully agree that the war against Ukraine has roots in Russian imperial ambitions, we reject the suggestion that Russia’s armed aggression is caused by NATO expansion into the Eastern European territory. Such a statement would imply that sovereign countries of Eastern Europe do not have the right to join international alliances unless Russia approves, justifying Russia’s colonialist and imperialist claims over countries in Eastern Europe. As anthropologists, we understand Ukraine’s defensive actions as resistance against the reactionary empire and recognize the right of people of sovereign states to decide on membership in international alliances. The sentence [this refers to the final sentence in the EASA EC statement quoted above; M.F.] also contains a deeply troubling ambiguity—referring to Putin as “main aggressor” implies that there are more aggressors in this war than Putin and Russia, assigning the blame for the war against Ukraine (even asymmetrically) to another party. **Don’t mention the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation** The “ambiguity” raised by the last point can be debated. On the other hand, most EASA members are not native speakers of English and thus there may always be ambiguity in written English statements from the organization. But I believe, it is clear from the statement condemning “Russian government’s illegal and unprovoked military invasion” in the opening sentence who is the aggressor. It is, however, the arguments made in the first three sentences which are particularly striking. I ask the readers to take a look at the first two paragraphs of the original EASA statement quoted above again. How could a mention of NATO’s role in the longer history preceding the invasion imply that sovereign countries do not have the right to join international alliances unless Russia approves? What logical somersault was performed here? Does the protesters’ problem with EASA EC’s statement lie in the word “roots”? Do the protesters read this as equivalent to “the cause”? It is certainly not a marginal position to argue that Putin’s actions are framed in geopolitical terms ([where the key agents are the US and China](https://lefteast.org/against-russian-imperialism/)) and that the West has not really tried to “[inscribe Russia in a more comprehensive security agreement and all of the bilateral and multilateral agreements](https://jacobinmag.com/2022/03/ukraine-socialist-interview-russian-invasion-war-putin-nato-imperialism?mc_cid=c9f7fa9edd&mc_eid=2ece385425)”. It is also not a marginal position to point out that NATO policies have made Russia’s invasion more likely. Moreover, pronouncements about Ukrainian membership in NATO (or in the European Union) had been merely symbolic. Even countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) had never truly supported Ukraine’s membership until now (geopolitics, in other words), leaving it in a particularly vulnerable position. In no way, however, does acknowledging [“the geopolitical confrontation between the US-led liberal “empire”, and the Russian imperialist project in East Europe](https://www.theasa.org/publications/asaonline/articles/asaonline_0111.shtml)” mean that Ukrainians are mere puppets without desires, hopes and agency, who should not freely express their will on which international alliances their country should enter, without a fear of becoming targets of military invasion. Of course, most Ukrainians have no time and patience for such debates now—their country has been brutally attacked and the fight against the Russian invaders is all that matters to them. In this sense, it is good that the EASA EC removed the final sentence of the statement to avoid a social media storm that would have followed with the publication of the petition and which would have detracted from the statement’s overall message. But let’s be clear here: there was no ambiguity in the original statement. The ambiguity was created by the initiators of the protest. Unless, of course, for anthropologists it is inconceivable that one can support the independence and sovereignty of Ukrainian people while seeing Russian tsarism and NATO enlargement as shaping the context of the invasion. But there is a danger that **knee-jerk ascriptions of culpability** and contests over the moral high ground **will weaken our capability to take a critical view** of ourselves, **and to** understand how our activities **contribute to fascism and militarism**. NATO in CEE The choice presented by the protest initiators is straightforward: if the EASA EC statement mentioned NATO as an actor shaping geopolitical contexts, it would go against Ukraine’s right of self-determination. This, to me, is **a whitewashing of NATO**. It is striking that it comes from anthropologists who must know that **the pro-NATO position was never** unequivocally **embraced by Ukrainians.** This is why, Volodymyr Arthiuk explains, “a silent majority” elected Zelensky who “[promised to end the war, to not press issues of identity and language](https://jacobinmag.com/2022/03/ukraine-socialist-interview-russian-invasion-war-putin-nato-imperialism?mc_cid=c9f7fa9edd&mc_eid=2ece385425).” And while for reasons of bare survival under occupation, [support for NATO membership, or at least for a closer cooperation](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/20/7136284/), increased among Ukrainians in comparison with the pre-war period, these views will continue to be in flux and are regionally specific. As regards Ukrainians’ political opinions, one must also wonder [what it will be in the future](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/record-number-ukrainians-support-joining-eu-backing-nato-membership-falls-poll-2022-04-05/), given how NATO has **failed** to come to their defence. Equating NATO membership unproblematically with popular sovereignty, with “the right of people of sovereign states to decide on membership in international alliances”, is even more **disingenuous** coming from CEE scholars, as in most CEE countries there were no referendums about NATO membership—there was no popular decision. And while in Poland or the Baltic countries, the majorities would have probably been in favour, even Václav Havel was against the referendum in Czechia, since the opinion polls were far from conclusive. In Slovakia, another country that I know well, [barely 50% supported membership in 2003](https://www.focus-research.sk/archiv/suhlas-nesuhlas-s-clenstvom-slovenska-v-nato/?fbclid=IwAR2L1Uqoeg9Ctu7D3t-aEtIkmLe9i2C4Dy_Arj5mvUsCO7ODDE3pmXWCClc) when the country joined the alliance. Continued ambivalence of these two countries to NATO can be seen, for instance, in demonstrations against the installation of tracking radar and kinetic missiles in Czechia. Although politicians argued these would protect from attacks by rogue states, such as Iran, the [public overwhelmingly (68%) rejected them](https://original.antiwar.com/zoltan-dujisin/2007/12/19/nie-bolsters-czech-opposition-to-us-radar-base/). In Slovakia, just prior to the invasion, [more people blamed NATO than Russia for the escalation](https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22831087/poll-slovaks-blame-nato-and-the-us-for-tension-on-ukrainian-border.html) of the tensions along Ukraine’s borders. The petition was initiated by eight anthropologists – seven Polish and one Slovak (see ‘[Protest initiators](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UHjtoczfboEF55eqQRkVpaCJSyBq3cz3F5MeufV3u2s/edit)’). The petition now claims to speak for an “international anthropological community”, whereas the EASA website speaks of an initiative by “EASA members” that stimulated the change. Since the petition with signatures was never publicised, I must suppose that the executive committee decided to change the wording of the statement following the email from the protest initiators. A predominantly CEE character of the initiative is further reflected in the online social life of the petition: most of the signatures come from Poland, Slovakia and Czechia. And while a public campaign was stopped short by the EASA EC changing its statement, any momentum for obtaining a critical mass for the protest would have emerged from within this region. In this way, the narrative of the protest echoes important discussions about the position of Central and East European anthropologists within the discipline, in which many signatories of the protest letter have been taking part actively. However, **consider the irony** it leads to: a group of CEE anthropologists led by former **members** of EASA EC end up **defending NATO** against EASA, which they imply is **a Western hegemonic institution misunderstanding the region** (even if it is currently presided over by a Bulgarian). Such positioning undoubtedly added to the pressure on the EASA EC, since it suggested that EASA’s statement was denying sovereignty to Ukrainians and to peoples of other “sovereign countries of Eastern Europe”, **legitimising Russia’s imperialist claims**. We must be wary of such east-Europeanising re-alignments in the context of the prevalent view of Ukraine in many CEE countries as a failed state between Central Europe and Russia; **the** **racialisation** **of Ukrainians** **as cheap** and thus exploitable, also sexual, labour, but ‘white’ (good migrants and even refugees!). Likewise, it is important to critically reflect on the grading of Europeanness in the CEE public sphere, where NATO and EU membership have been constructed as its unambivalent symbols. It would also be misleading to say that all CEE anthropologists found EASA’s original statement to be “the dangerous distortion” that the protesters saw it to be. Many disagreed, or would have disagreed, if they had been aware of the protest, and if not with the content of the protest, then with its tone. Indeed, there was a lively discussion on the mailing list of the Czech Association for Social Anthropology (CASA), with voices pro and contra. In the end, only a few members signed the petition. Of course, some were probably waiting for EASA EC’s response, while others might have thought this whole thing ridiculous, since, as one member put it, and I paraphrase, “Ukrainians need guns, not statements.” In any case, it shows that the options presented by the protest initiators as clearcut were not wholeheartedly embraced by all. The need for anti-militarism Let’s be honest here. Rather than an argument about popular sovereignty, the initiators’ position is a pro-NATO one. It pr**esents a false dichotomy: if one is against Putin, one cannot be against NATO**. To be sure, I understand where this position comes from. The feeling among many people in CEE, including my parents, confirmed by the invasion, can be summarised in the following way: only NATO membership protects our countries from becoming prey to Russia’s tsarist ambitions; it is therefore only NATO that enables people in member states to be safe and, by extension, CEE anthropologists to pursue our careers. Certainly, **such an argument is counterfactual,** as the world where CEE countries would not be NATO members would be a different world. Precisely because any line of argument about the absence of NATO membership must remain counterfactual it invokes both fears and desires, and in its operation must reproduce legitimising narratives. These are things anthropologists should be mindful of. **The argument** is also problematic as it **separates NATO’s past interventions and invasions from its role as a defensive alliance** through which smaller states can protect themselves against an imperialist next door. Violence elsewhere (e.g., **Yugoslavia**, **Afghanistan**, **Libya**, and with Turkey as a NATO members conducting a war against the **Kurdish** population within its borders and in **Syria**) and often **against** a threat of “tribal” or **racialised** “**savagery**” (Pierre 2013: 548) are treated in isolation from peace and European values at home. **This** compartmentalization is understandable in the context of Russian imperialist warfare, but it **leads to** simplistic listing of pros (NATO as a national-level ally against Russian colonialism) and cons (**continued militarisation internationally**; ‘humanitarian interventions’), which is a sophisticated approach [to neither the history of imperialism](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/pros-cons-british-empire-balance-sheet-history-imperialism.html) nor to a critical anthropology of military alliances. As anthropologists, **we must** resist such a compartmentalization. Our discipline must **be** anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, cosmopolitan and **anti-war,** even though it is always practised from a specific locale, such as CEE. We must reject simplistic Manichaeism, labour against provincialism, and r**eject seeing anthropologists as Putin’s apologists, just because they are critical of NATO** and of their own countries’ role in it. Furthermore, the above line of argument promises only war; **it extends Russia as a threat into the past with only war and crisis on the horizon**. One must wonder how such “truths” (constructed through the piling up of historical analogies, which are now in vogue) **skew anthropological sensibility**, especially in and about Central and Eastern Europe. Gregory Bateson (2000: 265), among others, showed how our truths, premises and habits of thought recursively reinforce our understanding of the world and of ourselves, which **leads further to the petrification of these truths. Against the real threat of securitisation in European anthropology, I suggest we promote an anti-war anthropology**, a part of a broader anti-war movement. To break the militarist habit of thought we should become **apprehensive of how militarism and militarisation shape research topics and field sites** (Gusterson 2007). We should also proceed as if we knew that the forever war (as a problematic, not static ontology) was the ground on which we stand and from which we speak as anthropologists. This task is more urgent now when countries are increasing their military spending or when some argue for the need to destroy Russia in a long-term war, with the suffering borne by Ukrainians. We might find inspiration in abolitionist anthropology and rethink European anthropology as a speculative analysis that not only critiques the existing order, but in a **move of counter-war imagination, reimagines and—through collective practical effort—reinvents the possible**, “past the ruins of the world (and the discipline) as we know it” (Shange 2019: 10). Two final comments The fact that Putin clearly broke international law and the Russian army has been committing war crimes should not make us blind to the fact that **the war has been going on in Ukraine for eight years preceding the invasion.** As anthropologists we must recognise the complexity of that situation. This does not make us Putin’s apologists. In fact**, the real problem** from the point of view of the discipline **is the way** European anthropology **chooses which ‘events’ it notices:** while we have had discussions on Brexit and COVID (e.g., dossiers in Social Anthropology and two [series of articles](https://www.focaalblog.com/?s=Brexit) on [FocaalBlog](https://www.focaalblog.com/?s=covid)), the war in eastern Ukraine—with 14,000 casualties between 2014 and 2021—**was never the focus of critical discussion** (e.g., no dossier or EASA-sponsored roundtable, not even by the protest initiators). Turning to the internal politics of EASA, it is important to note that many members would want the association to function as a learned society that abstains from activism and politics. For them, EASA’s past activities related to [HAU](https://easaonline.org/newsletter/74-0819/hau.shtml), [precarity](https://easaonline.org/publications/precarityrep), and possibly also the open letters published by the current EASA EC signify an unwelcome ideological move to the left. It is ultimately EASA members who will decide on this in the future elections. I, personally, am proud to be a part of an association that published such a strong anti-war statement on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Organising biannual conferences, publishing a journal or facilitating various topical networks is not enough.

**L – Hybrid War – Russia**

**Hybrid war threats create a blanket explanation for all of societies evils—it reinfoces extreme paranoia that can never resolve itself, turning case.**

**Jakub and Daniel 22** [Eberle, Jakub\*, and Jan Daniel.\*\* “Anxiety Geopolitics: Hybrid Warfare, Civilisational Geopolitics, and the Janus-Faced Politics of Anxiety.” Political Geography, vol. 92, Jan. 2022, p. 102502, 10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502. Accessed 24 June 2022. \*Jakub Eberle is a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague, Czech Republic. His research interests include international relations theory, international political sociology, critical approaches to hybrid warfare, and Czech and German foreign policy. \*\*Jan Daniel is a researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions as well as coordinator of its Middle East and Africa Politics Unit. He obtained his PhD in International Relations at the Institute of Political Studies at the Charles University. He has been a visiting researcher at the European University Institute, Free University of Berlin or Orient-Institut Beirut. His professional interests include politics and security in the Middle East (with a particular focus on Lebanon and Syria), peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding, Czech foreign and security policy towards the MENA countries and the debate on hybrid warfare. Theoretically, he is mostly interested in anthropological and post-structuralist approaches to international politics and international political sociology. He is a member of Editorial Team of the Czech Journal of International Relations and the IIR liaison point to the Euromesco network.  \ kaylan]

\*\*\* “HW” is hybrid war

This article theorises the relationship between geopolitics and anx- iety and uses this conceptual argument to analyse and critique the discourse of ‘hybrid warfare’. Conceptual works on the link between geopolitics and anxiety are scarce, despite contemporaneous appearance of the claims that we are experiencing (yet another) ‘return of geopoli- tics’ (Auer, 2015; Guzzini, 2012, 2016) and that ‘we live in anxious times’ (Eklundh, Zevnik, & Guittet, 2017, p. 1; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020; Zevnik, 2017b) in academic and public debates. We fill this gap by introducing the notion of anxiety geopolitics as a type of affective discourse that emerges to relieve the subjects from the uprooting experience of anxiety by anchoring both the self and the alleged source of danger within a familiar ‘mental map’. However, as anxiety can never be fully resolved or repressed, discursive fixes, including geopolitical ones, are always temporary and eventually **failing**. We contend that anxiety geopolitics is an ultimately ambivalent, Janus-faced way of ‘writing global space’ ( ́O Tuathail, 1996), in which anxiety is both repressed and reproduced through geopolitical discourses. In making these arguments, we build upon and contribute to multiple literatures in political geography and international relations. First, conceptualising geopolitics as a discourse through which global politics becomes spatialised, we borrow from the canon of critical geopolitics. We follow especially the more recent turn towards affective geopolitics, understanding affects as intertwined in the process of discursive con- struction. So far, anxiety has received only rare attention in this body of work (an exception is G ̈okarıksel & Secor, 2020), a gap this article ad- dresses by theorising the role of anxiety in geopolitics in detail. Second, in adopting the argument that construction of identity narratives is a way to manage anxiety and make sense of the world, we engage with the IR literature on ontological security. Yet, conversely, this body of work has dealt with geopolitics only scarcely (Browning, 2018; Guzzini, 2012, 2016), and these rare studies rely on a reductionist notion of anxiety. For these purposes, we reach to a third literature, namely the work on the political dimension of anxiety embedded (mostly) in Lacanian social theory. We then utilise these theoretical arguments to analyse and critique ‘hybrid warfare’ (HW), one of the key security discourses of our time. To start with, it is not easy to find out what HW is supposed to mean exactly, as there are many varying definitions of the interchangeably used notions of ‘hybrid wars’, ‘hybrid threats’ or ‘hybrid campaigns’ (for a magisterial conceptual discussion see Fridman, 2018). Most of them typically label some form of combination of ‘military and non-military as well as covert and overt means’ of conflict (NATO, 2019). This is usually followed by **long lists of disparate examples**. According to one EU definition, hybrid threats ‘range from **cyberattacks** on critical information systems, through the **disruption of critical services** such as energy supplies or **financial services**, to the undermining of **public trust in government** institutions or the deepening of **social divisions’** ( European Union, 2018). In this logic, HW targets **a wide range** of pre-existing social issues, political cleavages and security vulnerabilities, while seeking **to amplify and exploit them for the benefit of the attacker.** The covert and psychological character of such form of attack then appears to be **particularly worrying**, as ‘hybrid campaigns’ are ‘designed to be difficult to detect or attribute’ so as to ‘create confusion’ (European Union, 2018) and ‘sow doubt in the minds of target populations’ (NATO, 2019). Clearly, such definitions of HW are **so broad that they can encompass almost anything**; ‘any possible combination of military and non-military means’ or even **‘any possible hostile activity’** as has been argued elsewhere (Fridman, 2018, p. 155). Consequently and in line with approaches rooted in critical geopolitics, we do not provide an authorita- tive definition of our own. Instead, we focus on how HW is used in discourse to produce certain (geo)political effects. Apart from being a highly relevant problem, HW also presents a particularly fitting case to be analysed as an instance of anxiety geopolitics. First, the close link between HW and anxiety has been explicitly recognised by Maria M ̈alksoo, who shows how HW triggers ‘anxiety about the difficulties of concretising **unknown and indetermi- nate threats’** (M ̈alksoo, 2018, p. 378). Second, the relation between HW and geopolitics is at the same time strongly pronounced and marked by a profound tension. On the one hand, HW ostensibly departs from a ‘modern’ geopolitical imagination based on territorial states and borders ( ́O Tuathail, 1998). After all, it is about information operations in deterritorialised spaces of the globalised public sphere, unattributable cyberattacks carried out by non-state groups, or the incitement of hor- izontal protest movements discontent with the present political order. On the other hand, this ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination (ibid.) has been very often subdued to the much more traditional and ‘modern’ vision of a ‘new Cold War’ between Russia and ‘the West’ (for critical analyses of this discourse see Browning, 2018; Ciut ̆a & Klinke, 2010; Toal, 2017). Thereby, HW has been incorporated into the civilisational mode of geopolitical thinking that divides the world along an East/West axis. Approaching HW as a case of anxiety geopolitics allows us to analyse this tension and unpack the underlying puzzle: Why is it that the ostensibly novel, networked and deterritorialised phenomena associated with hybrid warfare get so easily submerged under such an old, static and territorial geopolitical imagination? We argue that the allure of East/West geopolitics lies in its familiarity, as it provides a well-worn map that promises to ‘make sense’ of the anxiety-inducing manifesta- tions of ‘hybrid warfare’. Yet, we also show that these attempts even- tually fail and the **HW discourse ends up perpetuating the insecurities and anxieties, which it was supposed to resolve**. As such, it serves well to **‘a ‘hybrid-industrial complex’** of government agencies, think-tanks, non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and pundits’ that emerged around it (Galeotti, 2019, p. 11). By pointing out to the role of anxiety geopolitics in this economy of power/knowledge that emerged around HW, this article provides both an analysis and a political intervention. The article proceeds as follows. First, we start by a theoretical dis- cussion, crafting the notion of anxiety geopolitics by developing and connecting insights of the literatures on critical geopolitics, ontological security, and politics of anxiety. Second, we argue that the amalgam- ation of the hybrid warfare discourse and East/West geopolitics presents a particular case of anxiety geopolitics, which oscillates between the promise to repress anxiety and the **repeated failures in doing so.** This is illustrated by examples from Czechia, a country considered as playing a pioneering and outsized role in the European HW debate (Daniel & Eberle, 2021; Jankowicz, 2020), which offers plenty of empirical ma- terial for developing our theoretical argument and drawing some more general implications. By way of conclusion, we discuss the broader take-aways for critical geopolitics and IR, as well as for policy debates on how (not) to address the threat posed by Russia. 2. Anxiety geopolitics: space, affect, and ontological insecurity Our research is located in critical geopolitics, from which we borrow the understanding of geopolitics as discourses and practices through which people ‘‘spatialize’ international politics and represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas’ ( ́O Tua- thail & Agnew, 1992, p. 192). Critical geopolitics focuses on how political events are articulated as somehow related to or driven by geographic phenomena, or how issues are ‘geopoliticised’, that is constructed as geopolitical problems (Cadier, 2019, p. 71). These ideas are best captured by the concept of geopolitical imagination: ‘Geopolitical imaginations are the result of subjects’ attempt to make sense of the world by associating political values with various parts of that map. They can also be spoken of in the collective sense, in which a group can be said to have similar (if ultimately unique) visions of the world.’ (Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 447) More recently, critical geopolitics has paid increased attention to affects and emotions (G ̈okarıksel & Secor, 2020; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013; Pain, 2009).1 Such affective geopolitics explores how affects are an indivisible part of social construction of space, as they are intimately entangled with lan- guages and images through which our ‘mental maps’ are produced and disseminated. Summarising this broader argument, Laketa argues that geopolitics should be understood ‘both as socially produced and intimately experienced’ and, consequently, ‘the emotional and the affective become the site of the geopolitical’ and vice versa (Laketa, 2019, pp. 156, 160). Therefore, international politics is spatialised also by engaging subjects at the affective level, which is an essential part of the production of geopo- litical imaginations through which subjects view the world and their place within it. This links critical geopolitics to a range of literatures that deal with the relationship between identity, emotions and affects, including the scholarship on ontological security and anxiety in IR. The rapidly growing literature on ontological security is concerned with how subjects – individuals, groups, or states – deal with the un- certainty of modern life without losing the ‘security of the self, the subjective sense of who one is’ (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344) that defines ontological security and makes life bearable. Building mainly upon the work of Anthony Giddens (1991), classical contributions agree that ontological security is sought through an active process of constructing the self and anchoring it in the social world, which happens through the establishment of routines (Mitzen, 2006), creation of biographical nar- ratives (Kinnvall, 2004; Steele, 2008; Suboti ́c, 2016), or maintenance of relationships (Berenskoetter & Giegerich, 2010). The key underlying purpose of ontological security-seeking is to avoid anxiety, which Gid- dens, following Freud, understands as an elusive and paralysing ‘generalised state of [...] emotions’ that is different from fear (Giddens, 1991, p. 44). Fear is ‘a basic emotion directed at a specific object that prompts an adaptive response: fight or flight.’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 241). In contrast, ‘anxiety is diffuse, it is free-floating: lacking a spe- cific object’, which makes it possible to ‘pin’ it to different things and concepts (Giddens, 1991, p. 44). Repressing the elusive anxiety by this ‘pinning’, which transforms it into the manageable fear of something, is then one of the key motives of human behaviour. As anxiety is consid- ered overwhelming and paralysing; the ‘chaos’ that ‘threatens on the other side of the ordinariness of the everyday conventions’ (1991, p. 37), subjects often prefer to deal with it through the production of fear via 1 The terms affect and emotion are often used interchangeably. We follow scholarship that sees affect and emotion as placed on a continuum, where af- fects signify amorphous bodily moods that are difficult to describe, whereas emotion refers to states that are already reflected upon and linked to culturally embedded and actionable categories like anger or love (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014). In this sense, anxiety is an affect, while fear is an emotion. J. Eberle and J. Daniel Political Geography 92 (2022) 102502 3the discursive construction of ‘specific objects and threats’ (Chernobrov, 2019, p. 39). This involves reaching to well-worn identity discourses, which serve as vehicles for ‘[t]ransforming the anxiety of the unknown into the security of the known (recognizable, even if illusory) [that] affirms the identity of the perceiving subject and enables it to confi- dently interact with the international other.’ (ibid.) These arguments have a direct purchase for critical geopolitics, as geopolitical imaginations are good examples of how such sense-making and anxiety-managing discourses can look like. Some have already recognised and developed this link. For Guzzini, the ‘revival of geopo- litical thought’ in Europe is directly linked to ontological insecurity stemming from ‘the sense of disorientation and foreign policy identity crises which followed 1989.’ (Guzzini, 2016, pp. 14–15) Making a more explicit link between anxiety and fear, Browning develops a very similar argument: ‘The attraction of tropes of a new Cold War and a return of geopolitics is precisely that they solve anxiety about current events by fitting them into clearly established systems of meaning, though doing so entails reducing anxiety by emphasising a world of threats and fears’ (Browning, 2018, p. 113). Both Guzzini and Browning are critical of using geopolitics as a tool of anxiety management, citing its adverse effects both in normative terms (creation of enemy-images, building an exclusionary ‘Fortress Europe’), and in the consequential decrease in physical security (e.g. as a result of escalating tensions between antagonists locked-in in their hardened identities). However, both also appear to ground their argu- ment in the assumption that anxiety ultimately can be managed (more or less) successfully, one that is shared by the Giddensian mainstream of ontological security studies. While scholars making such arguments would consider the price of anxiety-management via geopolitics as too steep, they still accept that such a trade-off can be made in the first place and that one’s ontological security can in fact be gained at the expense of physical security or the well-being of others. As some of the most recent debates in ontological security scholarship recognise (Browning, 2019; Cash, 2020; Gustafsson & Krickel-Choi, 2020; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020; Rumelili, 2020), these issues stem from Giddens’ problematic con- ceptualisation of anxiety that is adopted by most ontological security work in critical geopolitics and IR. To sharpen the analysis of the role of anxiety in geopolitics and deepen the critique made by Guzzini and Browning, an additional theoretical step is needed. For this purpose, we reach to the literature on the politics of anxiety drawing mainly on the work of Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst whose ideas have been increasingly prolific in IR (for an authoritative overview see Zevnik & Mandelbaum, 2021), and, to a lesser extent, critical geopolitics (Klinke, 2016; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013). Our approach shares the Giddensian notion that anxiety is an inarticulable, traumatic and potentially paralysing affect that subjects attempt to avoid and repress. However, instead of seeing it as merely something that ‘lurks’ behind as the dark other of normal life, anxiety is understood as a du- rable affective condition interwoven in everyday experiences as well as social processes and political institutions. It doesn’t just lurk, it is always already there, as it is present in the key mechanisms that hold society together: in the production of social subjects and the creation of rules through which these are regulated and bound together. In this reading, anxiety is correlative to the very emergence and existence of the subject as such. It is ‘a type of expectant dread’ or ‘a crushing experience of ‘out of placeness’’ that arises ‘when the subject, unable to ground themselves in either a functional horizon of values or a reliable social or subjective identification, fears that they might be somehow swallowed up, devoured’ (Hook, 2015, pp. 117, 119). It is less about the disorientation and uncertainty caused by one particular crisis (e.g. Russia invading Ukraine, Covid-19 arriving) and more about being reminded of the ultimately irreducible fragility of all things, including human lives and social orders. In this sense, anxiety is an affect linked to experiencing the limit of one’s own existence as a subject, something that signifies the encounter with ‘the real’, to use the Lacanian term for the internal limit of social order and/or the biological limit of human existence. Anxiety can never be fully managed or repressed, as it is a reaction to being confronted with what is for Lacan the ultimate reality of human existence: the fundamental ‘groundlessness of meaning’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 25) and, therefore, the impossibility of ever achieving a coherent and stable identity. In this sense, anxiety is the affect that ‘does not deceive’ (Lacan, 2014, p. 160), as it does not cover over the void at the heart of every social identity, but rather confronts us with it at the level of bodily sensation. To put it differently, subjects are always ultimately ontologically insecure, as no narratives, routines or re- lationships – personal or geopolitical – can ever fully deal with the omnipresent possibility that things may not make sense and everything can break down any minute. Anxiety emerges as the affect that signifies ‘the need for the stabilisation of the subject’ (Burgess, 2017, p. 29), yet this stabilisation is doomed to fail in the longer term. Therefore, in contrast to readings that see it as an aberration, anxiety is omnipresent, even though it clearly varies in its intensity across time and space. Sometimes it is experienced more often and more strongly, while there may be other, less anxious times (Solomon, 2012 makes this argument with respect to affects in general). The current social condi- tion is arguably one when anxiety is on the high; leading some authors to argue that we are now living in an ‘anxious society’, ‘a society on con- stant alert, despite having no identifiable existential threat. Instead, there is the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247, emph. added; Eklundh et al., 2017). Such (highly) anxious society was created by the congruence of a range of factors. Some point to the effects of neoliberalism and austerity that produce the widespread feelings of powerlessness and loss of control (Hirvonen, 2017). Others focus on the social media economy that requires users who are constantly obsessively checking for news updates, notifications and the affective gratification coming from ‘retweets’ and ‘likes’ (Davies, 2019). For yet others, the proliferation of anxiety is connected to the societal changes linked to gender, race and immigration (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Klinke, 2016; Zevnik, 2017b), or the ‘security creep’ perpetuated by discourses and practices of counterterrorism and cybersecurity (Heath-Kelly, 2018; Jacobsen, 2020). This extended understanding of anxiety as ontologically conditioned and socially circulated ‘nervous states’ (Davies, 2019) without a clear and concrete referent object opens the possibility to think (geo)politics of anxiety in broader and arguably more critical terms than in conven- tional ontological security literature. On the one hand, the Lacanian approach broadly agrees with the Giddensian ontological security framework with respect to how subjects try to deal with anxiety: by ‘pinning’ it onto an object and transforming it into a more tangible fear of something. In this manner, ‘fear becomes a way of easing anxiety; of attaching a signifier (an object of fear) to what is otherwise an un- founded experience of unease’ (Zevnik, 2017a, p. 237)

**Err neg on empirics—hybrid war scenario planning is the projection and imposition of unrelated threats to a geopolitical Other—stifles dissent, reproduces the threat, and leads to serial policy failure via NATO.**

**Jakub and Daniel 22** [Eberle, Jakub\*, and Jan Daniel.\*\* “Anxiety Geopolitics: Hybrid Warfare, Civilisational Geopolitics, and the Janus-Faced Politics of Anxiety.” Political Geography, vol. 92, Jan. 2022, p. 102502, 10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502. Accessed 24 June 2022. \*Jakub Eberle is a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague, Czech Republic. His research interests include international relations theory, international political sociology, critical approaches to hybrid warfare, and Czech and German foreign policy. \*\*Jan Daniel is a researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions as well as coordinator of its Middle East and Africa Politics Unit. He obtained his PhD in International Relations at the Institute of Political Studies at the Charles University. He has been a visiting researcher at the European University Institute, Free University of Berlin or Orient-Institut Beirut. His professional interests include politics and security in the Middle East (with a particular focus on Lebanon and Syria), peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding, Czech foreign and security policy towards the MENA countries and the debate on hybrid warfare. Theoretically, he is mostly interested in anthropological and post-structuralist approaches to international politics and international political sociology. He is a member of Editorial Team of the Czech Journal of International Relations and the IIR liaison point to the Euromesco network.  \ kaylan]

\*\*\* “HW” is hybrid war

Such ‘politics of fear’ then transforms the crushing and paralysing experience of anxiety into the management of ‘concrete objects that we have invented’ (Hir- vonen, 2017, p. 261), such as the geopolitically coded ‘Muslim terror- ists’ or ‘Russians hackers’. In this step, anxiety is ostensibly eased or repressed by the production of (geopolitical) narratives that ‘**make sense’** **of the unpleasant experience by giving it a name and placing it on a map**.2 On the other hand, however, the Lacanian take allows us to account also for the politics that is imminent in the failure of these anxiety- managing attempts. As we have argued, all narratives built around 2 There is nothing natural about the construction of particular fear objects, be it ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘Russian hybrid warfare’, as discourses of fear are al- ways contingent. Societies are complicit in the production of their fears through the reflexive/strategic as well as non-reflexive/habitual ways through which discourses are produced and reproduced. This also makes it possible to chal- lenge them and search for alternatives. Jparticular objects of fear, including geopolitical ones, are eventually failing, as these objects are **ultimately ‘false targets’**. They are merely temporary discursive vessels functioning as placeholders for expressing deeper ontological anxiety, **which is bound to strike back**. Consequently, **attempts to make societies** (feel) **more secure**, habitually end up **mak**ing **them** (feel) equally, or even **more, insecure** and anxious, **regardless of how much effort is invested** into fighting this or that particular threat. As Heath-Kelly (2015, 2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have shown, **successful security** discourses like counter-terrorism or cybersecurity **have actually managed to internalise this ‘failure** to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) **by incorporating it into their very structure.** According to them, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity are constructed as dangers so slip- pery and multifaceted that once we resolve one problem (by killing Osama bin Laden, resolving a particular cyberthreat), **a whole new range** of terrorist groups or cyber issues **emerges** to occupy their place. Consequently, and in contrast to conventional ontological security literature, politics of anxiety is not only about managing and repressing it through narratives, routines and relationships. It is also about other ways of **manipulating anxiety for political purposes**, **including repro- ducing,** nurturing and spreading it via the construction of **threats** so **opaque and widespread** that they cannot be possibly resolved, like terrorism, cybersecurity – or hybrid warfare. By its repeated failure to secure, such discourses hold societies in the anxious ‘state of constant and heightened alertness’ (Davies, 2019, p. xii), making them **ready to accept** a range of pre-emptive security measures across all possible areas of social life. Bringing the argument together, by the notion of anxiety geopolitics we conceptualise the politics of dealing with anxiety by linking it to objects and issues spatialised through the means of geopolitical imagi- nations. By references to geographical categories, such as states, regions, continents or civilisations, this type of affective geopolitics promises to transform the amorphous and ambiguous anxiety stemming from range of different issues into tangible and manageable objects of fear taking the form of geopolitical threats. Yet, as all such narratives and images are ultimately bound to fail to resolve the underlying anxiety, the analytical focus must be extended also to how these failures are accounted for and how anxiety is being further reproduced with the help of geopolitical imaginations. Therefore, anxiety geopolitics is ultimately about the oscillation between repressing anxiety through the geo- politicisation of both the ‘threat’ and the self, as much as it is about dealing with the recurring failures to secure the subjects produced by such geopoliticisation, which result in reproduction of social anxiety. 3. Hybrid warfare as anxiety geopolitics: learning from the Czech case We will now further develop our conceptual argument by discussing hybrid warfare as a case of anxiety geopolitics. Some have already shown that HW **plays an ontological security role at the level of NATO** and EU, as it ‘links the uncertainty emanating from the hybrid nature of the new threats to the known and routine relationship with its tradi- tional antagonist’, that is Russia (M ̈alksoo, 2018, p. 380). Following this argument, **Russia’s aggression suddenly gave meaning to a range of hitherto unconnected, yet omnipresent, and, therefore, anxiety-inducing problems that NATO**, EU and their member states **were facing**. Polar- isation and the rise of **populism**, widespread **distrust** in institutions, erosion of **international norms**, **cyberattacks**, **propaganda** and **disinfor- mation** campaigns **suddenly all ‘made sense’,** if they could be discur- sively linked to Moscow as instances of ‘**Russian hybrid warfare’**. HW thus provided NATO and EU, with the elusive ‘security’ of knowing one’s enemy (also Browning, 2018). Similarly, in Czechia, the HW discourse arrived at a time of intense social anxieties emerging from a range of different cultural, economic or geopolitical factors. For many in Czechia (and Central Europe more broadly), post-Cold War sense of ontological security had been provided through a civilisational geopolitical imagination of ‘the West’, which Central Europe supposedly (re)joined after 1989 (Cadier, 2019; Kuus, 2007; Todorova, 2009). Best captured by the slogan of a ‘return to Europe’, the vision of embracing liberal democracy, capitalism and Euro-Atlantic political structures was seen as a panacea that would resolve all big (geo)political questions once and for all. However, these very principles and structures arguably started crumbling precisely at the time that the Central Europeans were finally 0admitted in EU and NATO. The Iraq War laid bare the rifts within the West, calling in question its further relevance as a coherent geopolitical entity (Brown- ing & Lehti, 2010; Jackson, 2006). Resurgent Russia challenged Western hegemony in Europe and led ‘an influential part of the Czech political and intellectual elite [to] succumb[...] to anxiety’ (Drul ́ak, 2012, p. 79). Central European countries were hit particularly hard by the economic crisis and further hurt themselves by the (foreign- or self-imposed) ‘Western’ medicine of austerity (Tooze, 2018, pp. 220–238). In the Czech case, this led to one of the longest periods of economic recovery in Europe, accompanied by a free-fall in public trust in institutions, with only one in ten Czechs expressing trust in the government (11%) and the Chamber of Deputies (10%) at the lowest point in 2012/2013 (CVVM, 2013). Add to this the rise of illiberalism at home and increasing divides between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states, laid bare especially during the so called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016. As a consequence, you end up with a region that is not so sure about its feeling about and to- wards ‘the West’ any longer (Kazharski, 2018; Krastev & Holmes, 2019). Put differently, by mid-2010s, the Czech society was already in a state of anxiety and uncertainty about its own geopolitical identity and in search for ontological fixes.3 **This is where the HW discourse clicks** in following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. To the liberal voices that dominate security debates, hybrid warfare could be used to put a name on this anxiety and thereby attempt to **suppress it by the construction of familiar geopolitical narratives**. By invoking the prism of a conflict between a liberal-democratic West and an authoritarian Russia, all sorts of problems – spread of misinformation, return of nationalism, technological transformations or global power shifts – **could be reduced to the logic of civilisational confrontation**. This is the conventional ontological security part of the story, to which we add another step by showing how this promise of security is never actually fulfilled. Due to the supposed invisibility and omnipresence of hybrid threats and the insecure position the Czechs occupy in their own East/ West geopolitical imagination, **there is a surplus of anxiety that cannot be successfully managed.** The case study is structured according to the two ‘faces’ of the Janus- faced politics of anxiety. First, we show how hybrid warfare was used as a sense-making device promising to manage anxiety by providing a conceptual link between a broad range of social issues and anchoring them within the familiar East/West geopolitical imagination. This linking could simultaneously make hybrid warfare meaningful by geo- politicising it, and reinforce the crumbling East/West geopolitical imagination by showing its renewed relevance in facing hybrid warfare. Second, we show how the fleeting sense of ontological security achieved via this articulation gets undone by the recurring re-emergence of sur- plus anxiety and how HW ends up reproducing and perpetuating the sense of insecurity and anxiety it was supposed to resolve. The analysis is grounded in a range of empirical materials from 2014 to 2020, including official documents, media articles, popular books and parliamentary debates. Two caveats are in order. First, both Czech government and civil society have responded to the perceived threat of HW in many ways, including creating new official institutions and informal initiatives tailored to deal with it (Daniel & Eberle, 2018). In this article, we focus on the discourse that made these responses possible. Second, as shown elsewhere (Daniel & Eberle, 2021), the Czech HW discourse is not monolithic and includes different understandings of what exactly con- stitutes a threat to whom, ranging from military operations targeting public infrastructures all the way to individual citizen’s struggles with media literacy. In this article, though, we downplay these differences and instead focus on the commonalities that tie these different notions together as parts of ostensibly the same problem of Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’. 3.1. Repressing anxiety: making sense of hybrid warfare through East/ West geopolitics Starting with the repression side of anxiety geopolitics, this can be observed inthe successive steps through which ontological security is sought by associating a range of issues with hybrid warfare and then pinning HW onto the familiar map of East/West geopolitical imagina- tion. This consists of four interrelated discursive moves: identifying the supposed ‘origin’ of societal unease, putting a name of the problem, localising it in space, and endowing it with broader geopolitical mean- ings. In this particular case, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 serves as the supposed original moment and ‘cause’ of anxiety, hybrid warfare is the name presented to make sense of what is going on, Russia is constructed as the threat, and civilisational East/West geopolitics is used to give the situation broader meaning. Let us now discuss each of these steps in turn. First, a certain event needs to be constructed as a supposed point of origin of the perceived unease, **a ‘crisis’** that dislocates the symbolic order (Nabers, 2015). This is the first move in the repression of anxiety, one in which an ‘actually existing’ empirical event is discursively pre- sented as the apparent cause of the deeper ontological crisis that is affectively experienced as anxiety. In the HW discourse in Czechia, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine of 2014 is presented as such pro- foundly shocking and dislocating event. As the otherwise rather down-to-earth and matter-of-fact military intellectual, Karel ˇRehka, puts it: ‘the Russian Federation shocked the whole world. The unimaginable was broken into.’ (ˇRehka, 2017, p. 199) ‘Shock’ and ‘helplessness’ are words used also by a high-ranking Czech diplomat (personal interview, Prague, August 4, 2020). A leading Czech think-tanker then recalls how ‘surprised’ he was by Russia’s invasion and how ‘disorganised and fragmented’ the security debates were in the months that followed (Janda, 2017). The affective experience is captured well also in a widely cited and circulated popular book, which vividly describes how ‘we are walking on the edge of a cliff’ and ‘[u]ncertainty is the only thing that you can count on these days’ (Alvarov ́a, 2017, p. 20). Therefore, 2014 was constructed as a radical breakthrough into a much more insecure world. Yet, this move of identifying the supposed origin of these dizzying feelings of anxiety in one particular event was at the same time already the first step of seeking ontological security by making sense of it. A second step is putting the name on the problem. It is only the performative and affect-laden performance of naming that connects disparate phenomena together and creates a discursive ‘object’ that can be then dealt with politically (Laclau, 2005). In our case, this leads to the creative appropriation of the concepts of ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘hybrid threats’, which were virtually non-existent in the Czech public discourse prior to 2014 (Daniel & Eberle, 2018), and using them as a linchpin that connects all sorts of societal problems. For an authoritative Czech se- curity document, ‘hybrid threat’ is a ‘way to wage a confrontation or a conflict’, one that is characterised by an extraordinarily broad spectrum of measures: ‘a wide, complex, adaptable, and integrated combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities, characterised primarily by coercion and subversion’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). **The range of actors** that can execute such methods is **similarly broad**, including ‘military, para- military, and various civilian actors’ (ibid.). Similarly, an overview of a ‘Russian hybrid strategy’ provided by the counterintelligence service includes ‘interpretation of modern history’, different ways of ‘informa- tion warfare’, ‘networking/infiltration’ across the fields of politics, economy, crime, espionage, culture and education, and militar- y/guerrilla operations alike (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). In statements like these, hybrid warfare is stretched so as to incorporate almost anything that can be understood as a hostile activity. A such, it becomes an universal object of fear, broad enough to be used as a placeholder for all sorts of anxieties. In the third move, hybrid warfare is territorialised by pointing to Russia as its ultimate source. The ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of hybrid warfare in terms of flows, clouds and infrastructures, is backgrounded in favour of the ‘modern’ territorial East/West geopolitics of a Russian threat. In certain cases, this means little more than merely pointing out that it is indeed Russia that ‘has executed hybrid operations [ ...], including targeted disinformation activities and cyber-attacks’, as the Defence Strategy (Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2017, p. 7) puts it explicitly and other documents hint at implicitly (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2015). More inter- esting are the instances which present Russia not only as one source of threats, but as an orchestrator coordinating all possible means and ac- tors. In such cases, the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of net- works is used and reproduced, yet with a key twist: such networks are seen as hierarchical, with centre in Moscow. In this logic, different do- mestic actors – ‘alternative news’ websites spreading anti-Western nar- ratives, right-wing populists, even contrarian intellectuals – can ultimately be tied to an overall Russia’s masterplan (for an example see Janda & Kundra, 2016). The counterintelligence agency reports are an example of this ‘puppet-master’ approach. One of them lists ‘covert infiltration of Czech media and the Internet’ and ‘foundation of puppet organizations, covert and open support of populist or extremist subjects’ among the key activities of Russia’s ‘information operations’ (Security Information Service, 2016, p. 9). Another outlines this logic in colourful detail, claiming that ‘Russia is creating a structure in Europe drawing on the concept of the Comintern (the Communist International; the Third International) founded by the Soviet Union’ (Security Information Ser- vice, 2015, p. 11), an organised network of all sorts of actors ‘with pro-Russian stances or fighting against the system’ (ibid., 12). However, different actors can be labelled as agents or instrument of HW and then geopoliticised and linked to Russia not only by direct as- sociation, but also because they are merely voicing opinions that can be somehow qualified as ‘pro-Russian’. As a more recent counterintelli- gence report puts it, actually an ‘overwhelming majority of disinfor- mation websites in Czech are the work of Czech [...] citizens, who are not supported by Russian entities.’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 8) Nevertheless, this still makes them a part of a broader geopolitical threat, as ‘these people and their internet projects are misused by Russia to spread propaganda or support other components of the hybrid strat- egy.’ (ibid., 8) It is this imagination of a Russian-orchestrated networked threat that enables a leading Czech journalist to blankly dismiss the prominent disinformation website, Aeronet. cz, as ‘writing for Putin’ (Kundra, 2016b), without any evidence of links to the Russian state known at that point and with his own subsequent investigations showing that this is most likely not the case. It also makes it possible to deal with anxieties by externalising the problem, such as when a popular book argues that ‘Furious hate [...] is not Czech, it is something new, foreign. It came from the outside and ‘somehow’ entered into us.’ (Alvarov ́a, 2017, p. 88). In the fourth and final move, this ‘hybrid’ struggle with Russia is endowed with meaning by being inserted into the whole symbolic structure of East/West civilisational geopolitics, in which ‘[i]ssues of security and geopolitics are [...] reframed in cultural terms. They become simultaneously geographical, cultural and strategic concepts, and they diffuse into ever more spheres of political life.’ (Kuus, 2007, p. x) The societal anxieties that are managed via the narrative of hybrid warfare emanating from Russia, are now also made part of an eternal J. Eberle and J. Daniel Political Geography 92 (2022) 102502 6struggle between the East and the West. This reactivates the ‘mental maps’, in which ‘the West’ functions as a desired point of identification and a promise of security and prosperity, whereas ‘the East’ is seen as ‘an abyss’, a notion ‘which in the Czech political discourse refers less to a geographical space than to ontological categories defining the alienated past of the Czech Republic.’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84) As one member of parliament, Jan Bartoˇsek, put it, the Czechs are left with an unequivocal choice: ‘either we will be part of NATO as a firm ally of our pro-Western orientation, or we will be just one of Russia’s many colonies. There is no third way.’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2018a). In statements like these, Russia is presented as a fundamentally different entity, a quintessentially Oriental actor, belonging to a different ‘universe’ that ‘until nowadays has not met’ with the European one (Alvarov ́a, 2017, p. 70). Echoing classical Orientalist tropes, Rus- sians supposedly rely on ‘[m]ysticism, irrationality, associational instead of logical thinking – thus, a model of thinking that is of different civilisation, the one we know rather from the Orient’ (Alvarov ́a, 2017, p. 193). The potentially catastrophic consequences of allying with Russia are then often presented through references to the past, reinforcing the notion that what is at stake in HW is in fact yet another instance of a historical struggle between civilisations. ‘Many of us probably know our modern history, from 1945 through 1948, Russian advisers, death of [foreign minister] Jan Masaryk, occupation in 1968. The Russian in- fluence, which simply broke us away from the West, ripped us from [our] democratic development, and has incalculable economic conse- quences stretching to this day.’ (Helena Langˇs ́adlov ́a in Chamber of Deputies, 2018b). This idea that issues like propaganda, misinformation or rise of populism are instances of a dramatic geopolitical confrontation, is finally driven home also by the notion that it is the West as a whole that is under attack, not just any individual country. According to a coun- terintelligence report, ‘the goal of the Russian hybrid campaign’ is ‘primarily to weaken NATO and the EU internally, e.g. by weakening individual member states’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). Therefore, should the Czechs fail to defend themselves, they are sup- posedly endangering something much bigger. According to a member of parliament, Jan Lipavský, what the Russians want is ‘to break European unity’ (Chamber of Deputies, 2018b). Such ideas connect hybrid warfare squarely to the Messianistic undertones of the East/West geopolitical imagination, in which the Central Europeans serve as guardians defending the West at its limit. To paraphrase Milan Kundera’s (1984) foundational essay on Central European civilisational geopolitics, by fighting hybrid warfare, the Czechs are risking ‘dying for Czechia and the West’, which indeed gives a sense of deep purpose and meaning to their cause and produces a strong anxiety-repressing narrative. To sum up this part, one important aspect of the anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare lies in the way how it allows channelling deeper anxieties by using the East/West geopolitical imagination to produce familiar storylines, identities and objects of fear. Despite being con- structed as multifaceted, broad and difficult to detect, hybrid warfare is made legible by being projected on a familiar ‘mental map’, where it becomes merely the most recent instance of long-lasting struggle be- tween the West and a fundamentally different, antagonist Russia. However, the relationship between the discourses of hybrid warfare and East/West geopolitics goes both ways: HW is not only territorialised by, but also gives broader meaning to and, in a way, promises to reinforce the East/West civilisational geopolitics. It is in and through HW that Russia is constructed as fundamentally different and the West presented as a coherent entity under attack, as well as something worth defending against the potentially tragic alternatives. Through the discourse of hybrid warfare, doubts about the relevance or resilience of a West- centric geopolitical order are seemingly brushed away and old geopo- litical identities are hardened. This is precisely the logic of ontological security that makes the ideas of a ‘return of geopolitics’ and the ‘new Cold War’ so appealing, as shown by Guzzini (2012, 2016) and Browning (2018). 3.2. Reproducing anxiety: danger is everywhere and the East is already within The HW discourse arguably succeeds on the level of meaning, that is in ‘making sense’ of the new threats by geopoliticising them in East/ West terms. In contrast, its success is only fleeting at best as an anxiety- repressing ontological fix. In this section, we focus on the other face of anxiety geopolitics, showing how the HW discourse also contributes to the reproduction of anxiety. The argument that security discourses end up perpetuating the very insecurity they promise to deal with is not new (e. g. Campbell, 1998). More recently, Heath-Kelly (2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have advanced it from an explicitly Lacanian perspective and shown how the discourses of terrorism and cybersecurity are inherently bound to disappoint the underlying desire for security. The endurance of these discourses is made possible by way how they pre-emptively incorporate an explanation for their own failure. **Terrorism and cyber- threats are constructed in such a broad, complex and omnipresent manner that no individual achievement can lead to the resolution of the problems presented by these discourses.** **There are always new risks** and vulnerabilities, as the destruction or neutralisation of no actually existing objects of fear (e.g. Osama bin Laden) can ultimately satisfy the underlying ontological anxieties. There is always something else to worry about. Building on Heath-Kelly and Jacobsen, our final argument is that hybrid warfare works exactly like their examples, as HW, too, is a discourse that is simultaneously anxiety-repressing and anxiety- reproducing. In fact, we argue that the linking of HW and East/West geopolitics produces a particularly strongly anxiety-ridden discourse. While hybrid warfare presents threats as invisible and omnipresent due to their covert and networked nature, the East/West imagination further raises the stakes and salience of such threats by painting them as parts of a titanic civilisational struggle. The subjects produced by such discourse can never rest, as what may be going on right behind their noses is not just one particular cyber-attack, a single conspiracy theory that has gained traction on Facebook, or merely one instance of information stolen by a spy. Instead, it is a battle for the future of ‘the West’ and the Czech belonging to it, one where the alternative option is the most tragic one: a descent deep into the ‘abyss’ of ‘the East’ (Cadier, 2019). We will now illustrate these arguments by focusing on the unfathomability of HW, the shifting nature of the threats it produces, and the anxieties inherent in the East/West geopolitics that underpin it. First, the ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) is pre-emptively incorporated in the HW discourse by its portrayal of the looming dan- gers as insidious, invisible and even impossible to detect. As a key se- curity document states, ‘[t]he principal risk to which a subject attacked by a hybrid campaign is exposed lies in the fact that they will not be able to identify the hybrid campaign – in time, in its full scale, or at all’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 129). According to the deputy Helena Langˇs ́adlov ́a, what we are supposedly facing are highly dangerous, yet ‘creeping threats’, which we ‘cannot see on a day by day basis’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2019). This leads some to claim that ‘at no point in history was it so extremely difficult to decide, if we are at war, or not’ (T ́aborský, 2019, p. 164). While there may be little drama on the surface, **no one can ever rest in this logic.** An attack may be already underway, one that can even be approximated to war, **literally at any minute**. As the Special Forces general, Karel ˇRehka, put it at a conference organised in the Czech parliament: ‘In a way, we are already at war, we just do not realise it or are not able to admit it.’ (Lang, 2015) This is a mode of thinking that produces highly anxious subjects, in a constant sense of the ‘**expectant dread’** that is anxiety (Hook, 2015, p. 117), one not yet having a clear referent **and directed towards all possible** yet still **unknown dangers that may materialise at any time**. It is in these notions that an unspecified existential threat may be hidden behind mundane events that the otherwise backgrounded ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of HW suddenly kicks back in. If the ‘modern’ East/West **geopolitical imagination ‘made sense’** and J. Eberle and J. Daniel Political Geography 92 (2022) 102502 7provided at least some fleeting ontological security by pointing to Russia, this is frustrated by the surplus anxiety produced via this ‘post- modern’ imagination of insidious, **hidden networks operating in phys- ical and cyberspace alike**. In fact, as the discourse postulates, we may not even know that it really is Russia in the first place that is behind a particular incident, as hybrid attackers seek to create ‘an environment where responsibility for these activities cannot (at least formally) be attributed to them, or at least only speculatively and with great diffi- culty’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). We may ultimately never know if this or that mundane event is actually not a part of something much bigger, as it is the very aim of the attacker to ‘prevent a clear interpretation of events and the discovery of their interconnectedness’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). Therefore, while the prevalent ‘modern’ geopolitical reading of HW enables channelling anxiety by constructing Russia an object of fear, it still remains far from the manageable fear of ‘fight or flight’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 241). This is because these sup- posedly known aspects of the danger are constantly being accompanied and disrupted by the surplus anxiety of the ‘unknown unknowns’ stemming from the partial inclusion of the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical reading. **This effectively pre-empts the HW discourse from ever solving the problems it is supposedly designed to tackle**, as it is wholly **unclear how to act upon threats** that we are not yet aware of or do not know how to make sense of. Second, this oscillation between the known and the unknown and between fear and anxiety manifests itself in the constantly shifting construction of what is supposed to be the exact nature of the threat coming from Russia. This is best illustrated in the wording of the annual reports of the Czech counterintelligence agency (SIS), which reinforce the notion that Russia is indeed a severe threat, yet the precise character and shape of this threat appears to be changing year after year. As already mentioned, in first annual public report reflecting on the situ- ation after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the SIS warned that their assessment showed the formation of what was spectacularly labelled as the ‘New Reincarnation of the Comintern’ – a loose network of allied actors, similar to the Cold War Soviet-controlled network of ideologi- cally affiliated political parties, agitators and agents. The danger was portrayed as a new version of this tried and tested strategy, which Russia supposedly employs to connect different groups dissatisfied with the Western liberal democracy (Security Information Service, 2015, pp. 11–12). However, the spectre of the Comintern was a one-off, never to appear again. Instead, SIS later concluded that the threat resided in a much looser combination of often uncoordinated actions of Russian intelli- gence, authentic Czech individuals not in any way linked to Moscow but ‘only’ spreading their own ‘pro-Russian’ worldviews, and finally, even in the lack of education about modern history in schools (Security Infor- mation Service, 2018, pp. 6–8). This trend of diffusing the danger from a Kremlin-coordinated network to seeing the threats in mere ideological resonances further continued. The most recent report notes that there is a ‘transition from state-controlled or directed activities to spontaneous actions’ of like-minded actors. ‘When Russian state officials express what they desire to happen (for instance by spreading manipulative information), proxy actors without any links to the Russian state pro- ceed to action on their own initiative and based on what they think the officials might want’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9). Through this move, the spectre of ‘Russian hybrid warfare’ can now encompass virtually anything that can be somehow interpreted as matching with the desires or interests of the Kremlin, without any need for proving direct links, as these are no longer considered necessary. **The construction of ‘a threat’ now includes even situations when ‘a foreign power does not engage in any direct action and keeps its distance**, while using various ways (PR, instigating statements, propaganda etc.) to inspire individual persons to take action’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9). Put differently, Russian threat can be present even where there is no direct Russian hand whatsoever. **Literally any individual with views** somehow similar to those of the Russian state can be seen as part of it, which makes the idea that **security can ever be achieved virtually impossible**. Instead, this logic contributes to the reproduction of an anxious society, defined by ‘the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247). Third, this notion that the possibility that something ‘Russian’ may be insidiously present deep within the Czech society then revives also the old anxieties inherent in the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination it- self. Central Europeans’ self-positioning in East/West geopolitics is highly ambivalent (Kuus, 2007; Todorova, 2009). On the one hand, being or becoming part of ‘the Western civilisation’ is a source of ontological se- curity. On the other hand, this security is never quite complete or perma- nent. This is because Central Europeans locate themselves at the very limit of the West, as ‘European edge-men’ (M ̈alksoo, 2010, p. 5), whose mem- bership in the civilisation must constantly be proved as it can always be taken away – especially by the forces of the ‘East’. The ‘old shadow of Yalta’, the feeling that the region’s ‘freedom could yet again be expendable in times of crisis’ is constantly present (M ̈alksoo, 2010, p. 75). Put differ- ently, East/West geopolitics equips the Czech ‘pro-Western’ security in- tellectuals with a ‘mental map, where the country is depicted as being on the “edge” of Europe and constantly risking to “fall” into an abyss [...] traditionally characterised as the “East”’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84). While the East/West geopolitical imagination can succeed in spatialising the threat in the Russian ‘other’, the position it grants to the self is always potentially insecure. Therefore, it is also East/West geopolitics itself that produces subjects that are constantly on alert, facing the constant ‘possibility of loss of one’s soul’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 8) that defines the experience of anxiety. Such fragile geopolitical self-positioning further fuels the search for new and new sources of hybrid threats, as failing to uncover and face them may have existential consequences, especially given that ‘Easternness’ may have already infiltrated and compromised the Czech social body. This notion of ‘East within’ links to the above discussed unfathomability and invisibility of HW and manifests itself in multiple ways. For one counterintelligence report, it takes the form of smuggled ideas and narratives, presented ‘in a way leading Czech citizens to believe they are recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not of Russian propaganda’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11). Similarly, a popular book on ‘fake news’ geopoliticises social attitudes en bloc by identifying them along East/West axis, presenting the ‘disappointed’ part of society as ‘seeing a model in Russia, or perhaps China’ (Gregor, Mlejnkov ́a, & Zvolsi.info, 2018, p. 62). For others, the ‘East within’ takes the form in the physical presence of ‘Putin’s agents’ who supposedly ‘**quite likely teach your children at universities, you meet them for a coffee in your favourite caf ́e or work in normal jobs.**’ (Kundra, 2016a, p. 88). The anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare is thus also about creating the normatively highly disturbing ‘“red under every bed” mentality’ (Fridman, 2018, p. 3) and applying ‘the ethics of total war [...] even to the smallest skirmish’ (Galeotti, 2019, p. 8). Therefore, viewing security threats through the prism of hybrid warfare reproduces a highly anxious society and perpetuates the justification for those ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ ( ́O Tuathail & Agnew, 1992) that would not hesitate to pro- vide the sort of geopolitical fixes that were discussed in the previous sections. Thereby, the discourse ends up reproducing itself, as the two faces of anxiety geopolitics not only disrupt, but also dialectically reinforce one another: geopolitical discourse emerges to repress anxiety and provide ontological security, yet the anxiety inherent in the discourse disrupts ontological security and, to come full circle, creates the need for geopolitical discourses. The result is a society oscillating between its desire to avoid anxiety and the repeated frustration thereof; an affective pulsation that has arguably been elevated to a dominant mode of politics of (in)security in our present time (Eklundh et al., 2017), of which hybrid warfare is a prime example. As similar patterns of anxious over-reaction and securitisation of broad areas of social life have been recognised by authors writing about HW in different J. Eberle and J. Daniel Political Geography 92 (2022) 102502 8empirical contexts (Fridman, 2018; Galeotti, 2019; M ̈alksoo, 2018;

̈Ord ́en, 2019), we believe that the problem with ‘hybrid warfare’ is of a more general nature and the relevance of our analysis reaches beyond the Czech case. 4. Conclusion Introducing anxiety geopolitics as a conceptual linchpin between disparate arguments from debates on critical geopolitics, ontological security, and politics of anxiety, this article made two central contri- butions. First, we have theorised the relationship between geopolitics and anxiety, moving beyond the existing accounts above all by pointing out the Janus-faced character of anxiety geopolitics, in which anxiety is both repressed and reproduced. Second, using the case of Czechia, we have argued that hybrid warfare is a discourse that constantly oscillates between repressing anxiety by geopoliticising the source of danger in East/West terms, and subverting its own constructions by presenting the threats as insidious, invisible, and constantly shifting. Therefore, we contend that the HW discourse is structured in a way that cannot achieve its purported ambition to secure populations against ‘hybrid threats’ and instead ends up producing more insecurity and anxiety. Our argument has clear normative implications that expand the existing criticisms of HW by putting the underlying civilisational geopolitics in spotlight. This should help us challenge the technology- centred presentism of the HW discourse, showing that many of the ostensibly unprecedented concerns are in fact reheated versions of narratives that date back decades if not centuries. More importantly, it enables us to point to the presence of some of the highly problematic aspects of East/West thinking, especially those that have been rightly criticised as Orientalist, chauvinist or even racist (see e.g. Said, 1978; Todorova, 2009). Realising the presence of civilisational geopolitics makes it possible to ask whether certain portrayals of Russia in HW debates – e.g. as barbaric, irrational, irredeemable – may not represent narcissistic projections of the ‘Western’ self, rather than credible threat assessments (Chernobrov, 2019). Importantly, these are not scholastic matters of concern just for ivory-tower peaceniks, as the proponents of HW sometimes like to put it. Instead, **these criticisms have clear impli- cations for security policy.** As recognised even among NATO’s own an- alysts and officials (Caliskan & Li ́egeois, 2020; Rühle, 2019), **adopting the prism of HW and labelling Russia as an inherently irrational enemy is detrimental to leading a productive debate** on the exact nature of the challenges that Putin’s regime poses and formulating appropriate and efficient strategies to respond to it. We add to it by highlighting that the HW discourse not only ‘undermines strategic thinking’ (Caliskan & Li ́egeois, 2020), but also **never actually manages to provide security** and creates highly concerning societal side-effects (perpetuation of anxiety, proliferation of Orientalist images). There are also important qualifications of our argument and avenues for further research. First of all, we certainly do not claim that everyone who ever spoke of ‘hybrid threats’ or ‘hybrid warfare’ would find themselves in agreement with the examples used in our analysis, or be instantly guilty of Orientalism. While the article focused on overarching themes, there is certainly variation within the HW discourse, not only in Czechia (Daniel & Eberle, 2021), but also in Germany, UK or EU (Jan- iˇcatov ́a & Mlejnkov ́a, 2021; Monsees, 2020; ̈Ord ́en, 2019). One intriguing possibility for further research is in showing the variation in the way how geopolitical thought is invoked and anxiety repressed and reproduced within the different versions of the HW discourse. More generally, the theoretical argument should also be tried and developed in other contexts.

## AI Links

### 2NC---Link---Generic

#### AI threat construction and “arms race” rhetoric massively increases the risk of conflict---even if there is a “race” and even if we “win,” their impacts are inevitable

Cave and ÓhÉigeartaigh 18 – Director of the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence at the University of Cambridge; Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk

Stephen Cave and Seán ÓhÉigeartaigh, “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks,” AI Ethics and Society, January 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330280774\_An\_AI\_Race\_for\_Strategic\_Advantage\_Rhetoric\_and\_Risks

The Dangers of an AI Race for Technological Advantage: In Rhetoric and in Reality

What is so bad about framing the development of AI in terms of a race for technological advantage? After all, it is widely agreed that AI brings enormous potential benefits across many sectors. One recent report estimated that it could add £232 billion by 2030 to the UK economy alone, with healthcare one of the sectors most enhanced, potentially bringing faster, better service to consumers (PwC 2017). There is a widespread belief that competition and other market forces are central to such innovation. So in as much as a race to develop AI technology means these kinds of benefit come sooner, we have reason to view it positively.

But at the same time, the development of such a potentially powerful new technology will need to be steered if it is to be as beneficial as possible while minimising the risks it might pose (Crawford and Calo 2016). In the words of the Future of Life Institute’s open letter on ‘Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence’, signed by over 8,000 people including many leading figures in AI, work should focus “not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI.” (Future of Life Institute, 2017a). The danger of an AI race is that it makes exactly this thoughtful steering towards broadly beneficial outcomes more difficult.

Three Sets of Risks

We want to distinguish between three sets of risks:   
i) The dangers of an AI ‘race for technological advantage’ framing, regardless of whether the race is seriously pursued;   
ii) The dangers of an AI ‘race for technological advantage’ framing and an actual AI race for technological advantage, regardless of whether the race is won;   
iii) The dangers of an AI race for technological advantage being won.

(i) Risks Posed by a Race Rhetoric Alone

It is possible that **the trend towards ‘race for technological advantage’ terminology** in AI, including suggestions such as Vladimir Putin’s that the winner of such a race “will become the ruler of the world,” **could pose risks even if the race is not pursued in earnest, let alone won**. We perceive two main risks here:   
(i.a) The kind of thoughtful consideration of how to achieve broadly beneficial AI, as mentioned above, will require subtle, inclusive, multi-stakeholder deliberation over a prolonged period. The rhetoric of the race for technological advantage, with its implicit or explicit threat that dire consequences will follow if some other group wins that race, is not likely to be conducive to such deliberation. Indeed, rhetoric around technological superiority (such as the **‘arms race’ rhetoric** used in the Cold War in the US), played into what has been called a **politics of fear, or a politics of insecurity** -- that is, a political climate that discourages debate in favour of unquestioning support for a prescribed agenda (Griffith 1987). In The Politics of Insecurity, Jef Huysmans argues that use of the **language of security** (by which he means militarised language, which would include ‘arms race’ and related rhetoric) “**is a particular technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear** in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust” (Huysmans 2006).   
(i.b) Second, if the rhetoric of a competitive, ‘winner takes all’ AI race is used in the absence of an actual race, it **could contribute to sparking such a race.**

(ii) Risks Posed by a Race Emerging If the rhetoric of a race for technological advantage became an actual race to develop sophisticated AI, the risks increase further:   
(ii.a) First, there is the risk that racing to achieve powerful AI would not be conducive to taking the proper safety precautions that such technology will require (Armstrong, Bostrom, and Shulman 2016). We mentioned above the need for broad consultation about the role AI should play in the life of a community. This might help address important considerations such as avoiding biased systems, or maximising fairness. But in addition to these goals, serious attention must also be given to ensuring humans do not lose control of systems. Such considerations become particularly important if AI approaches general intelligence or superintelligence (Bostrom 2014), but also long before, particularly when AI systems are performing critical functions. The risk is that as the **perceived benefit** to winning the race increases, so correspondingly does the **incentive to cut corners** on these safety considerations.   
(ii.b) Second, a ‘race for technological advantage’ could increase the risk of competition in AI causing real conflict (overt or covert). Huysmans argues that militarised language such as this has “a specific capacity for fabricating and **sustaining antagonistic relations** between groups. In the case of the race for technological advantage, it encourages us to see competitors as **threats** or even **enemies**. The belief that a country intends in earnest to win an AI race, and that this would result in technological dominance, could, for example, prompt other countries to use aggression to prevent this (akin to the cyberattacks made against Iranian nuclear facilities attributed to the US and Israel) (Nakashima 2012), or motivate the targeting of key personnel (precedents -- though specific to their historical context -- might include Operation Paperclip, during which over 1,600 German scientists and engineers who had worked on military technology were taken to the US (Jacobsen 2014), or the apparently ongoing operations to encourage the defection of nuclear scientists between nations) (Golden 2017). Such scenarios would also in- crease the risk that a general race for technological superiority became increasingly a military AI arms race.

(iii) Risks Posed by Race Victory The third category of risks of an AI race for technological superiority are those that would arise if a race were won. We will not explore these in detail here -- and the forms they take will anyway depend on the precise nature of the technology in question. But as an example, these risks include the **concentration of power** in the hands of whatever group possesses this transformative technology. If we survey the current international landscape, and consider the number of countries demonstrably willing to use force against others, as well as the speed with which political direction within a country can change, and the persistence of non-state actors such as terrorist groups, we might conclude that the number of groups we would not trust to responsibly manage an overwhelming technological advantage exceeds the number we would.

### 2NC---AT: Threat Real---Arms Race

#### AI arms racing representations are incorrect

Scharre 21 – Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS, award-winning author of Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War.

Paul Scharre, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory,” Texas National Security Review, Summer 2021, <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/13985>

Current Military AI Competition Is Not an “Arms Race”

As Heather Roff has written, the arms race framing “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.” To begin with, AI is not a weapon. AI is a general-purpose enabling technology with myriad applications. It is not like a missile or a tank. It is more like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or computer networks.6 General-purpose technologies like AI have applications across a range of industries. Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly has argued that it “will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize.”7

Nations may very well be in a technology race to adopt AI across a range of industries. AI will help to improve economic productivity and, by extension, economic and military power. During the industrial revolution, early adopters of industrial technology significantly increased their national power. From 1830 to 1890, Britain and Germany, which were both early industrializers, more than doubled their per capita gross national product while Russia, which lagged in industrialization, increased its per capita gross national product by a mere 7 percent over that 60-year period.8 These technological advantages led to increased economic and military power, most notably for Europe relative to the rest of the world. In 1790, Europe (collectively), China, and India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, with Europe and India each holding about one-quarter of global manufacturing output and China holding roughly one-third. They all had approximately equivalent levels of per capita industrialization at that time. But the industrial revolution skyrocketed European economic productivity. By 1900, Europe collectively controlled 62 percent of global manufacturing output, while China held only six percent and India less than two percent. These economic advantages translated into military power. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the world’s land surface.9

Being ahead of the curve in adopting AI is likely to lead to significant national advantages. Although AI can increase military capabilities, the more consequential advantages over the long term may come from non-military AI applications across society. Long-term benefits from AI could include increased productivity, improved healthcare outcomes, economic growth, and other indicators of national well-being. Increasing productivity is especially significant because it has a compounding effect on economic growth. Over the long term, technological progress is the main driver of economic growth.10

Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the **militarization of AI does not**, at present, **meet the traditional definition of an arms race**, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12 Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI **fails** the arms race test in the critical area of spending.

Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent.13 Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races.14

Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget.15 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)

### 2NC---!---Speed Warfare

#### Securitization of AI development creates a security dilemma that ensures speed warfare---turns case

Scharre 21 – Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS, award-winning author of Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War.

Paul Scharre, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory,” Texas National Security Review, Summer 2021, <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/13985>

An Accelerating Tempo of Warfare

One possibility for how AI could alter warfare in a manner that would leave all states worse off would be if it accelerated the tempo of war past the point of human control, making warfare faster, more violent, and less controllable. There are advantages to adding intelligence into machines, but given the limitations of AI systems today, the optimal model for achieving the highest quality decision-making would be a joint human-machine architecture that combines human and machine decision-making. One way in which machines outperform humans, however, is in speed. It is possible to envision a competitive dynamic in which countries feel compelled to automate increasing amounts of their military operations in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work summed up the dilemma when he asked, “If our competitors go to Terminators and we are still operating where the machines are helping the humans and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”22 This is a classic security dilemma. One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other state’s security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up.

If states fall victim to this trap, it could lead to all states being less secure, since the pursuit of greater automation would not merely be an evolution in weapons and countermeasures that simply leads to the creation of new weapons in the future. At some point, warfare could shift to a qualitatively different regime in which humans have less control over lethal force as decisions become more automated and the accelerating tempo of operations pushes humans ”out of the loop” of decision-making. Some Chinese scholars have hypothesized about a battlefield “singularity,” in which the pace of combat eclipses human decision-making.23 U.S. scholars have used the term “hyperwar” to refer to a similar scenario.24 While the speed of engagement necessitates automation in some limited areas today, such as immediate localized defense of ships, bases, and vehicles from rocket and missile attack, expanding this zone of machine control into broader areas of war would be a significant development. Less human control over warfare could lead to wars that are less controllable and that escalate more quickly or more widely than humans intend. Similarly, limiting escalation or terminating conflicts could be more challenging if the pace of operations on the battlefield exceeds human decision-making. Political leaders would have a command-and-control problem in which their military forces are operating “inside” (i.e., faster than) their own decision cycle. The net effect of the quite rational desire for nations to gain an edge in speed could lead to an outcome that is worse for all. Yet, competitive dynamics could nevertheless drive such a result.

Financial markets provide an example of this dynamic in a non-military competitive environment. Automation introduced into financial markets, especially high-frequency trading in which trades are executed at super-human speeds in milliseconds, has contributed to unstable market conditions that can lead to “flash crashes,” in which prices rapidly and dramatically shift.25 Financial regulators have responded by employing “circuit breakers” that automatically halt trading for a pre-determined period of time if the price moves too quickly.26 Financial markets have the benefit of a regulator who can force cooperative measures on competitors to address suboptimal outcomes. Under conditions of anarchy in the international security environment, any such cooperation would have to come from states themselves.

The dynamic of a competition in speed is like an arms race, if we expand the definition of an arms race to be more in line with biological examples of competitive co-evolution. Biologists often use the metaphor of an arms race to explain “an unstable runaway escalation” of adaptation and counter-adaption that can occur in animals.27 This can occur between species, such as predator and prey, or within species, such as males evolving in competition for females. Biological arms races can manifest in a variety of ways, such as competitions between predator and prey with regard to camouflage vs. detection and armor vs. claws, as well as speed, cognitive abilities, poison, deception, or other attributes that might increase chances of survival.28 This broader biological definition of an arms race is more in line with the potential for an escalating “arms race in speed” among nations that leads to greater automation in warfare. While this concept does not meet the traditional definition of an arms race in the security studies literature, it is nevertheless a useful concept to describe the potential for a co-evolution in speed that leads to no net relative advantage and in fact may leave both sides worse off.

### 2NC---Alt Solvency

#### Emphasizing global cooperation and shared priorities solves the dangers of a race framework while still allowing the benefits of AI to be realized

Cave and ÓhÉigeartaigh 18 – Director of the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence at the University of Cambridge; Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk

Stephen Cave and Seán ÓhÉigeartaigh, “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks,” AI Ethics and Society, January 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330280774\_An\_AI\_Race\_for\_Strategic\_Advantage\_Rhetoric\_and\_Risks

Alternatives to a Race Approach

If we are not to pursue (and talk about pursuing) AI development as a race, then how should we pursue (and talk about pursuing) such development? This is too big a topic to consider thoroughly here. But we note these promising directions for alternative narratives around progress in, and benefits of, AI:

AI Development as a Shared Priority for Global Good

As advances in AI find application to an ever-wider range of scientific and societal challenges, there is a burgeoning discussion around harnessing the benefits of AI for global benefit. This reflects a widespread view among AI scientists and a growing number of policymakers that AI presents tremendous opportunities for making progress on global societal ills, and aiding in tackling some of the biggest challenges we face in the coming century -- among them **climate change** and clean **energy production**, **biodiversity loss**, **healthcare**, **global poverty** and **education**. Emphasising these benefits could **counteract a race approach** in a number of ways: First, if there is global scientific consensus that some of the key aims of AI should be to benefit humanity in these ways, then it becomes less important in which companies or countries key breakthroughs occur. Second, it makes clear that cooperation on the development of AI stands to result in faster progress on these pressing challenges. Lastly, if the aims of the field are to benefit humanity worldwide, then the global community represent stakeholders in the process of AI development; this narrative therefore promotes **inclusive and collaborative development** and deployment of AI.

Cooperation on AI as it is Applied to Increasingly Safety-Critical Settings Globally

The next decade will see AI applied in an increasingly integral way to safety-critical systems; healthcare, transport, infrastructure to name a few. In order to realise these benefits as quickly and safely as possible, **sharing of research, datasets, and best practices** will be critical. For example, to ensure the safety of autonomous cars, pooling expertise and datasets on vehicle performances across as wide as possible a range of environments and conditions (including accidents and near-accidents) would provide substantial benefits for all involved. This is particularly so given that the research, data, and testing needed to refine and ensure the safety of such systems before deployment may be considerably more costly and time-consuming than the research needed to develop the initial technological capability. Promoting recognition that deep cooperation of this nature is needed to deliver the benefits of AI robustly may be a powerful tool in **dispelling a ‘technological race’ narrative**; and a **‘cooperation for safe AI’ framing** is likely to become increasingly important as more powerful and broadly capable AI systems are developed and deployed.

Responsible Development of AI and Public Perception

AI is the focus for a growing range of public concerns as well as optimism (Ipsos MORI 2017, Fast and Horvitz 2017). Many stakeholders, including in industry, recognise the importance of public trust in the safety and benefits offered by AI if it is to be deployed successfully (Banavar 2017). It is the view of the authors that a narrative focused on **global cooperation** and **safe**, **responsible** **development** of AI is likely to inspire greater public confidence than a narrative focused more on technological dominance or leadership. Other powerful new technologies, such as genetically modified organisms and nuclear power, have in the past proven controversial, with significant communities arguing for a cautious, safety-first approach, to which the rhetoric of the race is antithetical.

Recent Narratives

There have been encouraging developments promoting the above narratives in recent years. ‘AI for global benefit’ is perhaps best exemplified by the 2017’s ITU summit on AI for Global Good (Butler 2017), although it also features prominently in narratives being put forward by the IEEE’s Ethically Aligned Design process (IEEE 2016), the Partnership on AI, and programmes and materials put forward by Microsoft, DeepMind and other leading companies. Collaboration on AI in safetycritical settings is also a thematic pillar for the Partnership on AI2 . Even more ambitious cooperative projects have been proposed by others, for example the call for a ‘CERN for AI’ from Professor Gary Marcus, through which participants “share their results with the world, rather than restricting them to a single country or corporation” (Marcus 2017). Finally, the overall narrative of cooperation was clearly expressed in a statement issued by a Beneficial AI conference in Tokyo3 : The challenges of ensuring that [AI] is beneficial are challenges for us all. We urge that these challenges be addressed in a spirit of cooperation, not competition. (Beneficial AI Tokyo, 2017).

Conclusion

Although artificial intelligence has been discussed for decades, only recently has it received serious and sustained attention from governments, industry and the media. Among the various ways in which this technology is framed, we have highlighted one that we consider to be potentially dangerous: that of the race for technological advantage. Partly, we believe that a general race to develop AI would be dangerous because it would also encompass -- given the dual use of this technology -- a literal, military arms race. But even if this were not the case, we believe there would be risks – e.g. from corner-cutting in safety and consultation. Although some might argue that the research community should altogether avoid using AI ‘race’ terminology for fear of giving it currency, we believe that the idea is already current enough to justify interventions that draw attention to the dangers. Much work remains to be done in understanding the dynamics of a possible race, and in developing alternative framings for AI development -- but there are encouraging examples on which to build.

**Biotech Links**

**2NC---Link---Generic**

**Positing biotech developments as a technology unstable in the wrong hands but beneficial in the right ones fuels securitized warfare and rampant, unsustainable biodefense spending, turns the case.**

Melinda **Cooper 8** Associate Professor in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Sydney, Australia; 2008; Life as Surplus, Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era; https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295987910/life-as-surplus/ - BS

In his public announcements on the matter Bush brings together the established **motifs** of **unpredictability** and probable **catastrophic consequences** with the requisite admission of resignation in the face of the **inevitable** (it is by now too late to mass-produce vaccines, stock up on sufficient antivirals, or rehabilitate the public health service). All of which, in a now familiar unfolding of logic, adds up to the necessity for preventive (read "preemptive") action. Specifically, Bush has suggested that the **D**epartment **o**f **D**efense should be authorized to forcibly **isolate**, evacuate, and **quarantine** the first line of **infected people** in any pandemic. ECONOMIES OF EMERGENCE In the mid-1990s the official rate of U.S. productivity growth suddenly **took off** in the statistics after a long twenty-five-year slump, seeming to confirm that the "information revolution" was indeed beginning to bear fruit. This sudden burst of exuberance was hailed as the **sign** of an **emerging** postindustrial **revolution**, whose two cutting-edge sectors (**biotech**nology and information technology) would **relaunch** the U.S. **economy** into a golden era of **indefinite growth**. As venture capital flooded into the digital and biotechnologies, it seemed that **speculation** itself had become the **driving** force behind **unprecedented** levels of **innovation**, allowing whole industries to be financed on the mere hope of future profits. W hat was at stake here, even according to the most skeptical of observers, was m uch more than an irrational bubble or the delirious financialization of the economy (Brenner 2002). Far from representing a final abstraction of the virtual from the tangible world of bodies, the rise of **venture capitalism** **institutionalized** a model of economic **growth** in which **production** itself was made to hinge on the **vagaries** of stock-market investment. This could not have been more **evident** than in the **biotech** sector, w here the most m aterial of **productions**—the experimental regeneration of life itself—became intimately infused w ith the virtual temporality of **speculation**. The political theorist Christian Marazzi has described the venture capital model of accumulation as an economy of emergence, where the so-called fundamentals of production are replaced by the traditional affective skills of the professional speculator—the ability to sense and respond to crowd movements before they take hold; to initiate new product lines before a m arket exists for them; to prom ote belief, euphoria, or panic in the face of an event that has not yet materialized. Marazzi (2002, 48-49) writes: "Everyday productivity is increasingly determ ined by the capacity to respond in unforeseen and unforeseeable situations, emergent situations, those situations that obviate any kind of programming and posit occasionality as central."23 During the late 19**90s** whole sectors of the **economy** were held aloft on a wave of media-induced **expectation**— expectation of **profit**, in the first place, but also a kind of collective **faith** in the soon-to-be realized **possibilities** of the new information and **life** science **technologies**. At a time when most biotech companies had yet to **develop** a marketable **product**, let alone make a **profit**, capital **investment** in the new technologies was sustained by the **hope** that the Hum an Genome Project (HUGO) and genomics in general were about to deliver an unheard-of revolution in health care, an era of designer drugs and precision-targeted interventions into the germ line. In M arch 2000, though, the venture capital frenzy of the late 1990s came to a fittingly millennial end w hen the dot-com stocks collapsed, followed later in the same year by the mass anticapitalist protests in Seattle.24 It was in this atmosphere of impending political and economic crisis, announcing the decline of the neoliberal triumphalism of the Clinton era, that Bush came to power. In retrospect, it seems clear that the war on terror was as m uch a political response to the downturn of the new economy as to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Bush's answer to the technophilic optimism of the Clinton era was an equally megalomaniac plan for indefinite war, encompassing the whole globe within his strategic vision. For a while venture **capital** continued to **invest** in the life sciences, with the **lingering hope** that the promised new economic growth would at least become tangible here. But when **HUGO** and other genome sequences were published, there was a sudden **sobering consensus** that the life sciences would need to move into the "post-genomic" era before the anticipated medical breakthroughs could be realized. In 2003 the **fortunes** of the **biotech** **sector slumped** to an alltime low, and at this point the U.S. **government** came to the **rescue** with a massive plan to fund "**biodefense" research** for the following ten years. The plan included generous incentives for drug development that seemed as much designed to overcome the time lags of commercialization as to counter the threat of bioterrorism. New biodefense legislation made sure that any "national health emergency" would become the perfect occasion for pushing through a drug w ithout clinical trial.23 Biotech would live again, but this time federal funding of life science research would be tagged to the new strategic vision of the Bush administration. The long-neglected domains of public health and infectious disease research would be rehabilitated and merged with biodefense while venture capital investment would again be courted, but this time on the pretext of perm anent war rather than perm anent growth. The difference between **Clinton's neoliberalism** and Bush's **neoconservatism** needs to be qualified then: **both economies mobilize speculative affect**, attuning it to the **emergence** of the **unpredictable**. What has changed is the affective valence of "our" relation to the future—from euphoria to panic to fear, or rather alertness (that is, a state of fear w ithout foreseeable end). W here the celebrants of the **new** economic **growth** reassured investors that there was no **end** to **innovation**, holding hope aloft with a constant **barrage** of **short-lived promises**, the neoconservatives w ant to **convince us** that there is **no end to danger**, that the **war** against **terror** can only be **indefinite** in **time and scale**.26 In the aftermath of September 11, **permanent warfare has become the new driving force behind U.S. economic growth**, feeding off its own **ineptitude** as it generates a seemingly **inexhaustible** dem and for **security services** of all kinds. Within this new configuration of powers, the life sciences have been promoted to a commanding position. The Bush administration has achieved something the theorists of Clinton's new intelligence agenda only ever dreamed of—the actual institutional conflation of security and public health research, military strategy, environmental politics, and the innovation economy.27 W hat is being articulated here is a profoundly new strategic agenda where war is no longer waged in the defense of the state (the Schmittian philosophy of sovereign war) or even hum an life (humanitarian warfare; the human as bare life, according to Giorgio Agamben [1998]), but rather in the name of life in its biospheric dimension, incorporating meteorology epidemiology and the evolution of all forms of life, from the **microbe up**. The extension of **preemptive warfare** to include the sphere of environmental and **biopolitics** conflates the eternalization of w ar with the **evolution** of **life** on earth— **as if** **permanent war** were simply a fact of life, **with no other end than its own crisis-driven perpetuation**. As **Dick Cheney** has **said**: "It **may never end**. At least not in our lifetime" (quoted in Woodward 2001). Inevitably, such a delirious **prognosis** on the **future** of **warfare** demands that we **rethink** the shape of a possible **antiwar politics**. Perhaps, given the recent nature of the events analyzed in this chapter, the problematic of resistance can be most forcefully posed in the interrogative form. What becomes of an antiwar politics when the sphere of military action infiltrates the "grey areas" of everyday life, contaminating our "quality of life" at the most elemental level (Brower and Chalk 2003)? In w hat sense is it even possible now to claim a right to "life," social security, public health—the peculiarly vital rights of the welfare state—w ithout falling into the trap of legitimating permanent warfare? And how do we counter a **politics** that turns the possibility of **ecological crisis** into a **tradable catastrophe risk** on the **capital markets**? One response to these questions has been to **redefine security** in **human**, biological, or even biospheric **terms**, as if this were the only way to salvage something of the vitalist politics of the welfare state. But such a strategy falls straight into the hands of the new intelligence agenda, w ith its manic desire to revitalize and expand the scope of legitimate security interventions. Rather than plead for a security politics w ith a hum an face, then, a more promising vector of resistance lies in the attem pt to underm ine the nexus betw een military security, the politics of life, and new forms of speculative capitalization. In the face of a politics that prefers to work in the speculative mode, w hat is called for is something like a creative sabotage of the future; a pragmatics of preemptive resistance capable of actualizing the future outside of the policeable boundaries of property right. And in the face of a politics that all too often adopts a posture of resignation in the face of the biospheric catastrophe, it is imperative that we do not give in to the sense of the inevitable. Neoliberalism has a vested interested in selective fatalism. Perhaps then the task of a counterpolitics is twofold: w herever possible, all efforts should be made to undermine the foregone conclusion, and w hen all else fails, the aim should be to reroute the catastrophe tow ard m ore interesting ends (catastrophes often become the occasion for renewing and creating countercommunities). This is an abstract formula for resistance that applies to such diverse questions as the capitalization of health and old age insurance; biological patents of all kinds; and even the commercialization of the "elements," from privatized water to tradable pollution rights and environm ental catastrophe bonds. Such a formula could describe any num ber of recent conflicts around the neoliberal politics of life, from the court case opposing AIDS activists to pharmaceutical companies in South Africa; to the revival of popular pharmacologies in the face of the depredations of a global drug market; and to projects in open source biology initiated by scientists across the life sciences, to nam e but a few. What is new about the current context, however, is the creeping militarization of these sites of biopolitical tension. The **domains** of **life** that **neolib**eralism has **sought** to incorporate into **commercial** and **trade** law over the past two decades are now being **forcibly recruited** into an expansive politics of **military security**. Increasingly, then, any counterpolitics of **health**, **ecology**, and life will need to **engage** with the pervasive reach of the **war on terror**; to contest, in other words, the growing **collusion** between **neoliberalism's politics** of life and the imposition of a **permanent** state of **warfare**.

**2NC---Link---Disease**

**Disease security rhetoric is inflated by the Pharma industry to sell solutions. Propagating said rhetoric contributes to the militarization of society and the ever expanding pharma market.**

**Rawlinson 17** – Western Sydney University Professor in International Criminology, Senior Lecturer Monash University, Lecturer with Special Reference to Criminology London School of Economics

Paddy Rawlinson, “Pharmatechnologies and the ills of medical progress”, 2017, The Routledge Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice

In the commercially driven process of **securitizing health, knowledge production** plays a **crucial role**, operating both as a tool and a good. **Security** as a commodity requires the consumer (here the public, the state and the medical profession) to **buy** (literally) into a belief that the **security products** offered are **effective** in **obviating** or at least weakening the risk of **disease** or illness. This further involves ensuring that any risk involved in **consuming** the **product**, in this case the vaccine, is overridden by the threat posed by the disease against which it is affording protection. Creating a vigorous **market** for business in a competitive environment, as studies of corporate crime have consistently shown, can involve a range of **deviant** and criminal **strategies** and activities, including fraud, corruption, intimidation and bribery, activities that are ubiquitous and, in some cases, systemic within industry. Historically ‘**Big Pharma’** has a poor track record for ethical behaviour (Braithwaite 1984; Dukes et al. 2014; Gotzsche 2013; Griffin and Miller 2011). Healy observes that unlike other health-risk businesses such as tobacco and the chemicals industry, in which ‘the best studies systematically point to hazards where they exist’ and where company studies tend to be a small component of evidence-production, often viewed with suspicion as being partial, the same does not pertain to the pharmaceutical industry:

with pharmaceuticals often the only studies are those of the drug companies themselves, and these studies, as one might expect, all seem to point to the benefits of an ongoing use of the very chemicals that may in fact be causing the problem.

(Healy 2012: 119)

Alongside vested-interest knowledge production, the **pharma**ceutical industry engages in **other** nefarious **activities**. These include **obstructing** the **publication** of **negative data** from clinical trials in **medical journals**, which are often financially **dependent** on **industry** for advertising and the sale of reprints; intimidating **whistle-blowers** amongst medical researchers and doctors **concerned** about the **safety of particular drugs**; and the ubiquitous practice of aggressively promoting products to the medical profession including providing financial inducements to win support for a particular drug (Gotzsche 2013; Healy 2012; Moynihan 2001). Nor are these deviant and harmful practices occasional aberrations, but instead reflect recidivist behaviour embedded within the industry (Braithwaite 1984; Dukes et al. 2014).

Despite a long history of **insalubrious behaviour** in the pharmaindustry, governments and intergovernmental organizations such as the **WHO** continue to focus on pharmaceuticalized solutions to what are arguably **pharmaceutically constructed** health **risks**. While obfuscating or down-playing the safety issues around the escalating **administration** of **medical interventions**, the pharmaindustry’s intensified **participation** in **research** and **policy**-making enables it to **construct** narratives of **high risk** around both the nature of **diseases** and their **prevalence**, and exaggerate the efficacy of its **products**, thereby creating an **ever-expanding market** (Healy 2012; Gotzsche 2013). This is especially the case in a product that is administered to a population. The vaccine industry is highly profitable not only because of its numerical reach but because, in an increasing range of jurisdictions, vaccines carry a mandatory status.

These policies, which for critics of mandatory medical intervention, are regarded as a **blatant violation** of **human rights**, have been legitimized through the discursive **modalities** of **securitization**, in much the same way that torture and extraordinary rendition were reconstructed as necessary for the protection of the very phenomena they were consistently eroding (Chossudovsky 2005). In both cases, where the market operates as a crucial driver, in which defensive mechanisms are for sale, whether vaccines or arms, there must be no limitation to demand. Creating demand through the security narrative and ensuring supply through mandate enables the constant proliferation of an industry which simultaneously protects and destroys. Excessive protection can only lead to destruction (consider the proliferation of nuclear arms during the Cold War in what was termed MAD – mutually assured destruction). Esposito captures this in his consideration of the process of over-immunization as a political, juridical as well as bio-political phenomenon, whereby ‘the warring potential of the immune system is so great that at a certain point it turns against itself as a real and symbolic catastrophe leading to the implosion of the whole organism’ (2011: 17). Yet, as has been made clear in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the voracious appetite of the market in its neoliberal manifestation continues apace ignoring the social and economic cannibalism of excessive profit-seeking. For the pharmaindustry that involves the presence, real or imaginary, of a constant threat of disease and infection.

State of infection

In its 2006 action plan to ‘increase vaccine supply’ the WHO informs us that ‘Influenza vaccine development and employment are critical elements of pandemic influenza preparedness’. In explaining how serious this risk of a pandemic actually is, and the consequent justification for spending billions of dollars on flu vaccines globally, the WHO slips into ‘**Rumsfeldian discourse’** describing the ‘the global **burden** of seasonal **influenza’** as an ‘**unknown’** (WHO 2006). We are now familiar with unknowns in their both knowable and unknowable states as being crucial to the extension of state power with its affiliate abuses. The ‘unknown burden’ of seasonal flu has occasioned not only the mass manufacture of a **vaccine** that, in its current stage of development has proven to be **less than effective** (Gallagher 2015), but also the introduction of **mandatory policies** around the **influenza** vaccine for health workers and other **professionals** (Babcock et al. 2010). Indeed, mandating a range of **vaccines** has now become **established practice** in a number of countries including the US, Australia, France and Canada, with the UK being a notable exception.

Mandatory creep has been occurring over the past few decades, overriding the hitherto right to abstain from vaccination programmes on the basis of religious or ‘conscientious objection’ (a term originally used for nineteenth-century vaccine objectors and subsequently adopted by the military for those who refused compulsory conscription on similar grounds) in many cases leaving medical exemption the only acceptable criterion for refusal. Vaccine programmes involve mass immunization or herd immunity in which a large percentage of the population is required to be vaccinated against a disease to ensure its control and hopefully gradual eradication, thereby protecting those who cannot be vaccinated against possible infection. Unlike other medical interventions, the focus here lies on the protection of the population rather than an individual. For Foucault, immunization represents a distinctive break from other medical relationships which seek to heal the individual, but operates as ‘a way of individualizing the collective phenomenon of the disease, or of collectivizing the phenomena, integrating individual phenomena within a collective field, but in the form of the rational and identifiable’ (2004: 60). This brings another dimension to the philosophy of reponsibilization that dominates the neoliberal concept of health, a paradoxical position that transforms individual accountability into sacrifice (for even the strongest advocates of mandatory vaccination admit there is no such thing as one hundred per cent safety). It is a subtly crafted moral sleight of hand that turns adherence to the market of and for pharmatechnologies into an abnegation of self, where the self operates not simply as part of the collective but as subservient to it: capitalism functioning through a ‘communist’ guise. Human rights can thus be dismissed as ‘nonsense upon stilts’ or perhaps worse still, as the greatest threat to human rights itself.

Given that the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights emerged from inter alia some of the most horrific medical abuses ever recorded it is even more ironic that the policy of mandatory vaccination is proliferating. It contravenes human rights contained within a number of conventions which establish individual autonomy regarding medical intervention. This includes Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights on the respect for one’s private life, that is ‘the right not to be physically interfered with’ (Liberty 2015) and more specifically, the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights protection against ‘torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’ (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966).

The combined rhetoric of **security** and science, fundamental to the justification and **waging of war**, not only assuages the retraction of human **rights** obligations by the state but can **render these rights** themselves **as presenting a threat**. As the war on **disease**, together with that on terror, has no defined **end**, no clear moment of **victory**, being non-territorial insofar as it has **no** physical **jurisdiction**, the suspension or weakening of human **rights** will continue and further entrench the ‘paradigm of **security** as the **normal technique of government’** (Agamben 2005: 14). In this environment vaccine objection easily slips into **criminalized activity** and criticism appears as **unpatriotic**. Concerns over conflict of interest, **data** manipulation, **bribery** and intimidation are turned into **politicized opposition** and those who voice these concerns become **enemies of the people**, **a security threat**, **health terrorists**. In this context, punitive measures against those who refuse, both for themselves or on behalf of those under their guardianship, are also becoming more draconian and can range from financial penalties, the exclusion of children from day care centres, loss of jobs (within the medical profession) or even prison (Willsher 2014).

Informed consent lies at the heart of the numerous instruments for the protection of the human body; the notion of bodily integrity underpins a series of rights that have been allocated to citizens in democratic states, including the right to abortion. When the information aspect of informed is either denied or contains negative data concerning safety it is rational to assume that consent might not be always forthcoming. Collusion between industry and politics is a major concern, as Eisenhower warned. Mary Holland’s critique of mandatory vaccination lays out the extent of these collusive relationships in the US, which were even admitted by politicians themselves:

In 2000, a Congressional report on Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Policy Making identified notable conflicts of interests in the FDA [Federal] and CDC [Center for Disease Control] advisory bodies that make national vaccine policy. These include ‘advisers’ financial ties to vaccine manufacturers’ as well as ‘advisers’ permitted stock ownership in companies affected by their decisions’.

(Holland 2012:77)

Declaring these activities in Congress has not deterred their occurrence. In 2007, an attempt was made by the erstwhile Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, to mandate the HPV vaccine in his state’s schools, a decision he was subsequently forced to overturn when it was revealed that Merck, the company that produced the Gardasil vaccine, had given donations towards his nomination (Eggen 2011). Nor will this be the last cosy relationship between politics and industry as mandatory vaccination policy continues to be applied to an increasing number of vaccines.

Conclusion

**Pharmatechnologies** manifesting as medical **research**, **drug production** and distribution, epistemological paradigms determining how **health**, **disease** and **risk are** to be **conceptualized** and negotiated, have now become a mode of **governance** in an increasingly **authoritarian environment**. This is not to detract from the **benefits** accrued from **medical progress** through pharmaceuticals and the important role played by vaccines in alleviating potential suffering. Yet, the **benign discourses** within which they **operate** can often **obscure harmful outcomes**, harms imposed as structural violence: opaque, **unidentifiable** and **normalized** (Žižek 2009). Victimization remains unseen or as a necessary price to pay for the **greater good.** In medical terms aspects of these harms are referred to as iatrogenesis, the unintended, often injurious, **consequences** of **medical intervention**. In this latter context it is akin to what military circles euphemistically term ‘**collateral damage’**, generally applied to the **killing** and maiming of **noncombatants**. However, some scholars who study **state** and **corporate harms** are less inclined to semantic generosity, not least when the majority of damage and injury inflicted falls on the same targets, the **socio-economically vulnerable**, gendered, racial, ethnic or other minorities whose lot it is to comprise the flotsam and jetsam of ruthless markets and the politics of indifference. Intention, or lack of, as they argue, cannot disguise the power relations at play as the usual suspects emerge as perpetrators and beneficiaries of systemic abuses.

If we are to accept the argument put forward by Tombs and Whyte that ‘The problems caused by corporations – which seriously threaten the **stability of our lives** – … are **enduring** and **necessary** functions of the corporation’ (2015: 4), a position supported by a plethora of cases, then all industry operating within a capitalist framework is intrinsically pathological. It is essentially a **diseased entity**, irrespective of the nature of goods and services produced or the rhetoric that designates it as benign. Ironically, this diseased entity in **combination** with an **increasingly diseased political system**, proclaims and even persists that it has both the **authority** and **ability** to produce and sell **health**. Yet, so strong is the belief in pharmaceuticalized health that **so many** literally buy into the ‘**truths’** of **pharmatechnologies failing** miserably to discern how the **contagion**-riddled **commodification** of health is actually the greatest **danger** to **health**. No business thrives on the elimination of demand for its goods. The technologies of war were justified through the eventual establishment of peace; so too the pharmaindustry legitimizes its existence through claims to health and healing. The existence of both is dependent on the perpetuation of the very phenomena they claim to defend us from, and in this they must continue to be producers of war and sickness. No longer does the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exist, as Eisenhower warned, it has become **fundamental** to the **industries of war** and **disease**, to **war on disease**.

### 2NC---Link---HIV/AIDS

#### Framing HIV/AIDS as a national security threat creates a biopoliticized security apparatus that targets colonized peoples

Ingram 07 - Department of Geography, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H0AP, UK

Alan Ingram, “HIV/AIDS, security and the geopolitics of US-Nigerian relations”, Review of International Political Economy Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 510-534 (25 pages), August, 2007, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25261925>

In 2005, Peter Piot, head of UNAIDS, the United Nations body charged with coordinating HIV/AIDS initiatives across the UN system, recounted the evolution of his political strategy for mobilizing national governments to do more to address their respective epidemics and endemics (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005a). Following his appointment upon the creation of UNAIDS in 1996, he tended to be directed towards ministries of health, as HIV/AIDS was regarded mainly as a health problem. But those ministries were generally marginal in the political dynamics of heavily affected states. Framing HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security, however, opened up new kinds of political access and interest. In making the case that HIV/AIDS was an issue of national security, Piot connected with a narrative propagated during the 1990s within the US by the influential Institute of Medicine about the need for the US to address the problem of 'global emerging infectious diseases' (including HIV/AIDS) as a matter of vital national interest (King, 2002).

These narratives exploited and played into the wider transformation of biopolitical security and facilitated the securitization of HIV/AIDS. A large and growing literature has emerged examining putative connections between HIV/AIDS and security (summarized and referenced extensively in Elbe, 2005,2006). Salient among the propositions of the dominant HIV/AIDS-security discourse is the idea that heavily affected societies will become increasingly prone to a variety of social, economic, and crucially, military and political crises that are likely to threaten development, stability and security over the medium to long term. Africa (particularly its eastern and southern states) has been the subject of most concern as the place with the highest incidence and prevalence rates and, it would seem, the most compelling prima facie evidence of HIV/AIDS-security linkages. This has included the supposed potential of AIDS to undermine the political fabric of countries with HIV prevalence over 10%; its ability to undermine the combat effectiveness of military and security forces (thought to be partic ularly at risk of HIV infection and particular catalysts for its spread); and to undermine the ability of countries to contribute to peacekeeping forces. Further causal pathways have been postulated around behaviours thought to be characteristic of military personnel (engagement with commercial sex workers; general predisposition to risk taking) and conflict-specific be haviours (use of rape as a weapon in war). It has also been suggested that breakdown in family structures and increases in the number of orphans as a result of AIDS deaths might lead to increases in criminality and facilitate recruitment into gangs and rebel groups. The cruder accounts move easily between HIV/AIDS, economic devastation and a supposed growing risk of 'terrorism' (Neilson, 2005).

Concern has also been elaborated about the security implications of the pandemic for countries and regions in the early- to mid- stages of worsening epidemics. Russia, India, China, Ethiopia and Nigeria were identified as key states in the 'next wave' of HIV/AIDS in a 2002 report by the NIC. This estimated that these five countries would drive the number of people with HIV for the rest of the decade, with the number infected growing from 14 to 23 million to an estimated 50 to 75 million by 2010 (NIC, 2002). In all the next wave states, the rise in HIV/AIDS was predicted to have significant economic, social, political and military implications. In addition, all five were recognized as major regional or global players. Ethiopia and Nigeria were predicted to be the hardest hit, with the most advanced epidemics, high rates of transmission and only limited public services to mobilize. Their epidemics were predicted to decimate key government and business elites, undermine growth and discourage foreign investment. This discourse has produced a variety of truth effects that have propagated through governance networks and echoed back from target countries and institutions, influencing national and international responses. Elbe (2006) has shown how HIV/AIDS has in the terms of Buzan et al. (1998) been securitized: a range of actors (international organizations, governments and NGOs) accepted the idea that the survival of key referent objects (communities, economies, elites, institutions, militaries, 'security') is threatened unless emergency measures are undertaken. According to this approach, a successful securitization takes HIV/AIDS out of the sphere of 'normal politics' and creates obligations to respond in ways that are adequate to the new salience of the problem. This sense of urgency is reflected in the names of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. However, as Prins (2004: 939^0) notes, 'During the last twenty years there has often been an uneasy relationship between the claim that an issue is important and the claim that it is a "security issue"'

Securitization theory raises questions first, about the appropriateness of greater state involvement in securitized issues (Buzan et al, 1998: 29). Elbe notes that 'In the case of HIV/AIDS ... framing the issue as a security issue pushes responses to the disease away from civil society toward the much less transparent workings of military and intelligence organizations', which can pave the way for the over-riding of civil liberties (2005: 128). Second, there are questions to do with the 'threat-defence' logic implicit in securitization. In the case of HIV/AIDS, Elbe suggests, this may remove the issue from more cosmopolitan and altruistic frameworks to a context more concerned with the maintenance of power, such that states become concerned only about health problems that engage their vital interests directly. Elbe also considers possible benefits of securitization, and argues that the main concerns apply in only a qualified manner, and have to be weighed against competing advantages. He argues that in some of the most affected countries, the problem is not excessive state mobilization, but its absence, with governments unable or unwilling to respond (see also Buzan and Waever, 2003: 237-8). Securitization may therefore be a tool for the international community to push reluctant governments to begin to save the lives of their citizens, with democratizing rather than illiberal implications; securitization represents a beginning to the 'proper politicization of the issue' (Elbe, 2006: 132). Greater involvement by the more powerful elements of the state can be a help to this goal, not an obstacle. Similarly, Elbe argues, securitization 'assists groups wishing to weaken the grip of patents on life-saving medicines because [according to article 73(b) of the WTO TRIPS agreement] these patents could potentially be overridden in light of national security considerations' (2006:133).

Elbe further acknowledges the reasoning that it is often only when faced with threats to self-interest that elites will act. Similarly, he argues that so long as funding does not come at the expense of civilian provision, concern about the military can generate valuable resources. Furthermore, because military forces are important actors in the pandemic itself they must be involved in prevention strategies, particularly as militaries are thought to be at higher risk of infection and represent an important vector for spread. So while highlighting HIV/AIDS in the military could have negative effects if it skews access to treatment, prevention strategies must involve military institutions. Finally, securitization of the virus, rather than HIV positive people themselves, might help to maintain a sense of vigilance that is conducive to prevention. Elbe thus argues that while securitizing HIV/AIDS carries risks, so does not securitizing it. He suggests therefore that HIV/AIDS be viewed as a security issue, or an issue with an important security dimension, rather than a dangerous and overwheling threat. Thus, security should not be reified in relation to HIV/AIDS, and human security and human rights should be used as frameworks as well as national security. However, as Elbe recognizes, 'the securitization of HIV/AIDS ... remains in the end a risky gamble on the ability of those presenting HIV/ AIDS as a security issue to maintain control over the uses to which this language will be put' (2005: 416).

Elbe has also suggested that the securitization of HIV/AIDS has turned international security 'into a site for the global dissemination of a biopolitical economy of power' (2005: 404). This renders the biological characteristics of populations a matter of 'high' politics; sanctions an institutional apparatus of surveillance of the world population; and invites the investment of a plethora of political actors around the optimization of the health of populations. Following Foucault further, Elbe argues that these biopolitical dimensions to the securitization of HIV/AIDS could give rise to the ethical dangers of normalization (through the targeting of sexual be haviour in AIDS interventions) and new racisms (through the exclusion of HIV-positive people and the targeting of relief on strategic groups) on a global scale.

These interventions advance critical understanding of HIV/AIDS and security in a number of ways. First, they specify hitherto under-theorized discursive and institutional power dynamics inherent in international responses to HIV/AIDS and identify important connections between actors, discourses and institutions. Second, they help in framing key political questions for the future of HIV/AIDS relief. Third, biopolitical analysis makes an important contribution in bringing cultural and racial politics into work on the security dimensions of HIV/ AIDS. Fourth, the use of biopolitics and securitization theory enables work on HIV/AIDS to connect with other critical analyses of global security issues using similar frameworks. I would suggest three further moves that are required at this point. First is a more historicized approach to the whole field of HIV/AIDS and security. For instance, attention has been drawn to multiple continuities (as well as discontinuities) between contemporary global health and the colonial era (Aginam, 2003; King, 2002). If, as McLeod (1988:3) suggests, colonial medical services formed 'part of the political order they helped maintain', there is considerable room for clarification of the extent to which current interventions proceed on discursive, institutional and geopolitical terrains that have been prepared by earlier rounds of imperialism, and how they are helping to modify them (Abrahamsen, 2003). In this context, it is perhaps not so much that the military and security agencies that have become more involved in HIV/AIDS are untransparent and prone to over ride civil liberties (though they are), but that they are already implicated in the production and protection of unequal world orders and specific constellations of power/knowledge over an extended period (Bilgin and Morton, 2002; Smith, 2004). Another focus for historicization, then, are the successive Western security institutions and projects that have targeted many of the spaces addressed by HIV/AIDS relief (not least 'next wave' states) through into the post-9/11 era

**2NC---AT: Threats Real**

**Even if the threat is real, securitization is perceived as hyperbole hindering preparation. Independently, securitization trades off with community-based responses to infectious diseases which turns the case.**

William R. **Clark 8**; Professor Clark is Head of the Department of Political Science and is a research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Religion 2008; BRACING FOR ARMAGEDDON? The Science and Politics of Bioterrorism in America; Oxford University Press - BS

Individual political and scientific experts also raised cautionary flags about the direction and magnitude of our efforts to defend against bioterrorism. Milton Leitenberg, trained as a scientist and an arms control expert, prepared a detailed analysis of the Aum Shinrikyo episode, in which he showed that far from representing the dawn of a new and dangerous world in which “anyone could do it” bioterrorism would be a major threat to humanity, it suggested something far different:

Aum utterly and totally failed [to produce biological weapons], after no small **expenditure** of time and money. . . . The experience of Aum is . . . in marked contrast to the legions of **statements** by **senior** US government officials and other spokesmen claiming that the preparation of **biological agents** and weapons could be carried out in “**kitchens**,” “bathrooms,” “garages,” “home breweries,” and is a matter of relative ease and simplicity. 17

This point was echoed by Amy Smithson, when she was Director of the Stimson Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project:

The subject of unconventional [**bio**logical] **terror**ism was tailormade for **hyperbole**, and unfortunately much of what has been said has made it **difficult** to ascertain the **gravity** of the unconventional terrorist threat. Taken together, the technical realities, actual case histories, **and** statistical **records** of terrorist behavior with chemical and biological substances **undercut** the **rhetoric considerably** and point not to catastrophic terrorism but to **small attacks** where a few, not thousands, would be harmed.18

Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert with the RAND Corporation, has repeatedly questioned the magnitude of the threat posed by bioterrorism. He points out that, with the possible exception of Al-Qaeda, there has been no indication that terrorist groups have seriously considered the use of bioweapons as agents of terror.

But even Al-Qaeda’s interest in bioweapons for terror purposes is open to question. Consider the following statement by Ayman al- Zawahiri, left behind on a computer in Kabul, Afghanistan after Al-Qaeda members had fl ed in 2001:

The enemy starting thinking about [biological and chemical] weapons before WWI. Despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials.19

Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman summed up the years of frantic governmental spending on bioterrorism after it took off in the late 1990s:

[**Bioterrorism**] was where the **funding was**, and people were sticking their **hands in the pot**. It was the sexiest of all the terrorism threats and it was becoming **a cash cow**. So the threat of bioterrorism became a kind of **self-fulfilling prophecy**. It was archetypical **Washington politics** in the sense that you generate an issue and it **takes** on a **life of its own**.20

Many tried to remind us that the **real** biological **threat** to Americans is, and will continue to be, emerging pathogens— viruses like HIV, and possibly H5N1 avian influenza, or other pathogens that may cross into the human species in the future, and against which we have no innate immunity. We have known about the threat of an H5N1 pandemic since the late 1990s. Had we spent **$40,000,000,000** directly on preparing ourselves to deal with the threat of emerging **pathogens**, rather than many of the **quasi-military** defense items associated with bioterrorism, we would probably be as well prepared for a bioterrorist attack, and certainly better prepared for a **natural pandemic**. But would we have done it—would we have spent **all that time and energy** and money—without the **visceral response** evoked by a more easily visualized attack by hypothetical **bioterrorists**, without the umbrella of a “**war on terrorism**”?

### 2NC---AT: Securitization Limited

#### Lack of balances and checks for international organizations during securitized emergencies allows endless securitization

Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 14 - Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Germany & WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany

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In the tradition of Harold Lasswell (1941), many social scientists and legal scholars have pondered over the so-called ratchet effect of emergency powers in national polities. Aaron Friedberg (2002:240) summarizes the position of these scholars: ‘Once undertaken … emergency increases in the size of central government bureaucracies, the bulk of the revenues they extract, and the range of activities they seek to control are rarely completely reversed.’ Hence, once seized, emergency powers tend to be institutionalized ex post, perpetuating the increased authority of the executive. Arguably, emergencies thus involve the danger that exceptional authority will become the rule(Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006: 230). This has a further implication, namely, that enduring exceptionalism also reduces the obstacles to, and increases the institutional incentives for, further securitizations. As Rasler and Thompson (1989: 123–124) note, the emergency empowerment of executive agencies also widens the opportunity to invoke security-related justifications for future bureaucratic expansions. The ‘autocratic tendencies’ inherent in the institutionalization of exceptional powers have been intensely studied at the national level (Questiaux, 1982: 31). These trends point to what we refer to as an institutional ‘emergency trap’, the dynamic feedback of emergency powers on securitization. Just like the classic ‘security trap’ theorized by the Copenhagen School (see c.a.s.e. collective,2006: 460), in which the quest for security can lead to the identification of ever more insecurities that societies seek to control, so the institution of emergency powers does not simply put an end toa security crisis. Rather, it can increase the pressure on executives to become active and respond in situations where a looming problem may be viewed as an existential threat. At the same time, it reduces institutional obstacles to further securitizations and creates incentives for executives to extend their reach and authority. Emergency provisions can thereby become a slippery slope toward yet further securitization. International organizations are especially vulnerable in this regard because they are not embedded in state-like democratic institutions. Even though public scrutiny of international institutions seems to increase with the institutions’ political authority (Zürn et al., 2012), mechanisms of societal influence and their capacity to act as an effective corrective on IO politics remain relatively miniscule (see Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006: 404). As we will discuss in more detail, there are significantly fewer checks and balances on IO authority than there are in constitutional democracies (see Klabbers,2007: 161–162). That the tendency of exceptionalism to become self-perpetuating also applies to IOs has become evident in WHO’s response to the H1N1 outbreak.

### 2NC---!---Surveillance

#### Securitizing biotech threats justifies a state of mass surveillance

D’Arcangelis 17 - [National Center for Institutional Diversity](https://lsa.umich.edu/ncid/people.gallery.html#tag=ncid&tagns=michigan-lsa), Gender Studies Program, Skidmore College; Interdisciplinary General Education Department, California State Polytechnic University

Gwen D'Arcangelis, “Reframing the 'securitization of public health': a critical race perspective on post-9/11 bioterrorism preparedness in the US” Critical Public Health, Vol.27 (2), p.275-284, 07-14-2016, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09581596.2016.1209299?cookieSet=1>

The amplified focus on bioterrorism after 9/11 shaped the US public health field’s views of disease spread and approach to disease control. The US national security apparatus not only projected the specter of enemy states and terrorists attacking the US with germ weapons, but also the notion that any disease outbreak might be an act of bioterrorism. For example, when the new pathogen SARS was first identified Critical Public Health 277 in 2002, national security specialists speculated about SARS as a tool of bioterrorism: ‘You can’t rule out that this is a weapon’ (McCombs, 2003) and ‘It’s a very unusual outbreak … it’s hard to say whether it’s deliberate or natural’ (Broad, 2003). In this context, newly emerging infectious diseases triggered more than just a germ panic, but also apprehensions about bioterrorism. Health authorities also began to regard disease outbreaks in a newly alarming light. The Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine), a prominent non-governmental organization that advises the government on issues of science, medicine, and health, exemplified a shift in framing disease outbreaks under the new security-oriented rubric of ‘biological threats’: Both naturally occurring and intentionally introduced biological threats hold increasing potential to cause disease, disability, and death. And beyond disease itself, the ability of infectious agents to destabilize populations, economies, and governments is fast becoming a sad fact of life. The prevention and control of infectious diseases are fundamental to individual, national, and global health and security [emphasis mine]. (IOM, 2003) While disease had previously been conceptualized as a national security threat (e.g. in 2000, the Clinton Administration formally designated AIDS a threat to national security), this new articulation framed disease in the same terms as terrorism. Disease and bioterrorism became two varieties of biological threats: one ‘naturally occurring’, the other ‘intentionally introduced.’ This reconceptualization even impacted the way health practitioners and journalists referred to a disease as old as influenza – as an example of ‘nature’s natural warfare’ and ‘Mother Nature’s WMD [weapon of mass destruction]’ (see e.g. IOM, 2003; Ryan & Glarum, 2009). Recasting disease in this way gave bioterrorism a weight it had not previously had in US public health conceptions of disease.

US public health disease control management paradigms changed apace with these terror-inflected visions of disease. Health institutions increased the scale and scope of automated surveillance, expanding the CDC’s national public health surveillance apparatus to monitor local and state health institutions’ electronic health databases such as ER triage logs, 911 emergency calls, and pharmaceutical sales. The rationale of this enhanced surveillance was to better enable the CDC to detect and intervene on an outbreak in its early stages. Health workers were also directly enlisted into bioterrorism surveillance through patient care. In late 2001, Congress approved funds for hospital staff training, encouraging them to become more attuned to potential bioterrorism attacks. Training focused on teaching staff how to recognize and treat patients exposed to at least one of seven diseases associated with bioterrorism (smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia, viral encephalitis, and hemorrhagic fevers) or to chemical or radiological attacks (Niska & Burt, 2006). Pressures to engage in bioterrorism surveillance also came from the US biodefense field – for example, US Army epidemiologists urged care providers to ‘have some familiarity with those diseases expected when caused by bioterrorism agents’ and to have a ‘healthy “index of suspicion” … to recognize an event early enough to make significant modifications to the outcome’. They suggested that this would help care workers to recognize when patient symptoms constitute a bioterror event, and thus be better equipped to enlist the aid of an infectious disease specialist and, if necessary, report it to local public health and law enforcement agencies (see e.g. Dembek, Kortepeter, & Pavlin, 2007, p. 353). To some, enhancing automated national surveillance and training health care workers to regard patients as potential sentinels of a bioterrorist attack might seem useful for preventing bioterrorism-related epidemics. However, this bioterrorism preparedness campaign also mobilized a disease-terror imaginary shot through with discourses of the racial Other. These racial discourses have implications for racially marginalized populations that I elaborate on in subsequent sections.

### 2NC---!---Racialization

#### Invoking an imaginary doomsday figure of foreign bio-threats creates a racialized other and justifies mass violence and surveillance in the name of national security

D’Arcangelis 17 - [National Center for Institutional Diversity](https://lsa.umich.edu/ncid/people.gallery.html#tag=ncid&tagns=michigan-lsa), Gender Studies Program, Skidmore College; Interdisciplinary General Education Department, California State Polytechnic University

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**The bioterrorist was prominent among an increasingly alarmist cast of menacing characters in the post9/11 national imaginary**. In this emergent ‘disease-terror imaginary’, the bioterrorist symbolized a new figure of diseased Other that threatened the nation’s health, one that was both continuous with but also departed from previous constructions. As I have shown in the previous section, racialized imaginaries of disease have historically impacted public health practice, with dire consequences for how US public Critical Public Health 279 health treats communities and people of color. This section outlines the racial discourses that comprise the figure of the bioterrorist, aiming, in doing so, to build the case for public health resistance to the larger racialized imaginary it represents. The figure of the bioterrorist, like that of the diseased Other, invokes ideas of germ contagion and the racial Other. While many historians and ethics scholars have argued that US concern with bioterrorism reflects an agglomeration of anxieties that began in the 1990s about globalization, biotechnology, and disease contagion (Cecire, 2009; King, 2003; Sarasin, 2006), they have varied on the question of the continuities between enduring ideas about the diseased Other and the figure of the bioterrorist. For example, historian Philipp Sarasin situates anxieties about bioterrorism in relation to First World/global north fears about the consequences of globalization – namely ‘a nightmare about dangerously open borders, streaming migrants, and uncontrolled exchange and contact’ – and he connects the figure of the bioterrorist to earlier figurings of the infected immigrant bringing disease and disorder to the US (Sarasin, 2006). In contrast, historian of medicine Nicholas B. King posits a distinction between the traditionally passive disease carrier and the bioterrorist in that the latter is unmarked by race, ethnicity, and nation: the archetypal bioterrorist symbolizes something quite different from the infectious bogeymen of the past. His predecessors in the American imaginary were passive carriers, primitive contaminants of modern society identifiable by race, ethnicity, or nationality … Bioterrorists are also more inscrutable than their historical analogs. American security agencies’ extensive racial and ethnic profiling since September 11 aside, bioterrorists are generally assumed to be ‘nonstate actors,’ difficult to track and impossible to identify by superficial characteristics alone. Unlike the immigrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they have no particular ethnic or national affiliation. (King, 2003, p. 438)

I build off the work of Sarasin and depart from King’s claim by arguing that the bioterrorist figure is, in fact, deeply racialized through its connection to discourses of terrorism – dominant ways of thinking and speaking about terrorism that construct and reify the figure of the Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim terrorist. While King is by no means unaware of, as he puts it, the ‘stigmatization and social prejudice [that] drive political decisions under the conditions of extreme uncertainty that would certainly accompany a bioterrorist attack’, he limits his analysis of the bioterrorist to an abstract notion that only in application becomes racialized. But the figure of the (bio)terrorist does not exist in isolation from, or prior to, its racialization. In the post-9/11 era, the highly charged label of ‘terrorist’ is indelibly intertwined with Arabs and Muslims. This construction of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists is the culmination of decades of US racial discourses that have pathologized Arab and Muslim populations and regions in the Middle East as uncivilized, backward, and, moreover, possessing a savage penchant for mass destruction and a hatred of a civilized and inherently peaceful West. The construction of a barbaric and sexually repressed ‘Muslim culture’ has in particular anchored notions of Muslim men as explosively violent (Bhattacharyya, 2008). These racial (and gendered) discourses have their origins in the oil wars of the 1970s, in the context of progressively fraught US geo-relations with countries in the Middle East, and have persisted since then. The post-9/11 national security agenda (the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, in conjunction with punitive actions against Arab residents within the US) have further racialized Arabs and Muslims, and consolidated the notion of an ‘Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim’ enemy, resulting in widespread societal discrimination and racial hatred towards those ensnared by this harmful, not to mention ill-defined, grouping,2 for example in jobs and street harassment (Naber, 2008; Nayak, 2006). Moreover, the discourse of terrorism goes beyond targeting an imagined Arab-Middle EasternMuslim enemy; it also invites a more generalized targeting of the racial Other. As Jasbir Puar notes, building off of Sara Ahmed, ‘feared bodies are contagious’ – i.e. bodies of color have long been read as a national security threat, and thus they intersect in the national imaginary as part of an undifferentiated racial Other or alternatively as substitutes for one another (Puar, 2007, p. 187). Terror discourse constructs the enemy population as porous and indistinct; thus terrorist profiling not only targets Arab and Muslim populations, but also other communities and people of color that have previously been and continue to be read as a national security threat (e.g. Sikhs whose targeting we can interpret, following Puar, as 280 G. D’Arcangelis the consequence of their resembling the terrorist in kind (rather than in look), and thus embodying just another dangerous racial Other to their attackers). Into this terror imaginary enters the figure of the bioterrorist, wielding diseases as weapons, enhanced with the fruits of biotechnological advancement. The bioterrorist connotes not only a terror threat, but also one that appears limitless, as diseases know no geographic bounds, spreading easily across borders. Like the unintentionally infecting disease carrier, the bioterrorist represents a threat that cannot be contained – the bioterrorist may wield disease intentionally, but once deployed the effect of the spreading germs is no different. The diseased body is an assemblage in the way Jasbir Puar (drawing on Deleuze and Guattari) uses it to highlight bodies that are unstable and permeable (Puar, 2007, p. 193); where the human body ends and the germ begins cannot be easily delineated. And the bioterrorist is an even more alarming assemblage – he looms with both illness and ill intent, igniting a specter of malicious entities that overtake the nation, cannot be controlled, and thus threaten largescale devastation with no known end.

A perfect illustration of how the bioterrorist embodies the combined menace of disease and terror can be seen in the emergence of one of its variants – the ‘suicide infector’. In a climate of growing emphasis on both bioterrorism and preemptive forms of biodefense, national security and public health specialists involved in planning for a bioterror attack hypothesized a terrorist body weaponized with disease. This fictional figure, known as a ‘suicide infector’ among other names3 would, rather than wield an attack remotely (e.g. using an intermediary tool like letters à la the anthrax mailings), instead ‘intentionally infect themselves and then attempt to spread infection to others’ and, moreover, ‘attempt to enter the country while not symptomatic’ (May & Silverman, 2003). The suicide infector was the subject of doomsday bioterrorism scenarios that enumerated the use of any number of potential biological weapons from anthrax to even deadlier and more contagious diseases such as smallpox or Ebola. A RAND Corporation report discussed a chilling scenario of ‘suicide attackers who ride mass transit spreading the virus’ (RAND, 2002). The discussion of the suicide infector scenario, which mainly took place in national security and health domains (see e.g. Galamas, 2011; Massachusetts Nurses Association, 2013; Williams, 2004), also made its way to popular domains such as news media (where it received some, if limited, attention). For example, a New York Times journalist described the possibility that ‘a smallpox epidemic could begin with a single infected person – a “smallpox martyr,” in the terminology of bioterrorism experts – simply walking through a crowd’ (Stolberg, 2001). The fact that such a figure was given serious consideration punctuates how easily the disease-terror imaginary was taken up and elaborated to produce a new vision of threat. Drawing from the already established figure of the suicide bomber, the fictional suicide infector was a more potent variation of the racialized trope of the uncivilized violent Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim terrorist. In weaponizing his own body (again, invoking the figure of a uniquely lethal racialized masculinity), the suicide infector exemplifies an embodied, irrational violence (even more so than the suicide bomber) because of his willingness to give his entire being over to the germ state. The suicide infector is a terror-inducing germ receptacle who turns the common metaphor of the racial Other as like a contagion to the racial Other as literally a collection of germs – devoid of reason, cutting a chaotic and careless path through an unsuspecting, defenseless US national body. If the envisioned suicide infector highlights clearly the way the bioterrorist blends racialized tropes of disease and terror to spectacular effect, it also shows that the bioterrorist figure builds on a characteristic feature of the disease carrier – invisibility. For the concern is not only that germs are invisible to the eye, and therefore that their transmission remains unseen; it is also that disease carriers can, when asymptomatic, remain undetected. While the traditional notion of the disease carrier connotes this sense of stealth to a degree, the bioterrorist figure takes this sense of an unseen threat to a new level; the bioterrorist is not infected in the first place and thus will never be detectable. Even in the suicide infector scenario, where his infected body risks betraying his intention, the danger he represents revolves centrally around the period he is asymptomatic and thus able to conceal the disease threat he poses. Moreover, this valence of the bioterrorist as an unseen enemy has dual resonance in the disease-terror Critical Public Health 281 imaginary – it links up with the trope of the Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim ‘enemy within’, a trope which resulted from US state targeting of Arab and Muslim Americans critical of US interventionist policies in the Middle East since the 1970s (Naber, 2012). The racialized figure of the bioterrorist epitomizes the way that the post-9/11 disease-terror imaginary entangles older racial discourses of the diseased Other with newer ones of the terrorist. He signifies teeming hordes of malevolent, surreptitious racial Others – a haunting presence of the imagined Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim enemy as well as, potentially, other bodies of color deemed dangerous to national security

#### Bioterror scrutinization leads stigmatization and targeting of communities of color deemed ‘suspicious’ and dangerous

D’Arcangelis 17 - [National Center for Institutional Diversity](https://lsa.umich.edu/ncid/people.gallery.html#tag=ncid&tagns=michigan-lsa), Gender Studies Program, Skidmore College; Interdisciplinary General Education Department, California State Polytechnic University

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Returning to the issues that animated this protracted discussion of the bioterrorist figure, I explore the potential impacts of the disease-terror imaginary on public health practice. This section focuses on the post-9/11 practices of public health ‘securitization’ that are presumably most susceptible to the racial dimensions of the disease-terror imaginary: the ‘index of suspicion’ that health workers have been encouraged to adopt and the automated surveillance of patient data and symptoms that has connected public health to national security and law enforcement. I query how the disease-terror imaginary might translate into public health practices that stigmatize and target Arab and Muslim populations, as well as other communities of color deemed ‘suspicious’ and dangerous in this imaginary. The purpose of this section is not to determine whether or to what extent these racialized impacts are occurring (ideally the subject of future empirical studies), but rather to meditate on possible impacts in the hopes that readers from the health field will help prevent them from coming to fruition.

The ‘index of suspicion’ that the national security apparatus has prescribed to health workers encourages them to view disease outbreaks as potentially the result of a bioterror attack. That being the case, it is important to ask how this greater emphasis on bioterror-induced outbreaks may foster suspicion of patients. Will practitioners perceive a suicide disease carrier instead of a sick patient? Moreover, in the context of a disease-terror imaginary rife with the specter of the racial Other, are health care workers and triage nurses more likely to look askance at patients who fit the ‘suspicious’ profile (i.e. Arabs, Muslims, and other communities and people of color ensnared by the disease-terror imaginary)? Even more broadly, will health workers perceive these ‘suspicious’ populations in the vicinity of a disease outbreak as perpetrators of the outbreak?

It is worth considering whether and how the exclusionary practices that the health field has historically applied to diseased Others might be applied – if they have not been already – to populations reflected in the disease-terror imaginary. While the harsh manner in which the US state and public health has treated, for example, Haitians (excluding them from entering the US and denying them proper health care services) may not necessarily come to pass through the securitization of public health, more everyday forms of exclusion can easily occur. Scholars of stigma and health inequality have shown how stigmatization and targeting of racially marginalized populations can occur at the level of individual practitioners’ everyday practices. Studies of the contemporary era have documented the racial biases that affect health care worker attitudes, behaviors, and interactions with patients, influencing their interpretation of symptoms and clinical decisions. Psychologists and health researchers Burgess, van Ryn, Dovidio, and Saha (2007) note that although ‘overt expressions of prejudice and negative racial stereotypes have declined substantially over time … even consciously egalitarian people may hold negative ethnic and racial stereotypes and attitudes of which they may not be fully conscious’ (Burgess

et al., 2007, p. 882). Given this, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that the racialized tropes of bioterrorist disease carriers will inform any ‘index of suspicion’ that health practitioners adopt. The automated surveillance that resulted from the post-9/11 focus on bioterrorism may also disproportionately target individuals and populations deemed ‘suspicious’. Scholars have examined how the expansion of automated surveillance in health settings after 9/11 has impacted patient care. Cultural geographer Bronwyn Parry demonstrates that automated surveillance reduces patients to disease vectors needing to be controlled rather than cared for, thus encouraging the depersonalization of patients and a decline in the quality of health care (Parry, 2012). Given this, I could ask how, in the context ofa racialized disease-terror imaginary, the reduction of patients to disease vectors might be racialized. What kind and degree of surveillance will health care practitioners apply to patients who are viewed vis-à-vis their race as ‘suspicious’? The way that the disease-terror imaginary paints a vast landscape of diseased bodies of color harboring vicious intent may result in discriminatory practices of surveillance in public health.

Perhaps even more significantly, the increased surveillance of health databases has enlarged the scale and scope of the information collected not only by public health authorities, but also by national security and law enforcement. Racialized ideas about ‘suspicious’ patients might inform the way that public health practitioners identify and decide to report patient outbreaks they suspect to be symptomatic of a bioterror attack, but they might also inform what law enforcement and national security officials decide to do with data from patients belonging to ‘suspicious’ populations. The post-9/11 surveillance apparatus has proven to be highly racialized, both in its application and in its conception (e.g. the Special Registration program of 2002 specifically targeted Arab and Muslim male foreign nationals). In broadest terms, post-9/11 automated surveillance in public health might facilitate the discriminatory targeting of Arabs, Muslims, and other communities and people of color marked as dangerous, sweeping them up into the treacherous clutch of law enforcement. I have explored these possible implications not only to lay out new directions in research, but also for more practical purposes to suggest areas of caution for public health workers – policy-makers, administrators, care workers, and practitioners who must negotiate the culture of suspicion that has followed in the wake of the ‘securitization’ of public health. National security planners, focusing on terror-infused notions of disease spread, have triggered a disease-terror imaginary of germ panic and terror hysteria centered on the specter of a malicious and exceedingly stealthy diseased Other. Fanning the racialized disease-terror imaginary in public health may, as I have probed in this section, feed into the larger post9/11 climate of fear-driven, racially discriminatory practices – the profiling of communities and people of color as suspicious and dangerous and, moreover, the targeting of those who trigger suspicion by the increasingly intersecting arenas of military, law enforcement, and public health.

### 2NC---!---Social Instability

#### **Securitization of diseases leads to widespread social instability**

Wishnick 10 - Dilemmas of securitization and health risk management in the People's Republic of China: the cases of SARS and avian influenza

Elizabeth Wishnick, “Dilemmas of securitization and health risk management in the People's Republic of China: the cases of SARS and avian influenza”, Health Policy and Planning Vol. 25, No. 6, Special theme: Unhealthy Governance: Security Challenges and Policy Prospects, pp. 454-466 (13 pages), November, 2010, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45090677>

A week later, Chinese leaders held a Politburo meeting on SARS and pledged to provide 'accurate, timely, and honest reporting' of the incidence of the disease (DeLisle 2003: 595). A task force was set up under the Beijing municipal government to coordinate between civilian and military authorities. Once securitization efforts were made in China, they went well beyond the speech acts envisaged by the Copenhagen School and involved a combination of official and unofficial speech acts, as well as personnel changes and mobilization techniques reminiscent of the Maoist era.

A political crisis broke out in China, resulting in the firing of the Minister of Health, the Mayor of Beijing, and more than 100 other officials complicit in the SARS cover-up. On 23 April, Vice Premier Wu Yi took charge of the Ministry of Health and headed a new command centre with budget of 2 billion yuan (US$242 million). On 26 April, an ASEAN+3 health ministers meeting was convened, followed 3 days later by an ASEAN summit meeting on SARS. Chinese leaders also met separately to discuss the crisis, and later, on 3 June, China hosted its own ASEAN meeting on SARS. These meetings helped to improve the region's coordination with the WHO and to develop cooperative efforts in disease surveillance within ASEAN. The Chinese government, which had faced criticism over the lag in its response time, took advantage of these meetings to reassure Asian neighbours about it handling of SARS (Caballero- Anthony 2005: 486-8).

Although many communities throughout the world organized to take steps to protect themselves from SARS, some of the steps taken recalled Maoist mobilization methods. On 1 May 2003, when Hu Jintao announced a 'People's War against SARS', the Beijing Times published a poster 'Declare War on SARS' (Figure 1), reminiscent of Maoist era campaign posters calling for the prevention of respiratory diseases (Hanson 2008). Neighbourhood committees were instructed to enforce sanitation standards and activists were sent door-to-door. Maoist era slogans were used to mobilize the population. Examples included 'Activate the whole Party, mobilize the entire populace, win the war of annihilation against SARS' and 'En Many Chinese academics note that the additional restrictions imposed by the authorities on the media during SARS were counterproductive, in that they led to rumours, panic buying and social instability (Li 2004: 38; Li 2008: 23; Ma 2008: 562; Lu 2009: 96). Although some of the Western literature on securitization contends that authoritarian governments securitize (and in the process, tighten controls over information) for the purpose of enhancing regime legitimacy (Vuori 2008: 71), Chinese authors argue that, to the contrary, the greater transparency in reporting avian influenza and other emergencies in evidence after SARS improved the credibility of the government domestically (Li 2008: 24; Lu 2009: 96). Securitization has had many negative consequences, for example, the imposition of severe legal penalties (such as capital punishment for knowingly spreading SARS), the construction of isolation wards for SARS (which led to riots in parts of China) and preventive use in poultry of an anti- viral medication meant for humans (which could increase resistance to the drug in the event of a new avian influenza outbreak). Securitizing acts also involve a high personal cost for local whistleblowers, who have faced harassment by local police, house arrest and even imprisonment. The national spirit unite with one heart to battle SARS' and “enlarge” the national spirit unite with one heart to battle SARS' Thousands were forcibly placed under strict quarantine and animals believed to possible carriers (cats, chickens, etc.) were slaughtered. SARS victims were called 'national heroes' and 'martyrs' (Perry 2007: 15). Although the Chinese population largely rallied behind the leadership and complied with the mobilization against SARS, there was evidence of opposition and protest. On 23 April 2002, just as the Chinese leadership was gearing up its response to SARS, some 10000 residents of Chaguagang protested a decision to turn a local school into a quarantine ward for residents who had possibly been exposed to the disease, fearing that SARS patients would be transferred to their community (Freedman 2005: 17)

Securitization resulted in reactive mobilizations, with mixed results for Chinese society. Although the epidemics eventually were halted, there were many adverse social, economic and political impacts. For some Chinese scholars, the solution is to balance state-led efforts with initiatives from social networks, drawing on traditional Chinese practices of mutual aid.

**Cyber Links**

**2NC---Link---Generic**

**The 1AC’s discourse of ‘Cyber Doom’ scenarios perpetuate a disseminated apocalypse characterized by the globalized manipulation of public fear that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy under securitized logics**

**Stevens,** King’s College London, **19**

[Tim, “Global Code: Power and the Weak Regulation of Cyberweapons”, King’s College London, January 2019, pg. 271-295, Research Station, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

Discourses of cyber security—of which ‘cyber war’ is a distinct subset—are heavily reliant on the articulation of catastrophic ‘cyber doom’ scenarios to mobilise political resources (Cavelty, 2008; Lawson, 2013). Strategic cyber war is also framed in ways prioritising the catastrophic nature of these scenarios, although their nature and character remain poorly understood. In the absence of historical events or processes definitively identified as strategic cyber war, cyber war can only be imagined rather than remembered. Moreover, rather than portraying cyber war as a protracted and heterogeneous process analogous to the unfolding of ‘real’ wars, cyber war is often reduced to a single image or identity, a textual cipher standing in for a more complex phenomenon. This deductive rationale identifies cyber war as ‘catastrophic’ or ‘apocalyptic’, with its character inferred from this initial assertion of its nature; the details of cyber war are described once this initial identity has been established, not before. Cyber war is often presented in these terms by a wide range of politicians, policymakers, defence and intelligence personnel, computer security professionals and academics. Cyber war discourses are disseminated through the broadcast and online news media, in popular culture—including films, television, novels—and other elements of the new media ecology Viewed as an ‘accident’, strategic cyber war appears immanent to our contemporary ‘wired’ world. All cyber war discourses stress that the vulnerability of modern societies increases as their dependency on information technologies intensifies. This dependence is not only practical, in terms of delivering services and goods, but psychological and political. The hypothetical ‘cascading failures’ catalysed by infrastructural subversion and destruction (Little, 2002) begin by revealing the materiality and functionality of ‘invisible’ yet physical information infrastructures (Dodge and Kitchin, 2004). Secondary failures of contingent sociotechnical networks like water, energy, transport and emergency response follow, which continue to cascade through the affective realm of corporeal and psychological stress, before undermining completely the collective imaginary that is society. As in the global financial crisis, the accident/apocalypse is characterised by the ‘instant and simultaneous globalisation of affects and fears’ (Virilio et al, 2008).

T**here is little current evidence that cyber war will reach the level of global accident. There is no firm indication that a cyber attack of any kind could cause physical damage on this scale, let alone human deaths** (Rid, 2013a). This may, of course, change in time. One might object that the version of cyber war presented here is constructed between human adversaries rather than between humankind and its technologies but this would be to forget the interconnectedness and interdependence of the sociotechnical infrastructures of postmodernity. So unpredictable are their potential interactions, we cannot know if the effects of cyber war would be restricted to the target systems alone, or would spread beyond them and potentially back across an aggressor’s borders. **Such ‘blowback’ diminishes the strategic utility of these operations to high-tech societies, including most of those with the capacity to launch an attack in the first plac**e (Feaver, 1998; Rathmell, 2003). There is no guarantee an act of cyber war would not cause a global accident, which leads once again to imagining cyber war as potential apocalypse. What, however, are the political implications of these apocalyptic visions: what political ‘work’ does the framing of cyber war as apocalypse perform in the present?

Cyber war is therefore both necessary and in some sense desired. **Whether transformative cyber war can be brought about by apocalyptic discourses alone is unknown but the potentially self- fulfilling aspect of cyber war discourse is evident. ‘**Like the monsters in your imagination’, writes former White House cyber security advisor Howard Schmidt, ‘these phantoms can take on a persona of an unrelenting danger that easily surpasses their true capabilities’ (Schmidt, 2006: 174). ‘As ominous as the dark side of cyberspace may be, our collective reactions to it are just as ominous— and can easily become the darkest driving force of all’ (Deibert, 2012: 261). In contrast to apocalyptic environmental discourses, however, in which there is quite literally no long-term future and therefore no hope (Swyngedouw, 2010), cyber war apocalypses are not characterised by pure negativity: they still offer redemption through cyber security measures congruent with capitalist logics and the desire of the national security state. Of course, it is precisely those who nurture fear of apocalypse that promise salvation the most and will, ultimately, they hope, be in a position to deliver it (Swyngedouw, 2013).

This article has not attempted to determine whether or not strategic ‘cyber war’ will happen, or within what timescale. ‘**Is it possible for one of these events to happen? Sure. Is it likely? Absolutely not’ (Schmidt 2006: 172). If the odds of such an event occurring are so small, it is arguably more important that resources are focused on less spectacular cyber security issues—crime, espionage, sabotage—from which cyber war is an unwelcome distraction (Lawson, 2012, 2013; Guitton, 2013).** Given that strategic cyber war may be a theoretical impossibility, the odds that cyber war qua war will take place vanish to zero. This does not exclude the possibility of large-scale disruptive and destructive events very similar to phenomena currently described as cyber war but these scenarios

#### Cybersecurity discourse actively perpetuates securitization by stating that cyberspace is inevitably threatening

By David Barnard-Wills and Debi Ashenden, March 21, 2012 (“Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk”, David Barnard-Wills is an experienced interdisciplinary research manager at Trilateral Research; Debi Ashenden is Professor of Cyber Security in the School of Computing at the University of Portsmouth, Space and Culture (accessed via SAGE Journal), accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1206331211430016>) /lrap

There has been remarkable consistency in the construction of the information and cyber warfare “problem” over the past two decades. The following section examines these regularities in the cyber security discourse. As analysts we do not regard these regular assertions, which have achieved the status of near-unquestioned commonsense as necessarily true. Neither do we deny any value to these statements. Rather, we wish to call attention to the fact that they are frequently taken for granted and assumed to be true rather than being rigorously established through empirical research. Furthermore, there are political consequences to holding and perpetuating these assumptions. The five characteristics of the cyber security discourse that we draw attention to here are that cyberspace is ungovernable, unknowable, makes us vulnerable, is inevitably threatening, and is inhabited by a range of threatening and hostile actors on which it confers a number of advantages. These characteristics have been derived from an empirical examination of cyber security texts and discourse.  
For privacy advocates, surveillance researchers and nonsecurity Internet analysts in contrast, the visibility, threats, and strategic advantages of cyberspace are constructed in near fundamental opposition. The digital environment is highly visible, with every action leaving a machine readable, potentially permanent record that can be shared and distributed. Websites leave cookies on individual computers and keep records of IP addresses, whereas Internet service providers are capable of monitoring all traffic and potentially passing this onto government. Furthermore, the structure of cyberspace is thought of as a medium that privileges the powerful, a site of powerful social sorting and surveillance (Gandy, 2003; O’Hara & Shadbolt, 2008). The individual, rather than a locus of power (and threat), is constructed as at risk, lacking fundamental skills and also little political power to determine the architecture and processes of cyberspace.

#### Cybersecurity discourse supports securitization by implying that cyberspace has endless threats that need surveillance

By David Barnard-Wills and Debi Ashenden, March 21, 2012 (“Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk”, David Barnard-Wills is an experienced interdisciplinary research manager at Trilateral Research; Debi Ashenden is Professor of Cyber Security in the School of Computing at the University of Portsmouth, Space and Culture (accessed via SAGE Journal), accessed 6/24/2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1206331211430016>) /lrap

First, cyber security discourse supports the militarization of online space. Haggerty argues that information war, understood as an ongoing feature of the contemporary international environment, means that war essentially becomes permanent, part of the “ongoing military gamesmanship of cyberspace” (Haggerty, 2006b, p. 252). Constructing cyberspace as a source of national security threat encourages the application of security practices from other environments that may be inappropriate or actively harmful to online activity. The language of attack and defense and of “cyber war” risks pushing out the needs of the civil sector and individual Internet users, reducing openness and increasing surveillance. Security discourses risk shutting down discussion about Internet policy, moving it from relatively open areas of government to the closed world of national security decision making. This risks excluding an important range of actors. Furthermore, constructing cyberspace as a site of risk and threat poses the potential of a self-fulfilling prophecy as that space is increasingly militarized by various parties. Nations do not operate in a vacuum and there is the possibility (although not the necessity) of a cyberspace security dilemma.

**Naming cyber-threats feeds the process of militarizing the internet and cyberspace. Portraying cyberspace as a potential vehicle for widespread social disruption justifies the expansion of the restrictive security apparatus.**

**Hart 11** - master’s in communications at Simon Fraser University

Catherine Hart, “Mobilizing the Cyberspace Race: the Securitization of the Internet and its Implications for Civil Liberties”, 2011, Cyber-Surveillance in Everyday Life: An International Workshop \* May 12-15, 2011 \* University of Toronto

[Abstract] In this paper I seek to explore the way in which the increasing regulation of networked **computing** through digital controls and surveillance is being **justified** using a **securitizing discourse**. I argue that the dominant frame of ‘**cybersecurity’** has become one based on **national security**, due to the potentially **debilitating effect** that a **breakdown** of the network would have on society, the **economy**, the **military**, and government. This understanding caused President Obama, during his 2008 presidential campaign, to declare the U.S. information infrastructure a ‘strategic **asset**,’ a move which positions the Internet as a significant **issue** for the **military** (Clarke, 2010, 116). Within the Copenhagen School’s perspective on International Security Studies, this is known as a ‘securitizing move’; an attempt to frame something as **essential** to **national security**. I seek to examine the application of this securitizing discourse to networked computing and its development into an issue of ‘cybersecurity’ over the past three U.S. administrations. To do this, I will apply the Copenhagen School’s framework to each administration’s official policy on cybersecurity, in order to assess whether the securitization is successful, and what impact proposed responses may have on civil liberties.

Securitization: A Framework for Analysis

A securitization is a **speech act** which constitutes a ‘**referent object’**, in this case the **state**, as **threatened** in its very existence, and therefore **necessitates** urgent **action** (Buzan et al, 1998). The analysis of this process of “**securitization**” in networked computing involves a three-part process: the identification of a discourse of **national security** within discussions of networked computing, evidence of the **acceptance** of this **discourse** by an audience, and the promotion or uptake of **restrictive responses** aimed at **increasing security**. The first part of the process, the mobilization of an existing discourse of national security, relies upon the understanding that “the very **utterance** of ‘**security’** is more than just **saying** or **describing something** but the **performing** of an **action**,” with the potential to **create a new reality** (Stritzel, 2007, 362). This is a prominent feature of framing, which Edelman explains allows “the character, **causes**, and consequences of any phenomenon [to] become radically **different** as changes are made in what is prominently **displayed**, what is repressed and especially in how **observations** are **classified**” (as cited in Entman, 1993, 54). Therefore scholars of **securitization** are not concerned with the **validity** of an **asserted threat**; their **focus**, rather, is the action that is **facilitated** as a **result** of the acceptance of the validity of a threat. Buzan explains that

[s]tates, like people, can be **paranoid** (constructing threats where none exist) or **complacent** (ignoring actual threats). But since it is the success (or not) of the securitization that determines whether **action** is **taken**, that side of **threat analysis** deserves **scrutiny** just as close as that **given** to the **material side**. (Buzan, 2006, 1102)

**2NC---Link---Russia/NATO**

**Cyberwar discourse has empirically been used to militarize society even in the absence of verifiable danger. Even if cyber-threats are real, they are socially constructed.**

**van Ooijen 20**, Utrecht University, Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights

Marleen van Ooijen, “Cyber securitization or cyberization of conflict?” 3-8-2020, A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights

[Abstract] In 2007, Estonia became one of the first countries to face severe cyber-attacks, which it represented as being Web War I. This discourse of **cyberwar** has been contested by scholars and **professionals**: in reality the event was **nothing close to a war** and therefore there also did not have to be **military retaliation** from **NATO**. By studying the event using Copenhagen School Securitization theory, it seems like it constitutes a failed or partially successful **securitizing move** i.e. an attempt at assigning an issue the identity of **existential threat** in order to **legitimize** **extraordinary measures**. This thesis, arguing from a post-structuralist position, views securitization as a gradual, long term process in constituted out of both **discursive** (speech act) and non-discursive -**practices** (extraordinary measures). The central question that the thesis seeks to answer is: How has a securitizing discourse on **cyber threats legitimized** the **militarization** of **cyberspace** in Estonia after the country experienced cyber-attacks in 2007? By making use of discourse analysis, this thesis argues that the discourse of **cyberwar** – or the militarization of **cyber security** – was shaped through its **repetition** over a longer time that make the immaterial/ virtual visible. The military **securitizing practices** reinforced and disseminated the idea of the **cyber-threat** and cyberwar narrative, but were also only possible because they were legitimized through this **securitizing narrative**. Simultaneously, these practices imbued the **securitizing narrative** with the material and thereby stabilized the **discourse**. Instead of treating securitization according to a sequential causality, it is a **coconstitutive process** in which the ideational and material interact and complement each other.

What will the future of warfare look like? This question does not only belong to science fiction, but has been a topic of both scholarly- and public enquiry. One of the most abstract new types of warfare is ‘cyber warfare’. Strategic military thinkers have **speculated** how new digital technologies would affect warfare and power relations. In such a ‘cyberwar’, physical weapons and borders would be **replaced**- or complemented by **digital weapons** that reach deep into societies and critical infrastructures. Yet, empirical scholars have **argued** that there have been **no examples** of **cyber-attacks** with a level of **lethality** and damage to fit the classical **definitions** of ‘**war’**.

Still, people talk about cyberwar as **something** that **already exists**, something that countries should **prepare for** and something that is **invisible** or even **secretive** but nevertheless **experienced** and **felt**. The quote at the start of this chapter illustrates a broader trend in how ‘cyberwar’ is discussed.3 In this discussion, popular concepts used are ‘information war’, i.e. practices like sending fake information and propaganda, or ‘cyber war’, referring to practices like hacking or temporarily disabling digital services.4 Mundane activities, previously considered a technical issue for computer experts, are talked about in terms of military practice, national security and conflict. This new interpretation given to the security of digital technologies is often studied by looking at the case of Estonia.5

In 2007, the country experienced cyber-attacks that it later branded to be ‘Web War I’. Stating this to be the first digital state-to-state attack, the Estonian government attributed the attacks to its neighbor, Russia. This narrative of ‘Web War I’ was widely taken over by the international press and fueled academic and policy discussions as well as a fear of cyber threats. Ever since, cyberwar as a new, realistic danger increasingly became a policy object on the agenda of (inter)national cyber security.6 The process by which an issue comes to be recognized as a threat to the survival of a ‘referent object’, in this case the Estonian state, is analyzed using the theoretical framework of Securitization Theory. Hansen & Nissenbaum (2009) have applied this theory to the Estonian case to illustrate how there have been ‘securitizing moves’ to cyberspace.

7 They concluded that this process of ‘**cybersecuritization’** is a distinct new type of **dynamic** or discourse, but has only been partially ‘**successful’** in the case of Estonia.8 International audiences did not accept the ‘**war’ narrative** fully, and therefore not all extraordinary measures were implemented. Moreover, Hansen and Nissenbaum predicted that the **narrative** of **cyberwar** would soon **fade** as it would not have enough impact to become the dominant interpretation. However, from a **long-time-perspective**, conceptions of (inter)national **security** have changed in the **international**- and domestic **arena**. A 2017-survey amongst **Estonians** found that **cyber threats** are still perceived as the **largest** security **issue** to the country.9 Furthermore, cyber security has become a prominent part of **policies**- and practices of **national security**. It therefore feels unsatisfactory to conclude that ‘securitization’ has not been successful considering ideas of cyber security and security have changed over time.

This thesis analyses the Estonian case, using an updated version of securitization theory. It thereby aims to develop theory and by implication provide a more holistic image of the case itself. This thesis seeks to answer the following question: How has a securitizing discourse on cyber threats legitimized the militarization of cyberspace in Estonia after the country experienced cyber-attacks in 2007? This thesis does not reject the approach and conclusions made by Hansen & Nissenbaum and other scholars, but seeks to advance both its theoretical- and empirical insights. The success of securitization should not be placed external to the speech act. Instead of looking at securitization as a static moment, it is viewed as a processin which a discourse of existential threat legitimizes changing material practices. Empirically, this means that it is not only the attacks and its representation that are the focus, but also the practices of cyber security that follow. The main argument is that the cyber-attacks, discursively represented as cyberwar, became a sign that is citable in future securitizing moves. This legitimized the increasing military involvement in cyber security, but also influenced conceptions of national security in the country. Through repetition, in the form of material practices, the discourse of cyberwar stabilized.10

Using a poststructuralist, discourse analytical method, securitization theory is amended to be able to include the possibility of gradual change in meaning attached to cyber security and to military practice. In this framework, both signifying narratives are considered to be part of this process as well as the material practices – i.e. extraordinary policy measures. In this process, not only the identity (meaning) of cyber security (threat) is formed, but also the identity of the referent object (the Estonian state) and the securitizing actors and audiences (cyber security experts or policy members). It is not only a case of the securitization of cyberspace, but also a cyberization of national (military) security.11 The first chapter lays out the framework of poststructuralist securitization theory, referred to as ‘performative securitization’. It will argue that the original theory is too static, as it is focused on a single moment and on external and fixed criteria for success. The new framework views securitization as a gradual and intersubjective process, as an accumulation of texts (including practices) that identify something as an existential threat.12 This thesis thereby seeks to highlight the discursive struggle by which military cyber security practices are legitimized. Secondly, the thesis will provide a brief outline of the methodology used and a chapter providing background information on Estonia and the attacks. Thirdly, the analytical chapters will show how broader discourses on cyber security and Estonian identity have been shaped prior to 2007, which serves as a structuring device for the analysis of securitizing moves made after the attacks. Understanding securitization as both a process of exceptionality and of quick change, the first analytical chapter focuses on the attacks as a triggering event. The last chapter looks at the gradual change to practices of security in the country. Finally, this thesis will argue cyber security and cyberwar have become stabilized as a security policy objective.13 The attacks as a security imaginary have shaped identities of the security field, Estonia as a cybersecurity expert and norm setter and cyberspace as an existential threat.

Chapter 2: Securitization theory, post-Copenhagen School

This thesis makes use of Securitization Theory, developed by the Copenhagen School (CoS) of security studies. This theory revolutionized thinking in security studies, by both deepening and widening the concept of security. Barry Buzan (1991) proposed to study how the meaning of security was constructed,14 whereas Waever (1993) widened the study of security to sectors outside the field of military security.15 Securitization theory provides a framework for studying how the logic of security is applied to ‘new’ issues, and how this legitimizes certain ‘extraordinary measures’. This chapter sets out the basic framework of securitization theory and its main critiques. These critiques form the basis of the argument for the framework of ‘performative securitization’, which structures this thesis. It will argue that the ‘speech act’ should be replaced with post-structuralist ‘discourse’.

The classic securitization theory framework

Securitization theory focuses on the process by which an issue becomes socially constructed and recognized as a security threat. 16 Securitization, in its classical version, is a ‘**speech act’**: by labeling something as a **security issue** it **becomes one**.17 The developers of this theory, Buzan, de Wilde and Waever (1998) based it upon John L. Austin’s speech act theory, in which **language is viewed** as **performative**. Each speech act can convey three types of acts: saying something meaningful (locutionary act), doing in saying something (illocutionary act) and the effects produced through acting in saying something (perlocutionary effect).18 The performativity of language, following Austin, is also dependent upon appropriate circumstances. 19 These contextual requirements for success of the speech act, or felicity conditions, include a ‘specific linguistic framing and a particular intersubjective context’.20 These ideas have been adopted by the Copenhagen School.

Securitization **theory** poses that a **securitizing actor** makes a **securitizing move**, in which someone frames an issue as an **existential threat** to the survival of a **referent object**. This then has to be accepted as such by a relevant audience. If successful, this logic of security takes an issue out of the political arena and legitimizes extraordinary measures.21A referent object can be the **state**, as in national security, but also **individuals**, **critical infrastructures** or the environment. Securitizing moves must follow internal **felicity conditions**: rules and conventions of a speech act and its consequences, or in other words a logic- or grammar of security.22 This logic of security constructs a story that includes an existential threat, a sense of urgency and a way out. 23 Similar to the speech act, external conditions must be met for securitization to happen. The theory includes external facilitating factors that can constrain or enable audience acceptance of the move, including the social position of the actor and - audience and the nature of the threat.24

**Threat representations lead to the securitization and militarization of the internet.**

**Claessen 20** – a PhD researcher in Russia studies at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (GGS).

Eva Claessen, “Reshaping the internet – the impact of the securitisation of internet infrastructure on approaches to internet governance: the case of Russia and the EU”, 1-7-20, Journal of Cyber Policy Volume 5, 2020 - Issue 1: Special Issue: Consolidation of the Internet , https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23738871.2020.1728356

ABSTRACT

In the face of the rising political stake associated with the **Internet**, states are increasingly **vying** for a **bigger role** in its governance. Within a climate of an **array** of **threats** associated with the **online** information **space**, the attention is turning towards the **governance** of the internet **infrastructure itself**, comprising both the physical (the collection of cables computers, servers and routers that make up the network) and the virtual infrastructure (protocols, social media platforms and search engines that make it possible to navigate and use the internet). The question of **sovereignty** is not only increasingly **reflected** in the legislation of political actors like **Russia**, but also recently in EU discourse in relation to technological **resilience** and **cyber security**. This article aims to map out the impact of the securitisation of the internet infrastructure in the Russian and the EU approach to internet governance.

Introduction

Within the context of rising challenges emanating from the online information space, states are increasingly faced with the dilemma of how to provide an adequate response to **threats** posed in an area that is inherently **decentralised** and **non-hierarchical** in its architecture. Due to a growing **awareness** of the use of information operations on the internet by state actors in the wake of the 2007–2008 cyberattacks on Estonia and Georgia, the Snowden revelations in 2013 and the use of hybrid actions and disinformation by Russia during and after the height of the Ukraine crisis, there is a **shift** in the debate on how to **manage** and **regulate** the **internet**. This shift is expressed in an increased focus on the **role** and responsibility of **state actors** in achieving a secure and resilient internet. As Milton Mueller (2017, 417) asserts, the dawn of these new challenges to state actors has led to cybersecurity claims being ‘used to enmesh various aspects of the Internet in foreign policy and military conflicts, as well as in other national forms of regulation and control in which states are privileged’.

Furthermore, security claims seem to form a fertile basis for arguments of state-actors aimed at (re)asserting their role in the area of internet governance. The **characterisation** of cyberspace as a domain for **military action** in 2016 by **NATO**, for example, has led to **increasing efforts** from both **Western states** and **Russia** to provide an international normative **framework** to protect against operations by state actors in cyberspace. In some ways, this explicit characterisation of cyberspace as a space for **military contention**, affirmed the assertion by Russia itself that the information space is being used to achieve **political-military goals**, a point which was made in the 2000 Doctrine for Information Security:

[One of the sources of threats for the information security of the Russian Federation is] the development by a range of states of the concept of information warfare, which foresees the creation of means to exert a dangerous influence on the information sphere of other countries of the world, the disruption of the normal functioning of the information and telecommunication systems, the preservation of information resources and the acquisition of unauthorized access to them.

As Maria Ristolainen (2017, 114) posits, this tendency towards the **militarisation** of the internet is **uncovering** new ways to approach the challenges posed by the **instrumentalisation** of the internet by state actors as ‘both Western and Russian cyberspace and/or information space is becoming a **new space** within which states may **act** and **reassert** **traditional notions of sovereignty** – yet through contradictory “**open**” and “**closed” approaches’**.

The appearance of these two different approaches can also be viewed within the development of cyber norms through the UN and the working groups for Information Security, the UN GGE and the UN OEWG. Since the development of cyber norms is marked by these two diverging approaches to sovereignty, the way they are presented by their proponents can be decisive. Because of this an effective strategy is necessary. These strategies can be viewed from the perspective of the process of “**strategic norm construction**”, through which political actors as strategists **manipulated** shared normative frames for their **political ends**” (Kurowska 2019, 1). An example of this is visible in the efforts by Russia to advance its normative **framework** on information security through the UN, as it routinely contests **Western dominance** in the creation of this normative framework and accentuates the need to respect the sovereign equality of states (Idem, 10).

**2NC---Link---Info-War**

**Information warfare is an empty signifier used to demonize opponents and generate support for militarization, particularly in the context of NATO.**

**Ünver and Kurnaz 22**, Department of International Relations, Özyeğin University, İstanbul; Turkey; Ahmet Kurnaz Department of Public Administration and Political Science Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Çanakkale, Turkey.

Akin Ünver and Ahmet Kurnaz, “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis”, 2-21-22, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4040148

Abstract: Following the Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, disinformation and fake news became popular terms to help **generate** domestic **awareness** against **foreign** information **operations** globally. Today, a large number of politicians, diplomats and civil society leaders identify disinformation and fake news as a primary **problem** in both domestic and **foreign policy** contexts. But how do security institutions define disinformation and fake news in foreign and security policy, and how do their securitization strategies change over years? This article explores 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, and more than 2,000 NATO texts, news, statements, and publications using computational methods since January 2014 and presents an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to explore the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. The study finds that **NATO’s threat** discourse and securitization strategies are heavily influenced by **US political lexicon** and discovers that word choices change based on their likelihood of mobilizing alliance resources and cohesion. In addition, the study finds that **NATO’s** recent **disinformation agenda** is in fact a **continuity** of **NATO’s** long-standing **Russia**-focused **securitization** discourse and an attempt to mobilize alliance **attention** on Baltic states and Poland to **counter Russia**.

1 Introduction

Over the last few years, disinformation, information warfare and **fake news** have become important strategic and political concepts in international relations(Cour la, 2020; Lanoszka, 2019). Although these terms aren’t new and are as old as the term ‘propaganda’, their mainstream use within the context of digital communication skyrocketed after the 2016 US elections (Grinberg et al., 2019). However even before that, these terms had begun to enter into the foreign policy discourse of NATO countries following the 2014 Russian military operations in Ukraine. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Russia had already designated information warfare as part of its 2010 Military Doctrine, which was updated again 2014 with a special emphasis on digital communication (Renz, 2014). A year prior, the importance of the digital space for military doctrinal considerations was outlined by General Valery Gerasimov - Russian Chief of the General Staff. In his 2013 article titled ‘The Value of Science is in the Foresight’, Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. … All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.” (Galeotti, 2019) These three texts are generally accepted as the doctrinal basis of modern Russian information operations that were demonstrated both in Ukraine in 2014, and later in Syria, after mid-2015 (Sinovets, Renz, 2015).

Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to **influence**, mislead and **confuse** foreign **populations** have assumed a central position in global **debates** about politics and **foreign policy**. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a **central position**(Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘**disinformation**/misinformation’, ‘**fake news’**, and ‘**information operations’** have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit, and delegitimize rival countries(Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.

The foreign policy use of such terms predates the 2016 US elections and proliferated after the Russian military involvement in Crimea and Donbas (Khaldarova, Pantti, 2016). The primary reason for this contextual proliferation was the Russian decision to deny the initial stages of its involvement in Ukraine and its broader strategy of distracting and dividing Western attention over Russian military operations (Mejias, Vokuev, 2017). There is still a debate over whether it was really Russian information operations that had derailed NATO response in Ukraine, or if disinformation discourses are employed in order to shift the blame over to Russia at a time when NATO was already divided over its commitment to Ukraine (Lysenko, Brooks, 2018). While there is robust evidence of Russian information operations in Ukraine and its role in spreading disinformation in NATO countries, sustained NATO apathy towards rising Russian military influence in the Black Sea after 2014 and Syria after 2015 support the latter claim.

Critics of Western disinformation **discourses** for example, argue **that such discourses** have turned into ‘**floating** (or **empty) signifiers’**, that have **no** specific or **agreed-upon meaning** (Farkas, Schou, 2018). In that vein, **blaming others** for engaging in **disinformation** often **distracts attention** away from a **mistake** or **failed policy** enacted by **the blamer** (Monsees, 2020). In this case, critics argue that Western discourses on **disinformation** are intended to distract attention away from **NATO** or EU **divisions**, or more domesticlevel **polarization dynamics**, by creating a unique **empty signifier** (disinformation) that is employed as a **rallying rhetoric** that **bolsters** the significance of **external threats** (Mas-Manchón et al., 2021). This way, disinformation and its associated terms like **misinformation**, fake news and information war get securitized, receiving disproportionate levels of **attention** in the **policy domain**. In this context, disinformation and its associated terms are used to **exaggerate** an **existing threat** and create a **rallying** discourse that **would channel** the attention of the divided Western nations away from their **internal disagreements**, and towards an inflated external threat. Some scholars go even further, arguing that disinformation is being securitized in the West (especially in NATO) to the extent the ‘war on terror’ was securitized through the 2000s (Lanoszka, 2019). In this line, disinformation is alleged to have become a new strategic glue that would help Western nations pool in their increasingly diverging interests and resources into a common cause (Baumann, 2020).

Securitization of disinformation in domestic politics is relatively well-studied (Freelon, Wells, 2020; Neo, 2021). Although these terms have entered into mainstream debate after the 2016 US elections, former President Donald Trump too, had securitized fake news to delegitimize his opponents by constructing rival disinformation as a national security problem, indirectly attributable to China (Polletta, Callahan, 2019). Following the tornado of accusations in the US, political actors in Britain, France, Italy, South Africa, Kenya and others have begun blaming each other for engaging in organized disinformation (Maweu, 2019; Saurwein, Spencer-Smith, 2020). Even in Sweden, there is empirical evidence that suggests accusing journalists of spreading fake news results in self-censorship of such outlets (Bennett, Livingston, 2018). There are further cases of evidence supporting the claim that elite-level discourses on disinformation have a direct effect on how the wider society perceives information and facts in general, creating a measurable effect on public trust towards such facts and information (Van Duyn, Collier, 2019). In Singapore for example, delegitimizing rival parties and news outlets through disinformation discourse is considered ‘acceptable’, as part of the state’s duty to discipline the opposition and its political actors (Tan, 2020). Similar trends emerging in democracies and authoritarian countries alike, such as in Austria, Australia, Poland, Russia, and South Africa, demonstrate the universality of instrumentalizing disinformation discourse as a political delegitimization tactic (Kurowska, Reshetnikov, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018).

While a robust scholarship is emerging on the domestic political uses of disinformation discourse, there has so far been no longitudinal, large-N study that explored how such constructions emerge in international politics. Furthermore, there has so far been no exploration of how such discourses evolve over time and under what contexts in foreign affairs. We know that disinformation and fake news are important issues in world politics and that they are frequently used to bring an issue to public attention, but we are more in the dark over the contextual and temporal nuances that drive how these concepts are discursively constructed in foreign policy discourse.

This study aims to provide an early addition to the emerging literature on foreign policy uses of disinformation discourses by focusing on how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has used them in its documents and social media posts. It does so by studying 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, and more than 2,000 NATO texts, news, statements, and publications using computational methods since January 2014 and presents an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to explore the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. Ultimately, we hope to trigger a wider debate on the securitization of disinformation and fake news in foreign policy, and the greater explanatory value of computational methods in studying large-N text data in studying such securitization strategies.

2 Securitizing Disinformation

Over the last few years, defining what misleading content is and how to measure the legitimacy of its dissemination has been at the forefront of journalistic, political and scientific debate (Tandoc et al., 2018). Even before its proliferation in 2016, disinformation was a widely-used term in the mainstream discourse, co-existing with other terms such as infoglut, or information overload (Andrejevic, 2013). Although at first disinformation and misinformation were terms used interchangeably, today, disinformation refers to the deliberate dissemination of false information with the intention to mislead and confuse its audiences. Misinformation, on the other hand, strictly defines unintended diffusion of false information by mistake, without malintent. There are also bridge terms such as ‘malinformation’ that is factually accurate but is deployed to harm and damage an individual or an entity, or the concept of ‘problematic information’ as defined by Caroline Jack (Jack, 2017; Morgan, 2018). Although it is not directly mentioned, all of these concepts refer to the digital space, where information manipulation is disseminated faster and wider on social media and digital communication technologies compared to more media forms of media.

As terms ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, ‘information operation’, and ‘hybrid war’ are often used interchangeably in political discourse, there are no **clear-cut** differences in the **strategic topic** of each word choice (Guess, Lyons, 2020). Politicians and leaders can often use these terms as a bag of **buzzwords**, without a **clear** operational **definition** of what each of them precisely **means**. Each of these buzzwords generate roughly the **same effect** on the **consumers** of such messages, which is the **delegitimization of their target** (Tucker et al., 2018). Especially problematic is the fact that once the discourse on disinformation is weaponized to **delegitimize rivals**, there is very little such rivals can do to **defend themselves**. Given the significant political charge of these terms, individuals or institutions that are alleged to be engaging in disinformation-related activities often have to enter into a fruitless spar of words to challenge such allegations, which usually leads to further controversy. This renders the accuser - or the side that securitizes disinformation - more advantageous compared to the accused, generating a dynamic similar to the ‘attacker’s advantage’ in cyber security where the defender is continuously blindsided (Tong et al., 2020).

Therefore, the **securitization** of disinformation - that is, discursively constructing disinformation as a **security concern** - is becoming almost as **controversial** as **disinformation itself**, and can often be **deployed** to **muddle** the waters of a **healthy debate**. Its problem lies within its success; namely how **successfully** disinformation gets **securitized** and rallies **policy resources** around itself. This fits into Buzan et. al. criteria for a ‘**successful speech-act’**, which takes places in a medium most appropriate for its dissemination and have a clear, mobilizable **referent object** (i.e. ‘those that spread disinformation’) (Buzan et al., 1998). By securitizing disinformation in the medium that is most conducive for its dissemination (social media and Internet), speakers get a chance to use the speed and volume advantage of digital communication technologies against their opponents. Also, such discursive constructions must be sedimented (1) rhetorically: have a clear argumentative function, (2) discursively: contain clear power and hegemonic relations within, (3) culturally: refer to a well-known case or instance, and (4) institutionally: in a way that mobilizes policy resources (Williams, 2003).

Yet for the Copenhagen school, not all speech acts constitute securitization. Securitization is a very particular **discursive construct** that designates a specific existential threat that requires the mobilization of **uncommon resources** and measures that go **beyond** the **norms** of institutional and political **responses** (Knudsen, 2001). In many cases, securitization happens to **trigger** and facilitate these **institutional changes** by ‘shocking’ power **brokers** and **bureaucracies** into action either through internal bureaucratic peer pressure, or through public opinion pressure (audience costs). As such, disinformation has been lifted ‘**above politics’** in Western **rhetoric** as a **peculiar threat** that requires a sidelining of **daily** political **squabbles**, mobilizing unique **resources** and addressing it in unity that would otherwise **cannot materialize** (Buzan, Wæver, 2009). Ultimately the discursive constructions of disinformation do constitute acute cases of **securitization** as they generate **amity-enmity relations** among countries that adopt this **discursive strategy**, versus those that do not (Buzan, Wæver, 2009).

#### Offensive information operations, specifically in cyberspace, are incredibly problematic because of how they convey information in attempts to “protect” the public

By Hedvig Ördén, 2020 (“Securing Judgement: Rethinking Security and Online Information Threats”, Stockholm: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, accessed 6/24/2022, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1387380/FULLTEXT01.pdf>) /lrap

Most research on the online information threat has been conducted within Defence and Intelligence Studies, employing the concept of ‘information warfare’ or more specific military-operational terms, such as ‘information operations’ 2 or ‘psychological operations,3’ to describe the online information threat. These studies are based on an understanding of information as a strategic weapon employed in state-to-state relations. As Daniel Ventre (2016) writes, a successful information operation is intended to ‘destroy, deteriorate, disrupt, deceive, exploit and influence enemy functions’ by targeting ‘leaders’ and other ‘human decision makers’ (Ventre 2016, 44). The aim is to impair ‘the enemy’s information and its functions while seeking to protect those on which one’s own military effort depends’ (Nincic 2003, 141). While cyberspace is considered a complicating factor in security-making, the envisaged path to security is still pursued within the traditional state-centric framework. Security is in the hands of a ‘cyber-defence’ (Heckman et al. 2015). In more extreme versions, the aim is ‘cybersovereignty,’ the establishment of Westphalian virtual-territorial boundaries in cyberspace (Demchak and Dombrowski 2014), or even the launching of a government-operated ‘alternative internet’ (Pherson and Mort Ranta 2019). On a strictly operational level, however, threat-descriptions and security-making practices focus on individual human vulnerabilities. Most notably, securitizing actors themselves as well as scholarship on security draw heavily on the ‘mind sciences’ of cognitive psychology, social psychology and evolutionary perspectives in psychology (Palmertz n.d. 3-4). Outlining the ‘theoretical foundations of information operations’, Björn Palmertz, for instance, argues that we need to understand the ‘mental processes and social circumstances that govern how we form attitudes, make decisions and implement them’ (Palmertz n.d. 3-4 and 34) when developing a defence against enemy operations. Such insights into the cognitive aspects of decision-making can also provide pointers for the conduct of powerful offensive information operations. In the light of this envisaged efficiency of perception-management, however, critics point to the potential dangers of countering enemy operations online. Miroslav Nincic, for instance, emphasizes that offensive information operations conducted in cyberspace – a sphere without state territorial boundaries – might blur the line between domestic and interstate practices for perception management (Nincic 2003, 147 and 141). In other words, when messages are directed at (foreign) enemies in cyberspace, they may still ‘convey the distortions to a domestic audience’ (Nincic 2003, 141). Such distortions, furthermore, can undermine ‘the public’s ability to form an autonomous judgement of government actions and to hold it accountable for these actions’ (Nincic 2003, 141). Countering online information threats through offensive information operations could essentially lead to problems with transparency and accountability – key principles in any democratic context.  
In contrast to this clear-cut national security perspective, many contemporary scholars within Strategic Studies conceptualize the online information threat in relation to the problems caused by increased digitalization. Describing the threat as a key part of ‘hybrid warfare’ – ‘the synchronized subversive use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities (including cyber vulnerabilities)’ (Omand 2018, 13) – this literature opens up for new non-state enemy actors and a broader object of protection.4 Regarding the civil population as vulnerable to Islamist fundamentalist ‘radicalization’ (Jasper and Moreland 2014) or as ‘psychologically’ unprepared for Russian ‘info-war’ (Aro 2016, 127), security goes from being the protection of the territorial state to the protection of the citizens within the state. In turn, protecting the democratic public requires a ‘comprehensive’ form of security (Aaronson et al. 2011 and Omand 2018). A widely embraced method is ‘strategic communication5 (Taylor 2002) – communication with ‘clear objectives’ used to inform, influence and persuade the target audience (Paul 2011, 5). The idea of protecting the democratic public from outside threats spread through online communication, however, builds on a set of problematic assumptions. Arguing that the proposed countermeasures rest on a ‘fundamentally flawed’ understanding of the premises for communication, Cristina Archetti highlights the neglected ‘network’ dimension of meaning creation (Archetti 2018, 83). In short, the depiction of strategic communication as having ‘clear objectives,’ or the assumption that communication can be a ‘powerful weapon’ used by enemies, leaves out the fundamentally intersubjective nature of communication. Communicative ‘truth’ cannot simply be inserted top-down, but is the outcome of a collective process of interpretation (Archetti 2018, 93). In a democratic context, such assumptions are even more problematic, since the intersubjective production of political ‘truth’, arising out of communication, is also a means of drawing the boundaries for legitimate authority.

**2NC---AT: Securitization Good**

**Even if the threat is real, securitization is a counter-productive response, de-securitized policy is far better at solving their impacts.**

**Lawson 13** – assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, published articles on these issues in journals such as Social Studies of Science, Security Dialogue, Cold War History, First Monday, and Communication, Culture & Critique.

Sean Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom: Assessing the Limits of Hypothetical Scenarios in the Framing of CyberThreats”, 2013, Journal of Information Technology & Politics

The discussion above should not suggest, however, that we should **not take cybersecurity seriously**. Rather, it should suggest that taking cybersecurity seriously requires **re-evaluating** the **assumptions** upon which **policy-making proceeds**. Making effective policy begins with a **realistic assessment** of what is **possible** based on **empirical research**. The remainder of this article identifies **potential negative policy implications** of **cyber-doom scenarios** and offers a set of principles that can be used to guide the formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy.

Negative Impacts of Flawed Assumptions

The language used to **frame problems** opens up some avenues for response while **closing** off **others** (Lawson, 2012). In cyber-doom scenarios, cybersecurity is framed primarily in terms of “**war**” and, with the use of terms such as “**cyber-9/11**” and “**cyber-Katrina**,” in terms of large-scale “**disaster**.” This war/disaster framing can lead to a **militarist**, **command-and-control mindset** that is ultimately **counterproductive**.

A war framing implies the need for **military solutions** to cybersecurity challenges, even though most of what gets **lumped** under the term “**cyberwar**” are really acts of **crime**, **espionage**, or **political protest**, and even though it is not at all clear that a **military response** is either appropriate or **effective** (Lewis, 2010). Nonetheless, the establishment of the military’s U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has been the most significant U.S. response yet to perceived cyberthreats.

Such a response is **fraught with danger**. First, the very existence of USCYBERCOM, which has both an offensive and defensive mission, could **undermine** the U.S. **policy** of **promoting** a **free** and **open Internet** worldwide by encouraging greater Internet **censorship** and **filtering**, as well as more **rapid militarization** of cyberspace (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 143). For example, some have already called for USCYBERCOM to launch strikes on WikiLeaks, which leaked hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. documents about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (McCullagh, 2010b; Thiessen, 2010; Whitton, 2010). Such a response would only serve to create a “**say-do gap”** (Mullen, 2009, p. 4)— a gap between words and deeds—that potential adversaries could use to justify their **own development** and use of **offensive cyber weapons** and efforts to thwart whatever possibility there is for international cooperation on cybersecurity.

Second, there is the danger of “**blow back**.” In a highly interconnected world, there is no guarantee that an **offensive** cyber**attack** launched by the United States against another country would **not result** in serious **collateral** damage to noncombatants or even end up causing harm to the **United States** (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 143). Such “**blow back**” may have occurred in a recent case where the United States military took down a Jihadist discussion forum, causing collateral damage to **noncombatant computers** and Web sites, as well as undermining an ongoing U.S. **intelligence-gathering** operation (Nakashima, 2010).

Third, there is the risk of **conflict escalation** from cyber to **physical conflict**. If the United States launched a cyberattack against a state or nonstate actor lacking the capability to respond in kind, that actor might choose to respond with **physical attacks** (Clarke, 2009). There have even been calls for the United States to respond with **conventional** military **force** to **cyberattacks** that amounted to little more than **vandalism** (Crovitz, 2011; Dunn, 2010; Zetter, 2009). Finally, a 2009 review of U.S. military strategy documents, combined with statements from officials, further adds to the confusion and potential for escalation by indicating that nuclear response remains on the table as a possible U.S. response to cyberattack (Markoff & Shanker, 2009; Owens, Dam, & Lin, 2009).

Next, a **disaster framing** portends cybersecurity planning dominated by the same “**command and control [C2] model**” rooted in flawed assumptions of inevitable “**panic**” and “**social collapse**” that have increasingly dominated official U.S. disaster planning (Quarantelli, 2008, p. 897). The result has been ever more **centralized**, hierarchical, **bureaucratic**, and **militarized** disaster **responses** (Quarantelli, 2008, pp. 895–896; see also Alexander, 2006; Lakoff, 2006). The result can be a form of “government paternalism” in which officials panic about the possibility of panic and then take actions that **exacerbate** the **situation by** not only failing to provide **victims** with the help they need, but also **preventing them** from effectively **helping themselves** (Dynes, 2006; see also Clarke & Chess, 2009, pp. 999–1001). This phenomenon was on display in the official response to **Hurricane Katrina** (Clarke & Chess, 2009, pp. 1003–1004). In the realm of cybersecurity, there are already provisions for the military’s USCYBERCOM to provide assistance to the Department of Homeland Security in the event of a domestic cyber emergency (Ackerman, 2010). Reminiscent of self-imposed blackouts during WWII, Senator Joseph Lieberman’s proposal for a so-called “Internet kill switch,” which would give the **President** the authority to cut U**.S. Internet connections** to the rest of the world in the event of a large-scale **cyberattack**,3 is the ultimate expression of the desire to **regain control** by developing the means to **destroy** that which we **fear to lose.**

The war/disaster framing at the heart of contemporary U.S. cybersecurity discourse risks focusing policy on the narrowest and least likely portion of the overall cybersecurity challenge— i.e., acts of “**cyberwar**” leading to economic, **social**, or civilizational **collapse**—while potentially **diverting attention** and **resources** away from making **preparations** to prevent or **mitigate** the **effects** of more **realistic** but perhaps less dramatic **scenarios**. But, there are a number of principles that can guide the formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy that can help us to avoid these pitfalls.

Strive for **Clear Problem Definition** First and Foremost

The first step to formulating and evaluating **prospective cybersecurity** policies is to strive for clearer definitions of the problems to be addressed. James Lewis (2010) has argued that “Pronouncements that we are **in a cyber war** or face **cyber terror** conflate problems and make effective **response** more **difficult**” (p. 1). Instead, he advocates that we **disaggregate** the different types of **cyberthreats**—including cyberspace-enabled economic espionage, political and military espionage, crime, and cyberwar or cyberterror—so that each particular threat can be addressed in the most appropriate and effective manner. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Dunn Cavelty (2008) goes even further by urging us to take the complexity of contemporary cybersecurity problems seriously, not by reducing all challenges to “cyberwar,” but instead by focusing “on a far broader range of potentially dangerous occurrences involving cyber-means and targets, including failure due to human error, technical problems, and market failure apart from malicious attacks” (p. 144).

For effective response, complex problems such as contemporary cybersecurity challenges require us, first and foremost, to acknowledge their complexity and to work toward the clearest, most precise definitions possible, even when absolute clarity and precision are unattainable. Seek Guidance from Empirical Research The formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy needs to be guided whenever possible by empirical research and rely less on hypothetical scenarios. While this may seem obvious, several influential voices in the ongoing cybersecurity debate have argued that the time for defining the problem is over and that now is instead the time for action (Carr, 2010; Yoran, 2010).

Partly in response to this kind of resistance to providing clear, consistent diagnostic frames, a recent JASON report has argued that a lack of clear problem definition and conceptual language is a chief impediment to creating a true science of cybersecurity (JASON, 2010). In the case of early airpower theory, reliance on unchallenged assumptions and hypothetical scenarios in the face of contradictory empirical evidence had disastrous results. By relying too heavily on hypothetical, cyber-doom scenarios, current cybersecurity planning is open to the same criticism that has been leveled against contemporary disaster planning: It is “organized to deal with predicted vulnerabilities rather than to mobilize social capital to deal with actual threats” (Dynes, 2006, p. 5). Additionally, while empirical research of a technical nature is crucial, the formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy requires knowledge of relevant “nontechnical” matters such as the geopolitical, economic, legal, and other aspects of cybersecurity (Carr, 2009; Lewis, 2009).

This article has demonstrated the value of research conducted in the humanities and social sciences for the analysis of cyberthreats. Finally, experts and policy-makers alike need to be critical and reflexive about cybersecurity claims, constantly asking if what they are saying or hearing is based on empirical evidence or merely the reflection of long-held anxieties about technology and recycled assumptions about infrastructural and social fragility.

Promote **Resilience** in **Technological** and Social **Systems**

While we should seek to **prevent cyberattack** when it is possible and prudent to do so, we should also **promote resilience** in technological and social **systems**. While it is **unclear** whether the possession of an **offensive** cyberwar **capability** will **deter** potential **attackers**, it is clear that more **resilient technological** and **social systems** are a **benefit** in **any case**, can help to mitigate the effects of a cyberattack should it occur, and can even help to deter cyberattacks by providing a would-be attacker with fewer valuable and vulnerable targets (Lewis, 2006; Nye, 2010, pp. 189, 191).

Promote Repair, **Maintenance**, and **Modernization** of **Infrastructure** Systems

Promoting **resilience** in critical infrastructures hinges on supporting ongoing repair, maintenance, and modernization of those systems. Recent events, such as the 2003 blackout and the 2007 collapse of the I-35 Mississippi River bridge in Minnesota, illustrate that U.S. infrastructure systems are aging and becoming more fragile and prone to failures. In each of these cases, it was a lack of repair and maintenance that was the cause of failure, not intentional attack (Nye, 2010, p. 180; Patterson, 2010a). Some have even argued that increased attention to infrastructure security has led to a reduction in funding for basic repair and maintenance activities (Liles, 2008). But repair and maintenance are the key to resilient systems, not only because they reduce the fragility of those systems and thus help to prevent failures in the first place, but also because they promote learning and adaptation among the human repair crews who will be the first responders when failures occur (Graham & Thrift, 2007, pp. 5, 14; Nye, 2010, p. 189). Thus, instead of “think[ing] of the grid as a fortress to be protected at every point” (Nye, 2010, p. 197) by a central authority against total collapse caused by a hypothetical cyberattack, we should invest in the more mundane, ongoing, and essentially decentralized work of repair and maintenance that are the true source of resilient infrastructures (Graham & Thrift, 2007, pp. 9–10). This warning against a fortress mentality and centralization of authority should apply to cyberspace itself, and should call into question recent calls to “re-engineer the Internet” largely under the direction of the National Security Agency (McConnell, 2010, p. B01).

Promote Decentralization and **Self-Organization** in **Social Systems**

Cybersecurity policy should promote **decentralization** and self-organization in efforts to **prevent**, defend against, and respond to **cyberattacks**. Disaster researchers have shown that **victims are** often the true **first responders**, and that **centralized**, **hierarchical**, **bureaucratic responses** can **hamper** their **ability** to respond in the **decentralized**, self-organized **manner** that has often proved to be **more effective** (Quarantelli, 2008, pp. 895–896). One way that officials often stand in the way is by **hoarding information** (Clarke & Chess, 2009, pp. 1000–1001). Similarly, over the last 50 years, U.S. military doctrine increasingly has identified decentralization, self-organization, and information-sharing as the keys to effectively operating in ever-more complex conflicts that move at an ever-faster pace and over ever-greater geographical distances (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998; LeMay & Smith, 1968). Preventing or defending against **cyberattacks** on critical infrastructure requires recognizing that **private actors** own **most cyber** and physical **infrastructures**. Thus, a centralized, **military**-led **effort** to protect the fortress at every point **will not work**. A combination of incentives, regulations, and public/private partnerships will be necessary. The owners and operators of critical infrastructures are on the front lines and will be the first responders. They must be empowered to act. Similarly, if the worst should occur, average citizens must be empowered to act in a decentralized, self-organized way to help themselves and others. In the case of critical infrastructures such as the electrical grid, this could include the promotion of alternative energy generation and distribution methods. In this way, “Instead of being passive consumers, [citizens] can become actors in the energy network. Instead of waiting for blackouts, they can organize alternatives and become less vulnerable to either terror or natural catastrophe” (Nye, 2010, p. 203).

Promote Strong **Local Communities**, Economies, and Good **Local Governance**

Finally, preparation for responding to any **disaster** requires the promotion of **strong local communities**, economies, and good local governance. Just as more **resilient technological** systems can better respond in the event of **failure**, so too are strong **social systems** better able to respond in the event of disaster of **any type**. Historians and disaster researchers alike have documented that the responses of individuals and groups in disaster situations largely depend on larger structural conditions in existence before the disaster itself. Communities that have weaker social ties among members, have corrupt or ineffective local government and law enforcement, and that suffer from economic hardship prior to a disaster will find it more difficult, if not impossible, to respond effectively in a time of crisis (Alexander, 2006; Lakoff, 2006; Nye, 2010, p. 185).

In part, this requires policies and planning by local governments during normal, predisaster periods that not only promotes the growth of strong local civil-society organizations such as businesses, churches, nonprofits, and neighborhood associations, but also plans to involve those organizations in postdisaster response and recovery efforts. Local governments should plan in advance to allow these organizations to act in a decentralized and self-organizing manner to aid in response and recovery. This could include not only planning for what government institutions can and will do in a disaster, but also what will be left to civil-society organizations, as well as which regulations from normal, nondisaster contexts might be relaxed during an emergency to allow civil-society organizations to aid in response and recovery. Finally, predisaster efforts by local government institutions to encourage the formation of informal network ties among the various civil-society organizations within the community can facilitate the kind of horizontal and bottom-up informationsharing that is necessary for effective disaster response and recovery (Brito & Rothschild, 2009; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2008, 2009; Storr & Haeffele-Balch, 2010).

CONCLUSION

In the last three years, cybersecurity has received perhaps more attention than at any time during the last three decades. In an attempt to call attention to **cyberthreats**, cybersecurity proponents have deployed **cyber-doom scenarios** that frame prospective cyberthreats in terms of “war” and “disaster” and offer the possibility of total economic, social, or even **civilizational collapse**. But this article has pointed to some of the potentially **negative** policy **consequences** that can occur when **cyber-doom scenarios** as motivational frames dominate or even replace properly formulated **diagnostic frames**. In particular, it has argued that **cyber-doom scenarios** are more a reflection of long-held but **incorrect** **assumptions** and misplaced fears about the **fragility** of **modern societies** and infrastructure systems than they are a realistic portrayal of what is possible as a result of cyberattack. These assumptions and fears often lead to a centralized, militarized quest for top-down control that is ultimately counterproductive to achieving stated policy objectives. Influenced by cyber-doom scenarios, current U.S. cybersecurity policy, with its creation of a military Cyber Command and suggestions for an “Internet kill switch,” is tending toward the centralized, militarized, control-oriented, fortress mentality that research suggests is neither prudent nor effective. Instead, the effective prevention and mitigation of cyberattacks requires the promotion of resilience by way of repair, maintenance, and modernization of technological systems and decentralization, self-organization, economic strength, and good governance in social systems. We do not need to wait for access to classified information or rely solely on **technical experts** to engage **critically** with **cybersecurity discourse**. By drawing upon existing research in related areas such as the history of **technology**, military **history**, and **disaster sociology**, we can **challenge** the **blurring** of boundaries between **diagnostic** and **motivational frames that** results in a potentially dangerous **war**/disaster **framing**, and we can instead provide alternative guiding **principles** for **cybersecurity policy-making**.

**Cyber-securitization has produced decades of failed policy.**

**Hart 11** - master’s in communications at Simon Fraser University

Catherine Hart, “Mobilizing the Cyberspace Race: the Securitization of the Internet and its Implications for Civil Liberties”, 2011, Cyber-Surveillance in Everyday Life: An International Workshop \* May 12-15, 2011 \* University of Toronto

Successful Securitization?

Having reviewed the securitizing discourse in the documents, I would suggest that Critical Foundations is a **securitizing move**, but perhaps **not** a **successful securitization**. Using the Copenhagen School’s criteria, it cannot be seen as **generating** enough **immediacy** and **salience** to promote more general **audience acceptance**. The report repeatedly states that **no evidence** was found of an **impending attack** (PCCIP, 1997, 5), and that [p]hysical means to **exploit** physical **vulnerabilities** probably remain the most **worrisome threat** to our infrastructures today. But almost every group we met... emphasized the importance of developing approaches to **protecting** our **infrastructures** against cyber threats **before** they **materialize** and produce major system damage (PCCIP, 1997, 5).

While a threat is suggested, the emphasis on being **prepared** before threats **materialize** has the **unintended effect** of **confirming** that this is not an **immediate issue**, but may be at **some point** in the future. While the report did prompt President Clinton to pass Presidential Decision Directive 63 the following year, in terms of **actionable response**, the author of the document, Richard A. Clarke, calls it “**toothless**” (Clarke, 2010, 109). Conversely, the NSSC is much more emphatic that these threats are very much present today. It suggests that the reason we have not yet experienced a nationally debilitating cyber attack is due to the high technical sophistication needed to carry out such an attack (DHS, 2003, viii). It then assures the audience that “[t]here have been instances where organized attackers have exploited vulnerabilities that may be indicative of more destructive capabilities” (ibid), thereby suggesting that smaller-scale attacks have occurred, and will only become more effective with time. The CPR goes even further, outlining specific cyber-incidents, disruption and damaged caused, and estimated financial losses (NSHSC, 2009, 2).

The increase of a sense of **urgency** in the documents, the institutionalization of **cybersecurity efforts**, and the targeting of progressively **wider audiences** seems to suggest a **gradual acceptance**, at least within government, of the securitization of cyberspace. Therefore in conclusion, I ask what responses are being justified by the acceptance of the need to increase cybersecurity, and what consideration, if any, is given to the impact these responses may have on civil liberties?

Responses to Securitization and Areas of Further Research Perhaps surprisingly, given the level of urgency with which the subject is addressed, all three documents hold firm to the American belief in federal non-intervention in the private sector, and eschew the regulation of industry. They recommend instead a response based on increased coordination and information sharing with the private sector, alongside a public awarenessraising campaign, and the government leading by example. In an effort to ensure that this publicprivate partnership is “genuine, mutual and cooperative,” Critical Foundations recommends that “the U.S. government should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation or expand unfunded government mandates to the private sector” (PCCIP, 1997, 3). Rather, it is suggested that financial incentives should be used to encourage the desired behaviour (4). The NSSC further addresses the balance between the public and private, and the importance of non-intervention, stating that “[t]he federal government should likewise not intrude into homes and small businesses, into universities, or state and local agencies and departments to create secure computer networks’’ (DHS, 2003, 11). Little attention is therefore given by the documents to civil liberties because little is needed, beyond ensuring that the promoted ‘information sharing’ respects privacy rights, so that “[c]onsumers and operators... have confidence that information will be handled accurately, confidentially and reliably” (PCCIP, 4). The CPR also suggests the designation of a privacy and civil liberties official to the National Security Council cybersecurity directorate to address any privacy concerns (NSHSC, 2009, 37).

**However** there is **evidence** of some **dissatisfaction** among security advisors with this approach. To Richard Clarke, these efforts at cybersecurity have been an “**unmitigated failure**” (Clarke, 2010, 104). Serving as the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, and CounterTerrorism under Clinton and the Special Advisor to the President for Cybersecurity under George Bush, he is also the author of PDD63 and headed the team that wrote the NSSC. He has long been an advocate of more stringent controls over cyberspace, and in his book, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, he suggests several much more **intrusive** and **restrictive methods** of cybersecurity. While military networks are governed and protected by U.S. Cyber Command, and the DHS has responsibility for dotgov networks, the safety of public networks is left to industry, and he does not trust industry to regulate itself, due to the fact that the information sharing and voluntary measure approach has been government policy for over a decade, but this has not protected cyberspace from a series of major incidents which have affected its proper functioning (Clarke, 2010, 113-112). He complains that, during the **Bush** Administration especially, the White House did not **taken** **cybersecurity seriously enough**, stating that “[n]o regulation and no decision-making authority meant **little potential** for results” (109).

**2NC---AT: Cyberthreats Real**

**Be skeptical of their impacts, descriptions of cyber-threats are neither objective nor neutral, but are instead informed by social context and used as a vehicle to expand state power.**

**Hart 11** - master’s in communications at Simon Fraser University

Catherine Hart, “Mobilizing the Cyberspace Race: the Securitization of the Internet and its Implications for Civil Liberties”, 2011, Cyber-Surveillance in Everyday Life: An International Workshop \* May 12-15, 2011 \* University of Toronto

The second stage in the process concerns the likelihood that this discourse will be accepted by a wider audience than those advancing the securitization. The ability of an actor to successfully securitize an issue is highly dependent on their position. Security has, to some degree, been institutionalized, as is the case with the **military**, and therefore “some actors are placed in **positions of power** by virtue of being generally **accepted voices of security**, by having the power to **define security**” (Buzan et al, 1998, 31). Government cybersecurity policy would therefore seem to be an ideal vehicle to mobilize and perhaps also **legitimize** a **securitizing move**. Policy represents an administration’s official standpoint on an issue which is understood to be a problem, and proposes solutions based on technical knowledge and research. However, as public policy scholar Frank Fischer explains,

[f]rom the social constructivist perspective... the social and political life under investigation is **embedded** in a web of **social meanings** produced and reproduced through **discursive practices**. Politics and public policy are understood to take shape through socially **interpreted understandings**, and their meanings and the discourses that **circulate** them are **not of the actors’** own **choosing or making**. (2003, 13)

Public policy therefore contains both a persuasive and a responsive element; it seeks to justify a chosen course of action which is based upon socially interpreted understandings of ‘national security’. To use the Copenhagen School’s terms, it is both part of the securitizing move, employing a discourse of security, but by its very existence, demonstrates the success of the securitizing move because the issue has been taken seriously enough to warrant an official standpoint and planned response. Assessing how far securitization in policy promotes national security above all other considerations, including civil liberties, is the third part of the process.

By applying a framework of security to an event, it is understood that the issue is one of urgency, and, in the words of Buzan et al, “if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure” (1998, 26). According to the Copenhagen School's approach, “[t]he invocation of security has been the **key** to **legitimizing** the **use of force**, but more generally it has opened the way for the **state** to **mobilize**, or to take special powers, to **handle existential threats**” (ibid, 21). If a **securitization** is **successful**, an audience will tolerate **violations** of **rules** that would otherwise have to be **obeyed**, for example the **restriction** of **free speech**, or freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. By its very definition, a framework selectively calls attention to **certain** aspects of **reality**, and therefore **ignores** or **omits others** (Entman, 1993, 54). A security framework privileges security above all other concerns, sometimes to the detriment of civil liberties. It is commonly understood that to attain security, a little freedom must be given up, but how much freedom is under debate. It is not yet clear whether the security arguments of the U.S. military, the intelligence community, and more hawkish members of government will result in the hypersecuritization of cyberspace—to use Barry Buzan's term for the mobilization of exaggerated threats and excessive countermeasures (2004, 172)—or whether a more measured view, taking into account civil liberties and the positive potential of the Internet, will win out.

**Empirics prove, “cybersecurity” only entered mainstream discourse after the Soviet Union collapsed and the national security apparatus lacked a justification for its own existence.**

**Hart 11** - master’s in communications at Simon Fraser University

Catherine Hart, “Mobilizing the Cyberspace Race: the Securitization of the Internet and its Implications for Civil Liberties”, 2011, Cyber-Surveillance in Everyday Life: An International Workshop \* May 12-15, 2011 \* University of Toronto

This conceptual shift was also used to explore the **new problems** presented during the **Cold War** of the avoidance of the deployment of weapons. The use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War both realized and ended ‘total war’; mutually assured destruction or ‘MAD’ ensured that total war was no longer viable in nuclear-armed states (Gray, 1997, 168). Hannah Arendt calls this shift “a radical change in the very nature of war through the introduction of the deterrent as the guiding principle in the armament race” (Arendt, 1965, 6). This also prompted the dissolution of any kind of real or imagined separation between the civilian and military domains, and expanded the concept of security into a more civilian enterprise, a third major focus of the new security studies field. Civilians would be the majority of the victims in a nuclear attack, but in another sense, civilian experts, from physicists to economists to sociologists were needed to expand military knowledge in this new war-avoiding climate of deterrence (Buzan & Hanson, 2009, 2). The role of **civilians** has grown even more important to current **military efforts** due to the increasing **reliance** on research and development as the military struggles to come up with more **intelligent** and **effective weapons** to accommodate these shifts in warfare.

Traditional concepts of **national security** were again **challenged** by the fall of the **Soviet Union** and the end of the Cold War. Buzan argues that [w]hen the Cold War ended, Washington seemed to experience a **threat deficit**, and there was a string of **attempts** to find a **replacement** for the **Soviet Union** as the **enemy focus** for US foreign and **military policy**... which for more than 40 years had created a **common cause** and a shared framing that underpinned US **leadership of the West** (2006, 1101). At a time when the US held the position of the only remaining superpower, with no other nation possessing the military might to challenge it, the traditional understanding of security as being state and militarily-oriented was shaken by the events of September **11,** 2001. The devastating attacks, targeting civilians and carried out not by a rogue or enemy state but by terrorists, created a new concept of security in which everyone was a potential threat, and everyone was therefore suspect. Providing a **solution** to the **threat-deficit**, Lyon argues that “[a]nti-terrorism initiatives pick up where the **Cold War rhetoric** and **attitudes left off**, replacing the old “Communist” bugbears with “terrorist” ones (2003, 7).

As issues of **national security** have **expanded** beyond traditional understandings of the military and warfare, and the invocation of the Global War on Terror has created a climate of constant, low-level threat, the response has been an increase in regulation and **surveillance**. Agamben explains the effect of this shift on the way in which nations are governed, documenting the gradual emancipation of a ‘state of exception’ from periods of warfare, through the declaration of this state of emergency in times of economic crisis, strikes, and social tensions. The result of this expansion of ‘exceptional circumstances’ has been that “the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government” (2005, 14). The state of exception has now become the rule (Benjamin, 2003 392).

The framework of national security has therefore been expanded to encompass a wider range of threats, but still invokes pre-existing schemata. As a result, **non-military** threats have been framed in traditional **security** terms by politicians for the last several decades, for example the **'war on drugs’**, as a means of justifying increasing **government regulation** and **control** (Buzan, 2006, 1104) and it is into this framework that **cyber security** has been **added** (Nissenbaum, 2005; Nissenbaum & Hansen, 2009; Bendrath, 2003; Bendrath et al, 2007; Saco, 1999). As explained by Myriam Dunn, when addressing cybersecurity, states usually focus on the protection of **critical infrastructure**, which includes information systems and telecommunications, energy and utilities, transport, and finance (2007, 87). Since being connected to computer networks, these facilities have become vulnerable to **attack**, as they could be hacked into by outsiders and damaged. At the same time, the Internet “challenges conventional ways of thinking about **space, sovereignty, and security**” due to its transgression of national borders (Saco, 1999, 262), and such a challenge to state authority through the “**blurring** of **traditional boundaries**” has prompted great anxiety from security advisers (ibid, 263). The **inability** to **control the traffic** which crosses into U.S. **cyberspace**, combined with the integration of information systems into all areas of life including critical infrastructure and the **military**, play into **fears** about **asymmetrical threats**. That is to say, with very little **risk** or **investment**, a weaker adversary could exploit U.S. **information dependence** and strike at this weak point while avoiding the nation’s military strength (Dunn, 2007, 93). A concern with this threat is clear throughout cybersecurity policy, as I will show in the analysis of securitization in three key documents from the last three administrations.

**“Cyber-doom” is a securitized myth.**

**Lawson 13** – assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, published articles on these issues in journals such as Social Studies of Science, Security Dialogue, Cold War History, First Monday, and Communication, Culture & Critique.

Sean Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom: Assessing the Limits of Hypothetical Scenarios in the Framing of CyberThreats”, 2013, Journal of Information Technology & Politics

ABSTRACT. Cybersecurity proponents often rely on **cyber-doom** scenarios as a key **tactic** for calling attention to prospective **cyberthreats**. This article critically examines cyber-doom scenarios by placing them in a larger historical context, assessing how realistic they are, and drawing out the policy implications of relying on such tales. It draws from relevant research in the history of technology, military history, and disaster sociology to examine some of the key assertions and assumptions of cyber– doom scenarios. The article argues that **cyber-doom** scenarios are the latest manifestation of fears about “**technology-out-of-control**” in Western societies, that they are **unrealistic**, and that they encourage the adoption of **counterproductive**, even dangerous **policies**. The article concludes by offering alternative principles for the formulation of cybersecurity policy.

[T]hese war games are about the real effects of a cyberwar ... about causing chaos in our streets at home due to sudden crashes in our critical infrastructure through manipulation of our banking, transportation, utilities, communications, and other critical infrastructure industries. These are all real scenarios ... . (Patterson, 2010b) In seeking a prudent policy, the difficulty for decision-makers is to navigate the rocky shoals between hysterical doomsday scenarios and uninformed complacency. (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 144)

Recently, news media and policy-makers in the United States have turned their attention to **prospective threats** to and through cyberspace. Prospective cyberthreats include attacks launched via cyberspace on critical infrastructures such as power, water, transportation, and communication systems, but also terrorist use of the Internet, mobile phones, and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) for fundraising, recruiting, organizing, and carrying out attacks (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Out of frustration over a perceived lack of attention to these threats, combined with a belief that “**exaggeration**” and “**appeals to emotions** like fear can be more **compelling** than a rational discussion of strategy” (Lewis, 2010, p. 4), some cybersecurity proponents deploy “**cyber-doom scenarios**” (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 2). These are hypothetical tales of cyberattacks resulting in the mass collapse of critical infrastructures, which in turn leads to serious economic losses, or even total economic, social, or civilizational collapse. These tactics seem to have paid off in recent years, with cybersecurity finding its way onto the agendas of top civilian and military policy-makers alike. The results have included the creation of a White House “cybersecurity czar,” the creation of the military’s U.S. Cyber Command, and the consideration of several cybersecurity-related pieces of legislation by the U.S. Congress.

In the last several years, several high-profile “cyberattack”incidents have focused news media and policy-maker attention on cybersecurity. These have included two large-scale cyberattacks attributed to Russia: one against the nation of Estonia in 2007 (Blank, 2008; Evron, 2008) and one against the nation of Georgia in 2008 that coincided with a Russian invasion of that country (Bumgarner & Borg, 2009; “Georgia cyberattacks spark debate in Washington,” 2008; Korns & Kastenberg, 2008; Nichol, 2008). In January 2010, Google’s accusations of Chinese cyberattacks against it garnered a great deal of press attention and were featured prominently in Secretary of State Clinton’s speech on Internet freedom (Clinton, 2010).1 Most recently, the United States and Israel have been implicated in the Stuxnet cyberattack against Iranian nuclear facilities (Sanger, 2012).

These are but the latest developments in an ongoing discussion of prospective cyberthreats. Over the last three decades, cybersecurity proponents have presented a shifting and sometimes ambiguous case for what, exactly, is being threatened and by whom. During the 1980s, the main cybersecurity concern was foreign espionage via the exploitation of the United States’s increasing dependence on computers and networks. Then, in the 1990s, experts began writing about the supposed nonstate, cyberterrorist threat to civilian critical infrastructures. In the opening days of the Bush administration, cybersecurity proponents replaced nonstate actors with state actors as the dominant threat. But in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the threat perception returned to terrorists using cyberspace to attack critical infrastructure.

Then, in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, state actors once more became the supposed threat, with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq making the list of states with a cyberwar capability (Bendrath, 2001, 2003; Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Weimann, 2005, pp. 133–134). Recent policy documents identify a combination of state actors working directly or indirectly via nonstate proxies—e.g., “patriotic hackers” or organized crime—to target private intellectual property and government secrets (Langevin, McCaul, Charney, & Raduege, 2008; The White House, 2009a; White House Press Office, 2009).

Despite **persistent ambiguity** in cyberthreat perceptions, cybersecurity proponents continue to rely on **cyber-doom scenarios** as a key **rhetorical tactic** for motivating a **response** to **cyberthreats**. This article critically examines **cyber**-doom **scenarios** by placing them in a **larger** historical **context**, assessing how **realistic** they **are**, drawing outthe policyimplications of relying on such tales, and offering alternative principles for the formulation of cybersecurity policy. It draws from relevant research in the history of technology, military history, and disaster sociology to examine some of the key assertions and assumptions upon which cyber-doom scenarios rely. It argues that cyber-doom scenarios are the latest manifestation of longstanding fears about “technology-out-of-control” in Western societies, that tales of infrastructural collapse leading to social and/or civilizational collapse are unrealistic, and that the constant drumbeat of cyber-doom scenarios encourages the adoption of counterproductive policies focused on control, militarization, and centralization. As an alternative, it is argued that cybersecurity policy should be based on more realistic understandings of whatis possible, which areinformed by empirical research and guided by principles of resilience, decentralization, and self-organization.

MOTIVATING CYBERSECURITIZATION

This article contributes to critical constructivist scholarship on cybersecurity discourse (Bendrath, 2001, 2003; Dunn Cavelty, 2007, 2008; Eriksson, 2002; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). Much of this work draws from securitization theory, which begins with the observation that threats to security are neither **natural** nor **given**, but rather must be **constructed** through **political discourse**. Securitization theory posits that the process of **constructing security** threats (e.g., “securitization”) involves a “**securitizing actor”** (a speaker, usually a political leader or decision maker) who identifies “**threat subjects**” (the source of the threat) and “referent objects” (that which is threatened). Securitization of an issue is used to justify taking “**exceptional measures**” outside the normal political process in response to the newly **identified threat** (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998).

By combining securitization theory with insights from framing theory, Myriam Dunn Cavelty (2007, 2008) has provided the most comprehensive theoretical treatment of cybersecurity to date. The result of “social contests for legitimate definition of reality,” frames “influence the actions of actors and define meaning in the public mind” (Dunn Cavelty, 2007, p. 23). She maps three types of frames to the process of securitization. “[D]iagnostic framing ... is about clearly defining a problem and assigning blame for the problem,” and therefore corresponds to the identification of threat subjects and referent objects in securitization. “[P]rognostic framing ... is about offering solutions” to the problem and corresponds to the “exceptional measures” justified by a successful securitization. Finally, “motivational framing” is about “rally[ing] the troops behind the cause or a call for action” (Dunn Cavelty, 2007, p. 23).

Where Dunn Cavelty has focused on diagnostic and prognostic framing, this article examines the ways that **motivational frames** might “**influence social action**,” as well as “how frames can be changed” (Dunn Cavelty, 2007, p. 23). While it is safe to assume that **prognostic frames** do and should reflect diagnostic frames to some degree (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 40), the impact of **motivational frames** such as **cyber-doom** scenarios on the development of **policy responses** is less clear, especially when the diagnosis of the problem remains ambiguous at best, as is the case for cyberthreats. Nonetheless, it is clear that motivational frames will have an impact upon policy-making. Uncertainty in diagnostic frames combined with the fact that “there have been no major destructive attacks on the cyber-level” leads Dunn Cavelty to conclude that “decisions have to be made based on scenarios and assumptions. ... [T]hat [cyber-threats] are hyped is in fact just a side effect of their nature” (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 5). But this article posits some potentially negative policy consequences that can occur when cyber-doom scenarios as motivational frames dominate or even replace properly formulated diagnostic frames.

Finally, this article provides insight into strategies that might aid critical security scholars with changing the framing of, and ultimately “desecuritizing,” cyberthreats. It is not the case that we do not know enough without access to classified information or advanced technical degrees to evaluate critically and challenge such scenarios. By drawing from knowledge produced in various fields of research, we are able to address particular assertions and assumptions that constitute cyber-doom scenarios. We have experience with and published research about the anxiety and fear that comes with the development of new technologies, the effects of using revolutionary new weapons, and the impacts of disaster on social, economic, and technological systems. By drawing strategically and appropriately from these areas, we can challenge the individual components of cyber-doom scenarios, work to re-frame the discussion of cyberthreats, and provide alternative guiding principles for policy-making.

CYBER-DOOM SCENARIOS

Cyber-doom scenarios are **hypothetical stories** about **prospective impacts** of a cyberattack and are meant to serve as **cautionary tales** that focus attention on cybersecurity. These stories typically follow a set pattern involving a cyberattack disrupting or destroying critical infrastructure. Examples include attacks against the electrical grid leading to mass blackouts, against the financial system leading to economic losses or complete economic collapse, against the transportation system leading to planes and trains crashing, against dams leading floodgates to open, or against nuclear power plants leading to meltdowns (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 2). Recognizing that modern infrastructures are closely interlinked and interdependent, such scenarios often involve a combination of multiple critical infrastructure systems failing simultaneously—what is sometimes referred to as a “cascading failure.” This was the case in the “Cyber Shockwave” war game televised by CNN in February 2010, in which a computer worm spreading among cell phones eventually led to serious disruptions of critical infrastructures (Gaylord, 2010). Even more ominously, Richard Clarke and Robert Knake (2010, pp. 64–68) present a scenario in which a cyberattack variously destroys or seriously disrupts all U.S. infrastructure in only 15 minutes, killing thousands and wreaking unprecedented destruction on U.S. cities.

Surprisingly, some argue that we have **already had attacks** at this level, but that we just have **not recognized** that they were occurring. For example, Amit Yoran, former head of the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cyber Security Division, claims that a “cyber9/11” has already occurred, “but it’s happened slowly so we don’t see it.” As evidence, he points to the **2007** cyberattacks on **Estonia**, as well as other incidents in which the computer **systems** of government **agencies** or contractors have been **infiltrated** and sensitive information stolen (Singel, 2009). Similarly, the speaker of the Estonian parliament, Ene Ergma, has said that “When I look at a nuclear explosion, and the explosion that happened in our country in May, I see the same thing” (Poulsen, 2007). As far back as 1994, futurist and best-selling author Alvin Toffler claimed that cyberattacks on the World Trade Center could be used to collapse the entire U.S. economy. He predicted that

[Terrorists or rogue states] won’t need to blow up the World Trade Center. Instead, they’ll feed signals into computers from Libya or Tehran or Pyongyang and shut down the whole banking system if they want to. We know a former senior intelligence official who says, “Give me $1 million and 20 people and I will shut down America. I could close down all the automated teller machines, the Federal Reserve, Wall Street and most hospital and business computer systems.” (Elias, 1994, p. F10)

But we have not seen **anything close** to the kinds of scenarios outlined by **Yoran**, Ergma, Toffler, and others. **Terrorists** did not use **cyberattack** against the World Trade Center; they used hijacked aircraft. The attack of 9/11 did not lead to the long-term **collapse** of the U.S. **economy**; we would have to wait for the impacts of years of **bad mortgages** for a **financial meltdown**. Nor did the **cyberattacks** on Estonia **approximate** what happened on **9/11**, as Yoran has claimed, and certainly not nuclear **warfare** as Ergma has claimed. In fact, a scientist at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which was established in Tallinn, Estonia, in response to the 2007 cyberattacks, has written that the immediate impacts of those attacks were “minimal” or “nonexistent,” and that “no critical services were permanently affected” (Ottis, 2010, p. 72).

Nonetheless, many cybersecurity proponents continue to offer **cyber**-doom **scenarios** that not only make analogies to weapons of mass destruction (**WMDs**) and the terrorist attacks of **9/11**, but also hold out **economic**, **social**, and even **civilizational collapse** as **possible** impacts of cyberattacks. A report from the Hoover Institution has warned of so-called “eWMDs” (Kelly & Almann, 2008); the FBI has warned that a cyberattack could have the same impact as a “well-placed bomb” (“FBI warns brewing cyberwar,” 2010); and official U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) documents refer to “weapons of mass disruption,” implying that cyberattacks might have impacts comparable to the use of WMD (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, 2006). John Arquilla, one of the first to theorize cyberwar in the 1990s (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997), has spoken of “a grave and growing capacity for crippling our tech-dependent society,” and has said that a “cyber 9/11” is a matter of when, not if (Arquilla, 2009, p. E2). Mike McConnell, who has claimed that we are already in an ongoing cyberwar (McConnell, 2010), has predicted that a cyberattack could surpass the impacts of 9/11 “by an order of magnitude” (Fisher, 2010). Finally, some have even compared the impacts of prospective cyberattacks to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that killed roughly a quarter million people and caused widespread Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 15:34 04 October 2014 90 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS physical destruction in five countries (Meyer, 2010), suggested that cyberattack could pose an “existential threat” to the United States (“FBI warns brewing cyberwar,” 2010), and offered the possibility that cyberattack threatens the continued existence of “global civilization” (Adhikari, 2009).

**2NC---AT: Cyberwar turns Securitization**

**Empirically denied---actual incidents of cyber-conflict don’t cause fear, but policy narratives do.**

**Gomez and Whyte 21** Senior Researcher with the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zürich, Switzerland, and a doctoral candidate at the University of Hildesheim, Germany. Christopher Whyte, PhD, is as Assistant Professor in the program on Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness at Virginia Commonwealth University’s L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs.

Miguel Alberto Gomez and Christopher Whyte, “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats”, 2021, International Studies Quarterly (2021) 0, 1–14

[Abstract] Physical damage resulting from **cyber operations** continues to reinforce the “**cyber doom**” narrative across societies **dependent** on information and communication technology. This is **paradoxical** given the **absence** of **severe**, lasting **consequences** from cyber operations **and** the relative **restraint** exercised by cyber-capable **actors**. Moreover, the **mass adoption** of **vulnerable** digital **systems** raises questions whether or not **individuals’** dread cyber **insecurity** is as **severe** as we are often **asked to believe**. Employing a survey experiment, we find that the assumptions of the “**cyber doom**” narrative are **misleading**. While sensitivity to cybersecurity **threats** is shaped by **negative information**, the onset of **panic** and dread is **not a given**. The **impact** of novel environmental **circumstances** on **opinion formation** is shaped by the individuals’ **embeddedness in modern digital society**. Consequently, long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the emotional response associated with it, **normalizing novel threats** over time. We present evidence suggesting that the unique characteristics of a development (i.e., web-technology proliferation) matter in opinion formation, as sensitivity to digital threats to the polity is grounded on personal threat sensitivity. Thus, **policymakers** can expect to see **public responses** to new national security threats manifest through the lens of **prevailing** social and **political narratives**.

According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). **Expectations** of real-world damage inflicted through **cyberspace** reinforce the “**cyber doom**” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive **failure** of social and economic **processes** across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).

For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects.

Presently, conflict in cyberspace is characterized by persistent-yet-limited effects and a condition of apparent restraint exercised by cyber-capable actors (Maness and Valeriano 2016; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a). Moreover, the unabated integration of vulnerable information systems across all aspects of modern societies raises the question of whether or not a sense of dread associated with the exploitation of cyberspace is as severe as commonly portrayed (Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting 2017). Most damningly, the idea that “cyber doom” is most visible in Western national experiences as a fear appeal employed by politicians to galvanize support for policy in no way explains these curious logical shortcomings.

At the heart of the “**cyber doom**” narrative is the assumption that **information** about **cyberattacks** released to the public—particularly information about sophisticated cyber **operations** of **foreign countries** and organized crime1— produces **anxiety** about the digital health and security of a person. Ironically, this assumed relationship between **cyber operations**, their portrayal in public-facing media, and individual impact is often **discussed** in **unclear terms by** **scholars** than is the determining role of **techno-strategic conditions**.

**Expectations, not reality drive narratives of “cyber doom”.**

**Gomez and Whyte 21** Senior Researcher with the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zürich, Switzerland, and a doctoral candidate at the University of Hildesheim, Germany. Christopher Whyte, PhD, is as Assistant Professor in the program on Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness at Virginia Commonwealth University’s L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs.

Miguel Alberto Gomez and Christopher Whyte, “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats”, 2021, International Studies Quarterly (2021) 0, 1–14

Our study finds that **sensitivity** to **cybersecurity** threats is situationally shaped by **exposure** to **negative reporting** but that the onset of associated **dread** is **not a given**. Instead, it is **influenced** by **expectations of the role of technology** in modern society. Respondents dependent on such technologies are not as prone to **negative effect** as are those who remain **not** so deeply **embedded** in the fabric of digital society. Both groups become more **sensitive** to **cybersecurity threats** to their person as the information they consume becomes more **negative**, and this personal concern facilitates a **heightened sensitivity** to threats to the polity. However, the dread predicted by the “cyber doom” narrative is only weakly predictive of this dynamic and has no effect on the threat sensitivity of those who do not respond emotionally. Finally, in both cases, the link between concern for society is not a clear result of negative information so much as it is the result of initial sensitivity to threats at the personal level.

Consequently, we make two contributions. First, we show that the impact of novel **environmental circumstances** on individual **opinion** formation is **shaped** by **issue embeddedness**, suggesting that long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the affective response it is associated with. Second, we present evidence suggesting **nevertheless** that the unique **characteristics** of such a development matter in **opinion formation**, as sensitivity to **digital threats** to the polity is clearly premised on **personal threat sensitivity**.

**2NC---AT: Plan De-securitizes---2NC**

**Even if the plan itself attempts to limit the extent of cyberwar, the discourse it mobilizes facilitates a state of exception.**

**Hart 11** - master’s in communications at Simon Fraser University

Catherine Hart, “Mobilizing the Cyberspace Race: the Securitization of the Internet and its Implications for Civil Liberties”, 2011, Cyber-Surveillance in Everyday Life: An International Workshop \* May 12-15, 2011 \* University of Toronto

In conclusion, given this context, it would appear that **while policy may not in itself restrict civil liberties**, it promotes the **discourse** which could **facilitate the enactment of restrictive laws**. A focus on cybersecurity ‘**awareness raising’** with the public can only increase the **securitizing discourse** around these issues. At the same time, a growing frustration is clear among **security** advisors with the lack of **regulation** and the inaction of cybersecurity policy, despite the protection it offers to civil liberties. Regulation might be an unpalatable word for both the left and the right in the U.S., but it is generally accepted that in cases of national emergency, it is sometimes necessary for the government to step in. The history of the **discourse** of ‘**national security’** has demonstrated that **exceptional responses** can **be justified** when this discourse is **mobilized**, and Agamben has warned of the shift in government towards the issuing of **exceptional laws** rather than the declaration of a **state of exception** (2005, 21). The PCNAA is a prime example of such an **exceptional law** which could be employed during a ‘**state of emergency’** vaguely defined as a “risk of **disruption**” to **cyberspace**, with virtually **no limit** on its **scope or length of** effect (ACLU, 2010, 1-2). As the securitization of cyberspace achieves success with wider audiences, I predict an **increase** in **surveillance** and **control** as governments accept the failure of **voluntary measures**, and legislate **emergency responses**.

## Alt

### 2NC---Ruthless

#### Rejection in all instances is necessary to break the pipeline capital has built between scholarship and the war machine

**Neocleous, 18** – Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University. (Mark Neocleous, “The bleak rituals of progress; or, if somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no,” *Socially Responsible Innovation in Security*, Routledge, 2018, pg. 129-139)//ILake-MO

Understanding security’s imperative to win requires a grasp of security as the leitmotif of bourgeois modernity. It requires understanding that security can never be disconnected from the powers of war and police to which it belongs, and therefore never disconnected from capital which operates with and through these powers. It requires an understanding of security not as a universal value but as a mechanism of domination deployed by state and capital, and that this deployment of security is part and parcel of the wider politics of fear which underpins bourgeois modernity. Far from being something that could ever be genuinely achieved, security exists for the opportunities it offers to get things done in its name. Security is a mechanism to mobilize, discipline and punish. In other words, security is a power for the fabrication of social order (Neocleous, 2000).

This power lies partly in the fact that in a so-called ‘age of rights’, security is often presented to us as the most fundamental of all rights. According to the United Nations, the fundamental rights of all human beings are ‘life, liberty and security’. This claim repeats the revolutionary discourse of rights in the eighteenth century, and one thinker who noticed the implications of such a claim was Marx. In late 1843 in an exchange with Bruno Bauer over ‘the Jewish question’, Marx runs through the various declarations of the rights of man announced by various states in the late eighteenth century, along with the constitutions which tended to follow such declarations. Marx points out that the rights in question, though revolutionary in some (liberal) ways, are still nonetheless the rights of a member of bourgeois society, ‘of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community’. ‘Let us hear what the most radical Constitution, the Constitution of 1793, has to say’, he suggests, and then notes Article 2 of that Constitution: ‘These rights, etc., (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality, liberty, security, property’. Marx works through these ideas. Liberty, for example, is ‘the power which man has to do everything that does not harm the rights of others’, according to one Declaration, or ‘being able to do everything which does not harm others’, in another. Liberty is thus ‘the right to do everything that harms no one else’. J. S. Mill would later confirm this in his articulation of the ‘harm principle’ in On Liberty, but Marx treats it as nothing less than the ‘right of … separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into himself’. The practical application of this right to liberty is man’s right to private property, Marx notes, ‘the right to enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at one’s discretion … without regard to other men, independently of society’. This ‘right of self-interest … makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it’. Such observations essentially launch Marx’s critique of both rights discourses through the rest of his work, but note what he says about security at this moment. On the one hand, the rights discourse is the realization of equality, which is nothing but the equality in which each person is regarded as such a self-sufficient monad. It is also, on the other hand, the raison d’être of security. Marx cites Article 8 of the French Constitution of 1793 – ‘security consists in the protection afforded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property’ – before making the following comment:

Security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property

As such, security is the insurance of the egoism of bourgeois society (Marx, 1844/1975, pp. 162–164). Marx has put his finger on the core ideological concept of bourgeois modernity: security. Security underpins and overrides the other egotistic rights associated with bourgeois modernity – liberty, property, equality – in order that bourgeois egoism and capitalist order be guaranteed.

Now, I have previously taken Marx’s comment to be a precursor to his claim a few years later in The Manifesto of the Communist Party about the bourgeoisie constantly ‘revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society’. The ‘constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation’ which accompanies bourgeois rule is what gets described today in the language of insecurity (Marx and Engels, 1848/1984, p. 487). Understood in terms of what has become the most important political trope of contemporary politics, the suggestion seems to be that at some fundamental level the order of capital is an order of social insecurity. And yet, at the same time, this permanent insecurity gives rise to a politics of security, reinforcing security’s place as the fundamental concept of bourgeois society. I have previously argued that this can be interpreted in terms of the ways in which security serves as a key principle of police power in constituting and regulating capital and its modes of coercion and control – the security of the community coincides with the security of the commodity – and have suggested that what is therefore now needed more than anything is nothing less than a critique of security (Neocleous, 2008, also 2000, 2014, 2016; Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011). If we take seriously a comment Marx makes (1843/1975, p. 142) in his debate with Ruge, that the main task before us is not to change the world in the way envisaged by some socialists but, rather, the ruthless critique of all that exists, including and especially politics, law and religion, then we might say that for us right now the target of such a ruthless critique has to be that new political religion called ‘security’. Such a critique must have as its target all the ‘innovations’ performed in security’s name, including those claiming to be ‘socially responsible’.

### 1NC---Anti-Security Alt

#### The alternative is anti-Security---only epistemic rejection of security discourse and policies solves.

Neocleous and Rigakos 11 – Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University London, Editor of the journal Radical Philosophy, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Middlesex University London; Chair of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from York University

Mark Neocleous and George S. Rigakos, “Anti-Security: A Declaration,” Anti-Security, https://www.academia.edu/2292255/Anti-security\_A\_Declaration

The purpose of the project, put simply, is to show that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion. Less simply, that security is a dangerous illusion. Why ‘dangerous’? Because it has come to act as a blockage on politics: the more we succumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation; the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we come to share in the fetish of security, the more we become alienated from one another and the more we become complicit in the exercise of police powers.

Fleshing out how we got here is the first challenge; showing how damaging this has been is an even greater challenge; doing these things in a way that contributes to a radical, critical and emancipatory politics even more so. But it is a challenge that must be made, and must be made collectively. As a start, we therefore offer the following declarations about an Anti-Security politics. [end page 15]

We deny all false binaries that obfuscate and reify the security problematic and serve only to reinforce its power. We therefore reject:

\* Liberty versus Security: In the works of the founders of the liberal tradition - that is, the founders of bourgeois ideology - liberty is security and security is liberty. For the ruling class, security always has and always will triumph over liberty because ‘liberty’ has never been intended as a counter-weight to security. Liberty has always been security’s lawyer.

\* Public versus Private: No post-hoc juridical determination about accountability, legal standing, uniforming, or legitimate use of force can undo the historic inter-operability of public and private police, state and mercenary armies, corporate and government security, or transnational corporations and international relations. The public sphere does the work of the private sphere, civil society the work of the state. The question is therefore not ‘public versus private’ or ‘civil [end page 16] society versus the state’, but the unity of bourgeois violence and the means by which pacification is legitimized in the name of security.

\* Soft versus Hard: Such dichotomous constructions – soft versus hard policing for suppressing dissent; soft versus hard military intervention for stamping out local and indigenous resistance; soft versus hard power to impose global imperial hegemony – are but aspects of the unity of class violence, distracting us from universal pacification carried out in the name of capital.

\* Barbarism versus Civilization: The history of civilization after the Enlightenment is the consolidation of wage labour, the cultural and material imposition of imperial domination, and the violence of class war. In the form of the ‘standard of civilization’ the majesty of the Law was central to this project. To civilize is to project police power. ‘Civilization’ is code for enforcing capitalist relations; which is to say: bourgeois civilization is barbarism. [end page 17]

\* Domestic versus Foreign: The greatest tyranny of security is its insistence on the construction of the ‘other’. Security creates both internal domestic and external foreign threats, generating the fear and division that underpins raison d’état. The colonial pacification of subjects abroad is soon turned into domestic pacification of subjects at home. New international policing initiatives are but a laboratory for the militarization of domestic security. The ‘war on terror’ is a permanent multi-front assault that lumps jihadists with peaceniks, feminists with Islamists, and socialists with assassins. No pretence at a distinction is necessary because the capitalist state is insecure in all directions.

\* Pre- and post-9/11: Let’s be clear: the murder of 3,000 on September 11, 2001 was horrific, but it did not change anything. To believe so is to engage in a deliberate act of forgetting. The security apparatus that revved up in the days after the attack had been in the making for decades as the [end page 18] terrain of the class war shifted. The targets of the new ‘war’ - this time on terror - were not new. The cry of ‘insecurity’ was again answered with two familiar demands: you consume, and we will destroy. Go to Disneyland, and let the state continue the work it had been conducting for generations. If 9/11 accomplished anything, it was to make security all but unassailable.

\* Exception and Normality: This is not a state of exception. The capitalist state riding roughshod over human rights in the name of security is normal. The ruling class carrying out acts of violence in the name of accumulation is normal. The devising of new techniques to discipline and punish recalcitrant subjects is normal. Targeted assassinations, the bombing of civilians, imprisonment without trial… normal, normal, normal. And, lest we forget: liberals falling over themselves justify such things? Normal. [end page 19]

We understand instead that security today:

\* operates as the supreme concept of bourgeois society.

\* colonizes and de-radicalizes discourse: hunger to food security; imperialism to energy security; globalization to supply chain security; welfare to social security; personal safety to private security. Security makes bourgeois all that is inherently communal. It alienates us from solutions that are naturally social and forces us to speak the language of state rationality, corporate interest, and individual egoism. Instead of sharing, we hoard. Instead of helping, we build dependencies. Instead of feeding others, we let them starve… all in the name of security.

\* is a special commodity, playing a pivotal role in the exploitation, alienation and immiseration of workers. It produces its own fetish, embedding itself into all other commodities, producing even more risk and fear while intensifying and distracting us from the material conditions of exploitation that have [end page 20] made us inherently insecure. It makes concrete our ephemeral insecurities under capitalist relations. It attempts to satiate through consumption what can only be achieved through revolution.

The call of this Declaration is that we:

\* name security for what it really is;

\* stand against the securitization of political discourse;

\* challenge the authoritarian and reactionary nature of security;

\* point to the ways in which security politics shifts attention away from material conditions and questions, in the process transforming emancipatory politics into an arm of police;

\* fight for an alternative political language that takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and its police powers…

[This card is the full declaration; it ends with an ellipses.]

### 2NC---Anti-Security Solves

#### The alt solves the aff — analyzing securitized narratives ensures that they are deconstructed.

Ahmed 11 – International Security Scholar for Foreign Policy and New Internationalist, former Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, former Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex, DPhil in International relations and M.A. in War & Peace Studies from Sussex University

Nafeez Ahmed, “The International Relations of Crisis and the Crisis of International Relations: From the Securitisation of Scarcity to the Militarisation of Society,” Global Change, 10-xx-2011, https://www.academia.edu/1608098/The\_International\_Relations\_of\_Crisis\_and\_the\_Crisis\_of\_International\_Relations\_From\_the\_Securitisation\_of\_Scarcity\_to\_the\_Militarisation\_of\_Society

In 2009, the UK government’s chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action ‘drivers’ of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a ‘perfect storm’ of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics.

While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, ‘most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.’ 2 Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be ‘secured’ and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms.

In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability – illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are ‘securitised’ as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource ‘shortages’ or ‘abundance’ causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conflict.

### 1NC---Ethics of Care Alt

#### The alternative is an ethics of care — that creates epistemological openings for emancipation.

Mignolo 13 – Professor of Romance Studies at Duke University

Walter Mignolo, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society, 1-24-2013, http://waltermignolo.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/epistemicdisobedience-2.pdf

Knowledge-making in the modern/colonial world is at once knowledge in which the very concept of ‘modernity’ rests and the judge and warrantor of legitimate and sustainable knowledge. Vandana Shiva (1993) suggested ‘monocultures of the mind’ to describe Western imperial knowledge, its totalitarian and epistemically non-democratic implementation.11 Knowledge-making presupposes a semiotic code (languages, images, sounds, colors, etc.) shared between users in semiotic exchanges. It is a common human endeavor (I would say of any living organism, since without ‘knowing’ life cannot be sustained). Taking a short cut from general conditions of knowledge-making among human beings sensu largo (that is, without racist and gender/sexual normativity) to knowledge-making in the organization of society, institutions are created that accomplish two functions: training of new (epistemic obedient) members and control of who enters and what knowledge-making is allowed, disavowed, devalued or celebrated. Knowledge-making entrenched with imperial/colonial purposes, from the European Renaissance to the US neoliberalism (that is, political economy as advanced by F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman) that guided the last stage of globalization (from Ronald Reagan to the Wall Street collapse), was grounded – as mentioned before – in specific languages, institutions and geo-historical locations. The languages of Western imperial/knowledgemaking (and the self-definition of the West – the West of Jerusalem – by social actors that saw themselves as Western Christians) were practiced (speaking and writing) by social actors (human beings) dwelling in a specific geo-historical space, with specific memories that said actors constructed and reconstructed in the process of creating their own Christian, Western and European identity. Briefly, the formal apparatus of enunciation is the basic apparatus for engaging in institutional and purposive knowledge-making geo-politically oriented. Originally theology was the overarching conceptual and cosmo - logical frame of knowledge-making in which social actors engaged and institutions (monasteries, churches, universities, states, etc.) were created. Secularization, in the 18th century, displaced Christian theology and secular philosophy and science took its place. Both frames, theological and secular, bracketed their geo-historical foundation and, instead, made of theology and philosophy/science a frame of knowledge beyond geo-historical and body location. The subject of theological knowledge depended on the dictates of God while the subject of secular philosophy/science depended on Reason, on the Cartesian ego/mind and Kant’s transcendental reason. Thus, Western imperial knowledge was cast in Western imperial languages and was theopolitically and ego-politically founded. Such foundation legitimizes the assumptions and claims that knowledge was beyond bodies and places and that Christian theology and secular philosophy and science were the limits of knowledge-making beyond and besides which all knowledge was lacking: folklore, myth, traditional knowledge, were invented to legitimize imperial epistemology. Theo- and ego-politics of knowledge also bracketed the body in knowledge-making (Mignolo, 2007a). By locating knowledge in the mind only, and bracketing ‘secondary qualities’ (affects, emotions, desires, anger, humiliation, etc.), social actors who happened to be white, inhabiting Europe/ Western Christendom and speaking specific languages assumed that what was right for them in that place and which fulfilled their affects, emotions, fears and angers was indeed valid for the rest of the planet and, consequently, that they were the depositor, warrantor, creator and distributor of universal knowledge. In the process of globally enacting the European system of belief and structure of knowledge, human beings who were not Christian did not inhabit the memories of Europe, from Greece through Rome, were not familiar with the six modern imperial European languages and, frankly, did not care much about all of that until they realized that they were expected and requested to submit to the European (and in the 20th century to the United States also), knowledge, belief, life style and world view. Responses to the contrary came, since the 16th century, from all over the globe, but imperial theo- and ego-politics of knowledge managed to prevail through economically sustained institutions (universities, museums, delegations, state officers, armies, etc.). Now, the type of responses I am referring to were responses provoked by the making and remaking of the colonial matrix of power: a complex conceptual structure that guided actions in the domain of economy (exploitation of labor and appropriation of land/ natural resources), authority (government, military forces), gender/sexuality and knowledge/subjectivity. Since the responses I am referring to were responses to the colonial matrix of power, I would describe such responses as de-colonial (Mignolo, 2007b). The cases/examples I offered in Section III also show that in such responses de-colonial geo-politics of knowledge confronted imperial theo- and ego-politically based assumptions on the universality of Western knowledge-making and institutional grounding. But there is still another dimension in de-colonial politics of knowledge relevant for my argument: the claim that knowledge-making for well being rather than for controlling and managing populations for imperial interest shall come from local experiences and needs, rather than from local imperial experiences and needs projected to the globe, invokes also the body-politics of knowledge. Why? Because not only regions and locales in which imperial languages were not ancestrally spoken and that were alien to the history of Greek and Latin were disqualified and the disqualification filled with knowledge-product and knowledge-making in bodies and institutions where the conceptual warranty of Greek and Latin legitimized the belief of their dwelling in the universal, but bodies too. Racism, as we sense it today, was the result of two conceptual inventions of imperial knowledge: that certain bodies were inferior to others, and that inferior bodies carried inferior intelligence. The emergence of a body-politics of knowledge is a second strand of de-colonial thinking and the de-colonial option. You can still argue that there are ‘bodies’ and ‘regions’ in need of guidance from developed ‘bodies’ and ‘regions’ that got there first and know how to do it. As an honest liberal, you would recognize that you do not want to ‘impose’ your knowledge and experience but to ‘work with the locals’. The problem is, what agenda will be implemented, yours or theirs? Back then to Chatterjee and Smith. De-colonial thinking presupposes de-linking (epistemically and politically) from the web of imperial knowledge (theo- and ego-politically grounded) from disciplinary management. A common topic of conversation today, after the financial crisis on Wall Street, is ‘how to save capitalism’. A de-colonial question would be: ‘Why would you want to save capitalism and not save human beings? Why save an abstract entity and not the human lives that capitalism is constantly destroying?’ In the same vein, geo- and body-politics of knowledge, de-colonial thinking and the de-colonial option place human lives and life in general first rather than making claims for the ‘transformation of the disciplines’. But, still, claiming life and human lives first, de-colonial thinking is not joining forces with ‘the politics of life in itself’ as Nicholas Rose (2007) has it. Rose’s ‘politics of life in itself’ is the last development in the ‘mercantilization of life’ and of ‘bio-power’ (as Foucault has it). In the ‘politics of life in itself’ political and economic strategies for controlling life at the same time as creating more consumers join forces. Bio-politics, in Foucault’s conception, was one of the practical consequences of an ego-politics of knowledge implemented in the sphere of the state. Politics of life in itself extends it to the market. Thus, politics of life in itself describes the enormous potential of bio-technology to generate consumers who invest their earnings in buying health-promoting products in order to maintain the reproduction of technology that will ‘improve’ the control of human beings at the same time as creating more wealth through the money invested by consumers who buy health-promoting technology. This is the point where de-colonial options, grounded in geo- and body-politics of knowledge, engage in both decolonizing knowledge and decolonial knowledge-making, delinking from the web of imperial/modern knowledge and from the colonial matrix of power.

### 1NC---Demilitarize the Social

### 1NC---Epistemological Failures Alt

#### Vote neg to reject epistemological failures. That’s the only way to maintain value to life.

Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Ph.D in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University

Anthony Burke, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory & Event, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218079

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28 The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness': Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30 Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33 Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35 Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification. This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39 Identity, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians. On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples: When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42 Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44 The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46 The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48 Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues, the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50 Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state: The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52 A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state. Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter. This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81 Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices? I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

### 2NC---Epistemological Failures Alt

#### Vote neg to accept insecurity by rejecting the 1AC — that creates an interrogation of epistemological failures

Bourbeau 15 – Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Laval, PhD from the University of British Columbia

Philippe Bourbeau, “Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics,” Critical Studies on Security, 11-16-2015, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2015.1111095?journalCode=rcss20

Securitization and desecuritization ¶ The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been ‘less security, more politics’, and the development of ‘possible modalities’ for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a, 52): it is generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of security policies and practices (arrow 2a in Figure 1), desecuritization lowers issues back into the realm of ‘regular politics’ or removes issues from the political agenda altogether (arrow 1 in Figure 1). ¶ Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and by moving security issues back into ‘normal politics’ (Wæver 2000, 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans (1995, 65–67). These strategies differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process. ¶ Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008, 597), and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a, 2015). There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent or directly oppose securitizing moves by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008, 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g., with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). ¶ A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006, 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has retained the status of a security issue. As empirical studies of securitization and desecuritization dynamics (e.g., Salter and Mutlu 2013; Lupovici 2014; Vuori 2015; Donnelly 2015) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve. Whichever the philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), such empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves. ¶ Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012, 529; 539–545) has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) ‘change through stabilisation’ (arrow 2b in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have (2) ‘replacement’; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) rearticulation; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) ‘silencing’ (types 2–3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 1). ¶ The previous literature on both securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization (arrow 1 in Figure 1) has produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations. ¶ China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the following ‘Sino-Soviet split’ (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of ‘parochial’ securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant ‘macrosecuritizations’ (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 257). ¶ Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008, 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically (Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death for the party. ¶ Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012, 542–544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards ‘world multipolarization’, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a ‘strategic partnership’ in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same ‘threat package’ of ‘terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism’ (the ‘three evils’) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006, 310). These are strong indicators of how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than securitization.¶ Desecuritization can be conceptualized in the above manner as a negative ontological corollary to securitization. Yet, it is also prudent to investigate securitization and desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when and how they are wielded in practical politics. It is proposed here that in addition to instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (arrow 1 in Figure 1), desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before ‘securitization plays’ in a game of securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words, desecuritization moves – both in terms of discourse and practice – can be used in a pre-emptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached (arrow 2b in Figure 1). For Wæver (2000, 254), silencing can be a strategy to ‘pre-empt or forestall securitization’. We argue here that beyond silencing, active desecuritization efforts can be made to block the escalation of a contention. Thereby, in addition to change through stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), there can be explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This tactic can be termed ‘pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal’.

**Aff**

## New Aff Ans

### 2AC – Plan Consequences Key

**Debate should be centered on the consequences of the plan—comparing opportunity costs is best for clash and argument refinement, which is a prerequisite to making critique and activism portable.**

**Fairclough and Fairclough, 18**—emeritus Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University AND School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Central Lancashire (Norman and Isabela, “A procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA,” Critical Discourse Studies Volume 15, 2018 - Issue 2, 169-185) [CDA=critical discourse analysis]

The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an **adequate framework for ethical evaluation** and **critique must include the comparison** and **evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action** in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can **contribute to the quality of ethical critique** by ensuring that a **wide range of arguments are considered** in making decisions, that all alternatives are **taken into account** and **thoroughly criticized**, and that people have to (at least) **moderate their own partialities** in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is **oriented to action**, including political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse. The **primary activity** in such discourse is **practical argumentation**, argumentation over action, over **what is to be done** (e.g. **what policies should be adopted**). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the **primary analytical focus** in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This **does not exclude other** familiar **forms of analysis** (such as **analysing representations**) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to **create particular** public **attitudes** and **opinions**, and thus **legitimize** or **facilitate a particular course of action**. Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a **normal part of everyday practical argumentation**: people **find reasons in favour** and **against proposals for action**, they **consider alternatives**, **adopt them** or **discard them**, and so on. A course of action **worthy of being adopted** is **one that has withstood criticism**. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are **likely to be instrumentally inadequate** iun relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them **ethically problematic**, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a **form of practical argumentation** (Fairclough 2013), open to the **same critical questions** that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA **does not come out of thin air**, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003). We have argued that the **primary focus** of critical analysis in CDA should be **practical argumentation** and **deliberation** (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of **what is to be done**. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which **(alternative) proposals are being tested**. The **framework** for critical analysis of **practical argumentation** and **deliberation** which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an **effective way of evaluating** and **critiquing discourse** from an **ethical point of view**. One of its strengths is that it allows **different approaches** to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an **ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality**. In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to **filter out** those **practical conclusions** (and corresponding decisions) that **would not pass the test of critical questioning**. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and meansgoal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are **tentatively supported** by **practical arguments from goals**, and are **tested in the light of their potential consequences**, via **practical arguments from consequence**. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to **expose potential negative consequences** of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their **acceptability** or **reasonableness**: if the consequences are **on balance unacceptable** for those affected, then it would be **more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action**. Unacceptable consequences are **critical objections** which can **conclusively rebut a proposal**. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be **chosen as the better proposal** on nonarbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the **most significant perspective** in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a **consequentialist** one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is **likely to result in a situation** that is illegal or **unjust**, then the proposal can be **evaluated as unacceptable** from both a **consequentialist ethics** and a **deontological ethical position**. Our framework can therefore **accommodate** deontological **ethical issues** within a broader **consequentialist perspective**. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.

### 2AC – Scenario Planning

#### IR Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant

Sus 20—Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator [Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance), February 2020, “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”, Contemporary Security Policy, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library]

Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.¶ Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.¶ This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.¶ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?¶ Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.¶ The Art of Scenario Analysis¶ We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.¶ While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.¶ Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).¶ Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.¶ Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry¶ The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.¶ Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8¶ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.¶ In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.¶ The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.¶ The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### Threat scenario-analysis is good.

Mahnken & Junio ’13 (Thomas; September 2013; Ph.D. and M.A. in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations and History from the University of Southern California, Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies; Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Studies from Johns Hopkins Univeristy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; International Studies Review, Vol. 15, Issue 3 “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” p. 374-395; RP)

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many **dimensions of political science** theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

### 2AC – Extinction First

#### The aff outweighs – extinction is the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely

Burns 17 (Elizabeth. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction? http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universa**l**, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### Extinction outweighs.

Farquhar et al. 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Computer Science DPhil Student at the University of Oxford. John Halstead, Political Philosophy DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Owen Cotton-Barratt, Pure Math DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Stefan Schubert, Philosophy PhD at Lund University. Haydn Belfield, a BA. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Philosophy PhD Student at the University of Oxford. [Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project, 1-23-17, [https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf%5d//BPS)

In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of *intergenerational equity* according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them *nothing*. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is *a global public good*. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an *intergenerational* public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is *temporal* free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the *availability heuristic*, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

## Perm

**2AC---Perm Do Both**

**Perm: do both---not all threats are socially constructed. Embrace securitization in this instance where the threat is real and reject security when it’s not. A sweeping rejection of security as an analytic frame is unnecessary AND precludes viewing security as an emancipatory right.**

**Tulumello 20** - PhD in Urban and Regional Planning (2012, University of Palermo), assistant research professor in human geography at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS-Lisboa), Fulbright Research Scholar at the University of Memphis (2016); Benjamin Hooks Institute for Social Change Policy Fellow (Fall 2016 to Spring 2017); Visiting Scholar at the Polytechnic of Turin (2019) and the University of Naples Federico II (2021); Senior Expert Evaluator for Regiostars Awards 2019 (DG-REGIO, European Commission; 2019); coordinator of the thematic section 'Political economy of territory' of the Portuguese Association of Political Economy (2020-2022)

Simone Tulumello, “Agonistic security: Transcending (de/re)constructive divides in critical security studies”, Security Dialogue 00(0), 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620945081

The project of critical security studies was born out of an **acknowledgement** of the implicit and explicit **violence** stemming from the hegemony of **security**-cum-**balance**. In what follows, I will discuss the limits of both **deconstructive** and reconstructive **approaches** in critical security studies’ engagement with the dominant logics of security.

The deconstructive field includes a number of epistemological endeavors – including poststructuralist, constructivist, neo-Marxist, post- and de-colonial, feminist, and queer approaches – to overcome **traditional**, **realist** views of **security**. This field has been quite successful – to the point of constituting a new mainstream in security studies14 – in exposing the ‘**dark side’** of security, its role in impeding the realization of a democratic politics (see Neal, 2019), and more generally its crucial role in the maintenance of the capitalist order (with its violence!). The ultimate version of this critique is offered by Mark Neocleous, who, by exposing the roots of contemporary security, beyond Hobbes, in liberal and Enlightenment thinkers such as Mill, Rousseau, Smith, and Bentham, has challenged the ‘**myth’** of the **balance** at its roots: security has always been the **central goal** of **liberal thought**, and liberty is systematically infringed in **security’s name** (Neocleous, 2007, 2008). **Security**, **Neocleous concluded**, is the political technology of liberalism; it is a project of social order (Neocleous, 2001) and **must therefore be rejected** (Neocleous, 2000). The rejection of security remains at the core of other strands of deconstruction. For instance, among the central tenets of the Copenhagen School is the idea that securitization is at odds with politics. Indeed, Ole Wæver (2011: 478n2) has even characterized security as a Schmittian concept. Granted, I am not suggesting that deconstructive approaches are not interested in the ‘tangible security’15 of individuals and communities – quite the opposite – but rather that they have explicitly or implicitly concluded that only by abandoning the concept of ‘security’ – and, in some cases, replacing it with other concepts like care or humanism – can we strive for it.

I want to argue, then, that the critique of **securitization**, liberal balance, and the persistent chimera of absolute security does **not imply** that we need to **reject security as a concept**. In order to make this point, I will start by unpacking a corollary of the deconstructive argument, the idea that security is inherently **antagonistic** to **rights** (Goldstein, 2010: 499). This formulation, which is coherent with the deconstruction of the myth of balancing security with freedom, neglects to **acknowledge** that **security** is a **right too**, though not **only a right**.16 Security – a certain degree of freedom from threats – is **necessary** for the **flourishing of individuals** (see Nussbaum, 2011) and for the **empowerment** of **oppressed groups** (see, for instance, bell hooks [1991: 47] on the importance of the **home** as a space of **personal safety** in the experience of black and brown women in the USA). Once we take **security** beyond **securitization** seriously, the **limits** of **deconstructive critique** become **evident**. For one thing, by **overly focusing on security as discourse and speech act**, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches (e.g. Huysmans, 2011; Williams, 2003) have largely **neglected** to engage with **insecurity** and violence **existing beyond securitization** and the machine of state security. On their side, critiques brought to the core of security theories have demonstrated that actually existing security is inherently defined by the liberal/Western project of social order, but this does not **exclude per se** the possibility of finding **different roots** for **security** outside of that very order – security existed, for better or worse, before the liberal order was created, and there may well be theories of security **outside** of the **hegemony** of liberal/Western thought. By focusing on **discourses**, theories, and practices (Harrington, 2017), in short, **critique has** forgotten the **ontological dimension** – that is, ‘the desire for security – **understood** as **certitude and trust** – [which] is seemingly **universal and timeless’** (Harrington, 2017: 76, emphasis added).

### 1AR---Perm do Both

#### Perm Best — understanding particularized threats is best because it challenges monolithic narratives.

Edelstein and Krebs 15 – Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the Center for Security Studies, and the Department of Government at Georgetown University; Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

David Edelstein and Ronald Krebs, “Delusions of Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, 11-xx-2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-10-20/delusions-grand-strategy

Instead of obsessing over strategy, Washington should adopt a more pragmatic approach to questions of policy. This would involve four main elements.

The first is narrative pluralism. When a single narrative dominates policy debates, only a limited range of options can be considered. At the height of the Cold War consensus, for example, legitimate voices hewed to anticommunist axioms, which prevented Washington from seizing opportunities to fracture the communist bloc and negotiate a stable arrangement with the Soviet Union. Now, with the United States relatively secure and the future of the global order up in the air, there should be room for differing views over national security; there is no excuse for enforced homogeneity. Narrative pluralism facilitates flexibility, which runs counter to the impulse to strategize. It is also often unpopular. Uncomfortable with narrative disorder, people clamor for their leaders to make sense of the world around them. If presidents fail to do so, they are pilloried as “unstrategic.” The challenge for leaders today is to satisfy the public’s demand for narrative order without overly narrowing the scope of debate.

Second, pragmatism involves focusing on specific challenges in lieu of searching for an overarching foreign policy doctrine. Doctrines force leaders to act for the sake of seeming consistent, even when it would be wiser not to. Even offhand comments at press conferences somehow become ironclad promises, or so Obama and his critics believed when it came to Syrian chemical weapons use, and the pressures mount all the more with officially endorsed doctrines. A pragmatic approach would consider threats on their own terms rather than as part of a larger strategic worldview. And it would sustain a more restrained foreign policy that avoids the distraction of peripheral interventions.

Third, a pragmatic approach would replace the ritual of periodic strategizing with more regular venues for officials to articulate the logic behind policy. Although national security sometimes requires secrecy, there are limits to what democratically elected governments should withhold from citizens. Citizens have the right to demand that their leaders explain their foreign policy priorities and initiatives and that their representatives in Congress, rather than engage in political grandstanding, ask hard questions of and demand real answers from the executive branch. An aggressive press, alongside strong freedomof-information legislation, is an essential bulwark of democracy. But the periodic publication of a formal national security strategy—and the many related documents released down the bureaucratic ladder—does not provide meaningful transparency. In its current form, strategizing is little more than political spectacle.

Finally, pragmatism calls for a more experimental approach to foreign policy. Creativity emerges only from an organizational and political environment that eschews rigid strategy and tolerates failure. Successful organizations adapt fluidly to changing circumstances, create cultures that permit experimentation, and learn from their errors. The first rule of foreign policy should remain “Do no harm,” but much international harm can come from playing it safe. The United States must cultivate a bureaucratic and political climate that is forgiving of small failures. Only in that atmosphere can the country’s foreign-policy makers go after the big wins—and leave strategizing behind.

#### Perm: Do Both — using the plan as a starting point for the alternative is epistemically valuable.

Nunes 12 – Senior Lecturer of International Relations at the University of York, PhD and MSc from Aberystwyth University

João Nunes, “Reclaiming the Political: Emancipation and Critique in Security Studies,” Security Dialogue, 8-15-2012, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010612450747

In the works of these authors, one can identify a tendency to see security as inherently connected to exclusion, totalization and even violence. The idea of a ‘logic’ of security is now widely present in the critical security studies literature. Claudia Aradau (2008: 72), for example, writes of an ‘exclusionary logic of security’ underpinning and legitimizing ‘forms of domination’. Rens van Munster (2007: 239) assumes a ‘logic of security’, predicated upon a ‘political organization on the exclusionary basis of fear’. Laura Shepherd (2008: 70) also identifies a liberal and highly problematic ‘organizational logic’ in security. Although there would probably be disagreement over the degree to which this logic is inescapable, it is symptomatic of an overwhelmingly pessimistic outlook that a great number of critical scholars are now making the case for moving away from security. The normative preference for desecuritization has been picked up in attempts to contest, resist and ‘unmake’ security (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2007). For these contributions, security cannot be reconstructed and political transformation can only be brought about when security and its logic are removed from the equation (Aradau, 2008; Van Munster, 2009; Peoples, 2011). This tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization. The assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context. Assuming from the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite: alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally, this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics. By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from within – opting instead for its replacement with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations. The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

## Impact Defense

### 2AC---No ! to Reps

#### Reps don’t shape reality and there’s no impact

Van Rythoven 19 – Researcher at the Journal of Global Security Studies, PhD in Political Science from Carleton University

Eric Van Rythoven, “The Securitization Dilemma,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 7-16-2019, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/5/3/478/5532523?redirectedFrom=fulltext#137694797

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

Yet, tragedy cuts both ways. Blanket opposition to securitizing moves can also have unanticipated effects. Ironically, the desecuritization of an issue may not just result in its repoliticization, but in its disappearance from public view (Floyd 2010, 57–58). Viewing security discourse as negative also underplays how the management of threats can serve as a focal point for democratic cooperation among different political actors (Roe 2012, 250, 257–58). The point is not that every security discourse and the practices it justifies has catastrophically perverse consequences. Instead, the goal is to highlight a sensible restraint over the limits of seeing into the future, how this shapes choice, and the dangers of hubris that follow. When properly adapted to this constructivist context, the tragic vision of securitization can be an important tool in cultivating prudence and restraint (cf. Lebow 2003, 364).

The problem with this tragic vision is that it points to processes that are never entirely in our possession. Whether in the form of background knowledge (Pouliot 2008), habits (Hopf 2010), or routines (Mitzen 2006), much of social life occurs without conscious deliberation and reflection. These forms of unthinking action impair reflexivity and limit actors’ ability to see how the world might be different and thus how outcomes can be uncertain. In some cases, this can be benign, such as the unreflexive amity between Canada and the United States that allows these countries to “escape” from the traditional security dilemma (Collins 2014, 572–73). But just as practices of amity can be habitual, so too can enmity. The hawkish US senator may designate Iran’s nuclear program as threatening because that is what hawkish US senators do, and there is no perceived way to be hawkish otherwise. The result is that the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves becomes concealed under an unthinking veil of common sense. The tragedy of securitization then is not only that political figures often exceed their limitations by ignoring how contingency can derail securitizing moves—it is that these limitations often never even register

This means overcoming the tragedy of securitization require a certain degree self-reflexivity. This is similar to what Booth and Wheeler describe as the “security dilemma sensibility,” or an actor’s ability and willingness to reflect upon their actions, including one’s own role in provoking insecurity in others (2008, 7). By sensitizing leaders to how uncertainty is an endemic feature of political life, and how their actions can be interpreted in unintended ways, security competition can be mitigated, at least in part (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 265). Yet, these moments of self-awareness and reflection are difficult precisely because there are powerful forces that demand simplicity and closure: namely our desire for a stable sense of self or what is widely referred to as ontological security (Mitzen 2006). Reflecting on the uncertainty of international politics can erode one’s sense of identity and agency, ultimately leading to a “deep, incapacitating state of not knowing how to get by in the world” (Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 29). Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma sensibility may have the laudable goal of alerting leaders to the role of uncertainty in political life, but this confronts the problem that many would prefer that it remain hidden.

The consequence is that this tragic aspect of the securitization dilemma takes on an intractable character. Either unwilling or unable to “know one’s limits,” as Herz would say (1950, 179), the role of uncertainty becomes hidden and security claims appear as a reliable strategy for control and influence. Like the classic realist dilemma, the securitization dilemma is pervasive because it is often invisible. The compelling need for a logic of selflimitation—of a careful and reflective use of security language and how it can be derailed by contingency— is obscured because of an aversion to recognizinguncertainty. It is this specter of a need for reflection and restraint that may not be realized, I suggest, which demands that we rethink the role of the analyst in provoking reflexivity among power-holders.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Role of the Analyst

Motivated by the absence of unintended and perverse consequences in constructivist theorizing of security, this article has pursued a reconceptualization of the security dilemma. Viewing the dilemma as a logic of limitation shaped by choice, uncertainty, and tragedy, the argument focuses on transposing this logic to the constructivist context of securitization theory. By showing how the choice to engage in the social construction of threats is complicated by uncertainty and the tragic failure to recognize one’s own limits, the dilemma analytic helps us to understand how securitization can be both a potent instrument for mobilization, as well as a volatile source of unpredictability. Moreover, this conceptual lens lays the foundation for an ethical imperative of self-limitation among securitizing actors—albeit one made difficult given the desire for simplicity and closure. Far from a rebuke of constructivist theorizing, the argument shows that taking the social character of security seriously means appreciating how political claims are always vulnerable to being derailed by different types of contingency.

This reconstructive move has important implications for studying the social construction of security. First, while the initial influence of realism on securitization theory is well-documented (Floyd 2010; Gad and Peterson 2011), few attempts have been made to show how engaging with these realist roots can yield new insights.22 Here, the reconstruction of the security dilemma demonstrates how returning to realist themes can yield a fresh insights. Second, the argument pushes scholars studying securitization to expand their universe of outcomes beyond the reductive binary of success and failure and to consider cases of perverse and unintended consequences. Not only are these outcomes relatively common, they undercut the prevailing image of securitization as a reliable technology of control. Third, the securitization dilemma shows why uncertainty is more of an enduring problem for social action than constructivists typically acknowledge. Contra earlier arguments where learning and socialization effectively mitigate the problem of uncertainty (Wendt 2006, 208–9), this perspective stresses how contingency means that social acts like securitizing moves can have unpredictable effects.

The most important result of this reconstruction, however, may be in how taking the tragic element of the dilemma seriously reorders the political role of the analyst. Rather than assessing the validity of a particular security discourse, or exposing its socially constructed nature, this perspective asks the analyst to provoke reflexivity on behalf of power-holders over the risks associated with securitization. While this entails a bias toward deescalation and desecuritization, unlike other approaches this is not achieved through overt references to any liberal, democratic, or emancipatory ideal. Instead, it is packaged for power-holders as a strategy of self-preservation. Here, the analyst presents the move to securitize as a risk-laden and potentially self-defeating strategy. The analyst points to a series of precedents showing how such a strategy can produce perverse consequences: how today's tough talk can become tomorrow's liability; how audiences can interpret threatening messages in unexpected ways; and how today's framing of security can lead to perverse consequences tomorrow. By foregrounding the problem of uncertainty, the analyst works to accentuate and impress upon actors the dilemmatic quality of securitizing moves.

Yet, the problem with presenting the move to securitize as a risk is that it may become accepted. Ironically, framing an escalation in enmity as possible but dangerous is precisely what may legitimize such a move in the eyes of risk-insensitive actors. This is Huysmans’ (2002) now familiar normative dilemma of writing security. The indeterminacy of language means that political actors may interpret advice in unpredictable ways. Frustratingly, this may include the precise opposite of the analyst's intention. This situation is likely inescapable, but it may be mitigated. What I suggest is that analysts should strive to cultivate a deeper subjectivity of risk sensitivity, comparable to Booth and Wheeler's security-dilemma sensibility, among political actors.

Key to this argument is how visions of the future satisfy the human desire for certainty. As Berenskoetter argues, “visions depicting the self in an imagined future order serve as anxiety controlling mechanisms” (2011, 654). Visions of the future inoculate actors against the anxiety of uncertainty by providing a narrative of where they are going and how to get there. Indeed, normative debates on securitization are already loaded with such visions. The impulse to securitize is underpinned by a utopian future where the security frame can finally mobilize a response to an otherwise intractable problem. Conversely, the impulse to desecuritize is sustained by a dystopian future defined by unrestrained authoritarian politics. A tragic vision of the future does something different: it presents a future where the only thing we can know decisively is that it is indeterminate and attempts to conclusively control it are vulnerable to failure. The very recognition of fundamental limits on human freedom (Steele 2007, 281–82) becomes transformed into a source of ontological security. This tempers the human need for cognitive closure by reconfiguring it into what Herz understood as a “fundamentally humble posture toward the value and precariousness of life” (Sylvest 2008, 442). An actor with a greater sensitivity to indeterminacy may still pursue securitizing moves, but with a cautious awareness that they are volatile acts best pursued sparingly. The analyst does not simply educate political leaders by pointing to the indeterminacy of the world; she seeks to make political subjects more sensitive toward it by crafting visions of a precarious future.

Finally, this tragic vision cannot, and should not, escape its own need for reflexivity. Its scholarly proponents need to engage in their own process of self-reflection, focusing on how their knowledge and interests are themselves historically situated. The ethic of restraint is a value, and not necessarily the value for all historical circumstances. A recognition of the social construction of security “facts” must be sobered by a recognition of the social construction of security “values” (Hamati-Ataya 2012, 685).

### 1AR---No ! to Reps

#### Securitization theory is wrong — other factors outweigh representations.

Baysal 20 – Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Faculty of International, Political, and Urban Studies at the Universidad Del Rosario

Basar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 7-1-2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1228409

Despite its strengths and popularity in the last 20 years, Securitization Theory has several limitations, some of which have already been identified by different scholars. The most criticized aspect is its focus on speech acts.16 According to McDonald, the theory over-emphasizes speech acts while neglecting other processes or means for communication, such as images and other visual representations like videos, which also play a significant role in the process.17 As Möller notes, “language is only one of the (albeit the most central) means, through which meaning is communicated”. 18 Moreover, Williams emphasizes the importance of images by stating that: “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics.” 19 Addressing these criticisms, several studies have examined the impact of other means of communication during the securitization process. 20 In line with this, the dual framework that is introduced in this article also takes different means of communication into account in addition to speech acts.

In addition to images and other visual representations, Paris School scholars also emphasize the role of the practices of security professionals,21 arguing that these play a more crucial role than discursive practices in constructing security issues.22 That is, rather than the magical power of speech acts, it is the institutionalizations and routinizations through repetitions of security practices that produce security issues. 23 Moreover, unlike the Copenhagen School, scholars of the Paris School also focus on the insecuritizing consequences of the process of securitization by asking what security does rather than what security is.24 In this way, they also inquire and focus on the threats that ordinary people face, like the Welsh School does, with its Emancipatory Security approach.25 However, the Paris School is also limited since it overemphasizes micro-level practices and ignores macro-level decisionmaking with its bottom-up framework.26 My dual framework borrows insights from the approach of the Paris School as it takes the practices of security professionals into account without ignoring the discursive impact of speech acts of macro-level decision-makers. Moreover, it also focuses on the insecuritizing consequences of securitization.

Another significant limitation of Securitization Theory is the inadequate analysis of the audience. According to Thierry Balzacq, the role of the audience is underspecified because of Wæver’s reliance on John L. Austin’s language theory.27 I additionally argue that the overemphasis on speech acts and under-analysis of the audience(s) in the framework of Securitization Theory derives from the tendency of the Copenhagen School scholars to see securitization as a universal phenomenon. According to Balzacq, however, “the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify the audience’s feelings, needs, and interests…To persuade the audience, the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience.”28

Securitization Theory also fails to adequately analyze contextual issues. Balzacq, for example, claims that whereas Securitization Theory claims that securitization modifies the external context, the opposite is also true: the contextual issues and audience characteristics also influence the process and success of securitization.29 According to Matt McDonald, “in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts, the Securitization Theory ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors.”30 Attention to these two related limitations, concerning audience and context, is essential to the dual securitization framework too. However, I do not elaborate on these in this article since they have already been discussed by various scholars, and many empirical studies have already been conducted with a focus on these issues.31

### 2AC/1AR---AT: Endless War

#### No impact to endless war.

Chandler 9 – Professor of IR at the University of Westminster

David Chandler, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics," Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

### 2AC/1AR---AT: Root Cause

#### No root cause, especially in IR. Realism provides unique insights.

Cruz 20 – Professor at Baylor College

Miguel Cruz, “Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner,” Air University, 2-3-2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2063140/between-theory-and-practice-the-utility-of-international-relations-theory-to-th/

Constructivism helps to understand and navigate the complex ways in which states as well as influential non-state actors engage with one another, how they define themselves and others, and how these shape the boundaries of the world within which they act.48 It helps explain how norms based on common ideas and values can help promote security and cooperation, and how significantly different ideologies can lead to conflict. Constructivism goes a long way in explaining how individuals and organizations influence policy decisions. However, constructivism alone can’t answer all policy issues. There are obvious gaps that require the application of realist and liberalist perspectives to comprehend modern international relations.49 In today’s complex, ever-changing environment, no theory is comprehensive enough to stand alone.50 Policy makers and senior advisors should consider the insights of each theory when articulating national security policy. Conclusion Theory cannot claim primacy over practice and implementation, but its understanding is a useful precursor for both. This is the central argument of this examination. As senior advisors, how we choose to explain national security issues inform the solutions we propose. Because national security policy is important to the practice of military affairs, it is paramount that senior military leaders develop a good understanding of those aspects affecting policy formulation. Improving this understanding can provide a stronger foundation for senior military leaders to engage more effectively with civilian leaders on defense-related policies. IR theory helps describe how policy makers see the world and how this influences policy making. Theory influences their perspectives and inform their biases and thus, deserve study and analysis. Three predominant schools of thought attempt to explain the way states behave: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. In general terms, realism focuses on state power, typically in relation to other states. For the United States, realist policies can translate into hegemonic actions designed to maintain preeminence in the world. Liberalism stresses the emphasis on democratic institutions and economic interdependence. This can prompt policies designed to maximize international cooperation through international bodies and trade at the expense of defense-related capabilities. Constructivism highlights the influence of shared norms, values, and ideas on state behavior. Normative policies generally focused on establishing international rules and norms of behavior states are expected to follow with heavy emphasis in the diplomatic and legal arenas. Theory, however, is no panacea. While these theories offer useful frameworks with which to observe international relations, they tend to either overemphasize or underestimate attributes in state behavior such as the primacy of power, the importance of interdependence or the necessity of norms. Thus, policy making and subsequent execution relying on one theory at the exclusion of others is risky. Senior military officers and policy advisors cannot be content with simply knowing what policy is. They must understand what policy does and the mechanisms available to recommend appropriate and effective policy. Having an understanding of how perceptions of the world and state behavior affect policy decisions is a way to do so. In this regard, IR theory remains essential for understanding world events, explaining their causes, assessing their impacts, and proposing suitable solutions. As Snyder suggests, “to use the insights of each of the three theoretical traditions as a check on the irrational exuberance of the others.”51 There is utility in theory, but it is the practitioners’ role to determine how they apply. Most importantly, it is the practitioner’s job to make the best use of them in order to advance national goals.

#### Totalizing claims of conflict are intellectually bankrupt.

Chan 20 – Professor of Political Science and Director of the Farrand Residence Academic Program at the University of Colorado, Boulder

Steve Chan, "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," ISSF, 11-9-2020, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides#_Toc55574357>

Having said all of this, I very much agree with Wang that “States can go to war for a variety of reasons. Attempting to isolate a single cause for all wars is impossible. The proposition that war tends to break out during a power transition is better understood as a probabilistic—not deterministic—statement.” In order to assess the relevant probability of war, it is imperative that researchers develop a valid and comprehensive data base to enable such assessment. Sensible, consistent, and theoretically informed rules for the inclusion and exclusion of cases would be necessary to implement this data project. Otherwise, an analysis can be seen to engage in cherry-picking, ransacking history for evidence supporting its proposition(s).

## Alt

### 2AC---Alt Fails

#### Other social structures overwhelm the alt AND securitization theory is wrong.

Goddard and Krebs 15 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

Stacie Goddard and Ronald Krebs, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] ~~fall on deaf ears~~. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

### 1AR---Alt Fails

#### Discourse changes fail — pragmatic approaches are key to solve.

Snetkov 17 – Senior Researcher at the ETH Zurich, Adjunct Lecturer at the Universities of Zurich

Aglaya Snetkov, “Theories, methods and practices – a longitudinal spatial analysis of the (de)securitization of the insurgency threat in Russia,” Security Dialogue, 4-7-2017, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010617701676

According to Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde’s foundational text of the theory of securitization, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), an issue can be non-politicized (it is not subject to public debate or policymaking), politicized (it is publicly debated and subject to policymaking) or securitized (it is presented as an existential threat, authorizing measures outside normal politics to address it), and ‘any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School model outlines that for an issue to be repositioned from the status of non-politicized or politicized to that of securitized requires an authorized and responsible actor to name it as an existential security threat to a particular referent object, and for this ‘securitizing move’ to be accepted by the relevant audience of this referent object, the endorsing of extraordinary measures to address it. In turn, desecuritizations are processes ‘in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Wæver, cited in Coskun, 2008: 405).

As such, the key aim of securitization theory is to identify what, when, where and how an issue is moved from being part of the normal environment of politics to becoming a threat to security and beyond the scope of normal politics – and vice versa (desecuritization). The Copenhagen School securitization model gained considerable popularity during the 2000s, and was applied to the empirical study of a diverse range of security issues, including the War on Terror (Buzan, 2006), immigration, trafficking and minority rights (Huysmans, 1998, 2000; Aradau, 2004; Sasse, 2005; Jutila, 2006), societal insecurity, human rights (Morozov, 2002), environmental politics, HIV/AIDS (Elbe, 2006) and EU security (Huysmans, 2000; Balzacq, 2008; Neal, 2009). However, it has also been the subject of a series of critiques and modifications from both its staunch supporters and ardent critics. As Ciută notes, this critique has three main strands: conceptual (structural issues particularly related to speech act theory and other necessary components of the model); epistemological (how securitization views contexts); and normative (related to the shift from securitization speech acts to practices of the political and the liberal) (Ciută, 2009: 302).

In light of these critiques, a ‘second-generation’ research agenda emerged among ‘contextual securitization scholars’ (Stritzel, 2012: 553), which is concerned with combining the formal aspects of the securitization model with a greater emphasis on examining the interrelationship between security politics and the contexts in which it operates. The aim of this agenda is to ‘construct a more comprehensive understanding of underlying processes’ by focusing on the ‘socio-linguistic and/or socio-political micro-dynamics of generating threats’ (Stritzel, 2012: 553; see also Balzacq, 2005, 2011; Guzzini, 2011; Salter, 2008; Stritzel, 2007, 2011; McDonald, 2008, 2011). Mirroring the original debate about the Copenhagen School model, the initial focus of such second-generation scholarship centred on analysing securitizing moves, while the inverse process of desecuritizing moves did not receive much attention (Coskun, 2008: 393). Recently, however, second-generation scholars have begun to delve more deeply into what it means to desecuritize an issue and ask what a desecuritized issue would look like (see Åtland, 2008; Aradau, 2004; Aras and Polat, 2008; Behnke, 2006; Cui and Li, 2011; Hansen, 2012; Knudsen, 2001; Roe, 2004; Wæver, 1995; Oelsner, 2005; Coskun, 2008; Salter, 2008; Klinke and Perombelon 2015).

These efforts have revealed a lack of basic consensus on the nature of desecuritization as a concept, model or process. As Coskun rightly points out, ‘the Copenhagen School does not suggest an explicit framework for its analysis as it has done for securitization’; ‘different scholars have interpreted and implied desecuritization differently’ (Coskun, 2008: 395). The notion that to analyse desecuritization is simply to follow the Copenhagen School securitization model, but in reverse, has proven problematic. Åtland (2008: 292) argues that, as opposed to securitization, ‘desecuritization does not necessarily happen as the result of a “speech act”. Rather, there are many other ways that an issue or issue-area can be moved out of the sphere of security politics and into the sphere of regular politics’. For many scholars, desecuritizing moves have come to be considered as the product of a wider management process, rather than a singular speech act or debate (for more on this debate, see Roe, 2004, 2006; Jutila, 2006).

#### The alt can’t overcome securitization.

Baysal 20 – Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Faculty of International, Political, and Urban Studies at the Universidad Del Rosario

Basar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 7-1-2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1228409

In addition, by focusing on the illocutionary act, securitization is presented as happening within a single moment rather than as a process over time. Ole Wæver, for example, argues “the utterance itself is the act … by uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means to block it.”37 That is, securitization occurs just within the moment when the speech act is performed, and the audience has accepted it.38 Although this Schmittian stance has somewhat changed in the 1998 book39 by focusing on the securitizing move and the inherent processual nature of persuasion of the audience, the processual understanding of securitization is still limited. Still, in this framework of the Copenhagen School (successful) securitization ends with the persuasion of a sufficient number of right people and the start of the extraordinary measures.40 However, I argue that securitization should be considered as a process that includes the definition of security, discursive efforts to convince the audience, security practices that normalize and routinize the security definition, the clashes between rival security definitions and arguments, and the insecurities that result from these security practices. I further argue that securitization lasts until the issue is fully desecuritized. It can further be argued that securitization and desecuritization may occur simultaneously; some groups may be struggling to securitize an issue, while others may be working for its desecuritization.

The main shortcoming of Securitization Theory relevant for the argument of this study is the lack of the analysis of rival voices. Securitization is considered as truth construction. That is, the Securitizing actor proposes a truth claim and convinces audiences of this claim. The securitizing actor proposes a security definition in which s/he describes the threat, legitimate security provider, referent object, and legitimate means to deal with the issue. However, there are always rivals who reject this truth claim or, in most cases, counter truth claims, and definitions emerge. This a constant conflict between these truth claims, while constructing security issues means that a securitization analysis should also examine these rival voices. These rival voices may take the form of non-violent opposition or counter-securitization. To overcome this limitation, a dual approach is required to examine rival voices in the securitization process.

The lack of a dual approach in Securitization Theory means that a securitization analysis can only problematize one side, namely that of the securitizing actors, by revealing how they create security issues and use security discourses to achieve their own aims. In most cases, this actor is the state or other formal institutions like the EU. In most cases, however, particularly when counter-securitization emerges, other securitizing actors are involved that should also be problematized. These may also use extraordinary or violent means like the use of force. For example, in the securitization of a minority group in a country, the state may be the securitizing actor, which uses extraordinary means as a result of a securitization process. However, there may also be a counter-securitization against the state from within this minority group, and this securitizing actor may also be using extraordinary means against the state like the use of force. The sequence of the primary and counter-securitization may also change. Hence, both primary and counter-securitizations should be investigated in a comprehensive securitization analysis. However, it should be stated that there does not have to be a countersecuritization in all securitization cases. There may also be non-violent opposition depending on the contextual factors, but I argue that there are always rival voices in line with the argument of Foucault that “where there is power there is resistance.”41

### 2AC---Alt Fails---Realism

#### The Alt Fails – it can’t change realist structures.

de Araujo 14 – Professor of Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeir

Marcelo de Araujo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 6-xx-2014, https://jetpress.org/v24/araujo.htm

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of **morally enhanced individuals** would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by **climate change**, grand scale **terrorist attacks**, or the risk of **catastrophic wars.** The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ **moral motivation**. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be **fewer wars, less terrorism**, and more **willingness to save our environment**. Although simple and attractive, **this assumption is**, as I intend to show, **false**. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an **old political arrangement** that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the **real possibility** of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, **biotechnology or nuclear capabilities.** The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that **“structural issues,”** rather than **human nature**, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the **survival of humankind**, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or **to reduce evil in the world**, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the **only, relevant actors** in the context of international relations; and second, that states **compete for power** in the international arena. **Moral considerations** in international affairs, according to realists, are **secondary** when set against the state’s primary goal, **namely its own security and survival**. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this **structure** that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor **security over morality**, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, **even if** human beings turn out to become **morally enhanced** in the future, humankind may still have to face the same **scary scenarios** described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that **in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary.** Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, **but the very structure of the political international system of states** within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to **dismantle their nuclear weapons**. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators **in the present as possible enemies in the future.** The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often **fail to cooperate,** and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, **even if,** in the future, political leaders become **less egoistic and power-seeking** through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of **bioengineering** is unlikely to yield the **expected results**, so long as moral enhancement is pursued **within the present framework of the international system of states.**

### 2AC---Securitization Inevitable

#### There’s no alternative to the current world order.

Tatum 18 – Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Francis Marion University

Dillon Tatum, “Toward a Radical IR,” Duck of Minerva, 11-28-2018, http://duckofminerva.com/2018/11/toward-a-radical-ir.html

David Brook’s latest column in the New York Times, banging on the same themes about “the kids are just not right,” raises some questions about what it means to engage in radical politics in the Trump era. Brooks compares the younger generation’s belief “that the system itself is rotten and needs to be torn down” to accomodationist and gradualisms. He continues on to speculate about how these new attitudes might affect older, more “pragmatic,” liberals who desire to work within the system. Brooks, as usual, uses a conservative argument to position himself in the “middle.” I have been thinking a lot about this issue of “radicalism” contra arguments about working within systems that are unjust in thinking about liberal world order and its futures. It has led me to a question I am currently exploring in a work-in-progress about what the possibilities are of radicalism as a way of approaching international politics. Against arguments like Brooks’, and even more sophisticated arguments about agonistic democracy developed by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, I think there is a place in IR for radical conceptions of transformation, order, and politics. What is radicalism? Brooks never fully fleshes out this concept. Philosophy and political theory have engaged with the issue of radicalism as a concept, though the results are often divergent. To quote Agnes Heller, in her treatise on radical philosophy, it “can give the world a norm, and it can will people to want to give a world to the norm.” Radicalism as an idea, and as a form of critique, mobilizes many different modes of thinking about the social and the political. The most comprehensive definition of radicalism is that provided by Paul McLaughlin, who defines radicalism “in terms of (i) a fundamental orientation (toward fundamental objects) (ii) in the political domain (iii) of an argumentative nature.” More than that, though, we can add that radicalism intervenes in the political domain with the goal of fundamental transformation. Additionally, though radicalism indeed proceeds in an argumentative nature, this methodology for argument is one that is aimed at critiquing, and seeking the destruction/replacement of existing institutions. A revised working definition of radicalism, therefore, is: a way of thinking about politics that focuses on totalities, praxis and political action, and the deployment of historicist methods with an eye toward “getting to the root of things.” Thus, radicalism is both a broad range of critical thought and practice, but also is specific in the realms of focus, action, and method. If Brooks is right that there is a major clash between a radical younger generation and a more pragmatic and moderate older generation in American politics, these differences are not well expressed in contemporary thinking about IR. Some of the biggest divisions are between what Robert Cox called “problem-solving theories” and theories that critique such approaches, but provide little argumentation aimed at tearing structures of injustice down altogether. In short: IR, even at its critical ends, is not radical (for an excellent exception see here and here). Why is this important? This morning, I taught a seminar on the question “Is Liberal World Order Finished?” I asked my students to think about what makes a liberal order “liberal,” and then asked: “Can we fix the liberal world order, or can we imagine a world without it?—and what would that look like?” The students were quick to point out the violences, inequities, and problems inherent in a liberal world order, but it took a good bit of pushing and prodding to get them to articulate whether/how we should/could take this order apart and rethink it. This was not just a difficult task for the students—it is something IR has not spent enough time meditating on. There is a lot to be critical of these days. And, I disagree with Brooks’s pessimism about a younger radical generation. Politics is deeply intertwined with engagements with radicalism. What I think is missing when we consider global politics, though, is that many of our pressing questions about institutions, order, and state action proceed from the same sort of moderation, accomodationism, or—at the most—an immanently critical vein. If we want to intellectually and politically approach issues like: What do we make of the future(s) of liberal world order? IR needs to engage with radicalism.

## Link Defense/Turns

**2AC---Russia Securitization Good**

**Russia is a geostrategic threat and labelling them as such is essential to maintain NATO cohesion and credibility---failure leads to deterrence collapse and Russian expansion**

**McInnis and Fata 22** – Senior fellow in the International Security Program and the director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense and a nonresident senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Kathleen J. McInnis and Daniel Fata, "Russia Still Threatens NATO Despite Military Failings," Foreign Policy, 5-20-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-threat-nato-madrid-summit/?tpcc=recirc\_latestanalysis062921

Recent events in Ukraine have once again proved that reports of NATO’s death are an exaggeration. Many leaders across the alliance have been quick to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with aid to Kyiv, increases in their own country’s defense budgets, or both. But as the war grinds on and the **geopolitical reality** of an **adversarial relationship** with Russia sets in, NATO must once again take the **longer view** on what all this means for trans-Atlantic and global security.

Conveniently, in less than two months, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid to endorse the alliance’s new strategy. The key question, therefore, is whether member states will use the moment to reforge NATO’s raison d’être to meet current and future challenges—in particular, by naming Russia as a threat to the alliance itself. Given the implications of Ukraine for European and global order, **the stakes could hardly be higher.**

Some take the view that Madrid should mark a reprioritization of U.S. efforts away from Europe and back toward Asia. Their logic goes that not only is European defense spending increasing, but Russia has also demonstrated ineptitude in the prosecution of its war in Ukraine. That means the longer-term need for significant U.S. forces in Europe has also therefore declined. And, after all, China is the pacing threat for Department of Defense planning.

In fact, **the opposite is true**. For starters, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it **abundantly clear** that **he views NATO** as a **strategic threat**. Recent events suggest we should **take these statements** **at face value**. In the runup to the current war, some analysts developed **elaborate rationales** for why the buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border didn’t mean an invasion was coming, such as a strengthened negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine’s future political directions. Another Russian invasion of Ukraine was **so** **obviously** strategically counterproductive that there must have been another reason for the buildup. **In the event, there wasn’t.**

And while Russian military incompetence has been startling, planners **shouldn’t leap to conclusions**. Russian forces were not able to capture Kyiv, but they have been able to seize tens of thousands of square miles of territory along Ukraine’s eastern border—at least for now. Estonia, a Baltic NATO member that borders Russia, is less than 20,000 square miles in size. Militaries can also reform, especially after disaster, as Ukraine’s own army did after its failures in 2014.

The United States has **good reasons** to want to **keep NATO vibrant**: The **strategic benefits** of U.S. leadership are **manifold**. Not only does American leadership in NATO provide pathways for **organizing military coalitions**, but it also affords the United States privileged status on **trade partnerships** and **access to bases**. If Putin **achieves his aim** of **discrediting NATO**, this could lead to trans-Atlantic **strategic insolvency**: a situation whereby allies, including the United States, are **unable** to meet their **security obligations** and, relatedly, maintain favorable standards of living for their populations.

Which brings us back to Madrid. The last time that NATO agreed on a strategic concept was in 2010. It is a document that specified that, among other things, defense of allied territory remains a critical mission for the alliance, but it is silent on naming nation-state threats to NATO. For a variety of domestic and international political reasons, building formal consensus on threats among 30 allied states is extremely challenging. Indeed, in the 2010 document Russia is **viewed as an aspirational partner** for NATO when it comes to European security—despite the **warning sign** of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the intervening years, Russia has conducted **destabilizing disinformation campaigns** in NATO states and has **attacked Ukraine twice**. And while NATO leaders have condemned Russian aggression, the rhetoric falls short of formally declaring Russia as a long-term strategic threat to the alliance.

**Durable consensus requires clarity**. To **prepare NATO** to contend with this threat over the long term requires a **frank admission** of the **strategic realities that Russia poses** in the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted in Madrid. As a practical matter, this will commit NATO members to take budgeting, force planning, acquisition, and possible troop repositioning seriously—and put teeth into the declaration. This is needed for NATO planners to determine, for example, whether spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is sufficient to meet the challenges to the alliance.

But the real value of the document is what the collective members reaffirm as to what NATO continues to stand for, what it calls out as the threats to the member territory, and what it intends to do to address, deter, and, if necessary, defend against these threats. By stating up front that **Russia is a** formal **threat**, member states—and the alliance as a whole—will find it **harder to backslide** from their **current cohesion**. It is **difficult to overstate** how important it is for NATO to ensure its **consensus is durable**; as the war grinds on and publics begin feeling the economic effects of the conflict and sanctions on Russia, the temptation to dilute support to Ukraine will undoubtedly mount. Not to mention, **calling it like it is** will **send an important message** to Putin: **NATO will not be deterred**.

**Words matter.** It is time for NATO leaders to formally **accept reality**: **Putin is a threat to the alliance and its members**, and, therefore, they should declare so in the news strategic concept. Indeed, **not declaring Russia a** formal **threat** to NATO territory would **compromise NATO’s credibility** and would **give Putin a pass** for the atrocities and violations he has committed in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the United States can **afford to allow that** to happen.

### 2AC---Threats Real---Generic

#### Threats real, fear good, and demands key.

Meisel Citing Wittner 17 – Climate Writer; citing Professor of History Emeritus at SUNY

Duncan Meisel citing Lawrence Wittner, "Mass Mobilization Stopped Nuclear War Before and It Can Again," Toward Freedom, 10-31-2017, https://towardfreedom.org/archives/activism/mass-mobilization-stopped-nuclear-war-before-and-it-can-again

A common thread running through the entire post-1945 period is that people don’t want to think about nuclear war. When they’re forced to think of it, when they can’t escape it, they want to stop it. But when it’s not in the headlines any more and governments are growing more reasonable, they’d just as well not think about it. If nuclear war did break out today, you can bet more people would focus on it, but, of course, we don’t want that war to have to take place. The peace movement’s challenge is to maintain its momentum and sense of danger — even though the world might seem safer and there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world. If the nations of the world are maintaining their arsenals, the struggle hasn’t come to an end. Do you think the moment we’re experiencing today with Trump and North Korea is potentially a driving force for another peak of movement energy? What’s different today? It’s possible that there will be some revival of the nuclear disarmament movement, but we haven’t seen the surge of resistance yet. I’m a co-chair of the national board of the group Peace Action, so I’m very well aware of how peace groups are doing. While Peace Action isn’t doing badly, we’re certainly not yet experiencing the surge of action in the streets, such as when its predecessors, SANE and the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, were taking off. One reason it’s not taking place is that the mass media rarely focus on the danger of nuclear war, and when they do focus on it, it’s the danger of some other country waging war on the United States. One day it’s Iran, another day it’s North Korea — but they don’t seem to get to the basic problem that nine countries have 15,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenals. It’s a worldwide phenomenon, as is the persistence of the idea of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national security. Right now there’s also a sense that only Koreans are vulnerable, that most Americans aren’t at risk of being bombarded by nuclear missiles. At the height of popular protest in the 1980s, millions of people were in the streets — in part because U.S. and Soviet arsenals could reach both sides quite easily. That got people to wake up and realize that nuclear war wasn’t such a hot idea after all. How big a role did fear play in these spikes of organizing? How can people dealing with fear of the Trump administration, or of North Korean nuclear mobilization, help direct that energy into making nuclear conflict less likely? I think fear has probably been the most important factor in mobilizing people. When you look at things psychologically, people should be afraid of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. It seems irrational to go bury your head in the sand and not worry about them. But it’s also true, in two ways, that fear is dangerous. One is that it can be demobilizing, that people get so scared they’re scared silent. They become so frightened they retreat and they don’t feel powerful any more. They might take drugs instead of taking action. A second danger is that, if people are scared of nuclear war, the hawks have an answer for them. They turn fear on its head: Yes, they say, nuclear war could be a bad thing, that’s why we need nuclear weapons to deter the bad Russians, Iranians, North Koreans and so on. This means fear may reinforce the desire for nuclear weapons rather than for getting rid of them. For these reasons, the use of nuclear fear has to be very careful. Peace activists have to make the case that as long as nuclear weapons exist there’s no real security from nuclear war, and therefore we need to get rid of nuclear weapons. That’s the best case that can be made by nuclear disarmament forces: The arms race is a race no one wins. What are some of the forgotten “paths not taken” of weapons not built or decisions not made as a result of anti-nuclear organizing? How might the world be different if those things had been built? The neutron bomb was being proposed during the Carter administration. This enhanced radiation weapon was designed to destroy people rather than property, and was scheduled by the Carter administration to be deployed in Western European nations. But once peace groups learned of it and began to focus on its terrible effects, this caused massive protests in Western European nations and, eventually, an unwillingness to support the neutron bomb deployment by their government officials. As a result, the Carter administration finally concluded that, if Western governments weren’t willing to stand up for it, the U.S. government wasn’t going to be the villain of the piece. So Carter canceled plans for its deployment. The MX missile was the jewel in the crown of the Reagan administration during its first term of office. Peace groups said that it was a first-strike weapon, and there was so much popular protest against it that Reagan couldn’t get funding through Congress. Eventually, a plan that began as 200 missiles barely slipped through with 50 missiles. That failure became the basis of the U.S. government’s push for strategic arms reduction treaties, for it meant the U.S. government couldn’t keep pace with development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. And the next best thing was seeing to it that neither country had those weapons. The best way to do that was to sign a treaty: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which Gorbachev welcomed and showed him, in many ways, to be a peace person, strongly influenced by the movement. Gorbachev had his own peace-oriented ideas, but he also received a large amount of information from the disarmament movement in the United States and around the world. He would take time out of his meetings with heads of state to meet with representatives of groups like the Freeze campaign, SANE, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. So, Gorbachev and Reagan’s detente and the overall drawback from the nuclear brink were heavily influenced by the peace movement — not just through public pressure but also through direct engagement. Are there other potentially winnable campaigns of this kind available to anti-nuclear weapons activists today that might limit the likelihood of the Trump administration using nuclear weapons? It seems to me there are two ways to develop mass pressure on Trump and Congress in connection with the general problem of nuclear weapons. The first has to do with the trillion dollar nuclear “modernization” program — the plan to upgrade the entire nuclear weapons complex, build new bombers and missiles and submarines and so on. That cost is so great that it provides the opportunity to reach people who are already concerned about the arms race or are satisfied with the weapons we already have and don’t want to bankrupt the country. So you can make demands for cutbacks in the “modernization” plan or stopping it entirely and mobilize a sympathetic constituency. A second way is to focus on Trump’s mental instability: The fact that he’s a reckless, dangerous leader, who really shouldn’t have the button to launch nuclear war in his hand. That’s what the currently proposed Markey-Lieu bill seeks to address: Under its provisions, unless there’s a nuclear attack on the United States, the president cannot initiate nuclear war without a Congressional declaration of war. Since Congress hasn’t declared war since 1941, that’s a pretty big restriction.

### 2AC---Experts Good

#### Experts are credible.

Ravenal 9 – Professor Emeritus at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service

Earl Ravenal, “Designing Defense for a New World Order,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects--- a.k.a. pork---funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities---at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)---for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups---about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”---not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation---is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points--- empirically---to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### 2AC---Realism Good

#### Realist IR understandings are accurate and key to prevent international conflict.

Basrur and Kliem 20 – Professor of International Relations in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Research Associate at the University of Oxford, M.A. and MPhil in History from the University of Delhi, M.A. and PhD in Political Science from the University of Bombay; Research Fellow in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, PhD in International Relations and Affairs from Universität Rostock, M.A. in International Relations and Security Studies from the University of Liverpool

Rajesh Basrur and Frederick Kliem, “Covid-19 and international cooperation: IR paradigms at odds,” SN Social Science 11-9-2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43545-020-00006-4

The realist approach

In the realist view, the basic principles of international politics never change. International affairs always remain essentially a struggle for power among self-interested states. Since realism is not a unitary theory, different branches of realism rely on different independent variables. Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau see perpetual conflict rooted in an innately selfish human nature, which translates into competitive state behavior (Morgenthau 1985). Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz focus on an inherently competitive international system without a central organizing authority that monopolizes power to manage inter-state relations and protect states from one another (Waltz 1979). Within this anarchic international system, states are the primary actors and employ self-help strategies to survive and, depending on the exact branch of neorealism, to maximize power or security. Because of an inevitably asymmetric distribution of power, the anarchic condition of international affairs may compel weaker states to either balance against or bandwagon with more powerful ones. Neoclassical realists marry neorealism’s systemic assumptions with domestic level factors that either facilitate or circumscribe foreign policy, for instance domestic institutions, government-society relations, and leadership perception (Ripsman et al. 2016).

Realism is generally pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and mutual support among states. It would immediately predict the national self-help and “us first” mentality that characterizes the global management of Covid-19 and its consequences. Travel and entry bans, international scapegoating, great power competition and pharmaceutical protectionism are ubiquitous.

Even in the world’s most integrated supranational organization, the European Union (EU), member states readily violate otherwise sacrosanct principles of cooperation, and realists would not be surprised by how quickly lofty European ideals and norms made way for national self-help once the Covid-19 crisis hit the continent. The outbreak was followed by immediate violation of many existing EU regulations: competition law, fiscal discipline, and freedom of movement. As countries closed their borders, EU capitals went into full nationalist gear (Guardian 2020a). Without any EU-consultation process, a number of EU countries immediately closed their borders and decreed export bans. When Italy, one of the worst affected countries in the world, asked fellow EU members for emergency relief with critical medical supplies, for several weeks it was met with precisely what realism would expect: its neighbors violated the EU’s single-market spirit by decreeing export bans on pharmaceutical equipment (Braw 2020; Reuters 2020).

Dismayed by the lack of European solidarity, Rome was happy to accept support from China, which, though itself badly affected, sent medical equipment and experts immediately. Far from being altruistic, however, Beijing aims to rewrite the Covid-19 narrative. It does not want to be seen as the point-of-origin of the Covid-19 virus and views the pandemic as an opportunity to come out ahead of the United States in a zero-sum competition for global primacy. In Italy and elsewhere, China’s “mask diplomacy” is a noteworthy public relations coup (Kliem and Chong 2020). Beijing wants to be recognized globally as a responsible provider of public health goods in the absence of US leadership, and thereby, progress towards its ultimate objective of comprehensive power accumulation relative to Washington.

Indeed, the US has not only been absent in terms of leadership, but has also actively engaged in nationalistic self-help at the expense of others. President Donald Trump of the United States, Europe’s closest non-EU ally and partner, tried to lure CureVac, a German firm that was developing a promising Covid-19 vaccine technology, to relocate its Covid-19 research and development division to the US and to guarantee exclusive American access to the firm’s products (Die Welt 2020). Similarly, Trump sought to block the sale of masks to Canada by a US-based firm (MacCharles and Ballingall 2020), though a compromise was arrived at later. The US (like other countries, e.g. Japan) has also sought to restructure global supply chains in order to bypass dependence on China (Pamuk and Shalal 2020), which—if it succeeds—will be a radical and long-term change.

Realists also point out that international institutions do not enable states to concentrate on greater long-term gains for everyone. Instead, international anarchy forces states to treat international organizations and institutions essentially like the international system itself: as an arena for zero-sum competition. Indeed, as realism predicts, the World Health Organization (WHO) has become highly politicized. For example, because of the PRC’s refusal to accept Taiwan as a diplomatically independent, sovereign nation state, the WHO disregards Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19 as well as related research and development results. Allegedly bowing to pressure from Beijing, the WHO does not recognize Taiwan and refuses to include Taipei’s very successful pandemic management strategies in its reports on global research efforts (Financial Times 2020). This also supports the neoclassical realists’ argument about domestic factors. It shows how domestic ideology shapes foreign policy decisions in China and hinders international cooperation.

If a severe transboundary global crisis cannot spur international cooperation, then what can? Realism reminds us that, because of the trust deficit systemically inherent in an international system characterized by anarchy, states hesitate to forgo their first instinct for self-help and zero-sum games, even amidst a common global challenge.

The liberal approach

Liberal theory highlights four imperatives for cooperation: interdependence, transnationalization, the growth of international institutions, and democracy (Doyle and Recchia 2011; Nye 1988).

When the fates of states are bound together, liberals claim, they must cooperate or pay a very high price. The global economy, for instance, is a complex network of trade, finance and manufacturing that places a premium on cooperation. From this perspective, states must cooperate to stem pandemics that flow seamlessly across the world and impose high costs on all societies. They must share knowledge and material resources to counter a scourge that harms them all. They certainly do so, for example, in US-led efforts to ensure the reliable availability of equipment to combat pandemics (Tribune 2020). But they do not cooperate consistently. The United States has sought to corner scarce medical supplies (Bradley 2020), European states have failed to coordinate policy (The Guardian 2020a), and China and the United States are squabbling over responsibility (Shi and Wu 2020). In short, the pattern is much as in another arena of contest between interdependent states: the as yet unfinished “trade war.”

Why? Interdependence does not automatically produce cooperation. It is only when the breakdown of interdependence raises the prospect of serious catastrophe that states cooperate. When nuclear-armed states are on the verge of war, for instance, they engage in tacit cooperation by practicing extreme caution and often seek explicit accommodation through talks, as was the case in Cold War crises. Even so, they continue to compete through arms racing, alliance building and occasional brinkmanship. Comparatively low levels of interdependence amidst the Covid-19 outbreak are unlikely to generate high levels of cooperation as the threat to national survival is limited.

The onset of pandemics has certainly produced unprecedented cooperation among epistemic communities, such as virologists, in a transnationalized world. Scientists from many countries have worked together to manage the threat of a viral outbreak ever since the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002. The appearance of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 quickly led to the activation of a scientific network that has been dubbed the “SARS club” (Butler 2012). More broadly, the onset of MERS spurred global research, producing as many as 883 scientific papers in 92 countries between 2012 and 2015 (Zyoud 2016). Likewise, as the New York Times has noted, the Covid-19 outbreak has galvanized unparalleled cooperative research in which scientists have bypassed standard protocols and competitive secrecy to engage in shared efforts (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick 2020). But, not for the first time, politics has trumped cooperation. The possibility of a quantum leap in global scientific collaboration has been stymied by the China-US spat, which has reduced the prospects of shared funding and finance to fight the virus. The US, for instance, stopped funding of a critical coronavirus-related training program for Chinese and other scientists even before the current outbreak. National priorities have overridden collective action, which is entirely in accord with realist expectations (Baumgaertner and Rainey 2020).

The same malaise afflicts international institutions, which liberals see as fostering high levels of cooperation. The Group of 7 major economies (G7) failed to organize a summit meeting in March 2020, while a subsequent meeting of their foreign ministers came up with no more than an anodyne statement seeking to foster research cooperation and do “whatever is necessary” to counter the economic fallout of the crisis even as they disagreed on whether China was to blame for the onset of the crisis (Schult 2020). The G20 did not do much better. It did support debt relief for poor countries, but its announced $5 trillion injection into the global economy was in fact no more than the sum of moneys already committed by its individual members for themselves (Chodor 2020). The institution at the center of the crisis, the WHO, has been acknowledged as critical to the information flow relating to the crisis. But the WHO has also been dogged by controversy for announcing the onset of the pandemic late (on 11 March, by which time it had already spread to 113 countries) and for apparently deferring to China in doing so (Basrur 2020). Such failings have brought much criticism and calls for its reform (South China Morning Post 2020).

Finally, democracy is said to be a binding factor, at least among developed economies. This is largely true with respect to the relationship between democracy and war. But the evidence is not persuasive in the present context. Developed democratic states in Europe and North America have engaged in recurring tugs of war over the sharing of counter-pandemic resources such as protective equipment and ventilators and have done relatively little to take collective action (Cohen and Musmar 2020). Overall, liberal theory does not have much to offer to explain the weak nature of international cooperation in the crisis.

Ideational approaches

The constructivist approach is an essentially ideational theory (or set of theories) that stresses the importance of belief structures, identities and roles, holding that, fundamentally, the ways in which actors behave in international politics are shaped by a consensus about reality and appropriate responses to it (Onuf 1989). From this standpoint, responses to the Covid-19 crisis are determined by deeply embedded beliefs about the priorities that states should adhere to in such a situation. The possibilities of cooperation, from a constructivist perspective, are not circumscribed by the anarchic condition in which states coexist (as realists would have it), but by our beliefs about what is feasible and what is not in such a condition (Pouliot 2011). The central dictum of the constructivist—“anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992)—thus sees the lack of collective action in the face of the pandemic not as an inevitable product of the material reality of the world as it actually is, but as arising from a realist thought structure. To wit, states fail to cooperate despite the urgency of the Covid-19 crisis because they are weighed down by the unquestioned notion that, even under the onslaught of a pandemic, self-help must come first, and the exercise of power must shape action. This worldview, for the constructivist, is an ideational construct that needs to be overridden if cooperation is to be achieved.

It is to the credit of constructivism that it widens the space for potential change by critiquing the realist perception of unalterable reality. However, while the concept of ideational structure is helpful in challenging established modes of thinking (and consequent habits of action) over time, it is not particularly helpful in offering insights into the short-to-medium-term responses of states to crises like the pandemic or to anticipating what, in fashioning states’ responses, might actually be do-able and what probably will not. On the contrary, since constructivist thinking views both cooperation and conflict in terms of thought structures, it explains very little as far as responses to the current crisis go. In short, constructivism is not a predictive theory and tends to be non-falsifiable and, more pragmatically, lacking in much utility other than urging new thinking. How to get from the present ideational structure to a more desirable one when a crisis breaks out remains a knotty problem.

Normative theory, which centers on moral judgment about what should be—as distinct from the materialist view of international politics as what is—is similarly problematic (Ramel 2011). Certainly, it offers useful space for the identification of responsibility when a crisis breaks out. The analyst may adopt two basic approaches that Robert Gregory labels “backward-mapping” and “forward-mapping” (Gregory 1998). The former looks at the origin and history of the policy process and how they might have created or contributed to the problem. In the present case, one would ask: who was responsible for the outbreak of the pandemic? A second question would be: was policymaker X warned about the problem and did he/she take action to avert it or mitigate its potential consequences? The latter approach considers the policy action taken at the time of the crisis. Did the policymaker act appropriately once the crisis had broken out? While both are normative questions, they also have strong practical implications. The attribution of responsibility relates to the consequences of the policymaker’s actions and to whether the individual held responsible was fittingly sanctioned or punished for it, whether legally or politically. This has important implications. If the person or persons responsible is/are not in some way punished, he/she/they may tend to repeat this or similar errors and cause a recurrence of societal harm. Here, China would certainly be one center of analysis, as questions mount as to whether Beijing took the necessary steps to share information once the outbreak of the novel Coronavirus was first confirmed by Chinese medical doctors in late December (The Guardian 2020b). As mentioned above, the WHO too is open to the charge of prioritizing political expediency by not including Taiwan in its assessments and recommendations.

The problem, however, of explaining why states behave as they do remains. The attribution of responsibility for a crisis is normally only a post facto phenomenon and does little to inform the analyst as to why international cooperation as a pattern of behavior does or does not occur. Even more, the scope for anticipating future behavior remains uncertain at best. Like constructivism, normative theory is valuable in understanding critical aspects of international cooperation or the lack of it, but it misses some of the most important facets of international reality: it fails to explain why states tend to let competition override cooperation when individual and collective interests collide.

Conclusion: realism redux

Much post-Cold War academic thinking gave the appearance of a “transition” in the way intellectuals view global politics: a “decline” of realism and the rise of alternative approaches in apex-level scholarly research (Maliniak et al 2011). However, this analysis shows that alternative paradigms in IRT have much less grasp over the current crisis than realism. The continued dominance of the state and of individual national interests over collective interests in the absence of effective international authority is evident in global responses to the pandemic. Realism tells us that, because of the systemic trust deficit in international affairs, especially in times of crises, states will turn to self-help and zero-sum calculations rather than to cooperative collective action. It is evident that precisely such behavior dominates the global management of the Covid-19 crisis. To be sure, cooperation does occur, but only when it does not clash with national interest.

Going forward, a realist would expect further restrictions on international exchange in order to minimize the threat and at least a temporary but nonetheless significant scale-down of globalization, as it were. The economic effects of the crisis are likely to be severe and unpredictable, and likely to include recession, flight of capital, widespread impoverishment, fall in agricultural output, and increased deaths from other diseases such as malaria and HIV (Congressional Research Service 2020; Economist 2020; Shiller 2020). These will be subject to the same dynamics of cooperation and conflict as described here, in particular in the context of Sino-US competition.

Rather worryingly, the Covid-19 crisis also points to what global action on other critical issues such as climate change, severe economic dislocation, or the apocalyptic consequences of nuclear war could look like in the future. They will in all probability not induce intense global cooperation to manage common challenges, but instead spur nationalism, zero-sum competition and the application of power to secure the objectives of individual nations.

On the positive side, realism also tells us that states try to imitate the successful activities of their peers. Governments may look jealously upon one another, but they will also adopt those measures used by others that are seen to be working. In that sense, we can place hope in the ability of Europeans and Americans to emulate successful measures taken by states like New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan to contain the spread of Covid-19.

Clearly, while all branches of IRT have something to offer, realism is best equipped to explain and anticipate the ambit of international cooperation in a crisis of the magnitude of the Covid-19 pandemic. Discounting its value can only subtract from the potential of IR as a discipline to meet its social function.

#### **Realism is accurate AND the only methodology to analyze threats.**

de Araujo 14 – Professor of Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeir

Marcelo de Araujo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 6-xx-2014, https://jetpress.org/v24/araujo.htm

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

## AI

### 2AC---Securitization Good

#### Military applications of AI are inevitable, so de-securitizing isn’t an option. The risks are real and pretending they aren’t risks undermining effective governance strategies. National security framing is key for building trust.

Gill 19 – Executive Director of the Secretariat of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation, Project Director and CEO of the International Digital Health & AI Research Collaborative

Amandeep Singh Gill, Artificial Intelligence and International Security: The Long View, 2019, Ethics & International Affairs, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5

An Agenda For Ensuring Security and Stability in the Age of AI

The starting point for dealing with the international security implications of AI must be the acknowledgment that we are in it for the long haul. There will be no quick fixes. The economic, political, and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies into security functions are simply too powerful to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications—minimizing casualties and collateral damage through better discrimination of targets, fighting crime, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases—to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental war caused by machine error.

This acknowledgment must be accompanied by an intensification of crossdomain literacy. AI cannot be the business of coders and cognitive scientists alone; nor can its security implications be the province only of diplomats, generals, and lawyers. Given the broad impact that AI businesses can have on society, the business of AI has to be everyone’s business. Governance of AI can only be based on a correct understanding of the power and limits of the technology, and such governance can only be effective globally if it is part of a tiered approach that includes actors at the intergovernmental, national, and industry levels.

Currently, though military investments in AI are being acknowledged, no state admits to the existence of lethal autonomous weapon systems in its inventory. Thus, if we want to build mutual confidence and trust, we are left either to add discussions on such systems to existing dialogues on cybersecurity and arms control more broadly or to begin with new dialogues on approaches to repurposable civilian capabilities. The latter might be a more productive venue for engaging the private sector, which is wary of being stigmatized by civil society as the maker or facilitator of “killer robots.” Tagging on discussions of AI to cybersecurity or traditional arms control would also be unhelpful because of the risk of false analogies.

Thus, new innovatively structured dialogues in the track setting (involving both government and nongovernmental parties) or the track setting (involving artificial intelligence and international security only informal nongovernmental parties) are required. The first objective should be to enhance mutual understanding through in-depth discussions on national approaches to AI development, testing and validation, deployment, and use. Another objective should be to allow some sharing of best practices or cautionary experiences. A third potential objective would be to shift thinking from zerosum competitive approaches to collaborative problem-solving using data and algorithmic insights pooled by the participants themselves or put in escrow with a trusted third party.

Agreement on norms to govern the military use of AI could take time, but influencing the direction of such use by other means brooks no delay. One important channel for shaping AI use globally is guiding principles short of binding law. At a time when there are trust deficits among nations and multilateral negotiations are at best seen as opportunities for “lawfare,” it makes sense to rally around shared values and ethical principles. In the context of emerging technologies, such an approach also permits more of an impact early on in the innovation cycle, when national or international regulatory reach is absent or ambiguous. Consistent with this logic, the EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence has identified five principles—beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy of humans, justice, and explicability—for the trustworthy and ethical development of AI.

More specifically, in the context of military use, in the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), comprised of states and including all countries thought to be pursuing national security applications of AI, identified ten guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. These principles cover aspects related to the applicability of international humanitarian law, human responsibility, accountability, risk assessment and mitigation, and the need to take a nonanthropomorphic view of such systems. The guiding principles are accompanied by building blocks of common understandings on definitions and the nature of human intervention required throughout the various stages of technology development and deployment to uphold compliance with international law, in particular international humanitarian law.

Another channel for the soft governance of AI could be engineering standards and codes. At a minimum, a common vocabulary for assessing risks and aligning design with safety and reliability considerations is needed. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems has started building a shared, multidisciplinary, and evolving resource of terms. There is further scope for constructing common standards that can progressively align practices around the globe to responsible principles.

Last Word

There is a growing concern over the repurposing of AI technologies for warfare. As with cyber weapons, LAWS could have indiscriminate effects and be turned around to attack the attackers.They can create challenges for the application of international humanitarian law principles, such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution, all of which presuppose a degree of human reflection and control. Their international security implications are still unfolding but could be as significant as the nuclear revolution in warfare, if not more so. Innovative and agile ways of governing the use of AI are needed urgently to head off risks to international peace and security.

#### Analysis through nation-states and security is good.

Robin Luckham 17, an Emeritus fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, where he has been based since 1974. Following the publication of his book The Nigerian Military in 1971, he has researched and published extensively on civil-military relations, militarism, political violence, democratisation, security and development, security sector governance, security ‘from below’ and peacebuilding. Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people? 2017.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009

6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the preservation of peace. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities. On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

### 2AC---Securitization Good---Nuclear

#### Multilateral AI securitization reduces distrust and alleviates tensions – that prevents nuclear war

Geist and Lohn 18 – Associate policy researcher at RAND, previous MacArthur Nuclear Security fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in RAND’s Washington office. PhD in Russian history from the University of North Carolina in 2013; Engineer at the RAND Corporation. Doctorate in electrical engineering from the University of California, Santa Cruz.

Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?” RAND Corporation, 2018, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html>.

Overall workshop participants agreed that **AI has significant potential to upset the foundations of nuclear stability and undermine deterrence by the year 2040,** especially in the increasingly multipolar strategic environment. Dismissing the Hollywood nightmare of malevolent AIs trying to destroy humanity with nuclear weapons, experts were instead concerned with more-mundane issues arising from improving capabilities. AI applications discussed included the ability to track and target adversary launchers for counterforce targeting and the incorporation of AI into decision support systems informing choices about the use of nuclear weapons.

Some experts fear that an increased reliance on AI could lead to new types of **catastrophic mistakes.** There may be pressure to use it **before it is technologically mature**; it may be **susceptible** to **adversarial subversion**; or adversaries may believe that the AI is more capable than it is, leading them to make **catastrophic mistakes**.

On the other hand, if the nuclear powers manage to **establish a form of strategic stability** compatible with the emerging capabilities that AI might provide, the machines could **reduce distrust** and **alleviate international tensions**, thereby **decreasing the risk of nuclear war.**

At present, we cannot predict which—if any—of these scenarios will come to pass, but **we need to begin considering the potential impact of AI on nuclear security before these challenges become acute**. Maintaining strategic stability in the coming decades may prove extremely difficult, and all nuclear powers will have to participate in the cultivation of institutions to help limit nuclear risk. This goal will demand a fortuitous combination of technological, military, and diplomatic measures that will require rival states to cooperate. We hope that this Perspective will begin that discussion and open a path toward pragmatism and realism on these controversial and often polarizing topics.

### 2AC---Securitization Inev

#### AI representations by foreign actors mean securitization is inevitable

Zeng 21 - Professor of China and International Studies in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University

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Geopolitically speaking, China’s national approach towards AI and moves to make it a security matter are fuelled by ever more competitive United States–China relations. Each side’s perception of the other’s AI advancement as a threat accelerates the securitization process. In the domestic arena, where the primary concern is the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the practical use of AI and its relevant discourses are geared to securing authoritarian rule. In this regard, China’s bold AI experiments practice a unique digital technocracy, making its AI approach quite distinct from that in Western societies.

Currently, this securitization is an ongoing process. Although the extent of its impact on targeted audiences, namely, local governments, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public, remains unclear, all nevertheless enthusiastically echo the central government’s AI campaign. In this regard, such securitization appears to convince domestic actors. However, it also generates unintended consequences. They are: (i) creation of a nationalistic environment that makes China less attractive to global AI labor and capital; (ii) impaired industrial efficiency by virtue of focusing on self-reliance; (iii) obstruction of China’s global AI governance leadership; (iv) reinforced technological rivalry due to disregard for potential global AI cooperation; and (v) constraints on the global access of Chinese AI companies. All could undermine China’s key objectives of fostering a booming AI economy and becoming a global AI leader.

Indeed, securitization of AI has progressively become a global movement. In the United States and Europe, for example, the AI advancements of geopolitical competitors, especially Russia and China, are often perceived as a potential threat to national and international security. The relevant speech act frames AI not as a normal technology, but as a national security matter that justifies the enablement of extraordinary actions from the state and society. In effect, it signifies the urgent need to deploy more resources and support, for example, in the US case, not only to the American AI-enabled military sector, but also the AI commercial industry.

This article focuses on how AI is securitized within China. Needless to say, the securitization process works differently in the Chinese context, given its unique state-society relations. Despite a non-liberal democratic setting, however, there is still a need to convince the domestic audience and thus win more support for China’s national AI plan. Table 1 categorizes the arguments into the securitization framework. It argues that the Chinese central government, as the securitizing actor, is performing a securitizing move by labeling China’s AI advancement as a matter of security. In the relevant discourses, the national interests and survival of the Chinese nation constitute the referent object that needs to be protected. As part of the central government’s AI campaign to mobilize domestic actors, this performative act aims to convince the domestic audience including local, subnational, academic actors, market actors, and the mass, as the rest of the article will explore.

The relevant securitizing move belongs to the type of securitization referring to a directive elementary speech whose aim is to raise an item on the agenda.36 It consists of “three sequential, elementary speech acts,” including claim, warn, and request.37 In this case, the State Council of China aims to raise its audience’s awareness of AI’s importance, and requests the relevant actions. As the quote at the beginning of the article claims and warns, other countries (i.e. China’s competitors) are elevating AI as a significant national strategy for the sake of national security.

The document also claims that, as China lacks significant original AI innovations, China’s overall AI development lags behind that of other great powers.38 As such, it requests the nation’s prioritization of AI advancement to protect national security. On the heels of this request comes the setting of the broad goal to make China a leading AI power, along with a three-step plan and a targeted timeline to: (i) catch up with the AI technological progress of world-leading countries such as the United States by 2020; (ii) make major breakthroughs in certain AI technologies by 2025; and (iii) become a global leading AI power by 2030.39 In short, the Chinese central government is labeling AI as a national security matter and highlighting the threat of falling behind in efforts to convince domestic actors to support its action plan.

The serious damage American sanctions have inflicted on Chinese tech companies has heightened China’s awareness of both its technological weakness and feelings of insecurity in regard to global reliance. Understandably, therefore, China wants to master leading AI technology independently. As Xi Jinping elaborates:

accelerating the development of a new generation of AI is an important strategic handhold for China to gain the initiative in global science and technology competition…We need to ensure that the core AI technologies are firmly in our own hands.62

China’s AI aspirations extend to global leadership. Since China’s rise, the US-led global order has left China dissatisfied due to the limits it places on China’s say in global norms and rules.63 Rather than a norm-taker, China now aspires to be a norm-shaper, or even a norm-maker. Many Chinese scholars argue that current established norms are geared primarily to serving interests other than those of China.64 To maximize Chinese interests, therefore, future norms should be defined by/for China, and on Chinese terms.

In addition to history and geopolitics, China’s securitizing move also has a domestic context. Certain scholars see AI as exerting two types of impact on China’s national security—traditional and non-traditional.80 The former refers to the military threat, namely the aforementioned use of AI in warfare; the latter includes such non-military sources as political security, economic security, environmental security, cyber security, and energy security.81 However, most important is the so-called political security (政治安全) or institutional security (制度安全), i.e., regime security.

As far as regime security is concerned, the bold and controversial AI practices China applies to state governance is an inevitable topic. As part of the CCP’s adaptation strategy in the digital age, China has invested heavily in AI technologies in order to advance towards digital governance. Such AI investment expects returns in the form of improved public services (by enhancing efficiency), and maintenance of authoritarian rule.82 AI’s empowerment of digital surveillance is widely discussed among international analysts, having been used to upgrade China’s sophisticated state surveillance program and potentially reshape state-society relations.83 Although similar—though less intensive and extensive—AI surveillance programs have been implemented worldwide, due to privacy concerns they have met with considerable social resistance in Western societies in efforts to balance states’ use of AI.84 In China, however, there is scant legal constraint on the relevant AI practices. For example, China has pioneered AI facial recognition technology, which has been restricted, or even banned in many Western societies. Meanwhile, to reduce social resistance, the Chinese government has proactively guided public opinion on AI by framing it as positive and modern social progress that is of enormous benefit in securing public safety, as will be discussed later.

Certain Chinese scholars also link AI with economic security. Li Zheng from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, for example, holds that sustaining the current socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is the core of China’s economic security.85 In essence, this economic security extends to regime security, i.e., securing the CCP’s rule. In spite of its quasi-capitalist market reforms, the CCP’s economic policies have always been constrained by its ideological commitment to being a communist entity.86 Thus, in the interests of its political legitimacy, the CCP must uphold certain socialist responsibilities. Li argues that AI will be able not only to improve socioeconomic governance, including market supervision, and fight economic crime, but also strengthen the CCP’s capability to manage the macro and microeconomy.87

### 1AR---Securitization Inev

#### Chinese securitization makes AI competition inevitable

Zeng 21 - Professor of China and International Studies in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University

Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 14, Issue 3, Pages 417–445, Autumn 2021, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/10.1093/cjip/poab005>

This article shows that the Chinese central government is performing a securitizing move by labeling AI as a security matter in order to convince local states, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public. But if AI is indeed being securitized, so what? Although it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of this securitizing move, it undoubtedly helps the Chinese central government’s mobilization of domestic actors towards advancing its AI agenda. Nevertheless, this move also generates unintended consequences for the securitizing actor’s goal in the long run. According to the State Council’s AI plans, its three-step AI plan carries the specific goals of fostering a booming AI economy, and a grand goal of becoming a global AI leader.125 Securitization may undermine these key objectives for several reasons.

First, a highly securitized AI sector will affect the flow of foreign AI labor and capital to China’s AI industry. To make it attractive to global talent and capital, a booming AI industry requires an outward-looking, open-minded, and international socio-politico-economic environment. However, the securitization trend is pushing in the opposite direction by producing a rising nationalistic, inward-looking, security AI discourse. This is counterproductive to China’s AI ambitions, because it puts China at a disadvantage in the global market. More specifically, there is a global shortage of AI talent and, as previously mentioned, China is short of 5 million or more qualified AI industry workers. This has led to fierce global competition in the AI industry for qualified workers, to the extent where Chinese tech companies offer extremely—or unreasonably—high salaries.126 Such financial attraction, however, could be offset by an unfavorably nationalistic domestic environment.

Second, the securitization trend could hinder economic efficiency. As previously discussed, it contributes to the rise of a self-reliance discourse on technology whose creation is often at the cost of economic efficiency. Precisely because China is lagging behind in AI development, it needs to make use of the global AI supply chain to catch up. However, the self-reliance discourse considers the risk of relying on foreign technology too high, and thus focuses on “Made in China.” Such self-reliance is difficult (if not impossible) to realize in the short run, and hinders China’s ability to benefit from the global AI market and thus maximize industrial efficiency. Similarly, the securitization of AI in the United States also undermines the appeal that America holds for Chinese national AI talent, capital, and technology. Growing tension between China and the United States has, moreover, undermined Chinese companies’ willingness to invest in the United States. In the long run, therefore, securitization is detrimental to the competitiveness of the American AI industry.

Third, in connection with the above paragraph, the domestic inward-looking nationalistic trend that securitization has created hinders China’s realization of global leadership. To lead AI in the global arena, China must provide public goods and win support from others through successful partnerships. It must play a key role in promoting global governance and, as a global leader, act according to common interests rather than solely national interests. However, a security-focused, inward-looking, nationalistic AI discourse is helpful to neither global governance nor common interests. For example, it can foster the rise of inward-looking national AI policies that prioritize national interests over those of the globalized world. This is in direct contrast to global governance goals, i.e., to build a shared future through global solidarity. Indeed, many of the problems that AI has created, such as those relating to ethics, represent collective challenges to humankind that require a globally concerted response. Inward-looking national AI policies may contribute to a fragmented global governance structure, and thus obstruct concerted global actions to address AI problems.

Fourth, the securitization trend has reinforced technological rivalry at the expense of the potential for global AI cooperation, and will likely exacerbate the United States–China confrontation. This is not to deny the existence of United States–China cooperation in the field of AI. However, by speaking of AI in the language of security and a global race, the relevant security AI discourse emphasizes competition over cooperation and destruction over creation. This may produce a real security threat, and perhaps an actual global AI race, thus undermining the space for cooperation from which both the United States and China can benefit. In other words, the rivalry discourse adopts a zero-sum geopolitical angle for understanding AI innovation that is inevitably to the latter’s detriment in both countries.127

More importantly, securitization may push AI further into the hard security area by virtue of its military applications. The securitizing actor tends to exaggerate the security threat to achieve a successful securitization, so enhancing the strategic risks of AI military practices and increasing the likelihood of war, and of escalating ongoing conflicts. In this regard, a highly securitized AI politics may set China and the United States on a dangerous path towards a catastrophic confrontation that imperils everyone’s interests and security. In the worst case scenario, as in all arms races, blithe assertions about the inevitability of AI-enabled war are a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy. In this regard, the aforementioned Fu Ying’s call to regulate AI’s military application merits more attention.

Lastly, by strengthening state involvement in China’s AI industry, securitization may undermine the interests of Chinese AI companies. The boundary between the state and the market is always far less defined in China than in other countries, due to China’s political environment. Making AI a national security matter justifies the necessity for heavier state involvement, if not control. Although a blessing in the Chinese domestic market, close ties with the state are a burden on the global stage. Take the aforementioned civil-military integration as an example. Although helpful in gaining China’s AI companies and research institutes more state funding, it undermines their global access. Close relations with the Chinese government have caused certain Chinese AI companies, including members of the “national AI team of China,” to be subjected to punishment, in the form of the aforementioned American sanctions. In this regard, securitization could hinder the access of China’s AI companies to the global market, and hence their future development. It also remains to be seen whether heavier state involvement in the AI industry hinders market efficiency.

### 2AC---AT: No AI Threat---China

#### AI revolutionizes Chinese military capabilities – gives them the capacity to create asymmetric advantages over the US

Stephenson and Fedasiuk 22 – China military technology research assistance at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and former surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy; research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and an adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Alex Stephenson and Ryan Fedasiuk, “How AI would – and wouldn’t – factor into a U.S.-China War,” War on the Rocks, 05-03-2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/>

How AI Could Enhance Chinese Capability

The most likely sources of a potential U.S.-Chinese conflict, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a contest over some South China Sea feature, would likely feature the full spectrum of civil and military information operations aimed at deterring U.S. intervention and degrading U.S. allies’ will to fight. AI could play a dominant role in each of these missions. The Network Systems Department of the People’s Liberation Army, for example, may try using generative language models to synthesize and amplify content on Facebook and Instagram, as it has done using botnets and other non-AI tools around Taiwanese elections. The Chinese military is also likely to wage a similar campaign to discredit U.S. military activities or sow division with partners, including Australia and Japan.

Soon after the start of a conflict, the People’s Liberation Army would likely attack U.S. sensor and communication networks, and several different kinds of machine-learning applications could aid this task. A cadre of scientists at the People’s Liberation Army National University of Defense Technology, for example, specializes in “fuzzing,” using machine learning to identify vulnerabilities in an adversary’s computer networks. Experts also point to AI’s role in attacking or defending critical infrastructure in Taiwan, Japan, Australia, or the United States.

Chinese planners also aim to use AI for electronic countermeasures and operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, analysts from anquan neican (a Chinese journal for cybersecurity research) are optimistic about cognitive electronic warfare — using AI to analyze incoming radar signals, and then automatically adapting one’s own output to optimize jamming. But several other applications of AI also play a role in electronic spectrum operations. In 2020, for example, the People’s Liberation Army awarded equipment contracts for swarms of drones equipped with modular radar-jamming systems, which could be flown near U.S. carrier strike groups, military installations in Japan and South Korea, or shared facilities in the Philippines. Many systems under development by Chinese universities and military research institutions are explicitly designed to counter U.S. drone systems and swarm concepts. Chinese companies have already exported drones to Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, among others. However, while some People’s Liberation Army experts contend that these drones have been “battle tested,” others are less sanguine about their capabilities in a real conflict.

Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army may attempt to use AI to enhance the lethality and reach of its surface ships and anti-access and area denial systems, which could hold U.S. forces at risk during a crisis. China’s current approach to territorial defense relies on hundreds of short- to long-range ballistic missiles that would target U.S. aircraft carriers and strike aircraft based in mainland Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and as far away as Guam. As early as 2016, Wang Changqing, director of the General Design Department of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, claimed that the company’s next generation of cruise missiles would use AI to adapt to specific combat conditions, being capable of adjusting flight profiles and even warhead yield. Chinese defense industry engineers appear inspired by the U.S. Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, which uses AI to improve accuracy and achieve more flexible targeting.

Finally, the People’s Liberation Army is building a wide array of autonomous vehicles and extensive undersea sensor networks that make use of AI and big-data analytics. These systems may be useful in recording and transmitting the locations of U.S. undersea vehicles, and would be crucial to overcoming the Chinese military’s disadvantages in undersea warfare. Large unmanned submarines, such as the HSU-001 and Haishen-6000, could be equipped with sea mines to deny the U.S. Navy access to undersea space between the first and second island chains, or to restrict access to the Taiwan or Luzon Straits.

Of course, AI has the potential to revolutionize Chinese operations in countless other ways, including through predictive maintenance, logistics, and back-office tasks not discussed in depth in this article. In any case, it is clear that the People’s Liberation Army is banking on the technology to create asymmetric advantages vis-a-vis the United States.

**Biotech**

**2AC---Securitization Good**

**Bio-threats are real. If attacks happen, the government and society writ large will securitize anyway which makes their impacts inevitable.**

**Saunders-Hastings 14** - epidemiologist and risk scientist with expertise in global health, infectious disease epidemiology and emergency preparedness. B.Sc. in Biology from Queen’s University, a M.Sc. in Global Health from the Brighton and Sussex Medical School and a Ph.D. in Population Health from the University of Ottawa.

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The Threat of Biological Weapons: A **Justification** of Biological Weapons **Securitization**

1. Introduction

In 2001, when attacks were carried out in the United States involving Bacillus anthracis, the bacterial agent that causes anthrax, the threat of biological weapons came into **sharper focus** for the American government. These attacks were not the beginning of the biological weapons threat, but rather a point along a **continuum** of increasing **risk**. Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention defines biological weapons to include the “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes” as well as the “weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict”1. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries, but the fear of biological weapons of mass destruction, here defined as weapons that pose an existential threat to the target, is relatively recent2. Much of it is attributable to the rapid advances made in the biological sciences over the past decade, particularly with respect to the field of genomics, where there is a growing ability to manipulate genes3. This knowledge has a variety of applications in the field of bioweapons. Additionally, while states use of biological weapons was a concern through much of the 20th century, the possibility that rogue states or non-state groups would use biological weapons was largely ignored until the start of the 21st century1.

Therefore, the **threat** of biological **weapons** has been framed as a **security issue** 4. This essay examines whether, and to what degree, the threat of a biological weapons attack has been overstated with respect to the government’s response by drawing on securitization theory, which critically evaluates the process through which an issue comes to be viewed through a security framework. In addition, the essay will also use the precautionary principle, described by the 1998 Wingspread Statement as the notion that “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”5. Though more often applied to considerations of environmental risk, in the case of biological weapons, the principle could be used to justify caution even in the absence of consensus surrounding the probability of an attack, simply due to the severity of the consequences if an attack was to occur.

It will be argued that the **biological weapons** threat has **not** been **overestimated** and that the biodefense measures **expressed** in **current** **policy** and funding decisions **are warranted**. Despite measures such as **likelihood-adjusted mortality**, which may suggest the U.S. government response is an **overreaction**, other characteristics of the bioweapons threat **justify** its **securitization** and resulting **prioritization** in the **government agenda**. To do this, the essay provides a discussion of how the potential **consequences** of an attack pose an **existential threat** to the United States, how there is an **inadequate degree** of **preparedness** for such an event, how the **mere possibility** of an attack is enough to warrant **high spending** on **preventive** and preparative **programs**, and how the response has been **appropriately measured** given the threat. The focus will be on the United States government because it has taken such a prominent role in bioweapon securitization and biodefense funding. A single country, the US, was chosen as a point of focus to avoid confusion due to differing levels of threat and response across countries. Additionally, any exaggerations that may exist in how the media or the public portray and view the biological weapons threat will be ignored; though this could be related to the government’s decision to securitize bioweapons, this is a separate issue from government policy decisions in response to the security threat and is outside the scope of this paper.

2. Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons

Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6. It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an **existential threat** to a particular group, or referent object7. In these situations, emergency response measures and **extensive** resource **commitments** are considered **justified7**. Securitization theory generally promotes **desecuritization** as **preferable** because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8. However, it also recognizes that **securitization** is **sometimes appropriate**. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6.

In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the **legitimacy** of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an **invasion of Iraq** by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce **biological weapons** of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9.

Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11.

However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of **biodefense prioritization** point to the fact that focusing **solely** on **potential fatalities** ignores **other issues,** such as the negative **social** and **economic fallout** from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more **expensive** to combat **intentional threats**, where there will be an **explicit effort** to **circumvent** current **practices** by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the **probability** of **one attack** is **not independent** from another, and that an increasing probability of **success** may elicit **more attempts12**. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavy-handed response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons.

3. Consequences of an Attack

A government’s decision to securitize an issue is a strategy to make extreme responses seem justified, and it centers on the perceived existential risk a threat poses to the population7. Beginning with a brief history of biological weapons use, this section will aim to defend the framing of biological weapons use as an existential threat by examining their ability to cause mortality or to generate negative social and economic fallout. A brief discussion of the potential catastrophic consequences of a smallpox attack will illustrate the argument.

The use of **biological weapons** dates back **centuries**. Examples include the Tatars catapulting plague-infected corpses over city walls at the siege of Kaffa in the 14th century, the deliberate triggering of a smallpox epidemic among Native Americans via contaminated blankets in the 18th century during the French and Indian War, and the contamination of salad bars with salmonella at a restaurant in Oregon in the 20th century2. However, with the development of the germ theory during the 19th and into the 20th century, there was an increase in scientific knowledge about biological weapons10. States became increasingly interested in such weapons, with Japan establishing a bioweapons program between 1932-1945, the United States in 1942, and the Soviet Union in 197313. In 1972, in response to increasing concern about the threat of biological weapons, the United Nations proposed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (or BWC)14. The treaty came into effect in 1975, and banned the development, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological weapons1. However, it failed to halt the research and development of biological weapons, which have continued into the 21st century.

Those who argue that government response to the **biological weapons** threat has been **overstated** point to very **low mortality** in **previous attacks11**. The anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, for example, resulted in only 5 deaths15. This argument could be used to urge **governments** to instead invest resources in **areas** that consistently cause **higher mortality**, such as **infectious diseases** like AIDS or even the seasonal flu. However, in carrying out a threat assessment, it is also important to look at the **potential** for **mortality**. Here it has been suggested future attacks may **not** be on the same relatively **small** **scale** as those in the past15. It is difficult to produce **reliable estimates** of fatalities that might result from an attack; there is huge variation in estimates and, often, little statistical evidence to support the predictions11. That said, it is agreed that, in theory, even **small amounts** of a dangerous biological agent could cause **significant mortality** if prepared and disseminated effectively16. For instance, the WHO estimates that 50kg of B. anthracis distributed upwind of a population of 500 000 would leave 95 000 people dead and 125 000 more incapacitated17. Other sources suggest that 100kg of B. anthracis, disseminated via a crop-sprayer, could kill as many as **three million people**, and comparable values have been projected for other agents2,18. Another concern is that a contagious biological agent will result in person-to-person transmission, creating a self-sustaining effect not present in any other weapons class10.

While mass casualties are **possible**, it is also important to note that, even in situations with **few casualties**, biological weapons attacks may have profound **social** and **economic ramifications3**. Such attacks could lead to **widespread** social **panic** and **disorder**, resulting in **self-destructive behaviour** and creating what is called a “**societal autoimmune effect**” involving increases in crime and looting19. While there is little evidence to predict this would occur based on previous disaster situations (such as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, where the public reaction is described as effective and adaptive, rather than panicked and disruptive), it must remain a consideration20. The effects of a largescale attack involving biological weapons are unknown, and epidemics of highly fatal diseases may cause serious social disruption20.

The **economic consequences** of biological weapons attacks are **severe** and suggest that investing in defense makes **good** economic **sense**. While there were only five deaths in the 2001 anthrax attacks, those attacks resulted in tens of billions of dollars in government spending21. Also, the financial sector may be negatively impacted if investor confidence plummets3. Similarly, an attack on the agricultural sector, which accounts for 15% of the United States GDP, could have severe economic ramifications3. If the biological agent being used is contagious, there could also be implications for trade and travel restrictions3. The SARS epidemic of 2003 showed the economic consequences of a highly infectious disease, essentially “crippling” some of the most dynamic cities in the world4. The Center for Biosecurity has estimated the economic cost of a biological weapons attack in the U.S. could exceed one trillion USD15. In short, there are social and economic consequences that, considered in conjunction with the potential for catastrophically high mortality, justify the framing of biological weapons as a significant existential threat to the United States. This is illustrated by considering the specific case of smallpox.

The Variola virus, which causes smallpox, is an example of an agent that, if weaponized and used in an attack, would pose a serious **existential threat** to the United States22. It is highly **contagious**; in a 1972 outbreak in Yugoslavia, even with routine vaccinations, which are no longer carried out, the **disease spread** rapidly, with each affected individual infecting 11 to 13 others23. It is also lethal, with a **30% fatality rate1**. Human populations are highly susceptible because, since **eradication**, **vaccinations** have not been given for **20 years24**. Other features make smallpox an appealing option for **bioterrorism**: it has no treatment once symptoms occur; it would not be detected for 7-17 days; it is physically disfiguring; and the virus is stable in aerosol form1,24. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of smallpox is that those infected are contagious before symptoms appear. Simulations have been carried out, including a 1999 exercise by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where a terrorist release of Variola virus grew into a global outbreak, which the health and emergency response system was unable to control22. Here it could be suggested that prevention efforts promoted by securitization are the only option, given the apparent inability to contain a global outbreak after an attack has occurred. While the dangers posed by the Variola virus are not contested, skeptics argue that it is too difficult to acquire to be a real danger10. However, there is significant concern over unaccounted Soviet Union smallpox samples, and a 1999 U.S. report pointed to evidence that secret stockpiles of the virus are held by North Korea, Russia, and Iraq1,25. It has also been suggested that the terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo holds quantities of the Variola virus22.

**Threat** and risk assessments should not rely solely on the **worst-case scenarios** of biological weapons attacks, especially since practical challenges still limit terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks that will have the greatest possible effect. However, it is **equally crucial** to be aware of the wide **range** of **consequences** of such an **attack**. This section has argued that there could be **serious ramifications** on several dimensions, ramifications which **justify** the **framing** of **biological weapons** as an **existential threat** to the United States and warrant investment in an appropriate response capacity. Securitization, therefore, played an important role encouraging policy responses that were justified and appropriate.

**The threat is real and securitization is necessary.**

**Saunders-Hastings 14** - epidemiologist and risk scientist with expertise in global health, infectious disease epidemiology and emergency preparedness. B.Sc. in Biology from Queen’s University, a M.Sc. in Global Health from the Brighton and Sussex Medical School and a Ph.D. in Population Health from the University of Ottawa.

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4. Preparedness for an Attack

This section will examine the capacity of the United States to mitigate the consequences of an attack, a primary aim of biodefense. For government action to be justified, the response must be **appropriate** to the given **threat level**. The argument will be that this is the case with biodefense programs, which must seek to address key weaknesses in the preparedness system.

There is a general consensus that the **U**nited **S**tates has insufficient **capabilities** to respond **effectively** to a **biological** weapons **attack3**. Three primary components of preparedness will be addressed: the ability to detect an attack, the preparedness of the health care and emergency response system to respond, and the medical countermeasures that currently exist. It will be shown that there are important deficiencies in all three of these areas, further suggesting that programs aimed at developing a more appropriate response capacity are not overestimating the threat but are both justified and necessary.

Biological weapons are a unique class from conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons because their effects may not be felt immediately26. It could take days before it becomes apparent that an attack has taken place; this is problematic as immediate treatment may be crucial to survival27. Oral antibiotics for inhalational anthrax, for example, should be administered within 48 hours of exposure, which leaves little time for detection and delivery1. Any delay in detection could result in a large number of casualties.

Additionally, if the weapon agent is contagious, failure to detect and respond the attack may result in a greater spread of the infection. For this reason, adequate detection capabilities are essential to bioterrorism preparedness.

Unfortunately, while funding for biodefense has led to **improvements**, such as biosurveillance systems that seek information on disease outbreaks, there are still **weaknesses** in the system15. The systems are still quite **rudimentary**, relying on a time-consuming process of clinician reporting, laboratory diagnostics, and the phoning, mailing, or faxing of reports15. To improve, biosurveillance must be modernized. We need more effective electronic reporting, quick, cheap, and reliable diagnostic tests, and the integration of public health surveillance data with that from other sectors such as law and intelligence agencies26. Currently, however, detection systems are not able to detect biological agents at relatively low concentrations, or to detect multiple biological agents with a single system, and they are not sufficiently portable and user-friendly26. Detection ability is further compromised by poor diagnostic capabilities in hospitals. One U.S. study found that 91.2% of U.S. hospitals surveyed lacked the necessary diagnostic technology to analyze and identify biological agents28.

Hospitals have been targeted as the weakest link in the preparedness chain, in particular due to their inability to accommodate a sudden influx of mass casualties29. It has been found that 60% of hospitals lack such resources as the supplies, equipment, beds, and staff to respond to a mass casualty situation28. Consequently, hospitals lack the surge capacity to attend to patients; this could be disastrous in terms of victims not receiving life-saving treatment, the failure to quarantine infectious individuals, and the possibility of social disorder as a result of public frustration. The problem is that hospitals need far greater resources to respond to a bioterrorist attack than they do for everyday functioning30. Practice scenarios have demonstrated this resource shortage problem on more than one occasion. A simulated attack on a U.S. city that involved the pneumonic plague resulted in antibiotic shortages after just three days; the situation worsened until, at the end of the weeklong simulation, 3700 cases of plague had been identified and 2000 “deaths” had been reported31.

Also of concern is the overall inadequacy of medical countermeasures for biological weapons, identified as one of the areas in greatest need of attention15. Of the twelve biological agents identified as posing the highest threat to the United States, only anthrax, smallpox, and botulism receive substantial funding for medical countermeasure development and acquisition15. One reason for this is that pharmaceutical companies are not as motivated to fund research and development addressing biological weapons since there is not as great a commercial market as there is for chronic diseases and influenza15. Even such practices as decontamination require funding and improvement. The decontamination procedures for B. anthracis, previously used in the 2001 anthrax attacks, while effective, were also slow and expensive, and could not be replicated in a situation with mass casualties15.

In the discussion above, it was argued that **high government funding** is not **overestimated** but is **appropriate** and **justified** to implement biodefense initiatives required to **improve** response **capacity**. This was done by demonstrating that the United States is **ill-equipped** to deal with a **significant** biological weapons **attack**, and that this **lack** of **preparedness** risks further **exacerbating** the already potentially **catastrophic consequences** of a biological weapons attack. Securitization was useful in helping justify prioritizing funding to address this issue.

5. Probability of an Attack

The potentially disastrous consequences of an attack and the lack of preparedness for such an event have been demonstrated, but perhaps none of that would matter (or justify prioritizing biodefense) if the probability of an **attack** by states or terrorists **was negligible**, due to an absence of capacity or will to carry out a biological weapons attack on the United States. This section will consider the likelihood of a biological weapons attack in the United States by states or terrorist groups. This issue is hotly contested, with some groups arguing that the chances of an attack are much lower than popular fears and perceptions would suggest, while others, like CIA Director Gross, believe it is “only a matter of time”, and predict another biological weapons attack on the United States before 202028,32. As noted earlier, this essay’s focus is not on whether media rhetoric is inflated or public perceptions unrealistic. Rather, it will be argued that the increasing availability of biological weapons and the documented intent of various hostile groups to acquire such weapons make an attack more likely. This is where we see the relevance of the precautionary principle, as an uncertainty surrounding the probability of an attack encourages us to adopt the principle, promoting caution where funding is allocated in light of the dire consequences that may arise were an attack to occur.

Officially ratified in 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention addressed concerns relating to the increasing biological weapons threat1. While commendable, the convention had important flaws including an absence of any formal verification of compliance by states. For instance, after signing the declaration, the Soviet Union continued to develop their biological weapons program (unbeknownst to the global community)33. Soviet defectors later confirmed the scale of their program, describing a massive, covert operation34. Other countries have also been alleged to have biological weapons programs, including Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria33,35. While Iraq has since claimed that its biological weapons were all destroyed, this has been impossible to verify2. Additionally, with the recent emergence of biotechnology industries in low and middle-income countries, most notably Brazil and India, more states are gaining advanced scientific capacity that could potentially be applied to biological weapons development and production3. The key here is that many states now have the scientific and technological capacity to develop biological weapons, but there is a limited capacity for national states or international organizations to monitor such a process36.

In the BWC definition of biological weapons, the primary focus is on intent—both in terms of the purpose of the microbial agent and the delivery system1. Intent is the determining factor in the classification of biological weapons, but this is extremely difficult to measure or prove until after an act has been committed. In the biological sciences, much research is readily applicable to justifiable ends (vaccines), as well as hostile ones (biological weapons). The United States will often accuse other states of hostile intent based solely on the presence of pharmaceutical and biotechnological expertise necessary for biological weapons development35. This can be viewed as an area of overreaction to the bioweapons threat, illustrating how securitization processes seem to legitimize some bad policy responses as well as good ones. Despite the fact that most states could use this expertise to develop biological weapons, the majority does not. This suggests that, while capacity is present, the intent to use biological weapons is limited. In fact, over the past century, there is only one confirmed case of a biological weapons attack by one state on another: Japan’s striking against China in the 1930s and 1940s1. It has been suggested that reasons for this may stem from fear of retaliation or the difficulties of controlling effects on civilians and combatants1. Most countries possessing biological weapons claim their purpose is to deter attacks or biological weapons use by others35.

In the past, the prospect of terrorists using biological weapons received **little attention3**. It was generally believed that terrorists would not be able to **engineer** biological **weapons** because they lacked access to the **necessary** biological **agents**, the technological **capabilities**, and the specialized knowledge to weaponize and **disseminate** a biological **weapon10**. Skeptics still believe that the advanced genetic capabilities required to produce biological weapons will not be available to terrorists in the near future3. For instance, the ability to process a biological agent into aerosol form, the most effective delivery method, requires expertise across a wide range of scientific disciplines32. Also suspect is their ability to account for environmental and meteorological conditions that may disrupt weapon dissemination10, 32.

However, a changing **global** and **scientific landscape** has led to a greater **potential** for the **acquisition** of **biological weapons** capacity by terrorist groups. For instance, during the Cold War, the Soviets reportedly employed approximately **55, 000 scientists** and technicians at 6 **biological weapons research labs** and 5 production facilities37. Among other things, smallpox was **weaponized** into ballistic **missiles** and bombs38. In 1997, the United States conducted a visit to one of these research labs to find that the facility was half empty, poorly guarded, and that most of the scientists had left39. It is, therefore, possible that the biological agents, the equipment, and the human knowledge and expertise have since fallen into the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations. Additionally, methods of biological weapons production are now **freely accessible** via the **Internet**, and the technological requirements are not beyond the means of a determined, **well-funded** terrorist **organization2**. Moreover, recent scientific advances may support biological weapons production by enabling the production of a higher yield of high-quality product36. They may also support more effective weaponization, by making agents more resistant to environmental hazards or by making agents targetable against specific biochemical pathways36. As these capabilities spread across the globe, there will be a greater potential for terrorists to harness and use these techniques. While the capabilities of terrorists to engineer biological weapons may have been overstated in the past, this can no longer be said to be the case.

It has been argued that two of the preconditions for assessing the threat of bioterrorism, vulnerability to an attack and terrorist capability, are in place; the only remaining consideration is intent40. It is important to determine whether the intent to acquire and use such weapons is present among terrorist groups. While terrorist groups have not often used biological weapons, it is unclear whether this is due to insufficient capabilities or lack of intent1. There are a variety of reasons why they may not be interested in the use of biological weapons, including viewing such weapons as illegitimate in military combat, risks of tactical failure, perceptions of high technical difficulty, and concerns about the indiscriminate nature of a biological weapons attack3. That said, various terrorist groups, including Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have a documented interest in the acquisition of biological weapons, and with advances in biotechnology and weaponization, their use may become more attractive2, 41.

Experts also point to a shift in terrorist intent: “**post-modern**” terrorism aims to inflict the highest mortality rather than make **political statements** through **violence33**. This makes **biological weapons** an **attractive option** for such groups; one estimate suggests that the cost to cause **civilian casualties** is only one dollar per square kilometer for **biological weapons**, compared to 800 and 2000 dollars per square kilometer for nuclear and conventional weapons, respectively42. In a similar vein, the recent “war on terror” has created an increasingly decentralized terrorist threat; biological weapons are particularly well-suited to this form of smaller, more informed terrorist groups28. In short, while the intent to use biological weapons has been documented in terrorist groups in the past, present circumstances may make the acquisition and use of biological weapons more attractive.

To conclude, it is difficult to either predict or prevent a bioterrorism attack, which makes any assessment of attack probability, by necessity, subject to a high degree of estimation. However, due to the potential severity of consequences of an attack, the precautionary principle justifies the government decision to allocate spending according to the severity of consequences, recognizing a situation where it is better to overestimate than to underestimate the probability of an attack. As argued by Michael Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, “The odds (of bioterrorism) are increasing…we have to walk a fine line between hyping the risk…and trying to convince people that it is a possibility for which we need to invest resources”2.

6. Biodefense Funding

The essay’s previous sections have argued that a biological weapons attack would pose an existential threat to the United States, that there is an inadequate capacity to respond to such an event, and that the possibility exists for such an attack to occur. This would suggest that a substantial amount of government funding should be allocated towards addressing this threat. The decision to securitize bioweapons facilitated this process. Critics who believe the threat has been overstated often argue that the government should not invest so heavily in biodefense, but instead, improve other sectors, such as reducing mortality from endemic disease11. Meanwhile, proponents may argue that a securitized issue should receive more funding than issues that are not framed as an existential threat4. This section will argue that the response, in terms of government spending, is justified in that it seeks to protect the public and has not exaggerated the threat of bioterrorism. This will be demonstrated by examining the degree of investment in biodefense, showing that a relatively small amount is allocated specifically to biodefense.

In 2000, the United States federal budget proposed that 10 billion USD be allocated to counterterrorism programs, an increase of 3.3 billion dollars from the previous year10. This covered all forms of terrorism, but there was a greater focus on biological terrorism than in the past, with spending on medical countermeasures and defense measures increasing fourfold from 91 million USD in 1998 to 336.6 million in 20002. These trends intensified after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “Amerithrax” scare. While estimates vary, the consensus is that, since 2001, the United States government has invested between 50 and 100 billion USD towards research and development in response to the perceived threat of a biological weapons attack43.

One calculation posited that the U.S. allocated 54.39 billion USD to civilian biodefense programs between 2001 and 201044. This did not include allocations to Bioshield, a program designed to address the lack of adequate medical countermeasures for terrorist attacks; 8.7 billion USD has been allocated since 200445. However, of civilian biodefense funding, 42.57 of the 54.39 billion USD was directed towards programs with multiple goals beyond biodefense improvement, such as basic infectious disease research, programs to improve public health planning and operations, and improving preparedness for a range of disasters44. One example is the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Hospital Preparedness Program, which seeks to improve surge capacity in healthcare facilities44. Some estimates suggest that up to 92% of biodefense funding has been directed to programs that serve secondary purposes, such as improving preparedness for disease pandemics and natural disasters15.

One could argue that the amounts dedicated to biodefense as a percentage of entire budgets are not very substantial given the existential threat posed by an attack. The DHHS, the largest recipient of federal biodefense funding, has a budget of 879 billion USD, of which biodefense made up only 0.5%44. Similarly, biodefense makes up less than 1% of the Department of Homeland Security budget, and only 0.10% of the Department of Defense Budget44. Accordingly, it could be argued that the bioweapons threat does not, in fact, take as high a priority in terms of government funding as one might expect, given the associated security risk. Additionally, almost all of the increases in investments have arisen from new funding; other sectors are not suffering at the expense of biodefense prioritization12.

High funding is appropriate independent of any controversy relating to estimates of attack probability, as the precautionary principle would suggest that decisive action is warranted given the potential for dire consequences, even with a low probability of the event occurring. These figures show that the funding response is not an overreaction but has been justified and appropriate given the documented threat of biological weapons, targeting programs that are likely to protect the public.

7. Conclusion

The anthrax attacks of 2001 are a case where biological weapons were used against the United States in the absence of any direct provocation. Since then, though the issue is controversial, biological weapons have been considered an important threat to U.S. security. This essay has defended the **securitization** of the **biological weapons threat** as a means to an end. It is a process to engage in where it is necessary to get **approval** for **policies** that are, in themselves, **necessary** and **justified**. By analyzing the **existential threat** posed by **bioweapons**, the lack of **preparedness** by the United States for such an event, and the possibility of an attack, evidence presented in this essay suggests that **these policies** and the overall government response **were appropriate**. Taking these issues into account, the essay concluded that the threat of bioterrorism has not been overestimated; it warrants securitization and the resulting response measures. Moving forward now, government must recognize and respond to the reality of an increasing bioterrorism threat.

### 1AR---Securitization Good---Disease

#### **Securitization is key to stop disease spread**

Wishnick 10 - Dilemmas of securitization and health risk management in the People's Republic of China: the cases of SARS and avian influenza

Elizabeth Wishnick, “Dilemmas of securitization and health risk management in the People's Republic of China: the cases of SARS and avian influenza”, Health Policy and Planning Vol. 25, No. 6, Special theme: Unhealthy Governance: Security Challenges and Policy Prospects, pp. 454-466 (13 pages), November, 2010, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45090677>

SARS first appeared in Guangdong province in southern China in November 2002, then spread to 28 countries, infecting 8096 people and resulting in 774 deaths, according to data from the World Health Organization (WHO). This case study raises interesting questions about securitizing actors.

Benefits of securitization include a mobilization of financial and public health resources, ending practices than may spread disease (eating sick poultry etc.), promoting public awareness, improving China's international image and preventing panic and social instability. Although concern with China's international image often is seen as the driving force behind China's more vigorous response to avian influenza, compared with SARS, Chinese scholars tend to emphasize that China's leaders primarily were motivated by domestic concerns in their efforts to improve governmental responses to epidemic.

### 2AC---Biothreats Real

#### Biological weapons have been used for decades and are a real threat

Bellamy and Freedman 01 - Department of Infectious Diseases, University Hospital of Wales

R.J Bellamy and A.R. Freedman, “Bioterrorism,” QJM: An International Journal of Medicine, Volume 94, Issue 4, April 2001, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qjmed/94.4.227>

Although often perceived as a recent invention, biological weapons have been used for hundreds of years. During the siege of Kaffa (now Feodossia, Ukraine) in 1346, the Tatars catapulted the dead bodies of plague victims into the city, causing an epidemic among the inhabitants. The subsequent migration of refugees from the defeated city may have caused the second European plague pandemic.3 In the 18th century, Sir Jeffrey Amhurst deliberately caused a smallpox epidemic among hostile Native American tribes by giving them contaminated hospital blankets. The effect on the Indian population was devastating.4

Recent use of biological agents to cause deliberate harm has only rarely been described in the medical literature, with approximately one report per decade. During the 1960s, several outbreaks of typhoid and dysentery in Japanese hospitals were caused by intentional food poisoning by a bacteriologist.5 In 1970, four Canadian students developed asthma, eosinophilia and pulmonary infiltrates after consuming food deliberately infected with Ascaris suum ova.6 During a single month in 1985 in Dalles, Oregon, 751 people developed salmonella gastroenteritis after contamination of salad bars by the Rajneeshee religious cult.7 Most recently in 1996, 12 laboratory staff developed dysentery after intentional contamination of muffins by a colleague.8 Although these amateurish attempts seem relatively minor, many experts regard bioterrorism as capable of causing death and incapacitation to tens of thousands of people.

The former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported that **a small aeroplane carrying 100 kg of anthrax spores could use a crop‐sprayer to deliver a fatal dose to 3 million people.**9 A report by the World Health Organization estimated that if an aeroplane released 50 kg of anthrax over a 2 km line, upwind of a population of 500 000 people, 95 000 people could be killed and 125 000 incapacitated.10 Other agents could also cause significant morbidity and mortality (Table 1). The bioterrorist was prominent among an increasingly alarmist cast of menacing characters in the post9/11 national imaginary. A series of hoaxes alleging the use of anthrax in several US states between October and December 1998 produced emergency reactions from local and state health departments, CDC and the FBI. Businesses were temporarily closed, and many people were decontaminated and given antibiotic prophylaxis before the use of anthrax was excluded.1

### 2AC---Biothreats Real---Smallpox

#### Smallpox constitutes a large and real biothreat

Bellamy and Freedman 01 - Department of Infectious Diseases, University Hospital of Wales

R.J Bellamy and A.R. Freedman, “Bioterrorism,” QJM: An International Journal of Medicine, Volume 94, Issue 4, April 2001, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qjmed/94.4.227>

Smallpox is potentially the most dangerous bioterrorist weapon because of its infectivity in aerosol form, case fatality of 30% and high patient‐to‐patient transmission rate. The world's population has become increasingly susceptible to smallpox because of the discontinuation of vaccination, and probably only 20% of the population are now protected.15 Clinical features include malaise, fever, rigors, vomiting, headache, backache, delirium and an erythematous rash. Over the following week, the patient develops mucous membrane lesions, which shed virus particles, and a rash which progresses from macules to papules to pustular vesicles. In contrast to varicella, the skin lesions are all present at the same stage of development. Patients are regarded as infectious until all of the scabs separate.22 Many exposed patients may shed virus from the oropharynx without developing the disease and cause further virus transmission.23

A high degree of awareness is required to diagnose smallpox, because it can easily be confused with varicella, erythema multiforme or allergic dermatitis. Pharyngeal swabs and skin scrapings are required for virus isolation, ELISA and PCR. Samples from any suspected patient must be processed in a biosafety category 4 facility. Clinicians should not be complacent that this disease is extinct, because recognition of a single confirmed case would be an international emergency, and prompt diagnosis and appropriate precautions could save many lives. Strict quarantine, including respiratory isolation, is required for anyone in contact with the patient, as infection can occur even if the patient is 10 m away.19

There is no known treatment for smallpox, although cidofovir is effective in vitro and could be used.21 Smallpox vaccine would need to be given to all potentially exposed individuals. The US has only 5–7 million doses of smallpox vaccine stored and there is currently no facility to produce further vaccine. Therefore, if a terrorist group began a concerted campaign of releasing smallpox virus, it would not be possible to protect the population.

### 2AC---Biothreats Real---Anthrax

#### Anthrax threats are real

Bellamy and Freedman 01 - Department of Infectious Diseases, University Hospital of Wales

R.J Bellamy and A.R. Freedman, “Bioterrorism,” QJM: An International Journal of Medicine, Volume 94, Issue 4, April 2001, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qjmed/94.4.227>

During the Gulf War, the US stockpiled 30 million doses of ciprofloxacin in the zone of operations to protect troops in case of an anthrax attack.4 Iraq produced enormous quantities of anthrax, and it is possible that some of this is now in the possession of terrorist groups. Aerosolized anthrax spores would cause the inhalational form of disease (traditionally known as woolsorters' disease). After a 1–5 day incubation period, the patient develops a prodromal illness characterized by fever, malaise, nonproductive cough and chest discomfort. A 2–3 day asymptomatic period may then occur, or the patient may progress directly to fulminant disease with severe dyspnoea, stridor, cyanosis, septic shock, meningitis and death. Once symptoms occur, inhalational anthrax is usually fatal despite antibiotic treatment.

Diagnosis is made by blood culture and ELISA. The patient does not require isolation as person‐to‐person transmission does not occur. Treatment with intravenous ciprofloxacin and supportive therapy are required. Anyone exposed to an anthrax attack requires prophylaxis with a 4‐week course of oral ciprofloxacin or doxycycline.21 The US military has stocks of an anthrax vaccine, although there are insufficient data in humans regarding the protective efficacy of the vaccine following inhalational exposure.21

Deliberate aerosolized release of anthrax would cause major problems for medical services. The exact location of release may be uncertain, due to the disease incubation period, and identifying those who have potentially been exposed may prove impossible. It is possible to develop sudden onset of illness up to 8 weeks after exposure. Therefore anyone developing non‐specific influenza‐like symptoms could be suffering from the prodromal illness. An appropriate public health warning would need to be issued and hospitals and general practitioners might then be swamped by an understandably panic‐stricken public.

### 2AC---De-Securitization Worse

#### **Even if securitization is bad, desecuritization is worse---allowing threats to become reality causes more securitization and turns the K**

Wishnick 10 - Dilemmas of securitization and health risk management in the People's Republic of China: the cases of SARS and avian influenza

Elizabeth Wishnick, “Dilemmas of securitization and health risk management in the People's Republic of China: the cases of SARS and avian influenza”, Health Policy and Planning Vol. 25, No. 6, Special theme: Unhealthy Governance: Security Challenges and Policy Prospects, pp. 454-466 (13 pages), November, 2010, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45090677>

SARS first appeared in Guangdong province in southern China in November 2002, then spread to 28 countries, infecting 8096 people and resulting in 774 deaths, according to data from the World Health Organization (WHO). This case study raises interesting questions about securitizing actors. Although SARS originated in China and disproportionately afflicted Chinese citizens (5327 infected and 349 dead), Chinese authorities were not the first to securitize the disease; rather this role fell to WHO and a retired Chinese military doctor who posted his concerns on the web. In fact Chinese leaders initially sought to desecuritize SARS. Despite the tendency of the Copenhagen School to treat desecuritization as a desirable outcome, indicating the end of extreme measures and their resulting negative impacts on social freedoms, in the case of SARS, desecuritization actually led to further restrictions on freedom of expression. The first incidence of SARS (initially called atypical pneumonia) was reported in Guangdong province in mid-November 2002, but Chinese provincial officials withheld information about the disease from the general public for another 3 months. On 11 February 2003, the Guangdong government finally made a statement about the disease, the same day that the official Communist Party newspaper, People's Daily, announced on its website that the province had succeeded in controlling the outbreak, though five deaths were reported (Congressional- Executive Commission on China 2003: 2; Huang 2003: 10). SARS then spread to Hong Kong later in February 2003, after a visiting doctor from Guangdong developed symptoms, and then continued to spread globally. Although the territory would go on to play a key role in publicizing and countering the disease, the story of SARS in Hong Kong is not included in this case study, as the securitization dynamics played out quite differently there than on the mainland, due to the more open social and political environment in the Special Administrative Region (on SARS in Hong Kong, see Loh 2004; Abraham 2005). The timing of the new disease was especially unfortunate for the Chinese leadership; coinciding with a period of leadership change, spanning from the 16th Communist Party Congress in November 2002 to the National People's Congress in March 2003. The Chinese Ministry of Health reportedly sent a team to Guangdong to investigate in late January, but the results were classified 'top secret' and no nation-wide health advisory was issued until 3 April (Huang 2003: 9-10). The Chinese government also refused to cooperate with WHO until April 2003. Desecuritization in this instance turned out to be far from optimal, resulting in the spread of the disease throughout China and globally, as well as in the restriction of information on public health inside and outside the country. Securitization The Copenhagen School assumes that securitizing actors are collectivities, or at least their designated representatives who enjoy a position of authority. Because a successful securitization involves convincing an audience of the urgency of a particular threat, most Copenhagen School scholars tend to discount the likelihood of individuals accomplishing a securitizing move (Buzan 1997: 19; Buzan et al. 1997: 33, 40-41; Huysmans 1998: 493; Hansen 2000: 289), though others emphasize that what really matters is the speaker's social capital (Vuori 2008: 77), positional power (Stritzel 2007: 364) or relationship to the audience (Balzacq 2005: 272). The SARS case raises new questions about securitizing actors and the role of the audience. Although in the case of SARS the initial securitizing move came from an international organization - the WHO, which issued a global health alert on 12 March 2003, followed by an emergency travel advisory on 15 458 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING (Caballero- Anthony 2005: 479) - it was a lone whistleblower who began the securitization process inside China.

### 1AR---De-Securitization Worse

#### In order to counter over securitization, many turn to de-securitization, but that is not the best option. Securitization can be good, as long as checks and balances are set in advance and can be enforced

Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 14 - Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Germany & WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany

Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, “WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 331-348 (18 pages), August, 2014, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26291745>

Given the spectre of exceptionalism that comes with security, research in the tradition of the Copenhagen School has focused mostly on averting securitizations that facilitate emergency measures (see Roe, 2008; Wæver, 2000: 253–254). It has been claimed that a securitizing move that shifts an issue from normal politics into the realm of the exception needs to be countered by an explicit desecuritizing move that shifts the issue back to the normal by discursively undermining the threat construction (Hansen, 2012: 542–545; Huysmans, 1995: 65–67; 1998; Roe, 2004: 285–287).8 Such a conception of securitization and desecuritization presents several ways back to normal politics. However, it also reproduces the categorical belief that there are only two possible political forms: ‘non-security’ (associated with normal politics) and ‘security’ (associated with the logic of war) (see Figure 1). This perspective is conceptually constraining because non-security is not always an option: on one hand, desecuritizing moves may simply not be successful because desecuritizers lack discursive authority or because their discursive strategies do not resonate with the relevant audiences (see Buzan et al., 1998: 26). On the other hand, non-security may be undesirable owing to the negative side-effects that desecuritization can produce – for example, by undermining legitimate claims to protect vulnerable groups (Roe, 2004). Without an alternative to desecuritization, this would mean letting the logic of war unfold.

The alternative we propose here is based on the assumption that there is little reason to accept that speaking about security concerns necessarily leads to the use of full emergency measures. Paul Roe (2004: 292–293) has argued convincingly that securitized issues can be managed. While the language of security remains present, its effects can be mitigated (see also Tjalve, 2011). As the debate on the state of exception among legal theorists shows, there are different ways of constitutionally dealing with emergencies that foresee particularly the taming of sovereign power through constitutional containment (see Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004; Gross, 2003; Scheuermann, 2006). For example, what has been termed the ‘accommodation model’ of exceptionalism is based on the understanding that it would be unrealistic to think that the existing constitutional order could remain completely untouched during times of crisis. Nevertheless, the basic pillars of the constitution need to be protected and the legal order should therefore have mechanisms ready to keep an emergency within these constitutional confines (Ackermann, 2004; Gross, 2003: 1043–1044; Tushnet, 2005). Thus, from a legal theory perspective, one important alternative and complement to desecuritization is constitutional accommodation (see Figure 1). It is an alternative in sofar as it mitigates the effects of securitizations that cannot be avoided. However, it is also complementary to discursive desecuritization because it counteracts the tendencies of the emergency trap outlined earlier – in other words, it removes or mitigates a precondition for further securitizations (see also White, 2013: 14–15 for the inverse approach).

Such confines can be both ex ante and ex post constitutional checks on discretionary powers. Ex ante, both the initiation and the scope of emergency measures can be constrained. Regarding the initiation of emergency rule, Schmittian decisionism – according to which the sovereign themself determines the exception – can be countered by functionally separating the decision on the presence or absence of an emergency and the decision on the means to overcome it. This is seen as a fundamental precondition for keeping emergency rule ‘constitutional’ (Rossiter, 1948: 299–300). At the IO level, this could mean that a member-state body or other subcommittee is entitled to formally invoke the state of exception and that only then can an IO organ decide on emergency measures. The range of available emergency measures can be circumscribed so that the sovereign’s discretion does not trespass on elementary rules and rights even in the state of emergency.

In addition, IO emergency powers can be contained ex post with the help of accountability mechanisms. As scholars in the literature on emerging global administrative law argue, basic principles of domestic administrative law – and thereby mechanisms of political and judicial review – can and should be instituted within the international legal system to increase IO accountability (see Kingsbury et al., 2005).9 Accountability can take the form of political review, whereby an interstate assembly or executive board watches over IO emergency powers. Legal review, in turn, can be achieved by either a legal counsel or an internal review panel to assess the lawfulness of the actions of IOs. In addition, inter-institutional processes of steering and control can contribute to the review of an IO’s deployment of emergency competencies (Kingsbury and Casini, 2009: 337). An important side-effect of accountability mechanisms is that they enhance the transparency and public scrutiny of IO activities. This may also prove to be positive feedback for desecuritization efforts by opening the possibility of discursively contesting the securitizing moves of IOs.

**2AC/1AR---AT: Militarization !**

**Disease securitization doesn’t cause a militarized response.**

**Watterson and Kamradt-Scott 16** Christopher Watterson, Institute for Public Policy and Governance at the University of Technology Sydney; Adam Kamradt-Scott, PhD from Aberystwyth University;professor at the University of Sydney

Christopher Watterson, Adam Kamradt-Scott “Fighting Flu: Securitization and the Military Role in Combating Influenza”, Armed Forces & Society 2016, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0095327X14567364

The **De-escalation** of **Military Efforts** in Combating Flu

From the earlier discussion, it is clear there is an established pedigree of military interest and involvement in combating influenza driven primarily by concerns regarding the disease’s impact on troop readiness and the perception that pandemic influenza was contemporaneous with conflict. The post–World War II era, however, witnessed a progressive reduction in **militaries’ role** in combating the **disease**, manifest in the **decommissioning** of military-led **influenza programs** and a reduced role in policy. We contend that there were three main axes that underlay this effective deescalation of military influenza efforts.

The first of these was the rise of the **international institutions** of public health in the postwar period leading to the mandate of **combating pandemic** influenza shift from a military to **civilian focus**. Primary among these was the creation of the World Health Organization (**WHO**) that was established in 1948 as the United Nations’ specialized agency for public **health**, and which took an active role in coordinating the international response to influenza. In 1952, the WHO established the global influenza surveillance network (GISN) that was charged primarily with identifying strains of influenza in common circulation, thus allowing the WHO to provide technical support to member states in managing influenza outbreaks. This network **replaced** what was in some states the traditional mandate of the **military establishment**, such as the Walter Reed influenza surveillance system, which until the late 1950s played a key role in pandemic detection and policy in the United States (and Downloaded from afs.sagepub.com at TUFTS UNIV on December 8, 2015 was also responsible for rapidly isolating the 1957 Asian flu strain and issuing initial warnings of a pandemic).83 When the ‘‘Asian flu’’ pandemic emerged in 1957, the GISN played a leading role in managing the global response, utilizing its international networks to collate and analyze statistical data to identify trends and effective public health measures.84 In 1959, under an edict from the expert committee on respiratory viruses, the WHO encouraged outposts of the GISN into closer engagement with national public health authorities of their host member states, officially recommending:

that the laboratory network originally organized under the programme should be brought into closer relationship with national public health authorities. This is necessary for two reasons—first, in order that the influenza centre of the country may be alerted to, and may organize the investigation of, outbreaks in distant parts of the country, of which it might otherwise not learn in time, and secondly so that the centre may keep the health authorities informed of the appearance of unusual viruses or epidemics elsewhere in the world and of the appropriate technical measures which should be taken.85

This move encouraged member states’ **ministries of health**, rather than **militaries**, to take greater carriage of **national influenza programs** through their partnership with the WHO.

For the United States, the embedding of influenza research in the **civilian sector** was also driven by the implementation of the **Vannevar Bush plan**, a conspectus that outlays the American postwar agenda for scientific **research**. In it, Bush proposed limiting military-based research to that involving the ‘‘improvement of **existing weapons’’** only, officially recommending that:

Some research on military problems should be conducted, in time of peace as well as in war, by civilians independently of the military establishment. It is the primary responsibility of the Army and Navy to train the men, make available the weapons, and employ the strategy that will bring victory in combat. The Armed Services cannot be expected to be experts in all of the complicated fields which make it possible for a great nation to fight successfully in total war... the job of long-range research involving application of the newest scientific discoveries to military needs should be the responsibility of those civilian scientists in the universities and in industry who are best trained to discharge it thoroughly and successfully.86

The second factor contributing to the de-escalation of military influenza work was the **absence** of a **second catastrophic pandemic** that effectively undermined perceptions of the **strategic threat** of the malady compared with the antecedent **Spanish flu**. The **normalization** of influenza **vaccines** at the close of World War II found fast utility in responding to **emergent pandemics**. Armed with new vaccine technology, nations such as the United States and Britain responded to the 1957 Asian Flu pandemic with large-scale programs to **vaccinate** their **citizens**.87 For the United States, the efficacious use of vaccines coupled with the low morbidity of the influenza strain meant that the impact on national interests was only marginal.88 Henderson et al. noted little discernible impact on industry or on the economy at large.89 Fred Davenport, then director of the AFEB Commission on Influenza, also observed during the peak pandemic period that, ‘‘there had been no disruption of essential activities in either civilian or military communities.’’90 In a 1959 report from the WHO, it was subsequently noted that ‘‘experience in many countries has now established vaccination as the most efficient method for the prevention of influenza,’’ offering governments a powerful tool for combating the disease.91 This experience was then replicated in the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak where medical interventions and an influenza strain of low morbidity resulted in a pandemic of relatively low severity.92 The optimism that accompanied the perceived diminishing threat of pandemic influenza was reflected in a statement by US Surgeon General in 1970 that that ‘‘the war against pestilence [is] won.’’93 It was also manifest in a decision by the US Army in 1971 to abolish the AFEB Commission on Influenza, in part because ‘‘the growing effectiveness of the prevention of disease [has] materially lessened the requirement for AFEB assistance in both field investigations and the organization of contract research.’’94

**Cyber**

**2AC---FW**

**Research in academic spaces can generate policy-relevant information necessary to navigate cyberspace. A focus on state-policy can be combined with critical approaches BUT abandoning statism makes relevant research impossible.**

**Cavelty and Wegner 20** - Cavelty is a senior lecturer for security studies and deputy for research and teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich; Ph.D. from the University of Zurich; Visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University) in 2007 and fellow at the stiftung neue verantwortung in Berlin, Germany 2010–2011. Wenger is professor of International and Swiss Security Policy at ETH Zurich; Ph.D. from the University of Zurich; visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

A second approach focuses on why cyber norms emerge only slowly, building on the existing IR norms literature (Finnemore & Hollis, 2016). Early works in this area focused on the debate among states, especially at the United Nations, followed by a growing number of proposal from the private and the civil sector (Hurwitz, 2014). However, cyber norms remain contested at the international level (Grisby, 2017). More recently, the interest of researchers shifted to the role of the creators (mostly private entities) and exploiters (sub-, semi-, and non-state actors) of digital technologies in shaping the behavioral standards that new regulation needs to take into account (Hurel & Lobato, 2018). **States** need to know how their **intelligence services** work in cyberspace, because through their **tools** and **practices** they set practical norms of acceptable (**cyber) espionage** with far-reaching effects on **state behavior** in **cyberspace** (Georgieva, 2019). The focus on the role of **intelligence** agencies in cyber conflict–as both the biggest threat and the most **capable provider** of **safety**–opens up interesting questions linked to the **larger transformation** of these agencies in the context of the **digitization of society**. Some authors argue that cyber conflict is primarily an **intelligence game**, because setting up cyber exploitation is much more expensive than countering released exploitation, which increases the incentive to keep the target at risk (Lindsay, 2017).

A third approach explores the broader repercussion of cyber conflict dynamics for government and governance. The concept of networked governance seems especially apt at capturing the essence of cyberspace as co-constituted by technical devices and networks and socio-political institutions (Hofmann, 2016). The key governance challenge in cyberspace is fragmentation of authority and accountability. A case in point is the lack in public transparency and trusted knowledge about the perpetrators behind most cyber incidents. Although the number of public attributions of cyber incidents by states and threat intelligence firms has been on the rise, both types of actors have political and economic reasons not to fully disclose their evidence (Egloff, 2019). As a consequence, attribution claims remain contested in the public domain, undermining the legitimacy of state action–from insurance matters and criminal proceedings to mechanism of international cooperation and potentially escalation control.

Cluster 3: Securitization, practice, and assemblages

Looking back at the beginnings of the cyber threat story, the policy debate was riddled with cyber-doom scenarios and constant attempts to mobilize in the political process. As a reaction to what was considered a “hype,” some scholars started to get interested in why and how this issue was presented the way it was and with what consequences. Early work to analyze the issues surrounding the politics of Internet from IR and critical security studies perspectives emerged at the end of the 1990s (Deibert, 2002; Eriksson, 2001; Saco, 1999). A bit later, there was a concentrated effort to apply variations of securitization theory to the issue of cyber security politics (cf. Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2013). Securitization signifies the representation of a fact, a person, or a development as a danger for the military, political, economic, ecological, and/or social security of a political collective and the acceptance of this representation by the respective political addressee (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). The successful securitization of a topic justifies the use of all available means to counter it–including those outside the normal political rules of the game.

Following the theory, the prime questions this literature engaged with were related to the object of security, to what or whom was considered the main threat, and to what policy responses flowed from these threat constructions (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Given its theoretical underpinnings, the Copenhagen School focuses mainly on official statements by heads of state, high-ranking officials or heads of international institutions (Hansen, 2006, p. 64). What a focus on elite speech acts ignores, however, is how these discursive practices are facilitated or prepared by practices of actors that are not so easily visible. The social competition for the definition of reality is not only held in the open political arena. There are always state and nonstate actors “under the radar”–that is, specialized bureaucratic units, consultants or other experts–which have the capacity to establish “the truth” about certain threats, thus pre-structuring the discursive field in relevant ways (Huysmans, 2006, p. 72).

Cyber security, so the common assumption, arises from the interaction of technologies, processes, and everyday practices. Thus, the literature pays particular attention to how a variety of actors uses different representations of danger to create or change different political, private, social, and commercial understandings of security in selected public spheres. In addition, it gives more weight to material aspects of the issue in the tradition of STS (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016; Collier, 2018; Shires, 2018; Stevens, 2016), looking at the co-constitution of technology and politics. In particular, it recognizes that the political reading of cyber security cannot be divorced from particular knowledge practices in different communities.

As the most recent research focus to emerge, literature in this cluster covers a variety of topics, united by a focus on understanding how cyber security emerges as an assemblage of people, objects, and enacted ideas. Questions of authority and power are most directly addressed by research in this cluster. C. Stevens (2019) sets out to better understand the role of cyber security companies by looking at Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet and the publication of their reports in the public. Tanczer (2019) focuses on the increasingly blurred boundaries between field of security professionals and hackers, pointing to changes in the larger context of security and insecurity that are reflected in the practices of these technical experts and in the conception of them. Shires (2019) looks at how the cyber security industry portrays cyberspace as a terrain of persistent threat, systemic vulnerability, and intelligence ambiguity, a classic “noir” narrative that results from systemic economic deficiencies (distorted incentives for protection) and from systemic political deficiencies (black markets for new exploits). By focusing on non-traditional actors and aspects of politics, this type of research is able to make invisible aspects of cyber security visible.

Conclusion: Where is **cyber security** politics research headed?

Over the past decade, **research** in **cyber security** politics has seen the emergence of a **growing** interdisciplinary **body** of work that is at the same time **theoretically informed**, grounded in **empirical observations**, and **policy-relevant** in many of its insights. We have ended our **intellectual history** by outlining three research clusters. In place of a summary of the past and present evolution of cyber security as a security political issue, we want to look into a possible future of research on cyber security politics in this concluding section. We do this based on the same assumption discussed at the beginning of this article: that the trajectory of both cyber security research and cyber security policy will continue to be shaped by the interplay between technology, politics, and science. The direction in which research and policy will move will be co-constituted by technological possibilities, political choices, and scientific practices. We end our intellectual history with a brief outlook on likely developments in all three areas.

Digital technologies have politics, and technological possibilities and developments will require new governance mechanisms, while at the same time being shaped by politics. First, the interconnectedness between ever more complex socio-technical systems is bound to increase. Cyber security will grow in importance as a topic as countries all around the world strive to shape digital transformation processes that affect society, economy, and the state alike. In the context of what has been called fourth industrial revolution, the complexity of socio-technical systems will increase due the ubiquitous digitalization and automation of technical processes that support a great variety of socio-political institutions. As these technical system become tighter coupled and integrate more aspects of society and economy, cyber security concerns will inevitably expand to more policy fields at both the national and international level. These developments will create new demands for technical and organizational research that needs to be better integrated with approaches from the social and political science.

Second, cyberspace will become increasingly dependent on space-based technologies and interlinked with newly emerging technologies in the fields of quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This will increase the size of cyberspace. More importantly, as an enabling technology with diverse applications in all areas of life, AI will link cyberspace to more policy fields. AI will become an essential element of cyber security and will have a profound impact on the speed, scale, duration, autonomy, and complexity of cyber operations, for both offense and defense. These new technologies will be primarily developed by global technology firms and the private sector. As a consequence, state actors will likely become more dependent on technology firms and independent technology experts, further transforming the relationship between public and private actors. The fact that there is considerable **uncertainty** regarding the tempo and scope of these technological developments creates new demands for **research** that maps, assesses, models, and **forecasts** new **technological possibilities**. As social scientists, we need to understand the increasingly salient **political** and social **aspects** that will affect the patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** in politics and society at the national and international level.

**Political choices** at the **national** and international **level** have a **technological dimension**. Politics will **influence** and **govern technology** development while at the same time being **pre-structured** by **technology**. First, we can expect that **political** and military **actors** will attempt to better understand the (limited) **strategic utility** of cyber operations below the level of **armed conflict**, in order to find the right balance between **restraint** and **exploitation**. One key challenge in this context is ho**w best** to **manage** the **transformation** of state intelligence services in the digital age and their **growing dependence** on private intelligence firms. Another key challenge is linked to information operations and propaganda that might be spread more targeted and effectively via AI technologies and social media platforms. These political developments raise important research questions that require interdisciplinary answers.

Second, public actors will uphold their efforts to control the risk of escalation trough international cooperation. States cannot secure cyberspace on their own, without taking into account **market** and **social forces**; yet no **stable cyber governance** framework will emerge without greater **convergence** on **responsible behavior** among **great powers**. As long as great powers **disagree** about what represents responsible use of **cyber operations** in **state interactions**, and for that matter what forms of espionage and interference in the political process of other states through cyberspace are acceptable, **little** top-down **progress** will materialize. **Bottom-up progress**, on the other hand, presupposes that the actors become **more visible** for each other in order to **successfully work together** in a multi-stakeholder framework. **Research** can shed light on **invisible actors** and **analyze** the interaction between market **dynamics** and **political dynamics** in stabilizing cyberspace, it can evaluate if the socio-technical institutions that secure cyberspace reflect the tools and practices of public and private actors.

Third, the key governance challenge at the domestic political level is how to overcome fragmentation of authority and accountability. Tighter coupling of technical systems and their growing interconnectedness with socio-political institutions creates growing demand for governance in networks, which in turn means that governments increasingly share responsibility with actors from business and society. The integration of policy into a coherent overall framework involves difficult trade-offs between security and privacy and creates horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation problems across government and at the intersections between state, economy, and society. Research can evaluate how states can fine-tune their multidimensional roles. How states decide to regulate their technology base is moreover directly linked to how they anticipate this will influence their relative economic, political, and military power at the international level. Academics in this context can study how different (democratic and authoritarian) political systems balance regulation and market forces differently and what this means for state access to the private technology sector, export control systems of dual-use technologies, and screening mechanisms of foreign investment into the strategically relevant technology base.

Scientific practice, as our third and final sphere of interest, will keep coevolving with the anticipated changes in the spheres of technology and politics. We started the article with the ascertainment that there is no “field” or “subfield” of cyber security politics–and we conclude with a wish that this remains true in the future. Research at the **intersection** of **cybersecurity** and **security politics** in order to remain **relevant** to **policy choices** and cognizant of technological possibilities needs to **speak to** a variety of **other bodies of research**, free to choose interesting and pressing issue without **disciplinary constraints**; it needs to co-opt some of the **new data** analytical tools **offered by AI**, and it needs to flexibly overcome some of the **institutional barriers** that slowed down its **independent contribution** to **cyber security**.

A first key challenge for cyber security politics research is conceptual and linked to the integration of theoretical knowledge from different disciplines and research traditions. Researchers need to better integrate concepts and mechanisms from IR and security studies, IPE, and intelligence studies to analyze the transformation of intelligence services and how this affects their relationship with private cyber security and intelligence firms. They need to better understand the interplay between (black) security markets and (covert) security political dynamics if they want to explain the co-existence of strategic restraint and low-level subversion in cyberspace. Cyber security politics research must pay more attention to economic aspects of the phenomena at hand. Practice theory with its focus on technological possibilities and socio-technical processes allows to integrate these different approaches at the empirical level. STS offers a productive lens for understanding the mutual interplay between the technical and the socio-political sphere and, from an analytical point of view, to deal with the opaqueness of cyber operations. Such an approach is of critical importance in an attempt to shed light on how the cyber security policy and practice of states, both at the national and the international level, are facilitated or thwarted by the interests and practices of actors that are not easily visible, in- and outside of governments.

A second key challenge or indeed an opportunity for cyber security politics research is linked to the fact that more data about cyber operations by many different actors around the world and better tools to monitor and analyze this data are becoming available. While there is room for theory development and theory testing, we will likely enter an era of empirical work. In-depth qualitative studies on the role of invisible actors in state interactions linked to cyber security can be combined with more data-driven approaches that evaluate how new AI tools affect the cyber offense-defense balance. As state actors begin to integrate these tools in their border guards, police corps, armies and disaster response structures, important social and political questions will arise linked to privacy, bias, and control. Conversely, governments and societies will need to discuss how much of this new data should be made publicly available and what this means for data protection and privacy. From a research point of view, these developments call for more interdisciplinary research at the intersection of computer science, mathematics, economics, and political science.

A third key challenge for cyber security politics research is linked to overcoming the institutional barriers that slow down its independent contribution to cyber security and cyber security politics. Universities can help the public actors at the national and international level to catch up in their technology competence, while educating the next generation of experts for society and industry. **Academia** can contribute to the study of **cyber conflict** and through its **independent** and peer-reviewed **knowledge** broaden the knowledge base for some of the **difficult** policy choices discussed above. Science can collaborate with the **private** and **public actors** in the development of **evidentiary standards** and norms that will underpin the **future resilience** of sociotechnical systems, and in the negotiation and establishment of new norms and institutions that should govern the use and misuse of these systems. Yet in order to free its full **potential**, universities must overcome the **institutional barriers** that slow down **interdisciplinary** and more so **transdisciplinary research** intersection of science, technology, while building a network of institutions and programs that together can considerably expand the body of **public knowledge** surrounding these societally and politically relevant questions.

**2AC---Perm do Both**

#### Perm do both---studying both political power and individual contributions to security logics is necessary for generating change

Cavelty and Egloff 21 – Senior Lecturer for Security Studies and Deputy for Research and Teaching at the Center for Security Studies; Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Florian J. Egloff, “Hyper-Securitization, Everyday Security Practice and Technification: Cyber-Security Logics in Switzerland,” Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12433>

On the other hand, Everyday Security Practices are invoked frequently in the Swiss cyber-security discourse. Particularly, the idea of individuals as ‘responsible’ partners is reinforced in the various cyber-security policy documents and debates. This is partially manifest in the credo that everyone is primarily responsible for their own cyber-security. Such thinking echoes with the strong political ideal of subsidiarity that demands the leanest role of the state possible. The responsibility of individuals in the security of the whole collective is highlighted through calls towards more awareness and prevention campaigns, informing the broader public about cyber risks and countermeasures, thereby aiming to improve prevention and resiliency, security concepts of the everyday.6 Through the aim of resiliency, the individual is discursively constructed as being directly attached to larger security outcomes of social collectives.

Of all three, Technification is the most intriguing logic. Cyber-security ‘experts’ with a mostly technical background drive the Swiss discourse – be they ICT entrepreneurs, specialists, or researchers. This reflects the technification of the securitised cyber-security discourse, in that privilege is given to constructing cyber-security as a primarily technical issue. Other, non-technical commentators often preface their statements with “I am no technical expert, but...” demonstrating the need to legitimise one’s own contributions to a political discourse, when one is not considered ‘technical’ This technified discourse is further visible throughout policy solutions, be they the way critical infrastructure risk is measured (i.e. calculated in complex formulas and statistics), or the state of internet security in Switzerland is communicated (e.g. how many percent of Swiss websites implement a particular security technology).

Conclusion

In this contribution, we demonstrated that Swiss cyber-security politics can be fruitfully approached with constructivist research, more specifically, one that draws on practice approaches. Of the three securitization logics as described by Hansen and Nissenbaum, all three are present in the Swiss case, with technification being the dominant one at present. For democratic politics, technification is a particular challenge. Assigning an issue to the technical realm has a depoliticizing influence, which removes it from democratic deliberations. By making cyber-security an issue of the ‘genius few’, technification makes contestation from those with less technical expertise very hard if not impossible or makes it easy for those with the most valued expertise to discredit others without it. In addition, the power of technical expertise comes with a claim of being ‘neutral’ or ‘a-political’, and hence, of being more valid than anything that seems emotional or based on morals.

The Swiss case also highlights interesting aspects for securitization research and beyond. In theory, securitization assumes that there is one powerful actor who can make a convincing case for the exceptional nature of a policy issue. The entire Swiss political system works against this. **There are always multiple voices and multiple audiences to convince** – which makes it much harder to be successful in a simple securitization move based on urgency. In such a political system, **less ‘visible’ bureaucratic actors need to be studied more thoroughly.** Security is not mainly the domain of security elites and politicians. Instead, the research focus needs to shift to everyday security practices, to less traditional security actors, and to actors outside government that have a central role in the creation of danger knowledge and everyday security.

Beyond securitization research, it is evident that looking closely at the **intricacies of political systems, power distribution and political culture,** as studied by scholars in comparative politics and similar fields, becomes necessary to understand security logics in any policy field. **Bringing the two research traditions more closely together** in some form of conversation across sub-disciplinary boundaries **could be beneficial for both.**

**2AC---Securitization Good**

**Cyber securitization is inevitable AND good – recognizing the threat is key to developing necessary protections**

**Hersee 19** – PhD in Cyber Security, which focusses on the dispute between digital rights and national security in cyberspace.

Steven Hersee, “THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE SECURITISATION OF CYBERSPACE,” Royal Holloway University of London, 2019, https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-cyber-security-dilemma-and-the-securitisation-of-cyberspace(dcf65dd5-c75d-40ce-8994-6da979eaa1e7).html

5.2 SHOULD CYBERSPACE BE DESECURITISED?

**Desecuritisation** is the process by which an issue is removed from the security sphere and is **no longer considered to be an urgent threat**, requiring exceptional measures to counter. For the Copenhagen School, ‘it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which me have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Busan, et al., 1998, p. 29).

But **desecuritisation is difficult to achieve once an issue has been accepted as threatening** and **desecuritisation does not guarantee than an issue will become re- politicised** and re-open to public debate. If securitising moves are rejected forcefully enough, then **issues can become both de-securitised and de-politicised** (See Figure 5.1). This means that **not only are the issues considered non- threatening, but they are also closed for discussion**. Islamic extremism and immigration are issues that are often difficult to discuss in a political environment because they are either securitised as existentially threatening or de-politicised because the responses to them are considered threatening, racist or intolerant.

Cyberspace scholars are in general agreement that cyberspace securitisation has mainly negative consequences. Kingsmith, for example, discusses the negative consequences that emerge from moves by states to securitise internet content.

Considering these securitising moves ... the more that filtering practices are withheld from public scrutiny and accountability, the more tempting it is for framing authorities to employ these tools for illegitimate reasons such as the stifling of both opposition and civil society networks (Kingsmith, 2013, p. 1).

Deibert also highlights the negative consequences of the securitisation of cyberspace, including the resultant threats to basic freedoms.

There has been a **growing recognition of serious risks in cyberspace**. The need to manage these risks has led to a wave of securitization efforts that have potentially serious implications for basic freedoms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, p. 49).

Whilst arguing that the securitisation of cyberspace is negative and inevitable, Deibert also contends that the form of this **securitisation can be influenced**. ‘The **securitization of cyberspace may be inevitable**, but what form that security takes is not’ (Deibert, 2012, p. 274). He suggests that it is better to securitise threats to human rights than to securitise threats to national security. Mariya Georgieva takes this further, citing the Snowden disclosures as an example of the securitisation of digital rights, arguing that Snowden had ‘successfully shifted the focus of the securitisation of cyberspace from values such as the survival of the state and effective national security to the survival of privacy and personal choice’ (Georgieva, 2015, p. 44). Whilst she celebrates this shift she does not explain why it is better to securitise privacy rather than national security. Helen Nissenbaum is one author who does take a more consequentialist approach to cyberspace securitisation, arguing that **it might be justified when the threat is as extreme** as its proponents claim.

If those who subscribe to a conception of security as cybersecurity are right, particularly **if the magnitude of threat is as great as those on the extremes claim, then an extraordinary response is warranted despite its chilling effects** (Nissenbaum, 2005, p. 73).

However, this approach is rare and most literature is either critical of state surveillance and the securitisation of cyberspace, or is complimentary of Edward Snowden and supportive of the securitisation of individual privacy. Given that a narrow majority of the British public support greater efforts to protect national security it is surprising that academic literature is weighted so strongly towards criticisms of state surveillance and the securitisation of national security (Pew Research Centre, 2016). Even when cyberspace securitisation by non-state actors is addressed, such as in Georgieva’s work on Snowden as an alternative securitizing actor, these forms of securitisation are **considered positive** because they **support human rights**. In the US and UK, academics have also been politically active in opposing state surveillance. In 2014 over one thousand scholars from a wide range of disciplines formed the ‘academics against surveillance’ campaign, which published an open letter criticising state surveillance (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014).

Whilst there is disagreement over whether desecuritisation is always best and what types of securitisation should be reversed, there are a variety of means through which desecuritisation can be achieved.

### 1AR---Securitization Good

**Even if cyber securitization is bad, it’s inevitable and necessary – their alt ensures infrastructure attacks and cyber crimes**

**Pickin 12** – MA in War Studies and University of London

Matthew Pickin, “What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?,” University of London, 2012, https://www.academia.edu/3100313/What\_is\_the\_securitization\_of\_cyberspace\_Is\_it\_a\_problem

In analysing the problems of securitization, major issues have been raised. Threat inflation, surveillance, militarisation and the military-industrial complex are only some of the most prominent issues. There are **benefits of securitization** however, and at the very end of this analysis it will be explained why **securitization is necessary for now**. The main supporting arguments for securitization include, the future of cyber-attacks in conflicts, protecting critical infrastructure and cyber-crime.

The 2010 National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated that the United States was under a severe threat of cyber-attacks (Blair, 2010). Due to the amount of infrastructure connected to the internet in the United States targets for cyber-attacks are nearly unlimited, as a superpower the United States presents a valuable target. “As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States is also the **main target** state that dissident groups, terrorists, and rogue states wish to damage (Valeriano & Maness, 2011, p. 145).” Therefore, the **United States must have some defence, or offensive capability in order to protect itself from future conflicts and attacks on critical infrastructure**. In Foreign Affairs William J Lynn the former deputy secretary of defence wrote that the centrality of information technology in the United States makes it a prime target. He argued that extending advanced cyber-defences was crucial for the American economy, and also stated that **failure of critical infrastructure** would **compromise national defence**, “Our assessment is that **cyber-attacks** will be a **significant component** of future conflicts (Lynn, 2011).” Therefore **in order to protect the United States, the government has been forced to securitize the issue**. According to William J Lynn an attack could compromise national defence; therefore the issue is very high in the national security agenda. In the article, he also addresses the critics who argue that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized and states that US cyber strategy has been designed to prevent this from happening, “Far from militarizing cyberspace, U.S. cyber-strategy will make it more difficult for military actors to use cyberspace for hostile purposes (Lynn, 2011).” In **securitizing cyberspace** and creating advanced cyber-defences and cyber-weapons the United States is **preparing for any future conflict or attack.** If such an attack or conflict is a real existing threat then it is **beneficial to prepare through securitization**, otherwise the disadvantages clearly outweigh any advantage.

The other **main benefit** of **securitizing cyberspace** would be **tackling cyber-crime**. According to the security company Sophos, in the first six months of 2010 it received 60,000 new malware samples every day. Apart from malware, cyber-crime covers many different areas such as financial, piracy, hacking and cyber-terrorism. These crimes are growing due to the constantly evolving communications system of social sharing of data, online data storage and social networking, “Although cybercrime has formed a hidden shadow and a kind of evil doppelganger to every step of the Internet’s long history from its very origins, its growth has suddenly become explosive in recent years by virtually any estimate (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 28).” Both Deibert and Rohozinski argue that the rise is cyber-crime has become a big problem for states, in 2011 counterfeiting and copying cost the Asia-Pacific region almost $21 billion. Certainly cyber-space has become a rewarding way to commit crimes with little risk of prosecution, “Cybercrime has elicited so little prosecution from the world’s law enforcement agencies it makes one wonder a de facto decriminalization has occurred (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 29).” Due to the trouble of cyber-crime, **the only way of combating it effectively would be greater state regulation and intervention**. With the whole of cyber-space effectively securitized by the United States due to the threat to national security by technological and social shifts, the government is asserting itself increasingly to counter these threats.

Conclusion

In analysing what was the securitization of cyberspace, the beginnings of the cyber-debate in the United States have been examined; this country was used due to reliance on information technology and the status as a superpower. The securitization model from the Copenhagen school of thought was used to understand how issues are non-politicized, politicized and eventually securitized. A different range of security bills have been examined with this model to understand what was needed for cyberspace to become a securitized issue. With the definition of securitization dependent on the terms of national security, the changing definition of this concept was also examined. Securitization has occurred due to an evolving history whereby the military have understood the potential of information technologies in warfare and where vulnerabilities have been recognised that could damage national security.

In evaluating whether securitization of cyberspace is a problem, it is very clear that securitization is a growing concern with many complications. There are many issues including privacy, regulation, surveillance, internet regulation and the growing tension in the international system. However, because the United States is a superpower contesting with other cyber-heavyweights such as Iran, Russia and China **the issue will not be de-securitized in the short term**. With the discovery and use of cyber-weapons, many states are in the process of making their own for defensive and offensive purposes. The government of the **United States will not de-securitize the issue of cyberspace while there are rival states and groups which prove a threat to the national security agenda**. These problems will continue to exist until there is no defensive agenda and the issue is de-securitized, for now **securitization is a necessary evil**.

**2AC---Cyber-Threats Real**

**Cyber-security research is based in sound research. Cold war threat inflation is a thing of the past.**

**Cavelty and Wegner 20** - Cavelty is a senior lecturer for security studies and deputy for research and teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich; Ph.D. from the University of Zurich; Visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University) in 2007 and fellow at the stiftung neue verantwortung in Berlin, Germany 2010–2011. Wenger is professor of International and Swiss Security Policy at ETH Zurich; Ph.D. from the University of Zurich; visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

Cluster 1: The **reality of cyber conflict**: Explaining state restraint and practices

In the **beginning** of this **intellectual history**, political aspects of **cyber security** were discussed almost **exclusively** in publications originating in U.S. **think tanks** and **war colleges** (for example: Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1992). This literature had **little ambition** to contribute to an academic debate. The two main questions it tackled were “who (or what) is the biggest danger for an increasingly networked nation/society/military/business environment” and “how to best counter the new and evolving threat.”

The first cluster is characterized by a **reevaluation** of the threat based on **empirical evidence** and a **gradual application** and adaption of “**old**” **IR** and strategic studies concepts to **cyber security** (Kello, 2013). Two cyber incidents–the discovery of **Stuxnet** in 2010 and later the **Snowden disclosures** in 2013–were **instrumental** in shifting the focus of both **policymakers** and **researchers** from the **threat politics** of “**what if**”-scenarios that had dominated the 1990s and early 2000s to the **reality** of the **strategic use** of **cyberspace** by state actors. In this new context, literature in **IR** and **strategic studies** could be used to examine how **state actors** use cyber instruments for their **political** or **military advantage** and analyze their impact on national and international security (Borghard & Lonergan, 2017; Kello, 2017; Maness & Valeriano, 2016). A strong disciplinary “**pull**” is visible in how early works **zoomed** in on an alleged **offensive advantage** in cyberspace due to the ubiquity of technical vulnerabilities (Peterson, 2013), grappled with the problem of **escalation dynamics** in cyberspace (Liff, 2012), and asked how deterrence might be adapted in order to uphold stability in cyberspace (Wilner, 2019).

As researchers began to build data sets of cyber operations (Kostyuk & Zhukov, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 2014) to link cyber issues to the larger agenda of conflict studies, an empirical puzzle emerged that **challenged** many of the **theoretical tenets** and standards assumptions of the **older literature**. Most cyber operations did not seem escalatory, nor were they determined by power asymmetries or changed the existing strategic balance. **Overall**, states seemed to exercise a fair amount of **restraint** in cyberspace (Gartzke, 2013; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). **At the same time, however**, a lot of cyber operations linked to **state rivalries occurred**, though as mere add-ons to existing conflict dynamics and not independent of a broad range of other foreign policy instruments (Betz & Stevens, 2011).

Reacting to this puzzle, the literature in this cluster has begun to move in two directions: First, and comparable to the evolution of the strategic studies literature during the nuclear age, some authors have started to integrate additional non-systemic explanatory factors into their analyses of cyber conflict. While some explore the role of beliefs and **cognitive biases** in cyber policy decision making (Gomez, 2019), others zoom in on the destabilizing role of bureaucratic politics and other deficiency of the policy process especially in crisis decision making. Second, and more consequentially, many authors acknowledge that the emerging empirical picture reflects the structural feature of cyberspace as an operating environment, which is marked by a high degree of technical interconnectedness and constant political contestation (Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018; Smeets, 2018). Taking this into account, operating strategically in cyberspace seems to be more technically and organizationally demanding than the “cheap and easy”-metaphor suggests, while at the same time offering little enduring strategic gains in the sense of changing a rival’s political goals (Lewis, 2018; Slayton, 2017).

**2AC---Realism Good**

**A focus on the state is still necessary and appropriate. Critical approaches fail because they focus on theory and abstraction over empirical data.**

**Cavelty and Wegner 20** - Cavelty is a senior lecturer for security studies and deputy for research and teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich; Ph.D. from the University of Zurich; Visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University) in 2007 and fellow at the stiftung neue verantwortung in Berlin, Germany 2010–2011. Wenger is professor of International and Swiss Security Policy at ETH Zurich; Ph.D. from the University of Zurich; visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

In 2006, Eriksson and Giacomello stated that the discipline of international relations (**IR**) was struggling to **apply** its varied theoretical toolbox to the topic of **cyber security**, therein detecting “great difficulties for theoretical adaptation and application in analyses of the complexities of the emerging new digital world” (p. 236). **This observation no longer holds true**. Due to interlinked changes occurring in the **fields** of **technology**, politics, and **science**, research that applies **international relations** or **security** studies theory to different facets of the **phenomenon** is no longer as **rare**, inviting us to look at this emergent body of research in depth at this point in time (for a similar undertaking see Deibert, 2017a, 2017b).

This special issue displays the latest wave of cyber security politics research. The articles position themselves mostly in a post-positivist research tradition and use a set of different theories and conceptual frameworks to analyze the current state of cyber security in politics. Some articles examine the contested nature of public attributions of cyber incidents, the norm-setting day-to-day behavior of intelligence agencies, and discuss the consequences for governments and governance. Another group of articles explores the knowledgeshaping practices of IT-security companies, the co-production of risks and vulnerabilities by technology and experts, and aim at better understanding the role of firms and experts in strategic state interactions.

In this introductory article, we provide the intellectual history to situate the literature in its broader evolutionary context. In a first part, inspired by Buzan and Hansen’s framework from their “The Evolution of International Security Studies” (2009), we discuss six drivers that have been influential in the evolution of (Western) cyber security politics and how it is studied. In a second part, we identify three clusters of research. In each of them, we highlight the interplay between technological possibilities and political choices of state actors in combination with scientific factors. The focus on “**the state**” is **appropriate and necessary**, because **security** politics is **inevitably tied** to questions of **authority and power**. That said, the state is not the **only** important actor in this space–rather, it is at the **intersection** between state and nonstate actors, nationally and internationally, that the **specificities** of **cyber security** politics emerge.

In the conclusion, we use these same drivers to look into the possible future of cyber security politics research. We claim that it should not be conceptualized as a sub-field of anything, so that inquiry is not overly restricted by the disciplining power of disciplines. Cyber security transcends levels of analysis, necessitates considerable interdisciplinary knowledge, and will be shaped by the availability of new data and methods. Its relevance for society is likely to become even bigger in the future, with new digital technologies expanding the spatial boundaries of cyberspace and with new complex issues emerging. Scientific knowledge of both the problem-solving and the reflexive kind is crucial to understand what politics these technologies will have and how they will be linked to broader socio-economic changes affecting the society, the economy, and the state in the future.

Factors driving the evolution of cyber security politics research

Mapping a body of research is no trivial and certainly no purely objective undertaking. In order to simplify and abstract, a series of choices have to be made about what to include and what to exclude. As critical cartographers know, “[m]apping is epistemological but also deeply ontological – it is both a way of thinking about the world, offering a framework for knowledge, and a set of assertions about the world itself” (Kitchin, Perkins, & Dodge, 2009, p. 1). First, we hone in on “cyber security politics,” highlighting two areas that help to structure the debate. What we aim for in these pages is an understanding of cyber security politics that is flexible enough to deal with the dynamics of the phenomenon, yet precise enough to demarcate the research focus sufficiently to be of use. Second, and loosely following Buzan and Hansen (2009), we identify six driving forces that explain the dynamic co-evolution of cyber security politics and the academic engagement with it. These factors help us to understand what researchers choose to write about, what subjects and issues they define as the main cyber security problem(s) and which ontologies, epistemologies, and methods carry legitimacy (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 39–40).

Staking out cyber security politics

What is “cyber security” and how is it related to security politics? Far from allowing a straightforward answer, this question lies at the heart of the political and academic debates about the issue. First, cyber security is a relatively new term for a set of older practices around the security of computer networks (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). Second, definitions for the term are contested, exemplified by the refusal of some state actors to agree on a common vocabulary (Giles & Hagestad, 2013). Third, the meaning of the term is changing across time. Not so long ago, a limited circle of experts discussed cyber security primarily as a technical risk management issue in critical information infrastructure protection. Now the highest government circles deal with cyber security as a key challenge of national security (Dewar, 2018). Fourth, parallel to the advancing digitalization of ever more aspects of the economy, society, and politics, cyber security concerns are expanding to additional policy domains (Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). In sum, cyber security is at the same time moving upwards in the political agenda and expanding sideways as a problem area to a multitude of additional policy domains.

Simple and static definitions are not well suited to deal with constantly changing contexts. However, if we look down on the conceptual space from a sufficient height, we notice that cyber security politics’ common ground is characterized by two main factors: First, by digital technologies, specifically their use and misuse by human actors in economic, social, and political contexts; and second, by enduring and often highly conflictual negotiation processes in formal and informal settings between the state and its bureaucracies, society, and the private sector, geared towards defining roles, responsibilities, legal boundaries and acceptable rules of behavior.1

The first dimension is tied to the use of a set of distinct digital technologies and how these technologies are linked to broader conceptions of socio-economic changes (Papp, Alberts, & Tuyahov, 1997). The marriage of computers and telecommunications, the integration of these technologies into a global multimedia system, and their worldwide inexpensive availability is the bedrock for heralding multiple, rapid and consequential transformations in production, management, societal interaction, and governance (Schwab, 2018) though it remains to be seen just how revolutionary these changes will really be. The most pertinent questions in cyber security politics with regard to digital technologies are what their characteristics are, what actions they make possible and which ones they restrain, but also who develops them in what ways and why and who has the power to shape their use and misuse.

The second dimension is tied to the role of states and their engagement with other actors nationally and internationally. “Security” in cyber security politics can be read in two ways: As cyber security politics (the security political aspects of the issue) or as cyber security politics (the politics engaging with questions of cyber security more broadly). This ambiguity is deliberate because we consider the question of what type of politics emerges under what kind of rules and with what kind of boundaries to be crucial. From a theoretical point of view, the question of how much politics there is or should be in security–and how much security in politics–allows us to link research in cyber security to debates in security studies (Hagmann, Hegemann, & Neal, 2019). Importantly, the state has different roles in cyber security, ranging from security guarantor, legislator and regulator, to threat actor and danger to society and other states (Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). Hence, cyber security politics are defined by national and international negotiation processes about the boundaries of the responsibilities of state, economic, and societal actors and the agreement or disagreement over the means these actors use. This second dimension includes the projection of power by certain actors, like the control over populations and information flows, and the push-back against it as well.

Six driving factors

In their intellectual history of international security studies, Buzan and Hansen develop a framework of five interrelated factors (2009, pp. 39– 100)–great power politics, technology, key events, academic debates, and institutionalization–that drove the evolution of the field. For cyber security politics, we propose a slightly different framework, purporting that changes in research are linked to changes in the empirical phenomenon, whereby these changes can go both ways: A research phenomenon often influences directions of research, but research also illuminates aspects of the phenomenon that have gone unnoticed before. We focus on the interrelationship between technology and the world of policy and state practice–on what political actors say they are doing and on what they are doing in the field of cyber security as a political issue, both nationally and internationally, often in relation to other actors–and on the different ways to observe this interrelationship (Figure 1). The intellectual history of cyber security politics is thus shaped by the interplay of three broad spheres: Technology, Politics, and Science.2 Technological dynamics interact with social and political dynamics. Technological possibilities and constraints influence socio-economic processes. In turn, political preferences and contexts shape the evolution of digital technologies. This also applies fundamentally to the actors developing these technologies and to the dynamic interplay of cyber security markets and cyber security politics. Within each of the three spheres, we identify two main drivers. In different combinations during different times, these six factors stimulate or dissuade scholars from picking up specific research questions. A summary can be seen in Table 1, with a more detailed description in what follows.

[[Figure Omitted]]

Technology as a driver

It seems like an obvious choice to include “technology” as a category, since the issue of cyber security is linked to the development and use of cyberspace, a technological environment entirely built by humans. Yet scholars have rightly pointed out that the vision of one unique cyberspace is itself based on a social construction (Bingham, 1996; Graham, 1998). Indeed, the conception of what cyberspace is and what can be done with it has changed considerably throughout its history, highlighting the needfor historically contingent understandings of the development and use of technologies. However, a core characteristic of IR scholarship’s dealing with digital technology is “technological determinism” (Herrera, 2003). The majority of IR approaches chooses to deal with technology as an exogenous variable (McCarthy, 2018, p. 4), seeing technologies as a material objects or power resources that drive social change or as neutral tools that acquire meaning only through their use (Leese & Hoijtink, 2019).

In contrast, we understand technologies as embodiments of societal knowledge in the tradition of science and technology studies (STS), as sites where power relations can be seen in operation and where the shaping and coordination of the behavior of social and political actors happens (Behrent, 2013, p. 57). During the design stage of technologies, the intentions, norms, and values of their developers find their way into the artefacts, while existing power structures influence the desirability of specific aspects or forms of technology. Once technologies diffuse, they are often given particular meanings and acquire purposes other than the one initially intended by their developers (Matthewman, 2011), but always within certain inescapable material bounds (see also Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018). For example: A pen can be used for writing, but it can also be used to stab someone. It can, however, not be used to make phone calls.

[[Table Omitted]]

That digital technologies “have politics” is hardly a contested statement (Deibert, 2003, 2013; DeNardis, 2014; Mueller, 2010; Price, 2018). Design decisions made by engineers in the late 1960s have implications until today, especially for security. From the early prototype phase as ARPANET (1967- 1972) to the gradual development into “the Internet” (1973-1983), technological protocols that define how data is exchanged were written in an egalitarian spirit (Naughton, 2016). The decision to have a system with minimal rules that had no central power and no censor was deliberate and based on philosophical and political beliefs of the technical community (Berners-Lee, 1999). Cyber security as we understand it today became an issue only gradually, when the system architecture changed from large proprietary machines with little connection to “smaller and far more open systems (not built with security in mind) coupled with the rise of networking” (Libicki, 2000), yet still ran on the same basic protocols.

The perception that cyberspace is creating and perpetuating insecurity with potentially catastrophic consequences is shaped by different key events linked to the technological sphere as a second important driving factor. In line with what we noted above, these events are not understood as causal forces that unidirectionally influence politics or science (cf. Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 54ff.) but rather as interrelated catalyzers. The category consists of events outside the cyber realm with influence on cyber security politics (examples include 9/11, the Snowden revelations, or the Arab Spring), and cyber incidents themselves. In its most basic form, a cyber incident is a disruption that challenges the normal operation of digital technologies. Undesired change inside machines create technical effects. Yet these technical effects alone are not sufficient to explain the salience of cyber security in politics. Between the initial effect in the machine and the political effect lies a knowledge production process that creates an incident embedded in a specific social context. A technical effect needs to be discursively linked to something with sufficient social or political value to become security politically relevant–which also explains why only some cyber incidents reach that stage while others do not (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016).

Such moments of disruption highlight previously hidden characteristics of socio-technical artifacts, opening up opportunities for the study of new aspects of the phenomena that were not easily observable before or did not seem important (Best & Walters, 2013, p. 346; Latour, 1999). Incidents are also linked to another fundamental issue in the study of cyber security: the availability of data. Our current knowledge about cyber security relies heavily on data from commercial threat reporting and news reports. Yet this data provides a partial and biased view of cyber threat activity, because it is often politicized and influenced by the demands of powerful buyers and the interests of capable providers (Lindsay, 2017).

Politics as a driver

The discipline of **IR** is mainly interested in patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** among **states** and how these patterns relate to shifts in the distribution and **character of power** in the international system: international power politics. As the issue of **cyber security** gained in importance in **state interactions**, experts and policy makers pondered whether **digital technologies** gave rise to a “**new**” type of **power** and how this power source would influence the **existing** power **distribution** in the system (Nye, 2011). Given that IR began as an “American discipline, was focused on American security and written by Americans” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 51), the debate about the security implications arising from the spread of information technologies also originated in America, with a series of implications for how the subject was studied. Though definitions vary, cyber power is understood as the use of resources related to cyberspace to achieve specific (political) ends inside and outside of cyberspace (cf. Nye, 2010, p. 3). In the contemporary U.S. setting, a discourse of simultaneous empowerment and disempowerment characterized the conceptual debate from the beginning. While the technological realm carried the promise of wielding a new sort of power, it highlighted new dependencies and vulnerabilities at the same time (Rattray, 2001).

Apart from giving the digital domain a particular weight in the broader questions that IR scholars are interested in, we also need to consider how **international politics** influence the **use** of **these technologies**. Given the **interconnection** between **technology** and politics, we can expect the **overall state** of **world politics** to have a noticeable influence on the forms of **use**/misuse of **these technologies**. Buzan and Hansen call this larger context “**patterns of enmity** and amity between **great powers**” (2009, p. 52). This highlights questions of cooperation and conflict, about the formation of alliances and the maintenance of strategic stability, about the proliferation and control of dual-use technologies, but also about the efforts of states to come to international agreements in the form of norms and institutions.

In our conception of politics, the **international dimension** is just **one aspect** of a broader set of political interactions. Cyber security is **not only** about **enmity** and **amity** and the potential for **war** and peace. In fact, it is not very often about situations of great urgency, but more often about “**normal” domestic politics**. Like many other complex policy issues, **cyber security** is cutting across different areas of **responsibility**, requiring coordination and cooperation between a wide **variety** of **public actors** at different levels of government, but also actors from business and society When government tasks and authority are delegated downwards (localization), upwards (supranationalization), or sideways (privatization) (Krahmann, 2003), governance in networks becomes important. Under such conditions, governments no longer simply issue instructions and monitor their implementation, but seek to shape the framework conditions so that cooperation operates as smoothly as possible even without constant oversight (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Salamon, 2002), coming with a set of challenges for state-society relationships.

Science as a driver

The last two factors are situated in the realm of science that is understood here as a collective term for “academic work,” “intellectual labor,” or “knowledge production.” Like Buzan and Hansen (2009, pp. 57-65), we focus on academic debates and on institutionalization. This introduces an element of internal conflict into our intellectual history, because even if academics would agree on the key events or issues that need to be studied, how they would study it would still differ widely. As a case in point, cyber security politics research is no subfield of anything–it is characterized and united by the engagement with a multifaceted and dynamic phenomena, but the disciplinary approaches used, the ontological and epistemological choices, vary greatly.

Debates about ontology, epistemology, and methodology are at the heart of some of the most fruitful key debates in security studies, but at the same time they divide the discipline. The biggest **cleft** exists between **problem-solving** theories and **critical theories**: the former do not explicitly question the prevailing social and power relationships, while the latter problematize these very relationships by analyzing their origins and their evolution (Cox, 1986). Which of these two approaches is **favored** in certain research settings however **depends** on many different factors (Bourbeau, Balzacq, & Dunn Cavelty, 2015). Building on decades of IR scholarship, **traditional approaches** have seen **incremental** **theoretical innovation** since the end of the Cold War. By contrast, **critical approaches** have gone through a phase of rich **theory** development and are only **slowly** becoming ripe for **empirical work** based on critical methods (Aradau, Huysmans, Neal, & Voelkner, 2014). The key focus of interest has been the analysis of the (social) power relations that underpin security policies in liberal states, highlighting security as a powerful political technology for social (and political) control (Dillon & Reid, 2009); as a collection of discourses that serve to empower and reproduce hierarchies (Shepherd, 2008); or as routinized and patterned practices carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals (Bigo, 2002). These overall research trends have an important impact on cyber security politics research, since the topic has been picked up by all approaches, leading to distinct takes on what cyber security politics is and how it should be studied.

**Emerging cyber-dynamics don’t make realism obsolete.**

**Ünver 17** - an assistant professor of international relations at Kadir Has University, specializing in energy politics, conflict psychology and radicalization sociology

Akin Ünver, 6-11-2017, "Computational Diplomacy: Foreign Policy Communication in the Age of Algorithms and Automation," Edam, https://edam.org.tr/en/computational-diplomacy-foreign-policy-communication-in-the-age-of-algorithms-and-automation/

**Automation** doesn’t change the fact that **diplomats** and embassies still matter. **Foreign policy**, like all politics, is a factor of **human condition**, including sense, gut feeling and cultural cues, along with its **imperfections**. However, there is a **clear trajectory** whereby **states** that can best **adapt** to automation – in war, **foreign policy** and economy – will develop more **efficient ways** of dealing with the challenges of an **interconnected**, **data**-centric **world**. Diplomacy too, can retain its **relevance** and influence over **politics** between **nations**, so long as it can properly designate areas where **automation** can help and where it can’t. Although all **states** will come up with their **own answers** to these questions, based on their **own individual interests and needs**, the common direction in which automation and foreign policy is headed is more or less similar for all countries. In the future, diplomacy has to build data processing and management capabilities, with dedicated departments and scientists supporting diplomats and negotiators on the ground. The structure of this new framework will also heavily depend on regime type, scope of foreign interests and alliance behavior.

The structural shadow of **uncertainty** over diplomacy is stronger than ever. Some communicative rituals and **practices** of diplomacy are growing more **obsolete**, as modern political communication slides increasingly to short and sharp rhetoric, coupled with automation tools that bombard audiences at unprecedented levels. **Diplomacy itself** is **hardly obsolete however**, as the task of mediating and **negotiating power relations** is perhaps as important as it was during the **Cold War**. **New power** centers – in the form of technology companies and big data brokers – are **changing** the **state-centric parameters** of **classical realism perhaps**, but the **inherent dynamics of power realignment** still render **diplomacy** a **crucial endeavor**. To rise to the challenge however, modern diplomacy has to develop a strong computational **capacity**, able to adapt to the changing nature of **digital communication** and advances in automation.